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Abstract
This study analyses the factors associated with rural modernisation between 1936 and 
1990 and places them in an international context. It focuses on the production of 
three commodities-sugar, bananas and potatoes. The approach departs from 
orthodox neo-classical analysis, which maintains that markets are the central agency 
responsible for change, and argues that institutions, the nature of the crop, 
technology, labour and land tenure as well as markets determined the path of agrarian 
transformation. This argument is sustained by considering scale- and capital-bias in 
agrarian technology, patterns of land usage and the changing role of labour in the 
productive process.
The three commodities studied are regionally specific, sugar in the Cauca Valley, 
bananas in the Magdalena Valley and the Gulf of Urabd and potatoes in the 
departments of Boyaca and Cundinamarca. Developments within these regions are 
presented with reference to appropriate national and international trends. For the 
sugarmill owner, informal institutions and political links assisted in obtaining 
machinery and inputs. For the banana exporter, links with international markets and 
capital availability allowed them quickly to establish production and trade. For potato 
growers, private local initiative and indirect state programmes fostered development. 
With bananas and sugarcane most changes to the productive process were labour and 
land saving. Nonetheless, labour remained an important aspect of cultivation and 
harvesting and some methods reverted to more labour intensive production with the 
passage of time. Moreover, low-cost techniques played an important role for all three 
crops throughout the modernisation process. The research proves that though relative 
prices have an influence on production, existing land usage structures, institutional 
arrangements, technical change absorbtion, and capital-bias distorted market prices 
and resulted in paths to modernisation that were less than optimal.
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Introduction
This thesis analyses the historical experience of the agricultural transformation 
in Colombia, using as reference three different commodities— sugarcane, bananas, 
and potatoes—and places their experience in a broader theoretical context. The three 
main areas for discussion are markets, institutions and technology: themes which are 
identified as being those that most strongly affected change. The thesis integrates 
some aspects of the new institutionalism and neoclassical economics and applies this 
framework to a multi-crop study of Colombian agriculture.
Initially, this study was designed to measure the biases of technical change and 
their effects on the development of agriculture. However, while it was found that the 
biases of technical change that influenced future transformations were of intrinsic 
interest, the underlying mechanisms which stimulated those changes were fundamental 
elements necessary for this type of study and therefore demanded attention. For this 
reason, other factors which contributed to modernisation were examined, these 
include, in addition to technology: markets; institutions; land usage; production-, and 
capital-bias; and characteristics of crop and processing. Finally, to interpret this in 
a human context, the interaction of these factors on labour was examined, particularly 
the benefits which accrued to ’workers’ in the process of technical adoption.
Issues such as social and political struggles will not be reviewed. The thesis 
will also not discuss directly concerns such as the quality of human capital, 
organisational changes in the labour force and trade union activity. Obviously, 
labour-capital relations affect production descisions but a consideration of these 
relations and a discussion of the long-run distributional effects of agrarian change 
does not require an extensive analysis of labour formation. This has already been 
done elsewhere. Labour is discussed to place the analysis of modernisation in the
context of the long-term distributional effects of technical change1.
The 1936-1990 period was chosen in order to provide a framework for the 
analysis of long-run change. The point of departure was selected because 1936 was 
the year when a land reform bill was passed which attempted to bring security of 
tenure to squatters with uncertain title2. It was hoped that land reform would lead 
to modernisation. In fact, the main changes were that landowners ensured that 
squatters and tenants did not gain title land by expelling them, and replaced labour- 
intensive crops with cattle grazing3. Nonetheless, it represents a point in which 
agriculture, started expanding significantly by increasing land under cultivation. In 
1936 agriculture comprised nearly one-half (46%) of GDP. By 1988, its significance 
had declined almost half to 24 %4, while the share of the economically active 
population employed in the sector had declined from 60% in 1938 to 32.4% in 
19845. Below the issues which influenced modernisation will be analyzed. This will 
be followed by a discussion of the case studies.
‘For literature on the importance of human capital see for example, Schultz, Theodore W. (1990). 
"Investing in People." In Eicher, Carl K. and Statz, John M. (Eds.). Agricultural Development in the Third 
World. Baltimore (2nd edition): The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.280-289. For an excellent study 
on labour in the agricultural sector see Booth, Anne and Sundrum, R.M. (1985). Labour Absorption in 
Agriculture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For a specific case study of the influence of labour during 
the transformation to modern methods see for example, Clemens, Harrie and de Groot, Jan P. (1988). 
"Agrarian Labour Market and Technology Under Different Regimes: A Comparison o f Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic." Latin American Perspectives. 15(4), pp.6-36.
2Hirschman, Albert O. (1963). Journeys Toward Progress. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,
p .108.
3Ibid., pp. 112-113.
4These figures are based on GDP deflated to 1975 prices. See Londono, Juan Luis (1990). "Income 
Distribution during the Structural Transformation: Colombia 1938-1988." PhD Disseration: Harvard 
University, appendix, table 1.
5Censo de Poblaci6nde 1938. Bogoti: DANE; Londono, Juan Luis (1990), on.cit.. appendix, table 19.
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Introduction
ELEMENTS OF AGRICULTURAL MODERNISATION
Agriculture traditionally was addressed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo to 
understand the forces behind surplus creation, capital accumulation and eventual 
’development*. In the writings of Smith, Ricardo and Marx the agricultural sector 
was analyzed to comprehend the causes of the Industrial Revolution and the process 
of growth6. In later writings the agricultural sector was often given secondary 
importance in the face of more ’dynamic’ ones. Recently the debate has come full 
circle and the agricultural sector is again considered to be a vital player per se in the 
economic system. In 1961, the five main functions of the agricultural sector within 
an economy were delineated by Mellor and Johnston: a)provision of foodstuffs, 
b)generator of employment, c)producer of inputs for other sectors, d)creator of 
markets for industrial output, and e)generator of foreign exchange7. With a large 
proportion of the world’s population still involved in agricultural pursuits, the process 
of agricultural modernisation is viewed as of crucial importance, not only to push 
development forward but also to improve rural conditions. The agricultural sector 
in less developed countries (LDCs), particularly in Latin America, experienced a 
sluggish transformation in the twentieth century, often characterized by pockets of 
commercial agriculture that exhibited high growth rates and existed alongside static 
zones of subsistence. Some of the debates concerning the restraints on agricultural
6Smith, Adam (1976, 3rd edition). An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Campbell, R.H. and Skinner, A.S. (Eds.) Oxford: Clarendon Press; Ricardo, David (1817), Edited by 
Sraffa, P and Dobb, M.H. (1951), The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo Vol.I. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederich (1967, follows the German 1983 edition). 
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
7Johnston, B. and Mellor, J.W. (1961). "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development." 
American Economic Review. Vol.51, pp.566-593.
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modernisation will be reviewed, and their links with the research in the thesis will be 
underlined. Lastly, the theoretical debates on labour’s participation in the benefits 
of technical adoption will be presented.
Markets
Both factor and product markets will be analyzed to observe change over time. 
Two aspects of the transformation of factor markets will be analyzed. First, it will 
be seen that the increased penetration of capital into LDCs resulted in the 
internationalisation of capital. Progressively the global market has become more 
homogeneous, with similar production patterns and final products. This point will 
be addressed in the case of bananas. Second, and related to this is the maturation of 
factor markets which resulted in wider availability of market information and the 
resultant trend to the increased perfection of market signals. For instance, the 
gradual development of international markets has effected changes in the location and 
ownership of sugar refining and shifts in production responsibilities in banana 
cultivation.
International product markets will also be studied, to assess the gains of trade 
in modernisation. The importance of external trade for providing an impulse to 
modernisation will be revisited. The recent onslaught of liberalisation policies in 
LDCs is based on assumptions inherent in the traditional theory of the gains from 
trade8. It is argued in this thesis that a sudden entrance into international markets
8See Alpine, Robin and Pickett, James (1993). Agricultural Liberalisation and Economic Growth in 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. 1960-1990. Paris: OECD; Nguyen, T.T. and Wigle, R.M. (1992). "Trade 
Liberalisation with Imperfect Competition: The Large and the Small o f it." European Economic Review 
36 (1), pp. 17-35.
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can create less than optimal conditions for modernisation, for the accompanying rise 
in prices (of land, inputs and labour) can negatively affect other agricultural activities 
and regional development in general.
Institutions
The second central theme to the thesis is institutions. The importance of 
institutions in economic development and their incorporation into neoclassical theory 
has been recent9. Their significance to this study is that explanations for market 
failure and seemingly irrational economic behaviour can be better understood by a 
close examination of institutional constraints. Informal and formal institutions are 
devised within each society which Douglass North describes as ’rules of the game’10. 
Informal institutions are defined as norms of behaviour, conventions, and codes of 
conduct11. Formal institutions consist of laws, economic policies, property rights— 
anything that is explicitly established and codified. Economic research on institutions 
has focused on transaction costs and property rights. Within the thesis, property 
rights will be explicitly addressed and implicit changes in transaction costs will be 
observed through the analysis of choice of techniques-new technologies. The 
evolution of property rights and their effect on future economic performance will be
9See North, Douglass (1993). "The New Institutional Economics and Development." London: Paper 
presented for the Conference on Public Choice and Development; North, Douglass (1981). Structure and 
Change in Economic History New York: Norton; Coase, Ronald (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." 
Economica 4 , pp.386-405; Coase, Ronald (1960). "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law and 
Economics 3, pp. 1-44; Bates, Robert (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: The 
University of California Press.
10North, Douglass, (1993), on.cit.. p. 14.
“North, Douglass C. (1991). "Institutions" Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), pp.97-112.
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assessed12. The main issues to the analysis on property rights will be defined below.
First, within the LDC literature, the inefficiencies resulting from highly 
skewed land distribution were commonly considered a source of sectoral 
stagnation13. Alain de Janvry maintained that early twentieth century development 
in Latin America was characterized by traditional landed elites who extended their 
sectoral command toward industry and finance, while retaining control of land in 
latifundio14. According to a study of 16 developing countries based on census 
material for 1950, 1960, and 1970, there were three major trends in terms of land 
tenure: l)rising inequality in the distribution of landholding; 2)increasing polarization 
in the agrarian structure and 3)small constrained farms produce most of the food 
grain15. The transformation of landed elites will be directly addressed in sugar 
production and the evolution of their participation in agricultural modernisation will 
be analyzed. In addition, the obstacles faced by small producers will examined in all 
three crops and explanations for the observed trends will be discussed.
Second, land ownership has also been linked positively to credit access and 
contributes to the discussion presented below concerning credit-bias. A problem for 
many farmers in LDCs is their temporary access to land. This makes it difficult for
12For an excellent review of agrarian institutions see Bardham, Pranab (Ed.) (1989). The Economic 
Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
I3de Janvry, Alain and Sadoulet, Elisabeth (1990). "Investment Strategies to Combat Rural Poverty in 
Latin America." In Eicher, Carl K. and Statz, John M. (Eds.). Agricultural Development in the Third 
World. Baltimore (2nd edition): The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.446.
Mde Janvry, Alain (1984). "The Political Economy of Rural Development in Latin America: An 
Interpretation" In Eicher, Carl and Staatz, John (Eds.) Agricultural Development in the Third World. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.87.
I5El-Ghonemy, M. Riad (1990). The Political Economy of Rural Poverty. London: Routledge, p.29.
6
Introduction
them to obtain credit from formal lending agencies as land has several attributes 
which are desired as collateral16. The most important question to be asked is 
whether provision of better defined and increased access to land titles raises 
agricultural output by easing access to credit. Data from three states in Brazil in 
1978 show that capital per hectare is substantially higher on titled farms than on 
undocumented or encroached land17. William Rodgers has also concluded that as 
land quality increases, the likelihood of rural migrations declines18. Therefore it 
appears that better land quality and provision of legally enforced land titles 
encourages permanent settlement and increases agricultural output. In this thesis the 
significance of strong property rights and the importance of land titling to increase 
agricultural output will be examined, and the circumstances under which titling 
expands output will be explored.
Third, in connection with unequal land distribution and inadequate access to 
land is the emergence of contractual arrangements. Land markets are rigid and 
sometimes determined by a long process of evolving land rights, a process that is 
identified by institutional economists as path-dependent19. Because of rigid 
ownership patterns tenancy agreements emerged which motivated different patterns 
of agricultural production. Some examples include: sharecropping, contractual
16Binswanger, Hans and Rosenzweig, Mark (Eds.), (1984). Contractual Arrangements. Employment, 
and Wage in Rural Labor Markets in Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
,7Feder, Gershon and Noronha, Raymon (1987). "Land Rights Systems and Agricultural Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa." The World Bank Research Observer 2(2), p. 160, citing Villamizar, F. (1984). 
"IDB Financing in Land Administration Programs." Paper presented at the International Workshop on Land 
Tenure Administration, Salvador, Brazil.
18Rodgers, William M. (1991). "The Significance of Access to Land as a Determinant of Kenya’s 
Interregional Migration." World Development. 19(7), pp.921-926.
19Bardham, Pranab (Ed.) (1989), op.cit.. p.9.
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agreements, squatters, colonists, and cooperative and common property rights. 
Within the thesis, squatter and contractual arrangements will be the two types 
discussed. The rationale for entering into these types of arrangements will be 
examined and their economic function will be explored.
Lastly, in addition to the focus on property rights, another significant aspect 
of institutions is that of innovation20. The role institutions have in the organisation 
of research and development, technological diffusion, establishment of links between 
local producers and consumers and State protection of local cultivators will be 
reconsidered. Well-organised public sources can obtain exceptional results such as 
the case of the Land Grant College System in the USA. However in LDCs the State 
is often not strong enough to create these institutions21.
Technology
The third central issue is technology. Arguments expounding the necessity of 
technical change are related to increases in productivity, efficiency and economic 
growth. Increased productivity can reduce the price level that would have otherwise 
induced an inflationary process22. An increase in productivity is also believed to
“ See for example, Ruttan, Vernon M. and Hayami, Yujiro (1990). "Induced Innovation Model of 
Agricultural Development." In Eicher, Carl K. and Statz, John M. (Eds.). Agricultural Development in the 
Third World. Baltimore (2nd edition): The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.97-114.
“ For a excellent concise review of the U.S. system see Bonnen, James T. (1990). "Agricultural 
Development: Transforming Human Capital, Technology, and Institutions." In Eicher, Carl K. and Statz, 
John M. (Eds.). Agricultural Development in the Third World. Baltimore (2nd edition): The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, pp.265-269.
“ Based on the assumption that in many LDCs there is an excess demand (supply does not meet demand) 
for food, see Ghatak, Subrata and Ingersent, Ken (1984). Agriculture and Economic Development. 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., pp.34-36.
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effectively increase real wages and thus the general standard of living. Consistent 
with the classical economist’s notion, there is clear evidence from a macroeconomic 
perspective that industrial expansion was greater in those years in which the increase 
in the price level of foodstuffs was comparatively lower23. Although there are 
inherent paradoxes within the modernisation of agriculture, such as the relative 
decline in the social and economic value of agricultural products as development 
proceeds, technology in the main can be considered beneficial. Nonetheless, one of 
the dilemmas to be addressed is the detrimental effects of technical change under 
conditions of a highly skewed income distribution. In this case, the benefits of 
change are channelled continually to one strata of the population with little gain 
accruing to the rest24.
Although technology is considered vital for growth, the incorporation of 
technical change in neoclassical theory is relatively new. This is due to the difficulty 
of quantifying innovation, therefore technical change and new technologies have been 
relegated frequently to the economist’s black box of residuals25. Technical change 
was seen as being embodied indeterminately in the factors of production, and was not
“ See Sarmiento, Eduardo (1988). "Las Complementariedades en la Teorfa del Desarrollo." Desarrollo 
v Sociedad. N o .l, pp. 17 and Sarmiento, Eduardo (1984). Funcionamiento v Control de Una Econorma en 
Desequilibrio. Bogota: CEREC.
24For discussion of the importance of socio-economic structures see Lewis, W.A. (1954), "Economic 
Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour", The Manchester School (22), pp.139-191. Amartya 
Sen’s discussion of entitlement access also sheds light on this issue. See Sen, Amartya (1984). Poverty and 
Famines: An Essay in Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See also Chenery, Hollis 
et.al. (1974). Redistribution With Growth. New York: Oxford University Press.
“ See Harrod, R.F. (1948). Towards a Dynamic Economics. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Domar, 
E.D. (1946). "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment." Econometrica. pp. 137-147; Solow, 
Robert (1956). "A Contribution to the Theory o f Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal o f Economics. 
pp.65-94.
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considered an independent factor which pushed forward development26. This study 
will focus on the long term path of technical change, examining the impulses for 
research and development, diffusion, and adaption. First, the discontinuous pattern 
of technical change will be analyzed. In other words, technical change can be pushed 
by the introduction of one new method which will trigger changes in the rest of the 
process. Second, the economic and political conditions under which technology is 
diffused and farmers adapt will be investigated. Third, the effect externally-induced 
technology has on development will be analyzed. A problematic condition facing 
developing countries is that technical change is largely based on inputs produced 
outside the country. Therefore, one of the most important effects technical change 
has on economic growth is inevitably externalized: production diversification and 
market amplification27.
The significance of internally-diffused, low-cost techniques will also be 
examined. The approach will be drawn from Ester Boserup’s pioneering 
interpretation of the relationship between technical change and population growth28. 
One of the elements of her study was the belief that low-cost, labour intensive
“ Economists who directly addressed technical change include: Schumpeter, J.A. (1959); Rostow, 
W.W. (1960); Kaldor, Nicholas (1957); Economist historians which analyze technical change include: 
Landes, Davis S. (1960). The Unbound Prometheus. London: Cambridge University Press; David, Paul 
(1975). Technical Choice. Innovation and Economic Growth. London: Cambridge University Press; 
Headrick, D.R. (1988). The Tentacles of Progress New York: Oxford University Press.
^Balcazar, Alvaro (1986). "Cambio T6cnico en la Agriculture." In Machado, Absalon (Ed.), Problemas 
Agrarios Colombianos. Bogota: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, p.213. For discussion on socially optimal 
technologies see Stewart, Frances (1977). Technology and Underdevelopment. London: The Macmillan 
Press, Ltd; Stewart, Frances (Ed.) (1987). Macro-Policies for Appropriate Technology in Developing 
Countries. Boulder: Westview Press; Berry, Albert and Cline, William (1979). Agrarian Structure and 
Productivity in Developing Countries. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Nadal Egea, 
Alejandro (1990). "Choice of Technique Revisited: A Critical Review of the Theoretical Underpinnings." 
World Development. 18(11), pp.1451.
“ Boserup, Ester (1981). Population and Technology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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techniques were vital to increasing productivity in the agricultural sector during the 
process of economic development. For example, in labour abundant economies a 
parasite attack could be halted by removing the insects manually, and soil fertility 
could be replenished by applying organic manures29. Without high capital to labour 
ratios, four out of the five economic functions described earlier by Johnston and 
Mellor are obtainable. In this study, it will be argued that low-cost techniques do not 
necessarily impede competitiveness but can actually enhance it.
Production- and capital-biases contributed to the explanation of diverse 
production methods. An extensive study conducted by Berry and Cline establishes 
that the agricultural sector in LDCs is characterized by constant returns to scale30. 
For example, qualitative data identify the availability of machinery rental 
arrangements, the scale irrelevance of cattle ranching (it can be a feedlot activity or 
conducted on large expanses of land), and the more highly motivated labour force on 
family owned enterprises as compared to the use of wage labour as explanations for 
this phenomena31. Quantitative data can be observed in the ample base of literature 
containing empirical production functions32. If there happen to be inverse
29Ibid, pp.24-26.
^Berry, Albert and Cline, William (1979). Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing 
Countries. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.6.
31Ibid. See also Bardhan, P.K. (1973). "Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale: An Analysis o f Farm 
Level Data in Indian Agriculture." Journal of Political Economy 81(6), pp. 1370-1386.
32Sidhu, Surjit (1974). "Relative Efficiency in Wheat Production in the Indian Punjab." American 
Economic Review (Sept 1974; Bardhan, P.K. (1973). "Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale: An 
Analysis o f Farm Level Data in Indian Agriculture." Journal of Political Economy 81(6), pp. 1370-1386; 
Lau, L. and Yotopoulos, P. (1971). "A Test for Relative Efficiency and Application to Indian Agriculture," 
American Economic Review. 61(1), pp.94-109.
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relationships in farm size and output per hectare it was attributed to production 
uncertainty in agriculture and other phenomena such as monopolistic control by large 
landowners of certain factors of production33. Nevertheless, there is a widely- 
accepted conception that large farmers are more productive because they supposedly 
provide efficient marketing services, produce high quality products, levels of 
education are usually higher thus they are most likely to be entrepreneurs. Therefore 
this sector is often regarded as being ’dynamic’, ’progressive’, ’modern’, ’capitalist’, 
etc.34. In this study the incentives that face small as well as large producers will be 
discussed and the motivations behind technical change will be analyzed so that the 
different mechanisms underlying technique selection can be understood.
Despite constant returns to scale among farm size, capital markets tend to be 
biased towards large landowners35. This results in a greater use of improved 
techniques on large farms, and further aggravates the distortions of factor use. 
Because of their relatively easy access to capital, large landowners will be more likely 
to employ capital using techniques instead of utilising labour, the more socially 
efficient factor in most LDCs. Nonetheless, it has been shown that highly 
sophisticated techniques are used to a similar extent amongst both small and large 
farms, despite the small farmer’s inferior access to credit36. Although time lags may 
have occurred during the initial adoption phase, (i.e. large farms adapt more quickly
“ Bardhan, P.K. (1973^. on.cit. p p .  1370-1386.
“ El-Ghonemy, M. Riad (1990). The Political Economy of Rural Poverty. London: Routledge, p. 123.
“ Berry, Albert and Cline, William (1979), on.cit.. pp.29-30
“ Ruttan, Vernon W. and Binswanger, Hans (1978). "Induced Innovation and the Green Revolution." 
In Binswanger, Hans and Ruttan, Vernon (Eds.), Induced Innovation: Technology. Institutions, and 
Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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than small farms37), within a few years of the introduction of new techniques the 
relevance of plot size and the use of the new technology usually has disappeared. 
Regardless of production scale-neutrality, this thesis will argue that large landowners 
in LDCs have qualitative advantages in terms of access to credit and markets, and 
usually own higher quality land (both in terms of geographic location and fertility)38. 
Biases in credit markets and easier access to technology can lead to inefficient 
allocation of resources, to the detriment of small producers.
What occurs to small producers under conditions of capital-bias? Originally 
small farmers, belonging to the ’traditional’ sector, were considered risk averse and 
therefore less likely to adopt new techniques. However, evidence suggests that small 
scale farmers are just as willing to adapt new techniques as soon as they have 
demonstrated their profitability in the region39. Moreover small producers are also 
beneficial because with their development factor markets are stimulated. The 
importance of small scale production will be underlined, and their efficiencies will 
be examined.
37See Griffin, Keith (1981). Land Concentration and Rural Poverty. London: MacMillan; and Pearse, 
Andrew (1980). Seeds of Plenty. Seeds of Want. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
38For a general discussion on land distribution in Colombia see Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1974).
"Problemas del Campesinado Parcelario." Desarrollo Rural. Kalmanovitz explained that the landed class 
in Colombia slowly rose during the colonial era and monopolized the territory where there were possibilities 
for servile labour relations. However Garcia Garcia refutes this claim by asserting that "...most large farms 
were located in the Urinoquian and Amazonic regions and had poor soil, inadequate water and were far 
away from consumption centres." See Garcia Garcia, Jorge (1991). "Colombia" in Liberalizing Foreign 
Trade : Brazil. Colombia. Peru (Vol.4). Papgeorgiou, G., et. al. (Eds.), Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, p.23. This view is supported by more recent analyses which claim that land fragmentation had 
already occurred on the more fertile lands as they were opened to agricultural production in the first 
instance. The large farms were predominantly located in expanison areas of the agricultural frontier with 
low-quality soils. However this statement is difficult to maintain as there are many large farms on fertile 
land surrounded by small units on marginal land
39Ibid.
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The nature of the crop is also crucial to production decisions. With regard to 
agriculture, Charles Kindleberger was one of the first economists to identify that the 
nature of a crop affected technological change.
Tree crops, like rubber, cocoa, and coffee take a long time to bear their first harvest, 
and they last for years in production. They do not encourage agricultural 
experimentation by the individual farmer as do annual crops40.
Do only annual crops stimulate research and development, or do production structures 
and regional producer associations have an impact? Through the case studies it will 
be observed that some crops, because of their biological nature, are more easily 
cultivated in some areas, technology is more quickly diffused and, production patterns 
sometimes converge. In others, research is more troublesome to organise, and 
technology derives primarily from abroad or from slow to develop internal efforts.
Labour
Two main issues for labour will be discussed. First, the transformation of 
labour in the modernisation process with the introduction of new techniques. Is 
labour always proletarianized? Second, the effects of technical change on labour both 
in terms of methods of recruitment, working conditions and qualitative changes in 
standard of living will be examined41.
With regard to the transformation from peasant to proletarian and estate
^Kindleberger, Charles (1965). Economic Development. New York: McGraw Hill, p.77.
41For general literature on these issues see Booth, Anne and Sundram, R.M. (1985). Labour Absorption 
in Agriculture. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Boserup, Ester (1981). Population and Technology. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Burton, Henry J. (1973). "Economic Development and Labor Use: A Review" 
World Development 1(12), pp. 1-22; Wharton, Clifford (Ed.), (1970). Subsistence Agriculture and 
Economic Development. London: Cass.
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farming to capitalist relations of production, Lenin delineated two mutually exclusive 
processes of transformation: internal proletarianization (Junker road) and external 
proletarianization (Kulak path) to capitalism. Internal proletarianization is 
characterized by the landlord’s increased control over the estate to the detriment of 
the labourer. External proletarianization is based on differentiation of small 
producers. It arises when tenants obtain title to land and begin to work the land 
independently of the landlord42. The former tenant is encouraged to become 
autonomous of the landlord in both production and distribution. In this phase, wage- 
labourers are obtained from the existing body of workers in the region, and internal 
differentiation proceeds in such a way to enrich some peasants and impoverish 
others43. Paths of rural transformation in Latin America have been found to be less 
straightforward than this classifaction suggests and peasants often portray 
’polyvalency’ in which they have various roles in society, such as wage-labourers and 
small commodity producers44. Does polyvalency enrich these farmers and protect 
them from the inadequacies of the market, or does it prevent them from being mobile 
and flexible agricultural labour since they are tied to their property? Particularly, 
with potato growing these changes will be observed.
Does agricultural development improve conditions for the rural worker? The 
problem with many studies is that they regard the rural sector as composed of 
farmers, workers or a combination of the two, and fail to see major differences within
42Goodman, David and Redclift, Michael (1981). From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development 
and Agrarian Transitions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, p. 103.
43Roxborough. Ian (19791. Theories of Underdevelopment. London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., p.99.
“ Goodman, David and Redclift, Michael (1981), op.cit.. pp. 103-105.
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the farmer category. Illustrations of the diversity of the rural sector include the 
landowner, the squatter, the labourer who owns a small plot of land, the small size 
farmer who hires labour (and hires himself out), the large landowner who hires 
labour, the absentee farmer and the manager (<mayordomo). Therefore it is difficult 
to devise a study analysing rural workers well-being using only changes in real wage 
rates over time. Moreover, there have only been a few empirical studies discussing 
the determinants of rural wage rates. These studies have run into many problems 
such as inadequate data on rural households, nonpecuniary differences in wage paying 
jobs, and the extent to which labour is mobile. Because of the diversity of the rural 
population, and the fact that the standard of living can not be simply measured by 
money wages, perhaps a more accurate variable is ’regional development’ such as 
construction of transport networks, hospitals, schools, literacy, etc. which reflect 
general levels of welfare. These variables are too vast to be accurately analyzed in 
this thesis, however the contribution of technical change to development and some 
qualitative changes that the labour force undergoes vis-a-vis the introduction of new 
techniques can be observed and weighed.
CASE STUDIES
The selection of sugar, bananas and potatoes was based on their importance 
to the national economy, location, trade orientation, land usage and data availability. 
Heterogeneity in all these aspects was the objective. Also these three crops, 
particularly the first two, were concentrated geographically therefore regional data 
could be used to supplement micro data. Also, patterns of technical adaption,
16
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changes in land usage, and patterns of labour recruitment were more easily observed. 
For all three crops it was discovered that modernisation commenced earlier than the 
1950s, contrary to the accepted periodization which marks the 1950s as the 
benchmark for the shift to modern production methods.
The most salient qualities of sugar were its aseasonal harvests, concentrated 
industry structure, and centralized production in the region of the Cauca Valley. 
Sugarcane production was first impulsed by buoyant domestic demand and later 
commercialisation expanded to external markets in 1964 with the Colombian access 
into the US sugar quota. Therefore modernisation has been pushed by internal and 
external stimuli. The cane-sugar industry directed some production toward the price- 
supported domestic market which created a degree of income security for the 
industry. Land usage in the Cauca Valley was characterized by landed estates 
therefore the transformation of these organisations can be observed. Migrant labour, 
common to cane harvests in other regions, was not used because sugar harvests can 
be conducted year-round, due to ideal climatic conditions. This also implied lower 
factory investments as a smooth flow of cane could be ensured year-round.
Export-bananas were selected because foreign capital was involved in its 
transformation since the 1890s and continued to be important until 1983, at which 
point cultivation and export were entirely absorbed by local initiative. Cultivation has 
been concentrated in the regions of Santa Marta (mainly until the 1960s) and Uraba 
(from the 1960s). Moreover, few studies have dealt specifically with a comparative
17
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analysis of the two regions, and with Uraba in general45. Bananas provided an 
example of an export oriented crop, allowing the ’’virtues" of integration into the 
global economy to be assessed. Since, unlike sugar, bananas participate in a less- 
protected, highly competitive world market, they were more sensitive to external 
standards. State-of-the-art technical change might be the only means of survival for 
the banana producer. Different to the literature on export-banana regions which 
centres on TNC activity, the thesis will underline the vitality and dynamism of small 
independent producers. Land usage was varied with many types of producers 
supplying the export market. The early entrance of foreign capital also resulted in 
a quickly proletarianized labour force.
Potatoes have been grown principally for internal markets throughout the 
period, and the growth in output has been strong since 1936. Although production 
was dispersed throughout Colombia, this thesis will focus on the largest producing 
regions, Boyacd and Cundinamarca. Location of producers was highly diffuse, being 
characterized by many small producers with low levels of capital. However the crop, 
unlike export-bananas or cane-sugar, was a mixed crop which indicated that both 
modern and traditional methods were employed. In addition, land ownership within 
potato growing areas tended to be less concentrated which sheds light on a different 
labour force structure in contrast to the transformation of capitalist relations 
predominant for bananas and sugar. Production decisions were determined by input 
and credit availability, factors which for most producers were in shorter supply. As
450ne main study which compares the two regions is Bucheli G6mez, Marchelo (1991). "El Surgimiento 
y la Caida de un Enclave Agricola: Estudio de las Zonas Bananeras de Magdalena y Urab&, 1948-1968.” 
Masters Thesis, Universidad de los Andes.
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regional potato techniques were not nearly as homogeneous as the other studied crops, 
they provide an example of disjointed technical change. It is argued that, because of 
this structure, modernisation of production has been slower, and marketing and 
commercialisation have been a major bottleneck to change.
The thesis is divided into three parts corresponding to each crop and each part 
is divided into two sections. The first section examines crop modernisation in other 
regions of the world with emphasis on the important issues outlined here and provides 
a comparative context for the Colombian case. The second section analyses the 
Colombian experiences. Finally, the conclusion integrates the results of the three 
parts and answers the questions laid out above.
Despite the constraints and imperfections of the agricultural sector, sugar, 
bananas and potatoes have experienced favourable expansion. Cane-sugar evolved 
from small bases of the 1930s to achieve the highest world cane yields in 1990. 
Growth has been sustained throughout the period discussed. Export bananas most 
salient qualities were their rebound into world markets in the late 1960s and the 
departure of TNCs as the agent of technical diffusion and marketing. Lastly, potatoes 
achieved positive five-year growth rates throughout the period and met increasing 
demands to feed the population despite inconsistent state policy.
19
Sugarcane
Sugarcane was the first source of processed sugar and has been an important 
element to the agricultural mix in many developing countries such as Brazil, the 
Dominican Republic, Mauritius, Peru, India, Cuba, Indonesia, Guyana and Colombia. 
Between 1600 and 1900 sugar was the most important of the internationally traded 
commodities1. During this period most sugar exports derived from cane though by 
the late nineteenth century beet-sugar exports surpassed those of cane-sugar until 1914 
when cane-sugar exports regained and maintained their dominance until 19902. In 
1985 sugar was second only to coffee as a source of agricultural export income for 
developing countries3. In terms of growth and development, sugar was a significant 
export earner, an important foodstuff, and in some cases employed substantial 
amounts of rural labour. Today sugar is produced in most countries: in temperate 
climates it can be obtained from beet; in tropical areas cane is used. Moreover it can 
be processed from a broad range of commodities such as corn, sorghum, milk, and 
fruits. Recently, synthetically produced low-calorie sweeteners have also emerged 
as a competitor to cane- and beet-sugar, particularly as an additive in a wide range 
of processed food. Because of the diverse form sugar can take, competition from
‘Fogel, Robert William (1989). Without Consent or Contract. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.,
p.21.
2Evenson, Robert (1976). "International Transmission of Technology in the Production o f Sugarcane." 
The Journal of Development Studies. 12(2), p.227; Chalmin, Philippe (1990). The Making of a Sugar 
Giant: Tate and Lvle 1859-1989. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, table 8.2, pp. 142-143; citing the 
International Sugar Council; Galloway, J.H. (1989). The Sugar Cane Industry. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, Figure 6.1, p. 132.
3Mulherin, K.S (1986). "The Economic Importance of Sugar and Sugar Cane-Problems and 
Perspectives." Paper presented in FAO conference entitled, "Produccidn y Sanidad Animal." Santo 
Domingo, p.7.
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substitutable compounds comes from many products and production methods4. In 
this thesis, sugar processed from sugarcane (cane-sugar) will be placed at the centre 
of the discussion5.
This chapter is organised into two sections. Part I concentrates on the general 
characteristics of the sugar agroindustry. First, crop and ^ processing characteristics 
and international trade will be addressed. Second, technical change and patterns of 
technical diffusion will be analyzed. Third, production- and capital-bias will be 
discussed. Lastly, methods of labour procurement, proletarianization and the 
changing role of labour within the production process will be examined. Part II will 
address the issues discussed in part I within the Colombian context.
4The extent of substitutability varies as each new sweetener has distinct qualities thus perfect substitution 
is difficult to obtain; see Rands Barros, Alexander (1993). Prospects for the World Sugar Trade. Discussion 
Paper No. 55, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, p.2.
5To the chemist sugar denotes a myriad of compounds, eg. fructose, lactose, etc.; the term sugar in this 
thesis will refer to sucrose and not any other chemical compound.
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Part I
CROP CHARACTERISTICS. PROCESSING and MARKETS
To provide background for the sugar analysis first the physical properties of 
sugarcane and general features of cultivation and will be described. This will be 
followed by a review of processing techniques. Lastly, the changing structure of 
international markets and centres of production will be analysed.
Sugarcane is a perennial grass that is grown in tropical climates between 35 
degrees northern and southern latitude6. There are two methods to propagate cane: 
by planting cuttings (rhizomes) or leaving a ratoon crop. Because cane reproduces 
asexually, cuttings are planted and seed is only used for experiment in breeding 
stations7. Once cane is harvested, a ratoon crop remains which will mature in 12-18 
months8. Ratooning can continue for up to ten years, however each successive crop 
yields less, and when the grass becomes unprofitable new cuttings must be planted9. 
In some regions ratooning can continue longer, depending on variety, climatic 
conditions, and extent and frequency of irrigation and input application. However, 
in cooler climates cane is often replanted annually, which considerably increases 
production costs. Cane requires high levels of rainfall during the growing season and
6Tacke, E.F., et.al. (1963). The World Sugar Economy Structure and Policies. Vol.H: The World 
Picture. London: International Sugar Council, p.3.
7Hagelberg, Gary (1989). "The Structure o f World Production and Consumption." In Brooks, C. et.al. 
(Eds.), Cane Sugar: the Small Scale Processing Option. London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 
p.41.
8Galloway, J.H. (1989), on.cit.. p. 13. The growth period is highly variable as it is dependent on 
climatic conditions. For example in Louisiana cane matures in 8-9 months, in Australia and Taiwan 15 
months, and in Hawaii and South Africa 18-22 months. Ratoons generally mature in less time. See 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia (1980). Chicago (15th edition): William Benton Publishers, p.769.
9Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 13.
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sunshine to ripen the plant10. Weeding and pest control must also be carried out but 
these tasks are not as demanding as for potato or coffee. Fertilization is also 
important as cane depletes the soil rapidly: the monocrop nature of large-scale 
plantations exacerbates this problem. Cane is also intercropped by small farmers. 
Because cane is a perennial and land planted with cane cannot be taken over 
immediately by other crops, intercropping could protect these producers against 
market fluctuations11. For example if semestral crops are included in the mix, they 
could smooth out income flows and supply foodstuffs to the household. In many 
parts of the world cane is cultivated and produced by traditional methods. These are 
largely beyond the scope of this thesis but aspects of traditional processing will be 
reviewed briefly in order to provide context for the analysis of milling. Particularly 
in part II, production trends of traditionally processed cane (panela) will be examined 
as they had an impact on the transformation to modern methods.
Cane-sugar can be processed in various ways, ranging from the rudimentary 
to the highly sophisticated. This results in a wide range of production structures and 
applications. Traditionally cane was mainly produced for export markets and, to a 
lesser extent, was processed in households for domestic consumption. Processed cane 
(e.g. whether with traditional or modern methods) had a long shelf life and could be 
traded in regional markets. Technical change had a large impact on the way cane was 
produced and marketed. These changes will be discussed below.
I0Abbott, George C. (1990). Sugar. London: Routledge, p. 14.
"Abbott, Gfeorge C. (1990), op.cit.. p. 15; Haraksingh, Kusha (1988). "The Uneasy Relationship: 
Peasants, Plantocrats and the Trinidad Sugar Industry, 1919-1938." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian 
(Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 1914-1940. London: Routlege, p. 119.
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The industrial side was the first to be transformed through the introduction of 
new technology12. Traditionally cane processing involved three stages: juice 
extraction, boiling and cooling. Under the impact of technological innovation cane- 
sugar manufacturing became more complex and differentiated involving six stages. 
These are shown in figure SI. 1.
Traditional processing was (and continues to be) conducted with human or 
animal power. Cane was crushed in primitive mills to extract the juice13. Once 
extracted, cane juice was heated and then allowed to cool into a hard block. In 
Spanish America this is called panela, in Brazil rapadura, in Haiti rapadou, and in 
India gur14. These traditional mills were known as trapiches or guildives15. By 
modern standards, traditional methods of processing are obsolete, but trapiches can 
still be found in the Third World because they are easy to build and can be financed 
by small cultivators who supply local markets.
Technological change, leading to capital intensive, large scale processing, 
resulted from market growth and triggered demand for labour, improved transport 
and the need to establish synchronised links between field and factory. If raw cane
I2Beechert, Edward (1988). "Technology and the Plantation Labour Supply: The case of Queensland, 
Hawaii, Louisiana and Cuba." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in 
War and Depression. 1914-1940. London: Routledge, p. 133.
l3Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983), Sociedad v Economfa en el Valle del Cauca: Emnresarios v Tecnoloeia 
en la Formacidn del Sector Azucarero en Colombia. 1860-1980. Boeoti: Banco Popular, pp. 13-19.
MPierre, Guy (1988), op.cit.. p. 122; Bermudez Mendez, Nora and Pochet Coronado, Rosa M. (1986). 
La Agroindustrial de la Cana de Azucar en Costa Rica. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, p. 194; Galloway, J.H. 
(1989), op.cit.. p. 139.
,3See Rojas Jos6 Maria (1983), op.cit.. pp. 13-19; Pierre, Guy (1988). "The Frustrated Development 
of the Haitian Sugar Industry between 1915/18 and 1938/9: International Financial and Commercial 
Rivalries." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 
1914-1940. London: Routlege, p. 122. In general trapiche was the term in Spanish America and guildive 
in Haiti
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is not processed within twenty-four hours of the harvest, sucrose levels drop 
dramatically. These characteristics differentiate cane from other plantation crops for 
there was always a need to reconcile labour-intensive field practices with capital- 
intensive factory methods. The use of steam power, shredders, vacuum pans, and 
centrifugals were the innovations that impulsed the shift from small-scale processing 
to large-scale centrals.
Modern milling emerged largely during the nineteenth century with notable 
advances in six areas: cane cutting/shredding/crushing, juice clarification, filter and 
evaporation, vacuum boiling pans, centrifugals, and drying16. The patio is the 
arrival point of cane from the field and is where cane is weighed and stored before 
being fed into the mill17. After passing through the patio, the cane is conveyed into 
cutters and shredders for juice extraction. In this stage approximately 60% of juice 
is separated18. In stage two the shredded material is then fed into roller mills where 
it is crushed and more juice is extracted. To clarify the juice, milk of lime is added, 
the mixture is heated and sent to a juice clarifier which separates the unpolluted and 
muddy juice. The muddy juice is removed and the clarified juice is then sent through 
a series of evaporators (stage 3) which remove almost all the water. A syrupy 
substance remains and is drawn into vacuum boiling pans to extract remaining water
16See Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit. p p . 135-138. and Deerr, Noel (1950). The History of Sugar Vol 
2. London: Chapman and Hall, chapter 33; see Figure SI. 1 for a diagram of the basic steps of cane-sugar 
processing.
’’Interview with Hugo Mosquera (9 Feb. 1992), Factory Engineer, Manuelita, Palmira, Colombia.
18Encvlopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia. (1980), Chicago (15th ed.): William Benton Publishers, p.771.
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Figure S l.l
Basic Steps in Cane-Sugar Processing
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Source: Encyclopedia Britannica: Macropaedia No. 17. Chicago: William Benton Publishers (15th Edition), 
p.770. Drawing by D. Meighan by courtesy of the Hatchi Zosen Co. Ltd., Tokyo.
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(stage 4). The syrup boils and seed crystals, small crystals of sugar, are added to 
activate the crystallisation process. During the boiling phase crystals grow from 
.3mm to 1.0mm19. After crystallization, a thick, gummy substance (massecuite) 
remains which is sent to centrifugal machines (stage 5). Centrifugals are cylindrical 
baskets pierced with holes in which massecuite is separated into raw sugar and 
molasses. This process is repeated until further extraction of raw sugar is no longer 
profitable. Raw sugar is then conveyed to the cooler where it is dried (stage 6), 
before packaging.
A chronology of technical change is presented in Part II in the sub-section on 
Manuelita. It will be seen that the introduction of new technology in one stage 
sometimes had a knock-on effect on other stages. In others, new methods were 
subsituted for old with little effect elsewhere in the production process. The most 
salient feature of modern milling technology was its impact on scale of production20.
International sugar markets have become increasingly regulated since the 
establishment of modern milling centres in the nineteenth century21. During the 
twentieth century century, different sugar agreements were established to control 
exports and prices22. Similar to bananas, this was different from the majority of 
agricultural commodities which were sold on ’freer’ global markets. International
,9Ibid., p.772.
“ Forsyth, David (1977). "Appropriate Technology in Sugar Manufacturing." World Development 5(3), 
p. 194.
21 Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 1914- 
1940. London: Routlege, pp.3-5; P6rez-L6pez, Jorge (1991), op.cit.. p. 122.
“ See for example, Chalmin, Phillippe (1990), op.cit.. chapter 1.
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sugar agreements and/or bilateral quotas were still common by 1990 and were often 
based on political relationships between exporting and importing countries. The 
political economy of many LDCs and their association with the industrialised world 
determined the direction of sugar exports. The nature of non-free markets was also 
evident in price differentials. For example, Brian Pollitt signals 1934 as the year US 
and London (world) markets began to diverge. At this time US prices improved 
through a tariff reduction from two cents per pound to .9 cents23. Moreover, in the 
1980s countries that exported to the EC benefitted with higher export earnings than 
those in the US sugar quota which experienced declining US imports which effected 
a drop in export income24. These preferential "high" price agreements however are 
volatile and can result in lower prices. For example, in 1960, the evidence also 
suggests that sugar sales to the Soviet Union were made at prices far below world 
market prices25.
In addition, sugar was often a powerful domestic political concern26. The 
importance of government policy was evident with the emergence of the nineteenth 
century European beet-sugar industry which expanded as a result of protection27. 
In contrast, for most of the nineteenth century producers of cane-sugar did not enjoy
“ Pollitt, Brain (1988). "The Cuban Sugar Economy in the 1930s." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian 
(Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 1914-1940. London: Routlege,
p.101.
24Jabara, Cathy and Valdes, Alberto (1993). "World Sugar Policies and Developing Countries." In 
Marks, Stephen an Maskus, Keith (Eds.), The Economics and Politics of World Sugar Policies. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, p. 136.
“ Pdrez-L^pez, Jorge (1991), op.cit.. p. 137.
26Pierce, Paulette (1984). Noncapitalist Development: The Struggle to Nationalize the Guyanese Sugar 
Industry. New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld.
^Fraginals, Manuel Moreno (1990), op.cit.. p. 133; see also Chalmin, Philippe (1990), op.cit.. chapters 
1 and 2.
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the same advantages. Only during the twentieth century, did domestic sugar policy 
in LDCs, coupled with increased population become vital and lead to spiralling 
consumption at home. From the 1970s onwards the majority of sugar was produced 
and consumed in LDCs28. For instance, India was the single largest producing 
country and consumed all its output domestically in 198829. Sometimes government 
intervened to keep prices low to foster consumption. On other occasions production 
subsidies were devised to stimulate production, reduce costs and secure adequate 
supplies for the domestic market30. The importance of institutional (public and 
private) support was manifest in the emergence of the agroindustrial complex in the 
Cauca Valley and will be examined in Part II.
The location and ownership of the value-added process milling also changed 
at much the same time as shifts in production and consumption. Refining during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was undertaken in capital-rich countries which had 
resources to invest in large mills (e.g. France, England, USA). Crude sugar was 
exported from cane producing areas to be refined abroad. (Once cane was 
transformed into crude sugar, refining could be delayed.) Three reasons explain why 
sugar was processed in consuming centres: a)before the introduction of refrigerated 
shipping crystals of sugar would coalesce during the long, hot ocean journeys and had 
to be reworked; b)during the nineteenth and part of the twentieth centuries fuel costs 
were high in cane producing areas while energy was cheap in centres of consumption;
“ Rands Barros, Alexandre (1993), op.cit.. table 3, p. 14.
29The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics (1990). London: Hutchinson Business Books Ltd., 
p.95.
“ Attwood, Donald W. (1992). Raising Cane: The Political Economy of Sugar in West India. Boulder: 
Westview Press.
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c)refining created jobs and governments in developed countries preferred to promote 
employment domestically31. In the twentieth century, new developments in 
shipping, the wider use of bagasse as fuel, increased demand for refined sugar in 
cane-sugar producing regions coupled with proactive government policy resulted in 
refining investments in LDCs32.
The shift of refining to cane growing countries demonstrates the industrial and 
policy maturity of LDC cane-sugar regions. Before the twentieth century the bulk of 
cane-sugar was refined in capital-rich areas. However with increasing capital 
accumulation in cane growing regions, investments were made to modernize mills. 
Technological change, increased local investments and stronger domestic support 
effected a shift to modern processing methods in cane-sugar growing regions. Thus 
with the modernisation of sugar production, infrastructure improvements were made, 
additional capital was invested and factor markets became increasingly perfected. A 
comparison can be drawn with the world banana experience. As markets matured 
domestic agents within banana growing regions gained a wider access to banana 
production, marketing and distribution and capital became increasingly 
internationalised33. How the changing international market structure affected 
sugarcane refining in Colombia will be examined in part II.
31Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 17.
32For an in-depth analysis o f these changes, particularly with reference to England see Chalmin, 
Philippe (1990), op.cit.. parts I and n.
33See Banana Part I.
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TECHNICAL CHANGE: discontinuous adaption patterns and reasons for adaption 
After reviewing aspects of cultivation and processing, this section will 
commence with a general background of the larger trends of technical change in field 
and factory. This will be followed by an analysis of two central issues of the the 
thesis. First, the discontinuous nature of technical change will be examined. Second, 
the reasons for technical adaption will be discussed.
Despite the long history of cane cultivation and sugar production, substantial 
technical changes did not take place until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries34. During this time modern milling was established for beet-sugar refining 
and transferred to the cane industry. But field activities remained traditional because 
renovative practices such as fertilization and disease control hardly developed before 
the twentieth century. Therefore field techniques remained mainly land extensive35. 
When soil became depleted, cane was planted in another area, leaving the previous 
area fallow. As adequate moisture was crucial, irrigation and drainage systems were 
the only major areas where change was observed before the 1900s. In the twentieth 
century the introduction of land and labour saving techniques represented significant 
productivity increases within the field. Nonetheless planting and harvesting remained 
arduous labour-intensive tasks36. Cultivation technological change was not
34Hagelberg, Gary (1989). "The Structure of World Production and Consumption." In Brooks, C., et.al. 
(Eds.), Cane Sugar: The Small Scale Processing Option. London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 
p.41. See Figure S1.2.
35Murphy, Martin (1991), op.cit.. p. 14; Fraginals, Manuel Moreno (1976). The Sugarmill. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, p.20;Thomas, Clive (1984), op.cit.. p. 11. More discussed on cultivation practices 
below.
36Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 15.
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necessarily linked with mill innovation but mill innovations almost always resulted in 
the modification of transport networks as there was a need to increase the quantity of 
cane milled. This extended the area from which cane could be transported. As a 
guide to the initial progression of technical changes figure SI.2 is used as a point of 
reference. The dates represent the point when a technique was discovered or applied. 
Now to examine the discontinuous nature of change.
The literature on technical change in field and factory typically enumerates 
changes that occurred in each area of production. Some analysts identify two distinct 
periods of change: early and late; while others specify phases of change?7. For 
example, Beechert considered varietal strain, cultivation, fertilization and irrigation 
developments as the first phase of technical change38. In this thesis it is argued that, 
technical change is discontinuous. Technical change is not a gradual ongoing process, 
but occurs when a new method of organisation, or tool, or product is introduced. 
Schumpeter argued:
. . .an economy in circular flow may be expanding, but it is not development. 
Development occurs only when an entrepreneur makes an innovation- a new technique, 
product, or way of organizing things—and shifts coefficient or rules of the gam e.. . and 
the system moves to a new configuration of circular flow39.
It is maintained that technical change does not only move activity to a new 
configuration of circular flow, but this move is a lengthy process, adjusting all areas 
of production to new technique of a particular area. Two major catalysts clearly
37For examples see de las Carreras, Alberto (1990), op.cit.. p.69-70; Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982), 
on.cit.. Beechert, Edward (1988), op.cit..
38Beechert, Edward (1988). op.cit.. p. 131.
39Handbook of Development Economics. (1988) Chenery and Srinivasen, p. 163.
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impulsed field modernisation. The first was varietal change and diversification, the 
second harvest mechanisation. Varietal switch will first be discussed, followed by 
a cursory review of transport and milling changes. As there were no significant 
changes in milling during the twentieth century, a detailed discussion need not be 
provided40. Moreover, the examination of field mechanisation will be implicitly 
reviewed in the section on reasons for technical change. It is placed here because 
it can illustrate both the institutional and economic reasons behind technical changes 
and its discontinuous nature.
^Discussed above.
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Figure S1.2
BENCHMARKS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE CANE AGROINDUSTRY 
1650s -Manure applied as fertilizer in Barbados due to increasing complaints about declining soil fertility.
1747 -Andreas Marggraf discovered a process for extracting sugar from red and white beets.
1797 -Steam power used to mill cane (only functioned for more than a few weeks) in Cuba.
1799 -Franz Case with assistance of King of Prussia built first beet-sugar factory.
1813 -Patent by Edward Charles Howard of vacuum pan.
1820 -Steam had become accepted means of powering sugar mills, however the rate of adoption remains slow.
1833 -Abolition of slavery in the British Colonies.
1840s -Plough, harrow and cultivator used in Louisiana and Cuba.
1840s -Centrifugal force first used in beet-sugar industry.
1848 -Abolition of slavery in the French Colonies.
1850s -Use of railways in cane plantations for transport of cane from field to factory.
1858 -Cane seedlings first identified in Barbados.
1880s -First successful version of a shredder installed in Louisiana cane-sugar mill.
1882 -Beet-sugar trade exceeds that of cane-sugar.
1900 -Since the early twentieth century no radical innovations diffused in cane milling.
1920 -Cane-sugar regained prominence on world markets and now comprised 70% of the international sugar 
trade.
1921 -First successful cane variety bred in Java in 1921.
1930s -Use of machinery for soil preparation and transport of cane.
-First successful attempt at mechanized harvesting in the USA.
1960 -Fertilization with nitrogen.
1960s -Anti-viral and -fungal seed treatments.
Source: Constructed from Fraginals, Manuel Moreno (1990). "Agricultural Backwardness—Industrial Development Experiences 
of Sugar Production in the Carribean.” In Lundahl, Mats and Svensson, Thommy (Eds.) Agrarian Society in History. London: 
Routledge, pp. 125-139; Heitmann, John Alfred (1987). The Modernization of the Lousiana Sugar Industry 1830-1910. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press;Galloway, J.H. (1989). The Sugar Cane Industry. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
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There were no major modifications in cane variety until the eighteenth 
century. From the sixth to the eighteenth centuries all was of a single type, 
creole41. During the eighteenth century a second wild type was discovered, 
’Bourbon’ of Otaheite’ which proved to be superior to creole42. Because both of 
these varieties were wild, only asexual cane reproduction was possible, therefore 
these "new" varieties could only be used in the localities where they occurred43. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century cane reproduction was enhanced by 
the discovery of seedlings in 1858. This was significant as it enabled the survival of 
cane production in the face of competition from beet-sugar44. Cane seedlings could 
now be bred scientifically in laboratories and robust varieties reproduced from 
cuttings45. Potentially this meant that new varieties could be bred to improve yields, 
suit different climatic conditions and resist disease. Also, varieties could be 
transferred internationally. The first successful strain was bred in Java46, POJ 
287847, was disease resistant and high yielding. Today it still is a robust t
41Evenson, Robert (1976). "International Trasnmission of Technology in the Production of Sugarcane." 
The Journal of Development Studies. 12(2), p.209.
42Ibid.
43Timoshenko, Vladimir and Swerling, Boris (1957). The World’s Sugar: Progress and Policy. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 126. For a discussion of the varietal revolution see pp. 125-132 
of this source.
“ Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 123.
43Hagelberg, Gary (1989). op.cit.. p.41; Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. ppp.141-142. For an example 
of the problems of the creole variety in Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century see Barrett, Ward (1970). 
The Sugar Hacienda of the Marquesa del Valle. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, pp.45- 
46.
46Evenson, Robert (1976). op.cit.. p.213.
47The letters in the name of cane variety signal the location in which it was bred, eg. CP 57603 is Canal 
Point, Florida. The first two numbers are the year in which it was bred, eg. 1957, and the last numbers 
denote the particular cane seedling.
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ype and is grown in many parts of the world.
With the discovery of new varieties a system of diversification was 
implemented to diminish losses due to virus or disease. Different strains would be 
planted in separate sections of the estate. This practice became common by the 1930s 
when more successful varieties were bred. Another knock-on effect was the 
introduction of upgraded irrigation networks. Although the development of irrigation 
systems took place earlier, later with the introduction of new types, extensive 
irrigation networks were important because they reduced the dependence on weather 
variability and enabled the programming of year-round harvesting in some areas. 
With the increasing practice of diversification, post-1950 anti-viral and anti-fungal 
seed treatments were conducted prior to planting. Also, new strains facilitated the 
transfer of later innovations such as input application. Without the presence of 
modern varieties the use of chemical inputs was unlikely. Although fertilization with 
manure was common as early as the mid-seventeenth century in Barbados, it was not 
until the 1960s that nitrogen-based fertilizers were widely used48. This triggered 
improved irrigation methods as a steady supply of water heightened the 
responsiveness of fertilizer and pesticides.
New varieties also impulsed scientific harvest programming. An important 
element to obtain optimum sucrose levels was targeting field productivity according 
to cutting frequency. During the season, cane continues to accumulate sucrose, 
however the rate decreases after a particular period. To maximize productivity the 
determining features are: a)to conduct the cut before diminishing returns of sucrose
^Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p.99. See Figure SI.2.
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levels set in, and b)to maximize output/hectare/month. Cuts had a high variance; in 
earlier times they occurred between 12-30 months, the most frequent were between 
15 and 20 months49. More scientific practices reduced and standardised the time 
between cuts and maintained longer ratoons which became profitable with increased 
fertilization50.
The last significant impulse motivated by varietal switch was the breeding of 
more erect varieties (coupled with improved transportation) which made cane burning 
feasible. Cane can either be harvested green or after burning. The cane itself will 
not burn because of its high water content (about 70-80%), although burning young 
plants can damage or destroy the plots51. The table below illustrates the differences 
in productivity of burnt and non-burnt cane. The data derived from the Manuelita 
mill however cross-country qualitative evidence suggest similar trends52. The 
advantages of burning are three-fold. First, it eliminates extraneous material such as 
undergrowth and top leaves53. Secondly, it makes cutting easier because stalks are 
not as heavy (some of the water has evaporated) and cutters or machines do not have 
to wade through thick underbrush. Thirdly, the mills receive less organic rubbish, 
which results in easier processing. As table S l.l  shows, the percentage of fibre in 
factory and percentage of extraneous material were substantially lower for burnt cane.
49Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982). Articulaci6n Social v Cambio T6cnico: La Producci6n de Azucar en 
Colombia. San Jose: Instituto Interamericano de Cooperaci6n para la Agricultura, p.294.
“Hagelberg, Gary (1974), op.cit.. pp.72-76.
5lGalloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 14.
“ Abbott, George C. (1990), op.cit.. p.89; Pollitt, Brian and Hagelberg, G.B. (1992), op.cit.. p. 11.
“ Pollitt, Brian and G.B.Hagelberg (1992), op.cit.. p .11.
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Table S l . l
Productivity of Burnt Cane Versus Non-burnt Cane at Manuelita, 1990
Cane Condition Non-Burnt Cane Burnt Cane
Cutters Output 3.7 MTCD 7.2 MTCD
% Extraneous Material 8.6% 2.4%
% of Fibre in Factory 18.2% 13.4%
% of Sucrose 17.6% 18.5%
Sugar Output 11.2% 11.9%
Source: Gomez, Jaime (1992). "Manejo de la Cana Verde." El Manualito. No. 145, p. l .
But there are also disadvantages of burning. Trash that was normally generated with 
unburnt cane provided ground cover and preserved moisture in non-irrigated areas54. 
Thus irrigation became more important when burning was introduced. Bagasse and 
sucrose levels were lower and sucrose levels dropped faster after twenty-four hours 
than for un-burnt cane55. Burning was less common in the early part of the 
twentieth century because of the dearth of efficient transport facilities and mechanical 
cutters. This once again evidences the interlinkages of technical change.
Apart from field changes, transport and milling were the most influential on 
sugar output as their efficiency largely determined production levels. Cane initially 
was transported to mills on oxen-drawn carts on trails and roads56. Early railways 
were often horse-drawn carts on portable tracks which were then updated with 
permanent tracks and then finally powered by steam. During the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, narrow gauge railways in Cuba and the Dominican Republic 
replaced oxen-drawn carts. Later, railways were replaced by tractors. Tractors
MPerez L6pez, Jorge (1991). op.cit.. p.67.
55Ibid.
56Murphy, Martin (1991), op.cit.. p. 14.
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connected with wagons or carts started to be used in the twentieth century although 
it was not uncommon to observe traditional methods used alongside modern57. 
Tractors transported cane from field to factory and then dumped cane in the mill 
patio. From here the cane was lifted and placed onto feeder tables. As can be seen, 
similar to milling, most transport changes were capital intensive.
Milling largely has remained the same since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. This makes technology easier to transfer and accommodate to local 
conditions. The mills themselves also have more opportunities to modify whole 
processes or elements of the milling process can be improved, replaced and repaired 
within the region. These characteristics make breaking the reliance on foreign 
exchange and technical experts easier. Steam powered mills since the 1820s and was 
still widely used until the 1990s. The type of fuel that was used to generate steam 
was either wood or bagasse. Noel Deerr observed that the earliest mention of milling 
also records the use of bagasse as fuel58. However the instantaneous adaption of 
bagasse as fuel did not always occur as some accounts stressed the use of wood first 
followed by its phasing-out and the use of bagasse. For example, the depletion of 
wood in Cuba in the nineteenth century, resulted in the introduction of new 
technology which allowed bagasse to replace wood59. The problem with bagasse 
was it could only be used if it was sufficiently dry. Once modern milling was 
introduced (Louisiana steel mills) bagasse as a main energy source became
^Abbott, George C. (1990), op.cit.. p.92. See Sugar Part 2.
^Deerr, Noel (1950). The History of Sugar Vol. Two. London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., p.584.
59Fraginals, Manuel Moreno (1990), op.cit.. p. 127.
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possible60. The use of bagasse meant a reduction in costs and enabled mill owners 
to increase output. It also showed that in the face of wood shortages (wood was also 
used for mill, cart and housing construction) new techniques were innovated and 
quickly adapted to maintain the mill in operation.
Why were techniques adopted? There are three main lines of argument: 
economic, political, institutional and social. Some analysts maintain that adoption of 
new techniques was driven by labour scarcity, pace of mill modernisation, and 
technology availability61. In other words, they take a neoclassical stance, believing 
that economic decisions are based on relative resource availability. Others contend 
that markets, international and domestic, were the prime factors that impulsed the 
shift to modern milling62. Yet others stress that internal politics and social relations 
were the chief determinants for the development of the sugar economy63. Within 
this analysis institutional contraints will be integrated to examine their supporting role 
in market development.
First, relative resource availability was considered the principal impulse for 
modernisation. For example in Louisiana and Queensland in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and in post-Revolutionary Cuba it can be argued that labour
“ Knight, Rolf (1972), op.cit.. p.30; Deerr, Noel (1950), op.cit.. p.584.
6lNagano, Yoshiko (1988). "The Oligopolistic Structure of the Philippine Sugar Industry during the 
Great Depression." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and 
Depression. 1914-1940. London: Routlege, p. 170.
“ Pierre, Guy (1988), op.cit.. pp. 121-130; Perez L6pez, Jorge (1991), op.cit.. p.27.
“ Thomas, Clive (1984), op.cit.. p. 107; Clemens, Harrie and de Groot, Jan P. (1988). "Agrarian 
Labour Market and Technology Under Different Regimes: A Comparison of Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic." Latin American Perspectives. 15(4), pp.6-36.
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scarcity motivated the adoption of labour-saving techniques64. Gary Hagelberg 
implicitly links mechanisation to abundant resources as he notes that until the mid- 
1950s only Hawaii and Louisiana (capital-rich areas), adopted mechanised cutting and 
loading65. However this logic is flawed as mechanisation was not only related to 
capital availability but to labour or nationalist resistance66. Furthermore cane 
mechanisation was closely related to corn as both crops have similar 
characteristics67. Thus technology transfer was more easily conducted in Louisiana 
than in the Caribbean, where large-scale corn cropping was negligible. Another 
aspect of technology transfer was that regardless of capital availability, often 
mechanised techniques were difficult to adopt as they required-costly, often difficult 
to integrate—changes to be made throughout the rest of the production process68. 
In addition, a skilled labour force was needed. Lastly, relative prices were influenced 
largely by other factors. These factors masked the significance of market signals.
Secondly on a broad level, the political economy of international market 
relationships between importers and exporters had a significant impact on technique 
choice. During the nineteenth century many traditional cane-sugar producers were 
forced to shift to modern methods due to an expanding, more efficient beet-sugar 
sector. Competition from beet-sugar resulted in a fall in international sugar prices 
and posed a formidable obstacle for the less-advanced cane industry. The result was
“ Beechert, Edward (1988), op.cit.. pp. 131-141; Pollitt, Brain (1988), op.cit.. pp.97-108.
“ Hagelberg, Gary (1974). The Caribbean Sugar Industries: Constrains and Opportunities. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, p.93.
“See below.
^de las Carreras, Alberto (1990), op.cit.. p.71.
“ Discussed below.
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that many beet-sugar processes were copied or modified and integrated into cane- 
sugar production69. This enabled cane-sugar to once again be competitive and regain 
dominance on international markets. On another level, individual country 
relationships with sugar importers were also convincing reasons for growth or 
stagnation. For instance, Guy Pierre fiercely argued that in Haiti the main forces 
behind growth or decline during the first half of the twentieth century were 
international agreements and patterns of international trade70. In Cuba trade with 
the USA during the first third of the twentieth century was identified as the primary 
stimulus to the expansion of the Cuban sugar industry71. Moreover the trade 
embargoes imposed after the Revolution of 1959 represented the largest restraint on 
production72.
Market growth also motivated producers to adopt output-augmenting methods. 
For example, during the late 1800s in the Dominican Republic there were 200-300 
trapiches throughout the country, some of which dated back to the 1600s73. Upon 
entrance into world sugar markets more efficient techniques were adopted to expand 
output. Martin Murphy reports that the Dominican industry was transformed during 
the 1875-1882 period when exports became important74. Until a dramatic change 
in demand for output was precipitated, the two-hundred odd trapiches met internal
69Fraginals, Manuel Moreno (1990). "Agricultural Backwardness-Industrial Development Experiences 
of Sugar Production in the Caribbean." In Lundahl, Mats, and Svensson, Thommy (Eds.) Agrarian Society 
in History. London: Routledge, p.133; Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. pp. 130-134.
70Pierre, Guy (1988), op.cit.. pp. 121-130.
71Pollitt, Brain (1988), op.cit.. p. 198.
72P6rez Lopez, Jorge (1991), op.cit.. p.27.
73Murphy, Martin (1991). op.cit.. p. 13.
74Ibid., p. 14.
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and colonial demand and modernisation was not a necessity. Increased demand for 
output, whether it derived from internal or external markets and changing social 
structures, was also a significant force. As stated above, during the twentieth 
century, domestic markets were a powerful stimulus to production in many LDCs75.
Institutional support was essential to the development of domestic and export 
markets. Historically one of the main restraints on cane production for internal 
consumption was limited markets due to poor transport networks and internal 
communication. Stronger institutions, such as state involvement in infrastructure 
construction paved the way for improved commercialisation. This, in conjunction 
with population growth, resulted in a rise of internal demand and consumption. 
Another reason for the importance of institutions were that only through some type 
of umbrella organisation could a country lobby for entrance into a sugar quota76. 
In addition state reform also impulsed modernisation in some regions. For example, 
in Mexico the implementation of agrarian reform resulted in structural transformations 
and effected a displacement and expansion of internal sugar production77.
The third approach focuses on social relations and State reaction to labour 
demands78. Harie Clemans and Jan P. de Groot analyzed the complex 
transformation process in the Dominican Republic from 1875 to the 1980s in the 
context of the changing roles of peasants and labour in the production process.
75See above.
76Interview with Ricardo Villaveces (various times), President, ASOCANA, Bogota, Colombia.
^For a consice account of the Meixican transformation during the first half o f the twentieth century see 
Crespo, Horacio (1988). "The Cartelization of the Mexican Sugar Industry." In Albert, Bill and Graves, 
Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 1914-1940. London: Routlege, pp.85- 
95.
78Hagelberg, G.B. (1974), op.cit.. pp.92, 96.
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Choice of techniques were specifically related to labour market policies arising from 
the nature of the state. In brief, under a neo-colonial trade regime after 1885 this led 
to rapid sectoral expansion and a landholding concentration79. After 1890 there was 
a crisis, wages dropped and peasants were no longer willing to become temporary 
labourers. Because land was abundant they became involved in production80. After 
1916, the occupation of the Dominican Republic resulted in an enclave sugar sector 
which further concentrated production and relied on migrant labour from Haiti. 
Because labour was cheap and the State did not promote local independent producers, 
contracted seasonal labour became widely used and until the 1980s the harvest 
remained labour intensive81. This illustration intends to emphasize the role State 
policies have in the transformation.
The Cuban experience also illustrates social and political realities which 
induced the shift to mechanisation. Prior to the Revolution of 1959, large amounts 
of labour were used in cultivation and harvesting. The period has been characterized 
by some experts as having high ’open’ and ’disguised* unemployment82. 
Timoshenko and Swerling argued that labour had been sufficiently abundant in Cuba 
which resulted in organised resistance to field mechanisation83. In this situation, 
labour seemed to have influenced the preservation of manual harvest techniques.
79Clemens, Harrie and de Groot, Jan P. (1988), op.cit.. pp.7-8.
“ Ibid., p.8.
81Ibid., p.6.
“ Pollitt, Brian (1981). "Revolution and the Mode of Production in the Sguar-Cane Sector of the Cuban
Economy, 1959-1980: Some Preliminary Findings." Glasgow: University of Glasgow Occasional Paper 
No.35, p .l.
“ Timoshenko, Vladimir and Swerling, Boris (1957). op.cit.. p.60.
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After the 1959 Revolution the pool of agricultural wage-labourers contracted 
because there were more employment opportunities in urban areas84. This pulled 
labour out of rural areas and stifled the supply of urban workers recruited for 
seasonal labour85. This severely affected Cuban agriculture and consequently the 
new government put agricultural restructuring high on the national agenda. Attempts 
were made at mechanizing planting and harvesting. However, because of the US 
embargo and trade restrictions from other countries, mechanised technology could 
only be obtained through internal research or trade with socialist countries. 
Mechanical cutters were first used in 1963 and proved to be inefficient. Machinery 
was not suited to cut, clean nor load cane86. Subsequent research led to structural 
changes. Cane variety was replaced by those which were more conducive to 
mechanisation, cane was burnt in order to minimize extraneous field material and 
modifications of plot design were executed to accommodate the mechanised 
process87. Full-scale mechanical loading in Cuba was then achieved relatively 
quickly after the introduction of mechanical cutters in the 1960s. Finally, by 1986 
two-thirds of the harvest was fully mechanised88. Therefore because of State 
involvement production methods were substantially changed.
These examples demonstrate that relative resource scarcity did not always
MPollitt, Brian and Hagelberg, Gary (1992). "Labour supply, harvest mechanisation and the demand 
for Cuban Sugar." Glasgow: University of Glasgow Occasional Paper No.54, p.3.
“ Ibid.
86P6rez-L6pez, Jorge (1991). op.cit.. p.63. Inadequate harvests were due to machinery that was unable 
to consistently cut at the bottom of the rhizome.
“Modifications of plot design consist o f making plot size uniform throughout sugar growing areas and 
systematizing distance between cane plants. See Sugar Part n .
“ Pollitt, Brian and Hagelberg, Gary (1992). op.cit.. p.8; Perez L6pez, Jorge (1991). op.cit.. p.67.
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significantly influence technical change. Although price signals in many cases 
motivated production decisions, these signals were determined by State policy or other 
insitutional forces besides resource availability. In many cases institutional action 
clearly encouraged changes. In others they were able advance entrance in 
international markets or were crucial to create internal conditions for domestic 
commercialisation, and research and development. In yet others such as the 
Dominican Republic, State support of foreign investment occurred to the detriment 
of local producers and workers. In Cuba, organised field resistance in the 1930s 
slowed down the move to mechanical harvests. However after the Revolution a 
labour shortage stimulated the State to develop mechanical harvesters. Throughout 
the period, increased demand was the most common factor to impulse technical 
change. Also, as discussed earlier, production for domestic markets became 
increasingly important to expand output and shift to modern production methods.
LAND USAGE and PRODUCTION BIASES
After reviewing technical change and the reasons of modernisation, the 
production biases of cane cultivation and milling will be analysed. Production scale- 
biases appears to exist: there are many interpretations within the literature which 
attest to the duration of large-scale units both in cultivation and processing. 
Explanations such as biological characteristics, ability to monitor labour, existence 
of large landholdings and milling economies of scale are emphasized. Was scale-bias 
the result of the nature of production or did institutional preference for large-units 
result in their widespread survival?
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Undoubtedly small growers were common. The decomposition of traditional 
processing methods did not always result in the disintegration of small scale 
production. Empirical evidence points to a great variance in size of plots from the 
onset of modern milling to the present89. In some areas mammoth plantations were 
consolidated. In others, estate owners leased small plots with the agreement that 
leasees would plant cane. In yet other areas small and large units coexisted and cane 
was processed in cooperatively owned factories. What were the economic reasons 
for these divergent trends? Below the discussion will concentrate on two trends: land 
monopolization and the promotion of independent suppliers.
A common theme in plantation studies was the tendency towards land 
concentration90. Land monopolisation occurred as a means to obtain irrigation 
water, as a source of collateral or to gain access to labour. Michael Gonzales in his 
study of Peru in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries argued that land 
consolidation expanded the labour market as it divested small- and medium-sized 
producers of their land91. But when hacienda production patterns transformed into 
other modes of production it was often difficult for the hacienda workers to gain title 
to land. In Peter Eisenberg’s book on sugar during the 1840-1910 period in
“ Abbott, George C. (1990), op.cit.. pp.78-82; Attwood, Donald W. (1992). op.cit.. chapters 8 and
9.
’'’See Florescano, Enrique (1984). "The Formation and Economic Structure of the Hacienda in new 
Spain." InBethell, Leslie ((Ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America Vol.n. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 167-168; Steward, Julian H., et.al. (1956). The People of Puerto Rico. Urbana: 
University of Dlinois Press; Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro and Guerra y Deben, Jose Antonio (1964). Sugar 
and Society in the Caribbean. New Haven: Yale University Press; P6rez L6pez, Jorge (1991), op.cit.: 
Attwood, Donald W.(1992), op.cit.: Hutchinson, Harry (1957). "Village and Plantation Life in 
Northeastern Brazil." Seattle: American Ethnological Society Monograph 27; Mintz, Sidney (1979), 
op.cit..
9,Gonz&les, Michael (1985), op.cit.. pp.120-121.
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Pernambuco, Brazil this process was described as ’modernisation without change’92. 
The great estates continued with large expanses of fertile land while the labourers 
lived outside the estate and maintained low standards of living. Clive Thomas 
analyzing, Guyana during the early twentieth century, also believed that land markets 
were formed historically and the transformation to modern milling did not result in 
any changes to the previously-exisiting plantation system.
While there was a reprieve based on the shortages and dislocations created by the 1914- 
1918 war, the plantation system was forced to adapt to the transformations occurring in 
the mode of production. These were subsequently to become the pillars on which the 
modern industry was built.93
By the end of the Second World War II, sugar production in Guyana was largely 
under the control of Trans National Corporations (TNCs). TNCs emerged from local 
planters who owned estates as early as 1835 (i.e. Josiah Booker) and also became 
involved in shipping, or mills which were consolidated in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth century. Later their investments extended to other areas such agricultural 
machinery services, shipping, retail sales, alcohol production, etc94. It was not until 
1976, when industry nationalisation significantly broke down this structure in Guyana.
The second path mill owners pursued was the promotion of small producers. 
This was done to maintain a reserve army of labour in rural areas, to secure low-cost 
cane, and/or to generate capital. In Guyana, to dissuade immigrants from leaving 
estates after their contracts expired, estate owners granted small plots of land within 
estate empoldered areas in the late nineteenth century95. Between 1921 and 1937
“ See Eisenberg, Peter (1974), op.cit.. particularly part n.
93Thomas, Clive (1984), op.cit.. p.23.
94Ibid., pp.27-29.
95Ibid., p.20.
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the Mauritian plantocracy also supported the growth of independent growers as a 
source of labour, cheap cane, and a source of capital (mill land was sold to 
independent cane growers)96. Granting land to labourers was evidenced in a British 
Foreign Office document referring to Colombia in 1943.
. . .  to counteract the lure of the town he [Mr. Rodgers] suggests that every estate 
labourer should be established on a small holding. The holding need only be half of 
hectare where he can grow vegetables and fruit, keep chickens and a cow or goats97.
Two overriding reasons in Trinidad were stated for the promotion of independent
suppliers: to guarantee an adequate supply of labour and cheap cane98. In general,
Bill Albert and Adrian Graves maintained that mill ownership concentration was
accompanied by the disintegration of large units and/or increased independent
growers99. With these trends, it can be seen that in some regions in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries estate owners maintained their monopoly over land.
In others, they promoted independent producers for cane and labur supply. During
the twentieth century, with the increasing concentration or mill ownership,
independent producers arose as a result of increased demand of cane from mills
during the twentieth century. Yet another trend is located in the literature is the
proletarianization of suppliers. This will be discussed in the labour section. The rise
of independent suppliers will be explored immediately below.
96North-Coombes, M.D. (1988). "Struggles in the Canefields: Small Growers in Mauritius, 1921- 
1937." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 
1914-1940. London: Routlege, pp. 195-198.
"PRO, Foreign Office (17 Aug. 1943). "Dr. Pound’s Report on Agriculture in Colombia," 
F0371.33809, Registry Number A7730/2266/11.
98Haraksingh, Kusha (1988), op.cit.. p. 113.
"Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.)(1988), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 
1914-1940. London: Routlege, p. 13.
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The importance of independent suppliers was that, in some areas, they 
diminished the extent of cane land concentration and shifted the risk of cultivation 
from mills to growers. For example, in Cuba until the 1930 independent growers (of 
all sizes) were the main source of cane supply. In Jamaica the number of 
independent farms doubled in the twenty year period following World War Two and 
the volume of cane produced by them increased four times100. In India as many as 
50,000 small independent cultivators might supply one mill in the 1980s101. As 
described above, in some areas with the support of estate owners independent 
suppliers were established. In others, mill owners could not afford new land 
purchases nor were not interested in cultivation so they resorted to contracting 
independent suppliers. Also, country experiences were related to institutional forces 
(e.g. estate owners and State policy) which guided the evolution of land tenure.
Some of the literature discusses the tensions between growers and mill owners 
with regard to cane price establishment. These conflicts will not be explored in depth 
here but hint at future debate presented in the Colombia case study. The underlying 
theme is that although mill modernisation resulted in concentrated milling ownership 
(discussed below) the corresonding increase in independent suppliers (in some areas, 
in some periods) resulted in profit sharing. Therefore mill owners were not always 
the sole beneficiaries of technical progress.
In addition to the formal institutions of land usage arrangements, biases that
‘“ Hagelberg, G.B. (1974), op.cit.. p.79.
101 Abbott, George (1990), op.cit.. p.93. For another example see de las Carreras, Alberto (1990), 
op.cit.. table 23, pp.90-91.
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affected production decisions could explain the existence of cane growing structures. 
First, in 1991 Jorge Perez Lopez maintained that the biological characteristics of cane 
facilitate large-scale growing as opposed to input-intensive crops such as vegetables, 
coffee or tobacco102. He argued that with these commodities tasks were difficult 
to programme and required the constant care and attention of labour. However this 
explanation is simplistic as crops that were less demanding and required less labour 
during the growing period led to early mechanisation of many cultivation tasks. This 
resulted in a scale-bias towards large units. Paradoxically, the qualities of cane did 
not facilitate early capital-intensive field methods and labour was used to a large 
extent in many areas103. Therefore the physical properties of cane do not explain 
widespread large scale cultivation.
Secondly, some analysts confirm that the ability to organise and to monitor 
labour effectively made the system scale-biased where forced labour could be 
employed (namely in the era of slavery).
The industrial discipline, so difficult to bring about in the factories of free England and 
free New England, was achieved on sugar plantations more than a century earlier—partly 
because sugar production lent itself to a minute division of labor, partly because of the 
invention o f the gang system, which provided a powerful instrument for the supervision 
and control of labor, and partly because of the extraordinary degree of force that planters 
were allowed to bring to bear on enslaved black labour104.
The gang system allowed labour to be divided and organised to perform non­
specialized tasks. Robert Fogel evidences the eventual predominance of large-scale
!02P6rez-L6pez, Jorge (1991). The Economics of Cuban Sugar. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, p.56.
103Early mechanisation occurred in Hawaii and Louisiana: the first harvester was not successfully used 
until the mid-1930s. Crops characterized by early technical advance were wheat, rice, and com. See 
Timoshenko, Vladimir and Swerling, Boris (1957), op.cit.. pp. 132-144; de las Carreras, Alberto (1990), 
op.cit.. p.69.
104Fogel, Robert William (1989), op.cit.. pp.25-26.
51
Parti: Sugarcane
production and the demise of small-scale growers.
In sugar production, on the other hand, free labor was vanquished almost everywhere 
by the gang system. Where small-scale production persisted it was largely for local 
markets protected by tariffs and the like or aided by some special local advantage. When 
the gang system was extended to rice, coffee, and cotton, it also conquered these crops 
and left small-scale farmers with minor fractions of these markets103.
Clearly dominion over the labour force could offer an explanation for the persistence 
of large units that was witnessed during this period. However plantation economies, 
such as those described above, also gained advantages because they had command of 
all factors of production106. Therefore the ability to monitor labour was only part 
of the explanation. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that during the period when 
slave labour was used in plantation agriculture (roughtly 1502-1880s) production bias 
was a result of this particular organisational arrangements. What occurred in later 
years?
In the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before major mill innovations 
were adapted, land monopolization originally occurred as a means for estate owners 
to gain access to irrigation water, a critical resource for cane growth107. Later, the 
establishment of modern mills resulted in a complementarity between land 
consolidation and capital concentration. Particularly, the drive to increase technical 
levels in the mill, resulted in the need for more land to increase cane production and 
meet higher mill capacity. Therefore the demand for land and higher capital
105Ibid., p.35.
,06The use of the term plantation economies will be used loosely, to describe concentrated land 
ownership, extensive cultivation, the use of servile labour and large amounts of capital. In the literature 
there is debate on the hazards generalizing Caribbean agriculture into the term plantation economy. See 
Hagelberg, Gary (1974). The Caribbean Sugar Industries: Constraints and Opportunities. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, pp. 1-7. Implicitly this view is shared as the divergences of "plantation economies" 
are underlined throughout the thesis.
I07Gonazalez, Michael J. (1985), op.cit.. pp.43-69; Thomas, Clive (1984), op.cit.. p. 15.
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requirements of mill innovations resulted in the establishment of large units. Within 
the literature there are many accounts of industrial and land concentration from the 
nineteenth century onwards. For instance, Galloway relates mill modernisation to a 
consolidation of landholdings in the late nineteenth century in general108. In the 
Dominican Republic Martin Murphy observed industrial and land concentration with 
the shift to more efficient techniques after 1875109. Similarly, Rolf Knight 
described a comparable process in many parts of Latin America when central mills 
were established during the late nineteenth century. However Knight observed two 
trends: the first was land and industrial concentration by one agent, the other was the 
establishment of central mills. Central mills were organised by smaller independent 
growers who would pool their resources and invest in one mill where cane could be 
processed. This arrangement allowed small sized planters to compete with plantations 
that milled their own cane. However the long term trend was that the operator of the 
central would gain control of land and diminish his use of and dependence on cane 
produced by independent suppliers110. Thus far, production scale-biases have been 
related to institutional factors existing in particular periods. During the era of slavery 
plantation owners were able to maintain control of all factors of production. With the 
abolition of slavery estate owners either maintained or expanded landholdings. 
Moreover, as a response to labour scarcity, they invested in capital intensive milling
I08Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 135; For an illustration of production concentration in the 
Philippines see Abbott, George C. (1990), op.cit.. pp. 172-178.
109Murphy, Martin (1991), op.cit.. p. 16.
M0Knight, Rolf (1972), op.cit.. pp.59-60. The pace and concentration of land acquisition was variable 
throughout sugar producing areas and a strict paradigm cannot be developed. For an illustration of the 
existence of centralized or cooperative milling see Emmet, Boris (1928). The California and Hawaiian 
Sugar Refining Corporation. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.3-6.
53
P arti: Sugarcane
and/or promoted the establishment of individual planters. Did other factors in the 
twentieth century enforce this trend?
The most important factor to increased industrial and/or land concentration 
was capital-bias and milling economies of scale. Capital-bias was also seen in slower 
rates of field technical adoption in small units. Capital-intensive technical change 
tended to displace small producers. M.D. North-Coombes maintained that small plots 
in Mauritius during the 1921-1937 period had lower yields because access to new 
techniques, credit and fertile land was deficient and colonial laws were biased towards 
estate and mill owners111. Clive Thomas also describes discriminatory capital 
markets after 1950 in Guyana.
Generally, peasant cultivation, lacking capital to provide adequate drainage and 
irrigation, and with no marketing capacity to export sugar, developed largely as a system 
of petty commodity production outside of sugar and based on the emerging domestic 
market112.
In this case it is possible that they would transform into kulaks, however with 
inadequate access to essential capital for infrastructure improvements and input 
purchases their existence appeared precarious. In the 1960s in India lower yields on 
smaller farms were attributed to short-term leases and insufficient capital113. 
Beechert observed that higher capital requirements of recent decades (post-1960) in 
the field effected an increasing tendency toward consolidation of large-scale
n,North-Coombes, M.D. (1988). "Struggles in the Canefields: Small Growers in Mauritius, 1921- 
1937." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 
1914-1940. London: Routlege, pp. 199-200.
u2Thomas, Clive (1984), op.cit.. p. 19.
M3Hagelberg, G.B. (1974), op.cit.. p.76 citing Stead, B.A. (1968). "Sugar cane production by Indian 
growers in Natal." South African Sugar Journal. 52 (8), pp.708-712.
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production and hindered small-scale units in Queensland, Australia and Hawaii, 
USA114. Thus as will be seen in banana cultivation capital intensive techniques had 
a tendency to displace small producers if no institutional support existed to extend 
credit and diffuse new techniques115. This implicitly demonstrated the existence of 
capital-bias in later years when capital-intensive techniques became important, which 
resulted in an apparent production-bias towards large units.
Another aspect of capital-bias was that of land quality. Much of the title-less 
land was often of a lower quality or located in geographically isolated areas. For 
instance in Peru the large estates owned the best land with ample amounts of 
irrigation water between 1875 and 1933116. In the 1960s, there was also evidence 
that small growers in the West Indies were at a further disadvantage because of their 
far location from the mill (transport costs were higher)117. The only circumstance 
under which this was changed was through institutional support. In the face of state 
reform such as Mexico in the 1920s and Peru in the late 1960s the structure was 
broken118. In Mexico the three principal interests within the industry were 
gradually separated (the workers, planters, and industrialists). Within the State of 
Morelos, the country’s leading producer before the Revolution (1910), much of the
II4Beechert, Edward (1988), op.cit.. pp. 138-139. Completely mechanised harvest were not possible 
until the 1960s.
M5See'Banana Parts I and n. for more sources on capital-bias in cane-sugar production see Abbott, 
George (1991), op.cit.. p.72; de las Carreras, Alberto (1990). El Azucar en la Argentina v en el Mundo. 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Hemisferio Sur, p.71; Hagelberg, Gary (1974), op.cit.. pp.82, 84-85.
1I6Gonz£les, Michael (1985), op.cit.. chapters 1 and 3, p. 121 citing report on small farmers in the 
Lambeyeque Valley by the Sociedad National Agraria, 1937, Archivo del Fuero Agrario.
n7Timoshenko, Vladimir and Swerling, Boris (1957), op.cit.. p.73.
u8Crespo, Horatio (1988), op.cit.. pp.85-95; Lowenthal, Abraham F. (1975). "Peru’s Ambiguous 
Revolution." In Lowenthal Abraham F. (Ed.), The Peruvian Experiment. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
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irrigated hacienda land was redistributed to ejidos119, thereby removing the bias of 
hacienda production and redistributing land to cooperative units. In Peru according 
to Lowenthal, after the 1968 Revolution, the sugar haciendas were successfully 
reformed with profits being distributed among permanent workers. Nonetheless, 
migrant workers continued to be as badly off as before, not receiving any of the 
benefits of the reform120. Therefore it is seen that land-quality bias (an aspect of 
capital-bias) features prominently in the literature and land rights were often fixed, 
with succussful redistribution occuring only with State reform.
Although mill and land ownership appeared to be increasingly concentrated, 
by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries cultivation 
often expanded to independent suppliers. The only clear empirical evidence that 
showed that scale-bias existed was that of the factory which operated with economies 
of scale and high amounts of capital. The introduction of capital-intensive field 
techniques in the twentieth century which resulted in the displacement of small 
producers corroborates the existence of capital-bias. Nonetheless regional experiences 
showed conflicting trends, in some areas small independent producers flourished 
while in others huge plantations persisted. Capital-bias appeared to be a clear 
disadvantage for small producers who were less able to receive credit and were also 
located on less fertile land. Also, the historical background of cane growing and the 
colonial institutions that were formed often misrepresented future conditions of
n9Crespo, Horatio (1988), op.cit.. p.86 citing Gonzalez Herrera, Carlos and Embriz Osorio, Amulfo 
(1984). "La Reforma Agraria y la Desaparicidn del Latifiindio en el Estado de Morelos." In Crespo, 
Horatio (Ed.), Morelos. Cinco Siglos de Historia Regional. Mexico, pp.285-98.
120Lowenthal, Abraham F. (1975), op.cit.. p. 16.
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exchange. For instance, plantations of the seventeenth and eightennth centuries often 
survived into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were located on higher 
quality land. State policy further strengthened scale-bias or in some cases, through 
agrarian reform, reversed the process.
LABOUR: proletarianization, contracting and the effect of technical change
In this section three important aspects of labour will be addressed. First, an 
analysis of the transformation of cane peasants to proletarians will be presented. 
Second, a discussion of the labour contract system will be provided. Third, the 
influence of new techniques on labour-use will be examined. In the case study 
detailed sectoral employment trends, wages, harvest organisation, the direct effect of 
technology on labour and proportional changes of labour used in field and factory will 
be provided. Broader issues frequently addressed in the literature will be presented 
here, but a comparative analysis of micro changes similar to that presented in part II 
will not be included due to the breadth and diversity of country experiences.
One of the most notable features of the history of cane was the use of high 
levels of labour during cultivation, particularly the harvest. Until the nineteenth 
century slave labour was used extensively in plantations. Sugar was the greatest of 
the slave crops121. There are also accounts of indentured labour procured from the
121Fogel, Robert William (1989), op.cit.. p. 18. During the 1502-1860 period, between 60 and 70 and 
percent of all the Africans who survived the Atlantic voyages were situated on one of Europe’s sugar 
colonies
57
Part I: Sugarcane
Indian Sub-continent and coolies from China122. In yet other regions such as Cuba 
during the last decade of the eighteenth century and again after 1850, mill owners 
would also employ temporary wage-labour recruited from the peasantry who 
cultivated tobacco and minor crops, shipyard workers and numerous small artisans 
123. First, these cases demonstrate the diversity of the work force before the 
twentieth century. Second, the gradual abolition of slavery and servile labour induced 
innovations in cane growing that resulted in new social organisations of cultivation 
that were present throughout the twentieth century. In the short term, the abolition 
of slavery in most regions resulted in labour shortage for plantation owners. 
However throughout the twentieth century, labour-intensive production became 
beneficial as rapid population growth occurred in many LDCs.
Sugar production moreover necessitates the employment of a particularly large amount 
of labour per acre cultivated. And since so many countries have a problem fmding 
employment for the agricultural population they have found sugar a very convenient 
means of doing so.124
During the twentieth century populous less developed countries theoretically had a 
comparative advantage. Nonetheless, as labour demand was seasonal due to the 
annual zafra (harvest) and agricultural workers were not a homogenous body of 
labourers (they were not solely agricultural wage-labourers), it was often difficult to 
obtain labour125. With the exception of Hawaii, Peru and Colombia where harvests 
could be conducted year-round, labour demand was highly cyclical because during the
122Abbott, George C. (1990), op.cit.. p. 12; Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 127.
123Fraginals, Manuel Moreno (1976), op.cit.. pp. 19-20
124PRO, Foreign Office. (3 May 1937). "International Sugar Conference and Negotiations Leading up 
to the International Sugar Conference of 1937." F0371.21220, Registry Number W9889/246/50.
,25See chapter 2 for a discussion of the diversity of the agricultural work force. For a specific 
discussion of the difficulty in analyzing cane labour see Hagelberg, Gary (1974), op.cit.. pp.85-93.
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growing period cane did not require large amounts of labour126. Huge amounts of 
workers were only needed during planting and the harvest. However, what happened 
to the cane labour force when technical changes were introduced? How did labour’s 
relationship with the means of production change when production was intensified and 
modern mills emerged?
With the maturation of sugar economies, empirical evidence suggests that 
many small producers and ex-estate workers became internally proletarianized being 
displaced by concentrated mills. For instance this was largely the case in the 
Dominican Republic post-1875, Cuba post-1930, and in Guyana after World War 
II127. The reasons for internal proletarianization were that rural inhabitants had 
difficulty obtaining access to land and others who acquired land title or usufruct rights 
faced discriminatory policies. For example in Cuba colonos (independent Cuban 
sugar growers) supplied cane to mills throughout the history of pre-revolution Cuba. 
In fact, between 1899 and the mid-1920s, a period of buoyant output, the number of 
colonos in Cuba increased128. Hence colonos were externally proletarianized. This 
demonstrated that it was possible to protect land rights of individual producers129. 
Although the reasons that colonos survived were related to the high variation of 
landholding size and tenure which was diverse ranging from very small-scale owners, 
leasees, or sharecroppers to medium- and large-scale planters130. Thus it was not
'“ interview with Oscar Gerardo Ramos (Feb. 1992), Historian at ASOCANA, Cali, Colombia.
127Thomas, Clive (1984), op.cit.. pp.18-23; Murphy, Martin (1991), op.cit.. pp.16-18; Clemens, Harrie 
and de Groot, Jan P. (1988), op.cit.. pp.6-12.
*28Pollitt, Brian (1988), op.cit.. pp.98-99, graph 8.1.
129Perez-L6pez, Jorge (1991). op.cit.. p.20.
l30Beechert, Edward D. (1988), op.cit.. p. 134; Pollitt, Brain (1988), op.cit.. p. 103.
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necessarily the interests nor livelihood of small-size farmers that were protected.
Moreover during the sugar crisis of the 1930s small and medium producers
significantly declined in Camaguey and the East, areas where US-owned modern mills
predominated131. Between 1930 and 1934 as much as 90 per cent were
displaced132. Thus, in the long term, the junker road to capitalism occurred.
However a linear transformation into total proletarianization did not ensue as many
times labour was seasonal, following the harvest, or lived near plantations and
became polyvalent peasants (discussed below).
The diversity of this work force cannot be denied. Nonetheless, a theme
common to many analyses was the use of contracted labour. Though other methods
to procure labour existed in cane growing, labour contracting will be discussed as it
directly related to the Colombian case. In the Caribbean, inter-island migration
became common in the nineteenth century. People from densely populated areas such
as Barbados and St. Kitts, Haiti and Jamaica immigrated to those expanding sugar
industries such as Trinidad, British Guyana, Cuba and the Dominican Republic133.
Other methods of labour acquisition were also necessary:
. . .the first spectacular experiment in 1840-41: the big harvesting job was begun by a 
group of Catalans contracted by the trafficker in whites.134
The labour contract system was common to cane growing in many parts of the world
from the mid-nineteenth century in the Caribbean, from the late nineteenth century
I31Pollitt, Brian (1988), op.cit.. pp. 100,102.
132Pollitt, Brian (1988), op.cit.. p. 102, citing Soto, Revoluci6n. Vol.n, p.286.
133Galloway, J.H. (1989), op.cit.. p. 130.
l34Fraginals, Manuel Moreno (1976), op.cit.. p. 136.
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to 1940 in Peru, and from the second half of the twentieth century in Colombia. It 
came to play an important role in securing cutters which were a scarce resource 
during the harvest.
Contracted cutters were typically obtained by a middleman hired to insure an 
appropriate number of workers. These midddlemen, otherwise known as 
enganchadores, were responsible for supervision and also directly distributed pay 
checks135. Within the literature there is much argument on the exploitative nature 
of this relationship. For example, workers were employed temporarily, received few 
benefits and were subject to long hours as harvesting had to be conducted within a 
specific period. This was particularly so for cane cutting. The importance of 
contracting to this thesis is that it was not used in Colombia until after the 1950s and 
only was used widely after 1970s. What can explain the late use of contracted 
labour?
Chris Knight analyzed labour contracting during the late nineteenth century 
until 1940 in northern Peru. He explained that the used of contracted workers was 
related to labour scarcity and the inability of labour to organise. Moreover, he 
signals the use of labour contracting and temporary methods of recruitment as a stage 
in the development of regional labour markets136. Therefore when modern methods 
reached maturity (post-1940) more stable patterns of labour procurement and an 
increase in non-wage payments were observed. Knight, maintained three reasons for
135Scott, C.D. (1993). "Bonos, Beneficios y  Bienestar. A Study of Wages, Work and Welfare on 
Peruvian Sugar Plantations." In Abel, Chris and Lewis, Colin M. (Eds.) Welfare. Poverty and 
Development in Latin America. London: The Macmillan Press, p. 161.
I36Ibid., pp.326-333.
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the disintegration of labour contracting137. First, as a result of population growth 
and the consequent abundance of labour, workers presented themselves at haciendas 
instead of being recruited by engachadores. Second, labour could more easily 
organise (due to its size) and demand improved working conditions. Lastly, the use 
of mechanical cutters reduced the demand for contracted workers138. Knight further 
observed that the decline of labour contracting led to a growing proportion of urban- 
residents who were hired to work in the fields139.
By reworking Ruth Dixon’s research another explanation to the situation is 
offered by relating land tenure to the use of wage labour. Using regional landholding 
averages for 95 countries around 1970 Dixon discovered that where small plots (under 
5 ha) predominated the use of wage-labour was low. The converse was also true140. 
Another factor observed in her study was market orientation, namely export-oriented 
crops correlated positively with the use of wage-labour141. Thus, the prevalence of 
wage-labour correlated negatively with the proportion of holdings under five hectares 
and positively with the value of exports142. In Dixon’s study Latin America was 
classified as the region with the smallest relative share of small landholdings in the 
Third World. This also implied that wage labour was used more extensively. 
Corroborating her findings, the use of contracted labour would suggest the relative
l37Ibid., pp.333-337.
138Ibid., pp.333-335.
,39Ibid„ p.335.
l40Dixon, Ruth (1983). "Land, Labour, and the Sex Composition of the Agricultural Labour Force: an 
International Comparison." Development and Change. 14(3), pp.350-351.
MIIbid., pp.355-356.
u2Ibid., p.356.
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abundance of wage labour. Several things can occur in this scenario: a)because the 
labour market is large there is an over supply of labour, thus wages remain low. 
However since labour is seasonal, its availability may contract during the harvest. 
Or b)because the labour market is regionally segmented workers cannot effectively 
organise to campaign for higher wages and better working conditions143. The 
labour contract system explains both of these factors. Higher (short-term) wages 
must be offered to attract workers for temporary periods of work and, workers can 
not effectively organise and pressure for improved working conditions because they 
are few and transitory. Therefore the differences in the use of contracted labour 
could be due to these factors. After analysing the Colombian data diffeent reasons 
for the use of contracted labour were discovered. They will be reviewed in part II.
Why did labourers become seasonal agricultural labourers? Brian Pollitt and 
Gary Hagelberg argued that migrant labour in Cuba, before the Revolution of 1959, 
was driven by the need to maximize income over a few months given limited 
opportunities for paid employment (they were peasants otherwise). In these 
circumstances men tended to highly mobile and work very hard when they got a 
job144. Peter Boomgaard, analysing Java between 1914 and 1940, also asserted a 
similar view.
. . .  a sizeable proportion of casual labourers came there [cane harvests] with a target 
income in mind. They wanted to work off a debt, or needed a specific amount of money 
for one of the many life cycle ceremonies that Javanese custom prescribed143.
w3For a discussion of effective organized labour in cane see Scott, C.D. (1993), op.cit.. pp. 149-174. 
144Pollitt, Brian and Hagelberg, Gary B. (1992), op.cit.. p.5.
143Boomgaard, Peter (1988). "Treacherous Cane: The java Sugar Industry Between 1914 and 1940."
In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.), The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression. 1914-1940. 
London: Routlege, p. 163.
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This is consistent with other general studies on agricultural wage-labour. Analysts 
have concluded that seasonal labour survives because in many countries unskilled 
workers need to supplement their income. The Colombian case has elements of the 
above issues.
The explanations behind the shift to modern methods of labour recruitment 
were discussed above. Below the specific changes that affected labour will be 
described. Regional cultivation practices demonstrated that in most cases throughout 
the twentieth century manual cultivation and harvesting were utilized to a much 
greater extent than mechanised methods146. For example a task not improved with 
mechanisation was cane planting. Even when mechanised methods became available 
many planters still preferred to hire manual labour for planting because less seedlings 
were damaged and more care and control could be taken147. Moreover, 
disregarding capital costs, in many areas of the world fully mechanised harvests were 
unthinkable due to the difficulty of effectively harvesting uneven and rocky terrain. 
The Cuban experience demonstrated the enormous restructuring of harvest 
organisation necessary for efficient technological adaption. Administrative costs were 
high: a virtual reorganisation of the production process was needed in addition to 
capital for machinery purchase. This is not a question of replacing labour for more 
efficient mechanical practices; rather it was a problem of supplanting a highly
U6For example cane techniques in Thailand, India, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. See
Abbott, George C. (1990), op.cit.. table 2.4, pp.90-91.
u7Interview with Carlos Navia (27 Jan. 1992, 13 Feb. 1992), Head of Field Department, Manuelita, 
Palmira, Colombia.
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sophisticated, organised manual process for a mechanical process of the same quality.
New techniques, such as care of cane seedlings and machinery operation 
resulted in increasingly stratified field and factory tasks. For example anti-virus and - 
fungal seed treatments demanded trained work force in contrast to the unskilled labour 
used for herbicide application. Increasing stratification in the work force was also 
observed in bananas. Its effect was that wages became progressively differentiated, 
often resulting in more temporary work and intensified rural conflict. This effect will 
be discussed further in bananas. Within sugarcane, differentiated wages resulted in 
higher wages for specialized tasks and signalled the development of a semi-skilled and 
skilled work force.
In conjunction with labour stratification, increased capital-intensity reduced 
labour demand per unit of output. Data from Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Guyana, and 
Peru and Jamaica during the 1950-1969 period demonstrate an absolute decline of 
labour in field and factory148. The most labour-intensive milling tasks during the 
first half of the century were mainly concentrated in the cane patio. In the patio a 
large labour force was initially demanded for cane movement, however, later in the 
period fully mechanised methods were introduced for this area of cane processing and 
the large teams of labour needed for the manoeuvre of cane became obsolete. This 
shows that increased technical levels led to decreased labour use. From the mill 
owners’ view point, the initial switch from traditional to modern milling was 
beneficial because it allowed the relocation of factory workers into the field149.
,48See Hagelberg, G.B. (1974), op.cit.. tables 12,13,16, pp.121,122,125 (the period for Guyana is 
between 1949 and 1966); Scott, Chris (1982), op.cit.. p.324.
149Perez L6pez, Jorge (1991). op.cit.. pp.56-57.
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However, from the perspective of rural labour, it would be advantageous to construct 
several small mills (1000 tspa) throughout the countryside, as smaller mills demanded 
more labour per unit of output150. From a developmental perspective, both 
characteristics are disadvantageous to population-rich, capital-poor LDCs. The use 
of labour in commercial sugar production has declined, though in many countries 
where sugar is produced population remains large. Resources are being allocated 
inefficiently as mill owners receive incorrect signals because of their easier access to 
capital. Also, evidence points to more efficient field techniques which resulted in a 
decrease in total labour use.
The evidence presented above corroborated that small producers were 
displaced by modern mills. Nonetheless complete proletarianization did not occur as 
only seasonal work was available. The use of contracted cutters in certain regions 
in particular periods was open to debate. Scott maintained that it was a stage in the 
modernisation of the labour force, whereas Dixon’s model would have attributed it 
to land usage structures. Lastly, the introduction of technical change resulted in
l50Lower labour-use can be seen clearly in this table:
Table S1.2
Cost of Production and Level o f Employment in Sugar Processing, 1975
Mill Output 
(tspa)
Average cost (US 
cents/tonne)
Employment Employment 
per Output 
(Men/tspa)
50,000 34.4 1030 .0206
25,000 38.9 701 .0280
10,000 50.0 435 .0435
1,000 92.0 683 .6830
Source: Constructed from Forsyth, David (1977). "Appropriate Technology in Sugar Manufacturing." 
World Development 5(3), p. 194. 
tspa= tonnes of sugar per annum.
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increased stratification and job specialization. Moreover, mill modernisation implied 
increased capital-intensity. This occurred in a period when many sugar producing 
regions experienced increased population growth. Therefore in most cases the effect 
of technical change on labour was reduced employment levels.
CONCLUSION
Cane-sugar has been processed for thousands of years although only recently 
was production modernised. Traditional cane processing can be conducted on a 
small-scale and can be more readily compared with the ’democratic* potato. The 
virtues of panela/gurfrapadura are numerous. Foremost, traditional methods of 
cultivation and processing are labour intensive thereby stimulating rural labour 
markets and exchange in general.
The shift to modern milling methods resulted in far-reaching transformations 
throughout the production process. The most common trend being agroindustrial 
centralization due to milling economies of scale. Cultivation scale-bias was difficult 
to assess as the historical plantation structure, capital and technical scale-bias mask 
many of the changes that took place. Some analysts argued that the nature of cane 
resulted in large-scale cultivation. However this is difficult to sustain on the grounds 
that large-scale cultivation often persisted because of institutional, capital and 
technological bias. The increasing concentration of mill ownership in the twentieth 
century also resulted in a rise in independent suppliers. The general trend seemed to 
be an increase in large scale planters however in some regions farmers persisted. In 
other cases where land reform or other policies were implemented to favour
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independent cultivators small and medium growers emerged, not necessarily to the 
detriment of the industry. Thus the political economy often shaped the course of cane 
production.
The structure of international trade can be compared with banana as markets 
were not entirely free, in this case being controlled by sugar agreements. Moreover, 
access into agreements was dependent on political relationship. Since the birth of the 
trade, foreign agents were widely involved in production, exportation and refining 
which were also the initial forces in technology transfer. However, later in the 
period, in some countries, maturation was reached and cane became refined 
domestically.
The pace of technical changes was varied, and a general trend of technical 
adoption cannot be established. Two main catalysts impulsed change: varietal switch 
and field mechanisation. Mill modernisation did not always result in a concomitant 
change in field practices as many times more suppliers were contracted or cultivation 
was extended. Also, labour-intensive field practices could keep pace with milling 
demands. In contrast to what will be seen in banana, international markets did not 
have as much influence in the spread of field and factory techniques. The increased 
use of technology in the twentieth century often resulted in a decline of absolute 
levels of labour employed in the sector. However mechanisation did not entirely 
phase out labour as in some regions manual and mechanised techniques were used 
alongside one another. Instead of huge capital investments and farm reorganisation, 
manual methods were more attractive economically, especially when the imperfections 
of mechanised harvests were considered. The reasons behind technical change were
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economic, political and social. Although in most countries economic reasons were 
the least important and market, institutional and social factors were the deciding 
forces behind development or stagnation.
The population explosion of the twentieth century gave production a second 
wind as labour scarcity during the nineteenth century often made large-scale 
cultivation onerous. Methods to procure labour have changed tremendously from 
slavery to migrant labour to contracted labour finally to organised labour who 
demanded improved working condition. Scott affirms that these stages were 
indicative of modernisation. However perhaps the change is not linear as the unique 
characteristics of rural labour may result in different outcomes151. The road to 
proletarianization occurred in many countries, resulting in the formation of junkers 
or kulaks. Although the existence of kulaks in many parts appeared precarious as 
they faced discrimination in terms of capital- and technology-bias, nonetheless, their 
survival further demonstrates the ability of small producers to withstand adverse 
conditions.
Sugarcane modernisation has been very complex characterized by rich regional 
experiences. Colombia is not a traditional sugar producer as many of the countries 
reviewed in part 1. The effect of distinct political economies, both internally and 
externally, gave way to yet other routes to modernisation.
,51See Sugar Part n.
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This second part is based on data compiled from Manuelita sugar mill, one of the 
largest mills in Colombia, and official material. The story of sugarcane in the Cauca 
Valley1 is not as turbulent as that of bananas nor as capital-scarce as potatoes, and provides 
an example of a gradual expansion and development. Problems related to potato or banana 
production such as inadequate infrastructure, rural unrest, violence, and lack of national 
capital and/or interests have not been present in the Cauca Valley. In addition, controversial 
issues such as the role of foreign investment, absorption of technological change and State 
intervention that have disrupted patterns of production in other parts of the world, have not 
disturbed the development of sugar production in Colombia2. The Cauca Valley is also 
distinct in another respect; as in Peru and Hawaii the climate permits year-round harvesting. 
Hence the agricultural work force is aseasonal, plant capacity is not determined by a seasonal 
peak, and cane seedlings can be bred and planted through the year. Moreover the push to 
modernise was not stimulated by external markets, and rather, entrance into sugar agreements 
was a result of high productivity levels.
The chapter will examine the evolution of sugar production in the Cauca Valley from 
1936 to 1990. The analysis will centre around the same factors discussed in other chapters, 
namely institutions and markets, and crop-specific factors that influence land and labour use. 
Manuelita was selected as a case study for many reasons. First, cane-sugar growing on the 
estate dates back at least to the nineteenth century thus antecendents to transformations in the 
twentieth century can be reviewed. Secondly, it was and remains one of the largest mills in
‘When "Cauca Valley" is used in this thesis it refers to the geographic Cauca River Vally which is located in 
the Departments of Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Risaralda. When referring to the departments within the region, 
Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Risaralda will be used; see Map S2.1.
2See Sugar Part I.
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the country and has pioneered technological advances: it established the first steam-driven 
I mill in 1901 and the first centrifugal in 1953. Thirdly, and of critical importance, the 
archives survive although they have not been used by other scholars. Nevertheless, while 
accessible, the archives are unorganized. The data consulted included mill records, payrolls, 
account books, cadastral surveys, field department reports, private records of company 
directors, and annual submissions to government. In addition interviews were conducted 
with current staff.
MARKETS: domestic demand and the shift to modern methods
As in other areas of the world small-scale methods of cane conversion were 
forerunners of large-scale agroindustry. Before discussing the development of large-scale 
mills, the evolution of cane production and milling will be analysed, as they provide insights 
to later transformations. The circumstances under which sugar production developed in the 
Cauca Valley will be examined.
During the first half of this century cane was processed primarily for internal 
consumption. Processed sugar, or rather panela, was widely consumed3. Panela was a 
traditional cane product akin to Indian Gur and Brazilian Raspado. Because panela was 
easily manufactured and transported, it was produced on a small-scale throughout the country 
for sale in regional markets. Panela experienced significant changes over time in terms of 
location of production, labour availability, and access to land and markets. Although an 
inferior good, total production has remained remarkably bouyant due to the physical growth
3See Table S2.1.
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of the market despite competition from refined sugar4. Panela continues to make an 
important contribution to the Colombian economy as an employer of rural labour (panela has 
employed roughly one-third of rural work force since 1960) and a food staple. Nevertheless 
competition from sugar has brought about a number of changes. Some panela producers 
were able to increase their scale of operations, substituting large-scale mills for trapiches. 
For example, Alfredo Posada who established the El Arado panela mill in 1929 and later 
transformed it into the Ingenio Maria Luisa5. Some producers became suppliers of raw cane 
to modern mills: many relocated to different regions. Entrepeneurial responses by panela 
producers to competition from modern sugar mills had an impact on patterns of land 
ownership and also on the dynamics of sugar expansion itself.
Though there is little quantitative data available prior to the 1950s, qualitative 
evidence shows that panela and other sugarcane byproducts such as chicha, guarapo and 
aguardiente were important elements of the Colombian diet in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries6. Even as late as 1954 average consumption of panela was 27 kg. per 
annum (Table S2.1)7. By 1970 per capita consumption had increased to 30 kg. per annum.
4See Table S2.2
5Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983). Sociedad v Economia en el Valle del Cauca: Emnresarios v Tecnoloeia en la 
Formation del Sector Azucarero en Colombia. 1860-1980. Bogota: Banco Popular, p.88.
6Melo, Jorge Orlando (1991). "Las Vicistudes del Modelo Liberal" In Ocampo, Jose Antonneio (Ed.), (1991). 
Historia Econdmica de Colombia. Bogot£: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, p. 167.
7 Table S2.1
Per Capita Panela and Sugar Consumption 
in Seven Colombian Cities 1953, 1970 and 1984-5 (Kg/year)
Year 1953 1970 1984-5 Growth Rate 
during 53/70
Growth Rate 
during 70/85
Panela 27 30 30 .5% 0%
Sugar 10 24 31 5.0% 1.8%
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During the same period processed sugar consumption rose from 10 kg. per capita per annum 
in 1955 to 24 kg. in 1970. By 1984/5 panela and sugar consumption were about equal at 30 
and 31 kg. per capita respectively. Five reasons account for the sustained importance of 
panela consumption despite the growing preference for sugar. First, the modern sugarcane 
industry could not meet internal demand. Second, employing locally available technology, 
panela was cheap to produce. Third, poor inter-regional communication tended to protect 
local producers of panela from centrally-produced refined sugar: panela was easier to 
transport and store than sugar. Fourth, rural consumers had a strong preference for the 
traditional product. Last, panela was an important staple used in traditional recipes8. 
Increased sugar consumption can be attributed to population growth and urbanization (city 
dwellers consume a higher proportion of sugar) and to the development of a modern food 
processing industry which used sugar as a sweetener and preservative9. Although panela 
may be considered an inferior good, many consumers still see sugar and panela as 
substitutes. Therefore price differentials must be taken into account. When average annual 
prices of the two commodities are plotted, a close inverse relationship is seen to exist 
throughout the 1936-1988 period. However panela prices are highly volatile as, unlike
Source: Rudas, Guillermo (1990). "Estudio General de la Agoindustria Panalera en Colombia." Bogot£: Pontificia 
Universidad Javeriana, p.33; Calculated from DANE Statistics.
8Sociedad de Agricultores y Ganaderos (1984). El Valle del Cauca: Tierras v Gentes. Cali: Sociedad de 
Agricultores y Ganaderos, p.73. Scientific research proves that panela is highly nutritious, containing several 
vitamins and minerals. Interviews conducted by Rudas in the late 1980s confirmed that the results o f this research 
were widely known: 93.8% of Rudas’ respondents stated that they knew that panela was more nutritious than sugar. 
See Rudas, Guillermo (1990, op.cit.. p.45.
9See FemanadezRiva, Javier and Motta Tello, Maria Teresa (1988). "Agroindustria y Desarrollo Agropecuario." 
Revista Nacional de Agricultura. No. 882, pp. 112-146.
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sugar, production is irregular being determined by labour availability10. Panela tends to be 
produced during the ’dead-time’ of coffee production when labour is available11. Annual 
price data disguise seasonal fluctuations making an analysis of the effect panela prices have 
on panela and sugar production difficult. Yet over time there were important changes in the 
location and scale of panela production. Rapid population growth and an undersupply of 
processed sugar, created space in the market place for the traditional product as the data on 
per capita consumption in note seven show.
Three types of change in the location and structure of panela production may be 
observed. In some cases modern sugar mills moved into and out of panela production in 
response to sugar/panela price differentials. In others, a few traditional farmers increased 
their scale of operations, displacing small- and medium-scale competitors. In yet others, 
small and medium producers survived by relocating to frontier regions. Contrary to the 
popular assumption that panela producers were mainly small- and medium-sized cultivators, 
tables S2.2 and S2.3 demonstrate that large-scale producers became increasingly important. 
First, to observe table S2.2.
10Junguito, Roberto, et.al. (1975). Las Industrias Azucareras v Panaleras en Colombia. Bogota 
FEDESARROLLO, p. 191; Rudas, Guillermo (1990), op.cit.. p.4.
“Rudas, Guillermo (1990), op.cit.. pp.4-5.
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Table S2.2
Principal Regions of 
Cane-Panela Cultivation, 1959/1986.
Region* Area, 1959(ha) Area, 1986(ha) % variation 
1959/1986
Narino 14,127 26,000 84
Montana
Nororiental
7,295 21,320 192
Rionegro 8,102 19,045 135
Amalfi 16,269 7,437 -54
Cauca Valley 28,200 4,897 -83
Andes 6,694 2,449 -63
Magdalena Medio 
Norte
1,332 2,250 69
Lengupa 3,127 1,600 -49
T&mesis 7,503 1,437 -80
Source: Constructed from Rudas, Guillermo (1990). "Estudio General de la Agromdustna Panalera en Colombia." 
Bogot£: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, p.21. Adapted from Censo Agropecuario (1959), Bogoti: DANE; 
Estadfsticas del Sector Agropecuario. Consensos Municipales. 1986 (1987), Bogoti: Ministerio de Agricultura and 
DANE; Anuario Estadfstico del Sector Agropecuario. 1986. 1987 (1987 and 1988), Bogotd: Ministerio de 
Agricultura, Anuario Estadfstico Agropecuario. 1988. 1989 (1989 and 1990), Bogoti: Minsiterio de Agricultura; 
Encuesta Aeropecuaria Piloto del Valle del Cauca. 1986 (1988), Bogoti: Ministerio de Agricultura; Estadfsticas del 
Sector Agropecuario. Consensos Municipales. 1986 (1988),(Boyacd, Santander, & Cundinamarca), Bogoti: 
Ministerio de Agricultura.
♦Due to different methods of data gathering the regions in the 1959 census and 1986 survey are not identical. But 
every effort has been made to ensure accuracy.
Table S2.2 refers to cane land exclusively devoted to panela through the period in the main 
producing areas12. In 1959 the region with the largest amount of cane-panela land was the 
Cauca Valley with 28,200 hectares or 30% of the total. By 1986 this dropped to 4,897 
hectares or 6%. As can be seen, the area under cane-panela in the Cauca Valley decreased 
by 83% between 1959 and 1986. Other regions which experienced a decrease in absolute 
and relative importance were Andes, Tamesis, and Amalfi (Antioquia) and Lengupa 
(Boyaca). Regions that experienced a significant fall in panela cultivation were those which
l2In 1959 a total o f 304,743 hectares was devoted to the cultivation of cane-panela. Of this total approximately 
100,000 hectares was located in the principal regions which were responsible for about 90% of market output; 
Rudas, Guillermo (1990), op.cit.. pp. 21, 23.
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possessed fertile agricultural land and where producers responded rapidly to changes in the 
market, particularly Antioquia and the Cauca Valley. Thus it appears that panela producers 
in these areas either changed their crop composition, shifting into coffee and domestic 
staples, or were displaced to other regions, of apparently lower quality land. Larger changes 
in Antioquia or Boyaca are beyond the scope of the thesis which is principally concerned 
with the developments in the Cauca Valley. Generally, increases in panela hectarage tended 
to occur in northeastern and eastern Colombia, marginal areas of lower quality land.
Table S2.3
Panela: Output Evolution for the Most Dynamic Regions, 1959, 1986 (tonnes/year).
Region* 1959
(Dept.
)
% of
total
prod
uctio
n in
1959
1986
(Region
)
% of
total
produ
ction
in
1986
Varia
tion
59/86
Annual
Growth
Rate
Cauca
Valley
3,941 20 15,881 31 303.0 5.3
River Suarez 
Banks
3,678 19 12,009 24 225.7 4.5
Frontino 3,244 17 9,452 18 191.4 4.0
Andes 3,244 17 7,020 14 116.4 2.9
Narino 1,074 5 5,077 10 372.6 5.9
N.E.
Mountains
4,494 23 1,577 3 -64.9 -3.8
Source: Constructed from Rudas, Guillermo (1990), op.cit.. p.23 and based on calculations from information from 
table S2.2.
Note: %s may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Due to different methods of data gathering the regions in the 1959 census and 1986 survey are not identical. But 
every effort has been made to ensure accuracy.
Table S2.3 refers to panela output and contains data on the most dynamic regions. 
Paradoxically it shows that panela output increased in all areas. Were cane-panela producers 
the sole suppliers of panela? Obviously not. Increased consumption of sugar and panela was 
driven by population growth and the evidence seems to suggest that modern mills in the
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Cauca Valley elaborated panela from time to time. Therefore it proves that modern mills 
often competed with or displaced small producers. Table S2.2 shows that in 1959 the Cauca 
Valley had the largest amount of land under cane-panela and table S2.3 corroborates that it 
was the largest producer of panela with 20% of total output. However, by 1986 the share 
of output increased to 31 % while cane-panela land decreased massively, falling by 83 % since 
1959. The apparent contradiction in terms of the contraction of cane-panela land and the 
growth of panela output can be explained by sugar mills responding to seasonal price 
differentials, switching to panela some cane that had been earmarked for refining. A recent 
study by Oscar Delgado for 1981 inidicated that 42.7% of panela was produced by 
agribusinesses13. Beechert’s research on Australia shows that the emergence of capital- 
intensive sugar refining led to the consolidation of large-scale units and discouraged small- 
scale production14. If all large-scale mills are located in the Cauca Valley it can be assumed 
that panela produced in other regions was elaborated by small- to medium-sized producers, 
some of whom might have been displaced from the Valley. As tables S2.2 and S2.3 also 
demonstrate, in Departments such as Narino there was a substantial increase in hectares 
planted with panela (hectarage grew by 84% between 1959 and 1986) while the share of 
panela output only increased slightly from five to ten percent. This would seem to indicate 
that less-efficient traditional methods of production prevailed in these regions. In Antioquia
l3Delgado, Oscar (1985). "La Estructura Agraria en Colombia." In Bejarano, Jesus Antonneio (Ed.), Lecturas 
Sobre Economia Colombia Sfelo XX. Bogoti: Procultura, p.49. Delgado definfes ’agribusiness’ as capital-intensive 
units engaged in the production, processing and distribution of farm products.
wBeechert, Edward (1988). "Technology and the Plantation Labour Supply: The Case of Queensland, Hawaii, 
Louisiana and Cuba." In Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (Eds.). The World Sugar Economy in War and 
Depression. 1914-1940. London: Routledge, p. 138. For further discussion on the impact of technology change on 
the scale of production see Sugar Part I.
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(Amalfi, Andes, and T£mesis) cane-panela hectarage declined absolutely, yet at the same 
time absolute output increased (Frontino and Andes). A probable explanation is that cane- 
panela was intercropped with coffee and domestic staples and that census enumerators had 
failed to classify the land correctly. Another explanation for the discrepancy between the fall 
in cultivated area and the growth in output may be that productivity levels were higher in 
central parts of the country where producers had access to better land, credit and inputs (e.g. 
chemical inputs and seedlings). This would support the analysis in part I that capital-bias 
was prevalent in modernised sectors, to the detriment of marginalised small producers. Also, 
large scale cultivation resulted in general changes in production structures with plantations 
obtaining the highest quality land and initiating a process where small producers were forced 
to relocate to less desireable areas.
With reference to the Cauca Valley, tables S2.2 and S2.3 demonstrate that within 27 
years, the region was transformed from the area with the largest share of cane-panela land 
and output to the status of marginal cultivator but most important producer. However does 
this mean, as has been suggested above, that the expansion of modern sugar mills in the 
valley drove out small- and medium-sized panela producers? Table S2.4 signals that for an 
earlier period (1901-1952) this was the case.
78
Part II: La Manuelita Sugar Mill
Table S2.4
Crops Displaced by Cane-Sugar between 1901 and 1952 
in the Cauca Valley
Land % Land % Total Area % 
Displaced Displaced, Displaced,
, 1901- 1922-1952 1901-1952 
1922
Land Use Ha. % Ha. % Ha. %
Pasture 8,114 67.9 21,291 70.7 29,406 69.9
Forests and Stubble 384 3.2 4,048 13.4 4,432 10.5
Cane-panela 1,101 9.2 2,271 7.6 3,376 8.0
Rice 54 .5 506 1.8 560 1.3
Cocoa 4,211 19.2 371 1.2 2,662 3.6
Others - - 1,620 5.3 1,620 3.8
Total 11,945 100 30,111 100 42,056 100
Source: Mancini, Simeone (1954), "Tenencia y Uso de la Tierra por la Industria Azucarera Colombiana.MActa 
Agrondmica, Vol. 4, Palmira: Facultad de Agronomia de Palmira.
Table S2.4 shows that in the main (between 1901 and 1952) land under sugar grew at the 
expense of pasture and forests. This is not surprising given the land extensive nature of 
cattle ranching and the felling of timber on virgin land. However, cane-panela was the most 
important commodity displaced by sugar during 1901-1952. A total of 3,376 hectares of 
cane land was shifted into cane-sugar cultivation for large-scale processing. If this land was 
mainly absorbed by modern cane-sugar producers this would imply that 1,125 families were 
proletarianized15. Also extrapolating from table S2.4 it is plausible to argue that panela 
displacement continued after 1952 and that, as indicated above, modern sugar production 
resulted in the expulsion of many small cane growers. Furthermore the data in tables S2.2, 
S2.3 and S2.4 also suggest a high degree of mobility in rural populations and that the
,3Assuming that most cane-panela producers farmed three-hectare plots and given that 3,376 hectares of cane 
land were displaced this results in 1,125 households. The assumption o f three-hectare plots is based on table S2.9, 
that evidences that the majority of plots in the Cauca Valley were comprised of less than 5 hectares in 1960, 
1970/71, 1977/78, and 1986.
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expansion of modern sugar production had a substantial impact on land markets and rural 
institutions.
INSTITUTIONS and LAND USAGE: development of organisations, evolution of land 
tenure and formal institutions
In this section changes in land usage patterns will be further discussed. First, the 
development of informal instituions will be analysed. Secondly, early Manuelita land usage 
data will be examined. Thirdly, larger Cauca Valley trends will be discussed for the 1936- 
1960 period. Fourthly, the evolution of cane contracts will be mapped. Fiftly, later 
Manuelita land usage trends, particularly the increased in contractual cane will be explored. 
Lastly the formation of formal instituions will be outlined.
Historically, large-scale cane growing in the Cauca Valley was often combined with 
cattle ranching, a land extensive activity. These processes were complementary in that cane 
bagasse served as cattle feed. Although little data is available about land usage in the late 
nineteenth century, German Colmenares argues that if haciendas existed as productive 
enterprises it was only as an activity subsidiary to mining, providing draught animals and 
food staples for the mining camps. Labour scarcity also precluded the existence of large- 
scale sugar plantations16. However during the twentieth century, stagnation in other sectors, 
coupled with increased demand for sugar, encouraged capitalists to develop cane. Growth 
in domestic demand after the 1930s coupled with investment in infrastructure also facilitated 
the development of inter-regional trade in sugar. In addition, between 1950 and 1970
“Cdmenares, German (1975). Terratenientes. Mineros Y Comerciantes. Cali: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, p. 130.
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domestic sugar prices doubled in real terms, further fostering market production. Given 
these circumstances it is likely that hacendados intensified cane cultivation at the expense of 
ranching17. However, transformations in the Cauca Valley were more complex18. Mill 
owners were not drawn exclusively from the traditional landed class. Two types of sugar 
capitalists have been observed by Jose Maria Rojas, capitanes de hacienda and capitanes de 
industrial9. Responding to market circumstances some hacendados switched pasture and 
cane-panela land to cane-sugar and founded large-scale mills. Another type of mill owner 
derived from urban capitalists who diversified into sugar production, these were the capitanes 
de industria.
Thus the founders of the sugarcane industry in the Cauca Valley were different from 
the mixed-cropping small commodity producers described in part I. They were also different 
from independent large-scale cane growers in other areas in the world because many were 
mill owners. It must also be emphasized that most capitanes de industria who initially 
entered the sugar industry as mill owners, eventually acquired land20. As Cauca Valley 
sugar processors grew most of their cane, the conflict between cane growers and processors 
present in other parts of the world was more muted in Colombia21.
Moreover, given their status capitanes de industria and hacienda experienced little
17Vdsquez, Edgar (1990). "Historia del Desarrollo Econdmico y Urbano en Cali." Boletin Socioecondmico. 
No.20, p.6.
,8See Collins, Charles David (1985). "Formacidn de un Sector de Clase Social: la Burguesia Azucarera en el 
Valle del Cauca Durante los Afios Treinta y Cuarenta." Boletfn Socio-Econdmico. Nos. 14-15, pp.35-90; Rojas, Josd 
Maria (1983), op.cit.
l9Rojas, Josd Maria (1983), op.cit.. p.91, (author’s translation).
“ See below.
21Rojas, Jose Maria (1985). "Sobre el Papel de los Empresarios en la Formacidn del Sector Azucarero." Boletm
Socio-Econdmico. Nos. 14-15, pp.7-34, pp.7-45.
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difficulty obtaining capital unlike small cane-panela growers. As entrepreneurial large
landowners they rapidly acquired new technology. They were also well represented within
the Colombian political system and obtained preferential treatment in terms of access to
credit and import licenses. The benefits conferred by this status are illustrated by the cases
of two Cauca Valley mill owners who were able to mobilize diplomatic support in their
efforts to procure modern equiment during a time of international crisis,
. . .the G6mez Sierra family are among Colombia's wealthiest landowners and are highly 
responsible and influential, could lend the weight of their support for obtaining the permit. It may 
be recalled that the G6mez Sierra sugar factory, the Ingenio San Jos6 near Palmira, Valle was 
equipped with British machinery delivered during the war, and experience with this machinery has 
been so satisfactory that the family are anxious to obtain, by preference, British equipment where 
possible22.
or
It now happens that the sugar factory above mentioned <La Esperanza> urgently needs to 
receive these spare parts as soon as possible, seeing that the factory is half paralysed by lack o f  
them; and that, in order to send them rapidly by aeroplane, a priority is required, which it is 
within the competence of His Majesty’s Government to grant?3.
This supports the argument maintained by Rojas and Charles David Collins that these
capitanes de hacienda and industria had connections with the government which facilitated
the procurement of machinery24.
The typologies of sugar capitalists established by Rojas and Collins provide a useful
starting point for a more detailed analysis of the evolution of the agroindustrial complex in
the Cauca Valley although it is difficult to fit all individuals within their classification as the
case of Ingenio Manuelita discussed below proves this case. The Cauca Valley cane complex
originated from three large-scale mills founded during the first three decades of the century:
“ PRO, Foreign Office (10 Oct. 1945). "Quarry machinery for Colombian family,", F0371.44952, Registry 
Number AS5688/198/11.
“ PRO, Foreign Office (4 Aug. 1945). "Air Priority for Pistonne Rings ordered by La Esperanza Sugar Factory," 
[signed J. Jaramillo Arango, Colombian Ambassador to the UK]. F0371.44955, Registry Number AS4118/610/11.
24Collins, Charles David (1985), op.cit.. pp.35-90; Rojas, Jose Maria (1985), op.cit.. pp.7-34.
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Manuelita, Riopaila and Providencia25. Although the number of mills in operation between 
1900 and 1990 fluctuated between 3 and 21, as can be seen in table S2.5, most modern mills 
were founded between the 1930s and 1950s. In 1990 there were thirteen mills in 
operation26.
Table S2.5
Dates of Foundation and Closure of Modern Mills in the Cauca Valley, 1900-1990
Year Sugar Mills Founded/(Closed)
1900-19 Manuelita*
1920-29 Riopaila*, Providencia*
1930-39 Bengala (1980), Mayaguez*, Maria Luisa (1968), La Industria (1976)
1940-49 Pichichi*, Central Oriente (1980), Balsilla (1985), San Carlos*, Papayal*, Central 
Castilla*, El Porvenir (1975)
1950-59 La Carmelita*, San Fernando (1969), Central Tumaco*, La Cabana*, Mel6ndez (1976)
1960-69 Naranjo (1981), Cauca*
1970-79 Risaralda*
1980-90 No mills established
Source: Constructed from Orozco, Guillermo A. (1984). La Agroindustrial Azucarera Colombiana. 1960-1983. Cali: 
ASOCANA, p.39; Sociedad de Agricultores y Ganaderos (1984), op.cit.. p.62; Knight, Rolf (1972). Sugar 
Plantations and Labor Patterns in the Cauca Valiev. Colombia. Toronto: University of Toronto Anthropological 
Series Number 12, p.38; ASOCANA (1992). Aspectos Generales del Sector Azucarero. 1990-1991. Cali: 
ASOCANA.
*Sugar mills in operation in 1990.
(date)=year in which sugar mill closed.
The table also shows the volatility of the industry. For example of the fourteen mills 
established between 1930 and 1960 only seven were still in operation in 1990.
Despite the fluctuation in the number of firms in operation, table S2.6 proves that the 
industry was dynamic. Land under cane grew almost continuously from 1915 to 1990. 
Growth was particularly intense in the late 1930s and the 1950s. A comparison between 
tables S2.5 and S2.6 confirms that there was a close correlation between the growth in the
“ Orozco, Guillermo A. (1984). La Agroindustria Azucarera Colombiana. 1960-1983. Cali: ASOCANA, p.35.
“ Aspectos Generales del Sector Azucarero. 1990-1991. (1992) Cali: ASOCANA, p. 13.
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number of mills and the area of land under cane. From the arguments advanced by Rojas 
and Collins it is logical to assume that most mills farmed their own land. Moreover table 
S2 .ll shows that until the 1960s most cane was cultivated on mill-owned land. Only after 
the 1960s did mills begin to buy in cane from independent growers. This would appear to 
suggest that most mills set up before 1960 had access to sufficient land. This argument will 
be expanded below.
Table S2.6
Land Under Cane Cultivation in the Cauca Valley, 1915-1990
Year Hectares % variation from year 
to year
1915 7,958
1937 14,341 80
1941 29,398 105
1951 36,926 26
1952 37,495 2
1960 61,600 64
1965 70,363 14
1970 91,982 31
1975 118,450 29
1980 133,187 12
1985 131,557 -20
1990 143,435 9
Source: Adapted from Vasquez, Edgar (1990). "Histona del Desarrollo Economico y Urbano en Cali." Boletin 
Socioecon6mico. No.20, p.5 based on: Anuario Estadistico. 1912 (1941). Cali: Secretariade Agricultura y Fomento 
del Valle; Censo Agronecuario 1950 (1951), Bogotd: Ministerio de Agricultura; Anuario Estadistica del Sector 
Agronecuario 1990. Bogot&: Ministerio de Agricultura. ASOCANA, 1990.
According to Urrea’s study of the Cauca Valley in 1960, the sugar agroindustry was 
composed of 16 sugar mills which owned a total of 133,187 hectares. By 1980 the number 
p f  sugar mills declined to 14 with 135,600 hectares27. If Urrea’s figures are compared with
^Urrea G., Fernando (1987). "Competencia y Cambio T6cnico en el Sector Azucarero en la D6cada del 80." 
Cuadernos de Aeroindustria v Economia Rural. No.19, p .11.
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those in table S2.6 it can be seen that only a small proportion of cane was cultivated on land 
not owned by mills. The data above would appear to confirm that, at least until the 1960s, 
most mills owned sufficient land for cane production, probably land was under-utilized before 
the 1960s. This also suggests that rapid growth in production during the decade soon 
exhausted available stocks. Thereafter increased mill output could only be sustained by 
buying in cane. Urrea’s statistics also corroborates that the number of mills did not increase 
significantly during the 1960-1980 period and that not all mill-owned land was used for cane 
growing until the end of the period. This would again indicate that most cane producers 
began as land-extensive operations that gradually devoted a larger and larger area of the 
estate to cane. Only when all the available land was planted with cane was there a trend 
towards more capital-intensive methods of production and a tendency to purchase cane from 
independent growers. Though as Rojas described two different types of mill owner (capitdn 
de hacienda and capitdn de industria) after the decision to establish a mill strategies for the 
agribusiness converged.
As has been proved, after the 1930s cane-sugar cultivation rapidly displaced cattle 
ranching. It has also been demonstrated that there were sound economic reasons for 
producing cane. However was there an opportunity cost and were there alternatives to 
specializing in sugar? Why did these entrepreneurs decide to grow cane and not other 
important, highly-demanded commodities such as cotton, wheat, or rice, that do not require 
such high capital investments for processing and that are suitable to the biological conditions 
in the Cauca Valley?28
“ The Cauca Valley has the unique characteristic that tropical, citrus, and temperate crops can all be cultivated. 
See Holt, Pat M. (1964). Colombia Today- And Tomorrow. New York: Praeger Publishers, p. 168.
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One explanation is attempts at agrarian reform. The land reform bills passed in 1936 
and 1961 were aimed at appropriating land that was not being economically exploited29. 
Most analysts agree that the Colombian land reform bills were effective in influencing 
production decisions and firming land ownership, but did little to redistribute land. One way 
landowners could demonstrate that their land was being exploited for economic purposes was 
to plant an extensive crop such as cane which could be combined with cattle ranching in 
order to spread risks. This type of land extensive activity that distributed risks was more 
difficult with cotton or wheat. Though the argument can made be that there were many 
possibilities for market growth for sugar, the same reasoning can be used for wheat or 
cotton. At this time Colombia was not self-sufficient in the production of many foodstuffs 
and imported sugar, wheat, and rice30. Furthermore the export potential for sugar was 
limited. Processing methods were not competitive and international sugar agreements 
restricted the entrance of new exporting countries31. Only after the 1959 Revolution when 
Cuba lost its US sugar quota was it possible for Colombia to gain entry to the US market. 
Thus it appears that landowners resorted to cane growing in order to secure land rights.
A second explanation for the preference for sugar could be flexible land ownership 
patterns during the late nineteenth century and the late 1940s to early 1960s, the epoch of
29A  review of the agrarian reform policies is not within the scope of this thesis. For information on the 1936 
policy see Machado, Absaldn (1986). Politicas Aerarias en Colombia 1900-1960. Bogoti: Universidad National 
de Colombia; Fajardo, Dario (1983). Haciendas. Camnesinos v Politicas Aerarias en Colombia. 1920-1980. Bogoti; 
Gaitin, Gloria (1976). Colombia: la Lucha nor la Tierra en la Decada del Treinta. Bogoti; Moncayo, Victor (1975). 
"La Ley al Problema Agrario en Colombia." Revista Ideoloeia v Sociedad No. 14-15; Tirado Alvaro (1981). 
Aspectos Politicos del Primer Gobierno de Alfonso L6nez Pumareio. Bogotd: Siglo Veintiuno Editores; Hirschman, 
Albert O. (1963). Joumevs Toward Progress. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. For more sources on the
1961 agrarian reform see Banana Part n .
“ Rojas, Jos6 Maria, (1983), op.cit.. p. 101.
3ISee Sugar Part I.
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la violencia32. The Cauca Valley in the nineteenth century has been described by some 
historians as an area of large landed estates. This view has been challenged by Rolf 
Knight33. Knight contends that because of constant fighting and wars during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, there was much room for entrepeneurial enterprise and land 
acquisition34. Although violence continued into the twentieth century, the nature and origins 
of conflict became more complex. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, a period when 
the majority of mills were established, political instability and rural-rural and rural-urban 
migration intensified35. For Salomdn Kalmanovitz this flight from rural conflict in the later 
period probably led to a concentration of agricultural units: rural areas were less attractive 
and small producers pulled out or were expelled36. Dale Adams reverses causality, arguing 
that the growth of large-scale, land extensive methods or production placed pressure on small 
producers who were unable to defend their properties and led to migration and violence37.
Thus, changing land ownership patterns of the late nineteeenth century and mid- 
twentetieth century allowed capitanes de industria to acquire more land and capitanes de 
hacienda to further consolidate holdings. Moreover, this situation of intense rural out­
migration and changing land usage patterns influenced mill owner’s decisions to refrain from
32There is an extensive body o f literature on violence in Colombia. Two sources which provide an excellent 
introduction are: Ocquist, Paul (1980). Violence. Conflict and Politics in Colombia. Boulder: Academic Press, 
particularly chapters 1,4 and 6; Sdnchez, Gonzalo (1991). Guerra v Politica en la Sociedad Colombiana. Bogotd: 
El Ancora Editores.
33See Melo, Jorge Orlando (1991), op.cit.. Fals Borda, Orlando
^Knight, Rolf (1972). Sugar Plantations and Labor Patterns in the Cauca Valiev. Colombia. Toronto: University 
o f Toronto Anthropological Series Number 12, p.32.
33Adams, Dale (1969). "Rural Migration in Agricultural Development in Colombia." Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 17(4), pp.527-539.
36Kalmanovitz, Salom6n (1988). Economia v Naci6n. Bogoti: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, pp.397-399.
^Adams, Dale (1969), op.cit.. p .528.
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contracting cane suppliers. Because small- and medium-sized producers found it difficult to 
defend their plot in times of rural unrest and violence (i.e. they did not have the resources 
to hire guards, etc.) mill owners preferred to grow their own cane38. Hence, this can 
explain why independent cultivators were used less in Colombia than in other regions of the 
world. It also demonstrates other forms of production-biases which accrue to large units. 
Manuelita provides an example of the importance of informal organisations that existed and 
enabled easier access to land during the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half 
of the twentieth.
The origin of the Manuelita estate can be traced to Spanish Colonial times. Until 
1767, when it was sold to the Jesuits, the estate was crown land— an Hacienda Reat39. By 
1799, 127 cane mills (trapiches) were in operation. Subsequently, the hacienda passed to 
Pedro Gonzalez de la Penilla and was later sold by an heir to Mariano Becerra Caravajal. 
He sold the land to Jorge Enrique Isaacs who bequeathed the debt-ridden hacienda to 
Santiago Eder. Eder, the founder of Manuelita, was a Russian-US immigrant who had close 
ties to the USA. By the end of the 1860s Eder owned 1000 hectares of land cultivated with 
cane40. Eder can be described as a entrepeneur who set up the first modern trapiche in 
Colombia41. Later his family was to be the first to introduce steam-driven milling in the
38See Ocquist, Paul (1980), op.cit.: Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1978). "Capitalist Development in the Colombian 
Countryside." In Arrubla, Mario et.al. (Eds.), Colombia Hov. Bogotd: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. More discussed 
below on methods o f cane procurement.
39Sociedad de Agricultores y Ganaderos (1984), op.cit.. p.69, citing Cordoba Zuloaga.
^Fals Borda, Orlando (1982). Historia de la Cuestion Aeraria en Colombia. Bogoti: Carlos Valencia Editores, 
jp.98. For a history of Manuelita see Eder, Phanor James (1981). El Fundador Santiago M. Eder. Bogotd: 
Publicismo y Ediciones.
41Rojas, Jose Maria (1984), op.cit.: Collins, Charles (1984), op.cit.. Ocampo, Jose Antonio, op.cit.
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Cauca Valley in 190342.
One of Eder’s main asset was his status as a "foreigner". He was able to profit from 
the informal institutions of Colombian society. Namely, throughout the nineteenth century 
Colombia was plagued with Civil Wars and land was transferred over to the temporary 
winner; a common expression of the time was: ’he who lost the war, lost his hacienda’ 
(quien perdi'a la guerra, perdia la hacienda)43. Losses were related to political party 
loyalty which was highly correlated to family lineage, therefore foreigners were the only 
landowners who escaped expropriation. This enabled Eder to start his agricultural enterprise 
in the middle of the nineteenth century and maintain the land throughout the war period. 
According to Knight:
While bands of armed irregulars occasionally penetrated the plantation boundaries and some 
military commanders attempted to draft peons on Manuelita, the plantation and its workers seem 
to have been relatively uninvolved in the fighting44.
He was able to accumulate—and hold--land because he was a foreigner. National and 
international business contacts enabled him to secure the latest mill machinery45.
Similar to other enterprises, Manuelita at this time was devoted to cattle ranching, 
coffee and tobacco, as well as cane growing. An example of this diversity is provided by
42Borrero, Heroin (1984). "El Azucar en Colombia." In Valle del Cauca: Tierras v Gentes. Cali: Sociedad de 
Agricultores de Colombia, p.79.
43Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983), op.cit.. p. 17.
“ Knight, Rolf (1972), op.cit.. p.33.
45Roias. Jos6 Maria (1983). op.cit.. p .18.
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the Manuelita census of 1918:
Table S2.7
Manuelita Land Use in 1918
Land Use Acres %
Sugarcane 1003.3 48.9
Improved Pasture 437.6 21.3
Natural Pasture 168.5 8.2
Coffee Plots 51.5 2.5
Woodland 337.3 16.5
Worker’s Camp (Campamento)* 36.3 1.8
Factory and Yard 15.8 .8
Total 2050 100
Source: Constructed from Knight. Rolf (1972). op.cit.. pp.36-38.
*Campamento consists of five barracks capable of housing close to 600 men, 31 family houses for administrative 
staff and mayordomos, 12-room house housing single clerical staff and 3 storehouses and a company store.
Almost a third of the land was under pasture and another 16.5% consisted of woodland. 
However, at 2,050 hectares, land held in 1918 represented only 25% of the size of the 
property in 1990. This indicates that a great deal of land was acquired in the twentieth 
century, particularly in the period before the before the twentieth century sugar "boom"46. 
Therefore, land acquired at the end of the nineteenth century was not significant in contrast 
to the estates in Brazil and the Dominican Republic which were described as experiencing 
a process of modernisation without change.
Prior to the establishment of Manuelita S.A. the enterprise was officially registered 
in the USA as the Cauca Valley Agricultural Company. In 1927 the Company was divided, 
the Cauca Valley Agricultural Company was left with cattle-ranching properties: cane land
^Interviews with Luis Ernesto Sanclemente (Feb. 1992), Ex-president of Manuelita, Cali, Colombia; Oscar 
Gerardo Ramos (Feb. 1992), Historian at ASOCANA, Cali, Colombia.
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was transferred to a new entity, Ingenio Manuelita, S.A.47. Cultivation maps, cadastral 
surveys, and annual reports submitted to the Superintendencia de Sociedades chart the 
expansion of the estate over time and changes in origin of cane48. This data shows that 
approximately half the land held originated from the creation of the Manuelita S.A.: most 
of the rest was obtained by the mid-1950s. In 1944 the company owned 3,329 hectares of 
land, 2,231 planted with cane49. By 1956 Manuelita and affiliated Sociedades Anonimas 
possessed 5,522 hectares with 3,941 under cane50. The land that was not planted with cane 
was used for pasture for draught animals or granted to workers to raise subsistence crops. 
Gradually more and more of the estate was converted to cane as little new land was available 
for purchase or lease. Appendix S.4 shows the gradual expansion of land devoted to cane. 
By 1964 it can be seen that most of the estates, except Carbonara, were producing cane. In 
1990 Manuelita owned 5,400 hectares of land; 4,626 were planted with cane and the 
remainder was primarily dedicated for fodder crops, roads, worker’s housing and the mill51.
The change in land usage from a mixed enterprise in the nineteenth century to 
concentration on cane shows the specialization of the enterprise and more intensive land-use. 
It also demonstrates that most land was acquired before 1956; in other words before exports
47Eder, Phanor James (1981). El Fundador Santiago M. Eder. Bogoti: Publicismo y Ediciones, p.636. S.A., 
Sociedad An6nima, which loosely defined, is a company which is owned by stockholders. Yearly reports to the 
Banking Superintendency from Manuelita reveal progressive changes in Manuelita Sociedad Andnima structure. 
These reports were unearthed from 1922 onwards. Accounting was conducted on a sociedad andnima basis until 
the 1960s.
^Sometimes a farm would expand its landholding yet this would not appear in the sociedad andnima statements. 
Thus the need to analyse cadastral surveys in order to note changes in farm size. See Appendix S.4.
49Eder, Phanor James (1981). op.cit.. p.643.
^Ibid., p.654.
31Interviews with Gerardo Ortiz (Feb 1992), Cultivation Department, Manuelita S. A., Palmira, Colombia; Carlos 
Navia (13 Feb. 1992), Head o f Field Department, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia. See table S2.1S
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became important. Furthermore these developments show that it is difficult to categorise 
Eder as a capitdn de hacienda or industria. He was not a traditional land owner but became 
a major capitalist who invested heavily in agriculture.
An analysis of land usage patterns in the early history of the sugar industry in the 
Cauca Valley was presented above. Below the post-1950 period will be examined. After 
1959, with the foundation of the Departamento Administrative Nacional de Estadfstica 
(DANE) and ASOCANA, more sophisticated data is available. Ministry of Agriculture 
material is also more specific. These sources compile information by department. First, 
aggregate Valle del Cauca land tenure data will be presented. Secondly, this will be followed 
by an analysis of cane data in the Cauca Valley. Thirdly, the section will conclude with 
analysis of Manuelita data. It must be emphasized that Valle del Cauca department and the 
geographic region of the Cauca Valley are two distinct areas. The latter comprising the 
whole area where cane is grown, primarily of Valle del Cauca and sugar producing areas of 
the departments of Risaralda and Cauca (Map S2.1). Thus Valle del Cauca data will serve 
as a proxy as the majority of cane-growing lands are located there.
In the 1960-1990 period land that was owned and administered by a sugar mill 
enterprise was almost entirely dedicated to cane growing, though mixed cropping persisted 
in some areas. The widespread practice of diversified hacienda production which had 
prevailed until the early part of the twentieth century had all but disappeard by the 1960s. 
Now land located close to mills was devoted exclusively to cane. However intercropping 
was normal in areas of rough terrain, lacking suitable supplies of water, or those with lower 
quality soil where crops such as red beans, corn, tobacco, sunflower, or soyabean were
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planted in addition to cane52. This diversification helped reduce regional food price 
instability, avoided cane overproduction, and maintained employment of the agricultural work 
force53. Nevertheless, monocropping by cane-sugar plantations was more harmful to the 
environment than mixed cropping techniques used by cane-panela producers.
Gini coefficients for Valle del Cauca show land usage concentration was high 
throughout the period.
Table S2.8
Valle del Cauca Gini Coefficient for Land Concentration, 1960-1986.
Year Gini Coefficient
1960 .79
1970 .80
1977 .83
1986 .79
Source: Encuesta Agronecuario Piloto del Valle del Cauca (1987). Bogoti: Ministerio de 
Agricultura, Chart 10, p.30. Calculated based on data from: National Agricultural Census of 
1960 and 1970 (1961 and 1971), Bogotl: DANE and Ministerio de Agricultura; Cauca Valiev 
Agricultural Census 1977/78 (1979), Bogotd: SEAM; Initial Agricultural Survey of Cauca Valiev 
1986 (1987), Bogot£: Ministerio de Agricultura.
Crop characteristics influenced land tenure structures in the Cauca Valley. In the case of
cane-sugar it was easier to maintain land extensive production patterns because labour
demand was aseasonal in contrast to other crops. Whereas in the cases of tobacco and
coffee, the seasonality of labour requirements forced large-scale producers to pull out of
production because they were unable to compete with their small- and medium-scale
counterparts54.
“ "Impacto Social Azucarero." (11 Oct. 1989), La Republica.
"Ibid.
"Kalmanovitz, Salomdn (1988), op.cit.. p.331. This does not contradict the argument of scale-bias presented 
in Sugar Part I as the ability to maintain a permanent labour force conferred cane growers an added advantage over 
cultivators which only demanded seasonal workers.
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Tables S2.9 and S2.10 contain a break-down of land distribution by plot size during 
the 1960-1986 period. The data refer to usufruct rights rather than land ownership. Tenants 
paid rents in cash, kind, labour services or a combination of any of the above. Other 
arrangements included sharecropping and colonisation55. The data show that the most 
common plot size was less than five hectares throughout. Total plots under 50 hectares 
comprised the majority of all landholdings (consistently around 90%). Thus demonstrating 
that there were a considerable number small holders who could supply cane and labour to 
the mill.
Table S2.9
Distribution of Land in Valle del Cauca, 1960-1986 
Number of Plots and their Respective Percentages.
Size of Ag Prod. 
Unit
1960 1970/71 1977
/78
1986
(Hectares) #Plots % #Plots % #Plots % #Plots %
< 5 25760 52.1 26185 53.7 19268 54.2 26440 51.4
5-10 8774 17.7 6955 14.3 4916 13.8 7960 15.5
10-50 10789 21.8 10892 22.3 7672 21.6 11933 23.2
50-100 2012 4.1 2339 4.8 1711 4.8 2570 5.0
100-500 1842 3.7 2064 4.2 1685 4.7 2197 4.3
500-1000 201 .4 234 .5 226 .6 266 .5
>1000 69 .1 102 .2 94 .3 65 .1
Total # of Plots 49447 48771 35572 51431
Agricultura de Colombia, OPSA, SEAM, PNUD, FAO, URDA,9, p.28. Comite de Producci6n Agricola (1971), 
Bogot4: DANE; Censo Nacional Agropecuario del Valle del Cauca 60/70. Bogoti: DANE; Censo Agropecuario 
de Valle del Cauca 77/78 (1979), Bogoti: Ministerio de Agricultura.
^Primera Encuesta Nacional Aeropecuaria: Total Denartamentos. (1990). Bogotd: Ministerio de Agricultura, 
pp. 6-7.
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Table S2.10
Total Land Area in Valle del Cauca, 1960-1986 
and their Respective Percentages.
Size of Ag 
Prod. Unit
1960 1970/71 1977
/78
1986
(Hec-tares) Total Plot 
Area
% Total Plot 
Area
% Total Plot 
Area
% Total Plot 
Area
%
< 5 44550 4.0 37985 3.1 22947 2.2 38833 3.2
5-1) 62634 5.6 49508 4.1 35413 3.4 53367 4.4
10-50 231932 20.8 240275 19.8 171262 16.4 246376 20.3
50-100 138189 12.4 158621 13.1 117779 11.3 171778 14.2
100-500 381134 34.2 403795 33.3 348337 33.4 426358 35.1
500-1000 132874 11.9 136156 11.2 148371 14.2 172640 14.2
>1000 123006 11.0 185262 15.3 199843 19.1 103914 8.6
Total 1114049 1211602 1043952 1213266
Source: Constructed from Agropecuario Piloto del Valle del Cauca (1987), Ministerio de Agricultura de Colombia, 
OPSA, SEAM, PNUD, FAO, URDA, Chart 9, p.28; Censo Nacional Agropecuario del Valle del Cauca 60/70 
(1971), Bogot£: DANE; Censo Agropecuario de Valle del Cauca 77/78 (1970), Bogotd: Ministerio de Agricultura.
As can be seen the total number of plots varied considerably during the period: the highest
number was in 1986 with 51,431, and the lowest in 1977/78 with 35,572. This indicates an
increasing trend to divide units. This variation also showed dynamic changes in access to
land. The period of greatest volatility was between 1970 and 1986 and the most stability was
between 1960 and 1970. However in terms of percentages of total landholdings the most
prominent plots size (<  5 ha) only comprised 4 to 2.2 per cent of total land area throughout
the 1960-1986 period. These small plots had the highest proportion of land area in 1960
(4%) and their lowest in 1977/78 (2.2%). In 1986 they accounted for 3.2%. This
demonstrates that, as in other sugar producing regions of the world, land became more
concentrated and small-scale producers cultivated only a small share of land56. However
^See Eisenberg, Peter (1974). The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco: Modernisation Without Change. 1840-1910. 
Berkeley: University o f California Press; see Sugar Part I.
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it must be borne in mind that cane cultivation represented a small percentage of agricultural 
land-use in Valle del Cauca. A comparison of tables S2.6, S2.9 and S2.10 suggests that in 
1980 approximately 10% of land was devoted to cane cultivation, a figure that has been 
steadily increasing. (The 1960 figure was 6%). Thus increasing land concentration appears 
to be a general feature of the Valle del Cauca and not only a characteristic of the sugar 
agroindustry.
A similar trend is observed if the analysis groups plots of 50 ha. and under (instead 
of 5 ha.). It can be seen that the proportion of total land farmed accounted for by these units 
fell from a high of 30.4% in 1960 to a low of 22% in 1977/78, with a modest recovery to 
27.9% in 1986. Though there were considerable variances from the mean, on average small- 
and medium-sized units accounted for 27 % of land area. These variations again show the 
relative instability of plots of up to 50 hectares. The data demonstrate that there were 
possibilities for small- and medium-sized (up to 50 ha.) growers to supply cane to the mills. 
But as will be seen below, their share in terms of numbers supplying cane and amount of 
cane supplied is only marginal.
Landholdings of 100-500 hectares comprised the largest share of land area, with a low 
of 33.3% in 1970/71 and a high of 35.1% in 1986. The plot size category that experienced 
the most volatility was greater than 1000 ha. From 1960 to 1977/78 the share of land 
represented by very large landholdings increased continuously, virtually doubling. However 
between 1977/78 and 1986 the share fell dramatically from 19.1% to 8.6%, a level below 
that of 1960. Over time, large-landowners (above 100 ha.) continued to maintain a dominant 
proportion of land in their control. Plots over 100 hectares represented between 5 and 6% 
of the number of landholdings during the entire period though in terms of land area, they
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comprised 66.7% in 1977/78 and 57.9% in 1986.
This clearly illustrates the extent to which large landholdings were still prevalent in 
the region. After the land reform bill of 1961 one would expect an increase in plot numbers. 
The converse occurred, there was a slight decrease from 1960 to 1970 confirming the widely 
held view that land reform once again solidified property rights but did very little to change 
plot distribution. The increase in large landowning in the 1970s can also be attributed to 
many factors such as the land extensive nature of cane, the effects of the Chicoral Pact of 
1972 and the inflow of drugs money which was frequently invested in land57.
What happened to land ownership in the sugar sector? Have mills expanded their 
holdings or have independent owners obtained more land? Before analysing table S2.ll a 
discussion of the different contract arrangements in cane growing will be conducted.
In Colombia, cane contracts became important as the industry expanded. During the 
first half of the century if more cane was needed, it was relatively easy to purchase land or 
devote more of the estate to cane. However, as mills were established, contracts became 
more usual. Though there are references to contracts at the beginning of the industry, their 
importance increased dramatically from the 1960s, and the share of cane grown on mill- 
owned land declined as a consequence58. Contracts between mill and supplier are difficult 
to categorise. Occasionally cane shortage led mill owners to search for additional suppliers
^The Chicoral Pact of 1972 formally initaited the dismantlement the agrarian reform law of 1961 and guaranteed 
that landowners would not face land expropriation under any conditions. See for example, Kalmanovitz, Salomon 
(1988), op.cit.. p.456.
^Roldin, Diego (1985). "Progreso T6cnico, Crisis y Perspectivas del Sector Azucarero Colombiano." Boletm 
Socio-Econ6mico. Nos. 14-15, pp. 180-182.
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from neighbouring producers59. Many contracts were based on personal relationships 
between mill owners and family and friends: informal contacts became significant in
procuring cane for mills. According to a study conducted in 1957, contracts lasted on 
average ten years; a trend that continued to 199060. Contracts were also arranged with 
small- and medium-sized landowners, and absentee landlords.
Four types of contracts exist in Colombia: cane in supply, participation shares, 
administered land, and land rental61. The first type, cane in supply (compra de cana en la 
mata), occurs when cane is cultivated by a farmer and the mill is responsible for cutting, 
lifting and transport. The producer is paid in one of two ways: a)according to the amount 
of cane that is produced; or b)according to the amount of sugar that is extracted per tonne 
of cane62. Most growers were paid in kind by weight of cane cut. The second type, 
participation shares (cuentas en participacion) is characterized by landowners that allow the 
sugar mill to cultivate their land for a period of approximately ten years. Cutting, lifting, 
transport and payment of cane are conducted in the same manner as cane in supply.
A third type, administered land (tierras cedidas en administracion) is a combination 
of the two previous forms. The sugar mill provides technical assistance to the landowners 
who cultivate cane. The cultivator will receive a certain amount of refined sugar for every 
tonne produced. This amount is calculated to cover the administration and production costs
^Interview with Carlos Arias (22 Nov. 1991), Head of Cane Contracting Operations at Manuelita, Manuelita
S.A., Palmira, Colombia. Much of the information in this section derives from this interview.
“ Castillo, Jorge Americo (1967). "Notes on Recent Developments in Colombian Agriculture." Cali: Universidad
del Valle., p .13; Interview with Carlos Arias (22 Nov.1991), Head of Cane Contracting Operations, Manuelita, 
Palmira, Colombia.
6lJunguito, Roberto, et.al. (1975), op.cit.. p. 173.
“ Ibid., pp. 173-174.
98
Part II: La Manuelita Sugar Mill 
incurred by the sugar mill e.g., new techniques, cutting and transport63. The producer, in 
return, must pay back a portion of refined sugar as payment. In 1990 growers received 20 
kg of sugar/tonne of cane64. This was a substantial improvement on earlier periods. 
According to Pineiro the share paid to land in administration cultivators was 13 kg 
sugar/tonne cane in 1960 and in 1978, 10 kg.65. According to Carlos Navia Manuelita had 
always paid 20 kg before 1990 at which point it began to pay 25 kg.66. This might 
demonstrate the greater efficiency of Manuelita. It is one of the largest mills in the Cauca 
Valley and unit costs for processing cane were low67. Furthermore, because of the time 
dependent nature of cane, the radius of land from which Manuelita could draw supplies was 
limited. It is possible the company was willing to offer higher prices to guarantee supply.
The last type is land rental (arrendamiento de tierras). The sugar mill being 
responsible for cultivation. The producer is accountable for land improvements such as 
construction of drainage ditches and wells, and land levelling. Rented land is not paid 
according to cane output as with other contracts, but by money rent calculated on the basis 
of hectarage68. With all types of contract, producers receive part advance payments.
Table S 2 .ll presents changes in cane acquisition. Column 5, cane in supply, covers
“ Ibid., p. 175.
“ Ibid., p. 174.
"Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982), op.cit.. p.69.
"Interviews with Carlos Navia (Tan. and Feb. 1992), Director o f Field Department, Manuelita S.A., Palmira,
Colombia. The 1990 increase can be explained by increases in land values, or a decrease in real sugar prices,
decreases in chemical input prices or a combination of a myriad of factors which affect the production process.
^See Sugar Part I.
"Ibid.
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the first two types of contract arrangements indicated above. Orozco does not have data on 
participation shares, it is possible that he groups participation shares and administered land 
together as in both types the mill is largely responsible for cultivating cane69. Table S2.14 
shows that mill-owned property remained relatively stable. Most fluctuation in mill-owned 
property occurred during the 1968-1983 period. The increase in mill-owned property 
between 1968 and 1974 can be attributed to the regressive land reform bill. Yet taking the 
period as a whole there were only slight changes. The amount of mill-owned land in 1960 
and 1988 was similar, at 45,866 ha. and 49,307 ha. respectively. However greater changes 
were observed in cane obtained under contract possibly because independent suppliers had 
the option of entering into an agreement with any one of several neighbouring mills.
69In some literature administered land and participation shares are grouped together. See Junguito, Roberto, et.al. 
(1975), op.cit.. p. 196.
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Table S2.ll
Changes in Cane Acquisition Modalities in Valle del Cauca, 1960-1988.
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type of 
Contract
Sugar Mill 
Property
Administer 
ed Land
Rented
Land
% of 
cane 
cultivat 
ed by 
mills 
(1 + 2 +  
3)
Cane in 
Supply
Year Area (ha) (%) Area (ha) <%) Area
(ha)
(%) % Area
(ha)
(%)
1960 45866 74.5 ---- 0 4570 7.4 81 11164 18.1
1964 45643 71.1 1065 1.7 6230 9.7 82 11263 17.5
1968 46317 53.8 1058 1.3 16043 18.6 74 22632 26.3
1974 53693 46.2 14672 12.
6
11917 10.2 69 35984 31.0
1980 45416 34.1 20910 15.
7
4795 3.6 55 62065 46.6
1983 48576 35.2 19994 6.0 8155 14.5 54 61186 44.3
1988 49307 34.3 18269 12.
8
5909 4.3 51 69938 48.5
Source: Constructed from Orozco. Guillermo A. (1984). La Aeroindustria Azucarera Colombiana. 1960-1983. Cali: 
ASOCANA, p.86; citing Fadul, M. and Penalosa, E. (1961), op.cit.: Junguito (1974), op.cit.. and ASOCANA.
In addition to the absolute stability of mill-owned land, the principal trends observable in the 
above table are on the one hand the relative decline in the importance of mill owned land and 
the percentage of cane cultivated by mills and on the other the increasing importance of cane 
in supply. The rapid growth of cane in supply shows that a increasing proportion of cane 
was derived from independent cane growers who by the late 1980s were responsible for 
almost half of the cane processed by mills.
Who were these suppliers? Were they "urban cane growers"? Helmsing used this 
term in relation to cotton growing on the Atlantic Coast. He described urban cotton growers 
as these landowners who let small- to medium-sized landholdings, lived in urban areas, and
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held an occupation in public or private sectors70. This phenomenon had earlier been typical 
in cattle raising. From this it might be extrapolated that the same process was occurring in 
the cane sector.
The phenomena of "urban cane growers" is illustrated by the experience of the 
Risaralda Mill. Rising land costs in the Cauca Valley meant that late-coming mills found it 
difficult to buy land. In most cases cane was obtained by means of contracts. Risaralda, 
established in the 1970s, negotiated contract arrangements covering approximately 10,000 
hectares of cane71. Risaralda is located on the northern fringe of the sugar-producing zone 
in an area previously dedicated to cattle ranching72. This shows that one land extensive 
activity was replaced by another. Although specific land tenure data is not available one 
cannot be certain of the size of producer growing cane. But it is likely that large cattle 
owners contracted land to the mill. Furthermore mills that have shut-down processing 
operations, often contract their cane land to other mills73.
Did these contract arrangements diffuse profit participation?74 First, the advantages 
for the sugar mill owner will be analysed. The main reason these contracts were established 
was to guarantee a sufficient flow of cane. As contracts are established for ten years it is 
a way in which mill owners could control cultivation without having to purchase new land 
and plan mill capacity expansions in accordance with the amount of cane that will be
70Helmsing, A.H.J. (1986). Firms. Farms, and the State in Colombia. Boston: Allen and Unwin, Inc., p.223.
71Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983). op.cit.. p .151.
^Ibid.
73Orozco, Guillermo (1984), op.cit.. table 31, p.86; Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1984), op.cit.: See also Table S2.5.
74See also Sugar Part I.
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received. In addition capital can be concentrated in mill investments, and the introduction 
of new techniques in both field and factory processes sustained. Other technical changes 
such as improved harvesting techniques and transport methods will remain in the domain of 
the mill.
What are the advantages to landowners of the cane contracts? First, a landowner with 
insufficient capital can become involved in the agroindustry by supplying mills with cane. 
Second, because most contracts are paid according to cane weight, sucrose content is not a 
critical factor. Thus there is a tendency for growers to over-irrigate (if cane is heavily 
irrigated weight increases without increasing sucrose levels) and select higher weight varieties 
in order to increase tonnage/hectare. So a cane cultivator is eager to increase cane weight 
and not necessarily sucrose content. Third, some of the gains from technical change such 
as improved cane variety, disease control, fertilizer application, and plot redesign could result 
in higher weights of raw cane which would benefit landowners, while technical change 
resulting in sucrose productivity improvements would be biased towards sugar mill. The 
administered land contracts can be a form of technical assistance and credit to farmers and 
allow absentee "urban cane growers" to use land productively. However the trend towards 
cane in supply shown in table S2.14 would appear to suggest that landowners, rather than 
the mill owners, were the principal beneficiaries.
What are the economic explanations for letting land? The most apparent explanation 
is that landowners were also involved in other pursuits, in which case receiving rent from 
the mill was a means of investing in other areas. Also, it could be that start-up costs for 
land preparation, i.e. machinery rental for irrigation ditch construction, land preparation, etc. 
were too high for small landowners. Furthermore because payment for rented land is related
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to its hectarage, payment was technical change neutral. Payment in the other forms of 
contracts, e.g. land in administration and cane in supply, was according to output. Hence 
as improved techniques make land more productive and the activity less risky, landowners 
may move away from letting and become more involved in cultivation. Analysis of rental 
contracts show that returns were highly biased in favour of the mill. Rojas shows that mills 
obtained 88% of output, landowners 12 %75. FEDESARROLLO, a private economic 
research organization, estimated different proportions, 75%/25%76. The increase of cane 
in supply contracts can be explained by more scientific, less risky techniques mentioned 
above. Also, given the bias of land rental, a landowner would benefit if he became involved 
in cultivation.
Recent trends in Manuelita are illustrated in the following stacked bar graph and table. 
The bottom half of the graph denotes land that is cultivated but not necessarily owned by 
Manuelita which corresponds to columns 1 and 2 in S2.13.
75The estimate is based on 1963 statistics o f a monthly rent of 50.00 pesos per plaza (set according to price of 
sugar/quintal +  10.00 pesos). After 18 months the landowner would receive 900 pesos, the equivalent of 22.5 
quintals o f sugar. Assuming average production/plaza to be 93 tonnes of cane; the conversion to sugar is on average
10% of raw cane which equal 9.3 tonnes of sugar (186 quintals). Of these 186 quintals, in sugar terms, only 22.5 
quintals must be paid to the landowner. See Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983), op.cit.. pp. 149-150.
76Junguito, Roberto, et.al. (1975), op.cit.. p.372.
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Figure S2.1
Evolution of Forms of Manuelita Cane Acquisition, 1976-1990.
1976  1981 1986
Year
| | Man. + Participa H  M anuelita Participation : ; I C an e  in Supply
Source: See Table S2.12.
Prior to 1982 no distinction was made between Manuelita property and participation shares. 
Furthermore rented and administered land shares were not included in the data suggesting 
that these two modes were not used in Manuelita. After 1982 disaggregated for Manuelita- 
owned property and participation shares were available.
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Table S2.12
Evolution of Forms of Manuelita Cane Acquisition, 1976-1990
Year Manuelita 
Property (Ha)
+  Participation 
Shares
% Cultivated 
by Mill
Cane in 
Supply
Total Area (Ha)
1976 6518 67 3161 9679
1977 5570 64 3180 8750
1978 6598 65 3603 10201
1979 7381 62 4499 11880
1980 7844 63 4579 12423
1981 6717 55 5579 12296
1982 4500 2789 61 5369 13687
1983 7524 61 6163 15967
1984 7766 47 8201 15566
1985 4607 3192 51 7767 15875
1986 4625 3071 49 8179 15933
1987 4626 3073 51 8234 16948
1988 4629 2950 45 9369 16948
1989 4614 3068 43 10018 17700
1990 4626 2999 47 10282 19230
Source: Manuelita S. A. Archives: Superintendence de Campo, Monthly Reports of Cultivation Department 1970- 
1990. Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Harvest Department 1970-1990.
From 1983 onward, Manuelita land property remained relatively stable as did participation 
shares. Total land directly cultivated by Manelita dropped slightly quicker than the sectoral 
trend. However during the 1980s Manuelita cultivated less than half of the cane. The most 
variable form of cane acquisition during this fifteen year period was cane in supply. 
Manuelita trends converge with sectoral tendencies in that cane in supply has represented a 
similar share of the total cane grown (between 19-49%). Cane in supply contracts began in 
the mid-1960s, most of which originated from plots of less than 75 hectares (Table S2.13)77.
^Interview with Carlos Navia (27 Jan. 1992, 13 Feb. 1992), Head of Reid Department.
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Table S2.13
Manuelita Land Usage Data 
Number and Plot Size of Cane in Supply 1985-1989.
Size of Ag Prod. 
Unit
1985 1987 1989 1991
(Hectares) #Plots % jjfPlots % #Plots % m o ts %
1-25 9 13.2 7 10.9 8 11.3 14 14.7
26-50 20 29.4 15 23.4 15 21.1 27 28.4
-75 9 13.2 11 17.2 18 25.4 18 18.9
76-100 14 20.6 14 21.9 7 9.9 11 11.6
101-200 7 10.3 6 9.4 7 9.9 10 10.5
201-300 2 1.5 4 6.3 4 5.6 2 2.1
301-500 5 7.4 4 6.3 9 12.7 10 10.5
501-1000 2 1.5 3 4.7 3 4.2 3 3.2
Total # Hectares 7767 8234 10017 11258
Source: Manuelita S. A. Archives: Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Cultivation Department 1970- 
1990. Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Harvest Department 1970-1990.
♦Plot sizes o f suppliers and participation shares were only available Manuelita from 1985 onwards.
Table S2.14
Manuelita Land Usage Data 
Number of Cane in Participation Shares, 1985-1991
Size of Ag Prod. 
Unit
1985 1987 1989 1991
(Hectares) m o ts % m o ts % m o ts % m o ts %
1-25 4 11.4 4 12.1 6 17.1 4 10.8
26-50 12 34.3 10 30.3 8 22.9 12 32.4
51-75 4 11.4 6 18.2 8 22.9 7 18.9
76-100 3 8.6 2 6.1 3 8.6 4 10.8
101-200 9 25.7 8 24.2 8 22.9 8 21.6
201-300 2 5.7 2 6.1 1 2.9 1 2.7
301-500 1 2.9 1 3.0 1 2.9 —
501-1000 — — — — — — 1 2.7
Total #  Hectares 3192 3073 3068 3346
Source: Manuelita S. A. Archives: Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Cultivation Department 1970- 
1990. Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Harvest Department 1970-1990.
Although aggregate data does not exist, tables S2.13 and S2.14, show that Manuelita
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obtained most of its cane in supply and participation shares from small- to medium-sized 
landowners. In 1985 they represented 45.7% of total plots and by 1991 (figures were not 
collected in 1990) had declined slightly to 43.2%. Manuelita small- and medium-scale 
growers farmed a larger area of total land than aggregate data for the Valle Del Cauca data 
displayed earlier would appear to indicate. This would seem to imply that patterns of land 
distribution (usufruct rights) were more equitable than elsewhere in Valle del Cauca. Large 
landowners (100 ha. and above) also figured less prominently in terms of land area. 
Manuelita data showed that the smaller supplier’s plots (1-50 ha) and large-sized supplier’s 
plots (>  lOOha) lost importance, while medium-sized supplier’s plots (50-100 ha) gained.
How can these changes be accounted for? A reasonable assumption is that 75-100 
hectare plots were broken up into smaller plots (50-75ha). The relative decline in importance 
of supplies from small-sized plots is consistent with the general Valle del Cauca trend 
described above. A plausible reason for the displacement of large-sized plots is that these 
growers found it profitable to move out of production, whereas small- and medium-sized 
cultivators were less inclined to do so as they depended heavily on their plot both for 
subsistence and money income.
The emergence of cane-sugar production in the Cauca Valley displaced other 
agricultural activities, primarily cattle ranching and cane-panela production. Though some 
cane-panela producers transformed and became involved in modern milling, others were 
clearly displaced. As witnessed in part I, a reverse process in the transformation to modern 
cane milling was observed. Either mill owners first owned land and were engaged in mixed 
agricultural enterprises or quickly purchased land and became involved in cane milling. 
Mills also were rapidly concentrated within the Valley, for reasons of climatic conditions,
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land reform policies and the early establishment of formal institutions which fostered 
agroindustrial development. Gradual industrial concentration was observed in the Cauca 
Valley only until the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, the use of independent suppliers increased which was similar 
to trends described in part I. The rise of contractual cane resulted in the diffusion of profits, 
as before cane was solely cultivated within the mill estate. Although land rental was biased 
towards mill owners, the other contracts did not necessarily put independent growers at a 
disadvantage. Despite these new trends, total land concentration in the sugar sector remained 
high. However this can not be attributed exclusively to the sugar agroindustry as Valle del 
Cauca demonstrated and yet more concentrated tendencies. Manuelita trends also exhibited 
a comparable behaviour, but had a larger proportion of cane procured from cane in supply.
Formal institutions that assisted in sugar operations were also instrumental in 
promoting and protecting Cauca Valley mill formation. Some of these organizations were 
set up at the instigation of planters and others were established as a result of State initiative. 
Research and development efforts were present as early as the 1920s with a state 
experimental farm established in Palmira78. Another important impulse in the 1920s was 
the Chardon Mission, a group of Puerto Rican specialists, contracted to assess cane growing 
in the Valley in 1929. By this time Eder was the largest mill owner in the Cauca Valley and 
was also US consul in Cali. He, along with Enrique Olaya Herrera, Colombian ambassador
^Orozco, Guillermo (1984), op.cit.. p.36.
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in Washington, were principally responsible for the Mission79. The Mission argued that 
natural endowments such as ideal soil conditions, levels of annual rainfall and sunlight, and 
year-round harvests provided strong foundations to establish a modern industry. In the 1930s 
the Escuela Superior de Agricultura Tropical, later transformed into Facultad de Agronomfa 
de Palmira also assisted in cane research efforts80. Furthermore, as a formal lobby, the 
sugar agroindustrial sector was swift to organize. In 1934 the Sociedad de Agricultores y 
Ganaderos (SAG) was formed only seven years after the powerful FEDERACAFE had been 
set up in 192781.
These developments mark an impressive degree of organisational and institutional 
support for a crop that was not nearly as important to the Colombian economy as coffee82. 
The SAG was complemented by the Corporacion Autonoma Regional del Cauca (CVC) in 
1954 which was modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States 
with the objective to promote regional development83. The CVC was established to provide 
technical assistance, power and flood control and drainage for the Cauca Valley84. 
Subsequently ASOCANA, the cane growers association, was formed in 1959. In 1962 
ASOCANA pressed the National government to join the International Sugar Organization so
79Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983), op.cit.. p.21.
“ Ibid., p.3.
8lJim6nez, Margarita and Sideria, Sandro (1985). Historia del Desarrollo Regional en Colombia. Bogoti: 
CEREC, p. 94.
“ For the importance of coffee see for example, Palacios, Marco (1980). Coffee in Colombia. 1850-1970. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; McGreevey, William Paul (1971). An Economic History of Colombia 
1845-1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bergquist, Charles (1981). Caf6 v Conflicto en Colombia. 
Medellin: Universidad de Antioquia.
“ Holt, Pat M. (1964). Colombia Today- And Tomorrow. New York: Praeger Publishers, p. 167.
“ Ibid.
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that Colombian producers could obtain preferential access to the US market85. Later, the 
Fondo Nacional del Azucar y Panela (FONAZUCAR) was established in 1978 as a non-profit 
organisation to promote the development of the sector vis-a-vis production, marketing, 
import, export, and credit policies and also levied a tax on sugar sales to set up a research 
and development centre for the sugar industry, Centro de Investigacidn de la Cana de Azucar 
(CENICANA)86.
The development of these institutions, particularly ASOCANA and CENICANA, has 
been attributed to the concentrated industry structure in which funds were more easily pooled 
at micro and macro industry levels87. A less apparent advantage was the gradual geographic 
conentration of mills in the Cauca Valley which made the diffusion of technical change 
easier88. Innovation diffusion was also facilitated by the centralized, highly oligopolistic 
structure of large-scale cane growing. Hence learning externalities were high89.
The Colombian industry was mainly based on domestic sales until the Cuban 
Revolution. Until 1959 Cuban sugar accounted for 80% of purchases from foreign sources 
in US markets. Colombia did not export sugar until 1960 and only obtained access in the 
USA in 1964 when allocated a quota of 300,000 tonnes90. Most Colombian historians assert
“ Ramos, Oscar Gerardo (1990). Treinta Anos: Apuntes Para Una Historia. Cali: ASOCANA, p.9.
“ Roldan, Diego (1985). "Progreso TScnico, Crisis y Perspectivas del Sector Azucarero Colombiano." Boletin 
Socio-Econ6mico. Nos. 14-15, p. 174. Interview with Juan Pablo Cabal (Nov. 1991), Chief Economist, ASOCANA, 
Bogota, Colombia.
“ Junguito, Roberto, et.al. (1975), op.cit.. p. 15.
“ See Map S2.1.
“ For a discussion o f learning externalities see for example, Stiglitz, Joseph (1989). "Markets, Market Failures 
and Development." The American Economic Review. 79(2), pp. 197-203.
“JimSnez, Margarita and Sideri, Sandro (1985), op.cit.. Table I.4.D, p.38. Rojas, Jose Maria (1985), op.cit..
p.21.
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that the 1960s was a period of sugar sector consolidation driven by opportunities in export 
markets91. This was not the case. As demonstrated above there was substantial 
institutional consolidation prior to 1964. In fact, had there not been considerable 
modernisation of cane processing before 1964, it is most unlikely that Colombia would have 
gained access to the market92. In addition there is evidence of estate level modernisation 
before the 1960s. In 1953 the first estate-based refinery in Colombia was installed in 
Manuelita. This represented a significant move in the history of the cane industry. However 
subsequent progress was slow, by 1990 there were only three sugar mills which had refining 
capabilities93. This meant that most estates still transformed cane into crude sugar for use 
in industrial processes at home and abroad or exported it to be refined overseas. Until the 
late 1970s, the greater part of sugar was exported crude: exports of refined sugar
commenced in 1980. These developments—production for export and later the export of 
refined sugar—represented a formidable impulse. But it must be stressed that modernisation 
in terms of irrigation, cultivation, mill machinery, etc. had already occurred on the larger 
mills like Manuelita before the 1960s. While many changes occurred in the 1960s and a 
tight unified industrial structure was not evident until the 1970s and 1980s, consolidation in 
terms of the creation of basic infrastructure, technical change adoption and institutional 
support for the industry were all features of the 1930-1950 period94.
Much of the institutional support established in Colombia occurred before export
9ICollins, Charles David (1985), op.cit.. pp.35-90; Rojas, Jose Maria (1985), op.cit.. pp.7-34.
"Bulmer-Thomas argues the same for the Central American republics. See Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (1987). The 
Political Economy of Central America Since 1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 158-159.
"Interview with Juan Pablo Cabal (various times), Chief Economist, ASOCANA, Bogoti, Colombia.
"Technical change to be discussed below.
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growth and the centralisation of agroindustrial sugar production in the Cauca Valley. 
Institutional development was determined by informal and formal agents. The political 
influence of large landowners and their connections with the ruling political class obviously 
explains the founding of official organisations. But businessmen, like Eder, who were able 
to accumulate land and enter the industry were also responsible for significant advances. 
Thus in the Cauca Valley foreign markets were not necessary for economic expansion and 
competitiveness. Before 1964 (the year Colombian entered into the US sugar quota) 
technically advanced milling was established and industrial concentration, a feature common 
to sugar production in other areas of the world, had already taken place95. What other 
elements indicated early modernisation?
TECHNICAL CHANGE: Industrial concentration, foreign technology, and discontinuous 
adaption patterns
This section will discuss patterns of technical change. First industrial concentration 
vis-a-vis mechanisation in the Cauca Valley will be illustrated by Manuelita data. Secondly, 
the importance of foreign technology will be examined. Lastly, the discontinuous nature of 
technical change will be analysed.
The process of modernisation is signalled by tangible and intangible factors. These 
include industrial concentration, mechanisation, upgraded irrigation and drainage networks, 
more efficient transport networks, variety diversification, appropriate fertilizer dosage, 
improved plot lay out, and changes in machete design. There were three patterns of
93See Sugar Part I.
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technological adoption. Some technologies were imported and continue to be so through the 
period. Others were initially imported but subsequently refined and adapted in Colombia. 
Yet others were internally derived. In the literature excessive attention has been devoted to 
industrial concentration as indicating modernisation. This neglects the importance of other 
issues listed above. The topic of industrial concentration will be addressed immediately 
below, the other factors will be discussed subsequently.
One indication of industrial concentration in sugar was the early mechanisation of 
field tasks: in other sectors machinery was not widely used until the 1950s and 1960s or 
even the 1980s. This probably indicates that capitanes de industria were able to acquire 
capital through other activities which funded the modernisation of sugar production. 
Contrary to neo-classical analysis, early mechanisation occurred in the 1930s and continued 
into the 1950s and 1960s, despite capital and foreign exchange scarcity and the relative 
abundance of other factors (land and labour)96. Given relatively easy access to land and 
labour, land- and labour-using methods could have been expected to prevail97. Yet cane 
cultivated for agro-industrial processing became and remains one of the most highly
^If real wages indicate labour scarcity, data demonstrate negligible improvement in rural real wages and income 
distribution during the 1925-1972 period. For example, Miguel Urrutia and Mario Arrubla witness a small recovery 
of real wages in the 1930s, following the collapse of the late 1920s. Data gathered by Ocampo cofirm these 
findings. Nonetheless a deterioration of rural wages during the 1935-1945 period left the rural worker with wages 
similar or inferior to levels o f the pervious decades (1920s). During the 1945-1965 period, although there are 
various problems with the wage data in Colombia, Urrutia claims that generally the distribution of income improved, 
however the rural sector distribution of income continued to deteriorate. In addition, according to Urrutia, between 
1964 and 1972 aggregate rural incomes remained contant and rural incomes did not increase. See Urrutia, Miguel 
and Arrubla, Mario (1970). Comnendio de Estadisticas Historicas de Colombia. Bogoti: Universidad National, 
p.34; Berry, Albert and Urrutia, Miguel (1976). Income Distribution in Colombia. New Haven: Yale University 
Press; Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio (1991), op.cit.. pp.237-238; Urrutia, Miguel (1979). Cincuenta Afios de Desarrollo 
Economico Colombiano. Bogoti: La Carreta, p.201; Urrutia, Miguel (1985). Winners and Losers in Colombia’s 
Economic Growth o f the 1970s. New York: Oxford University Press, p.68.
^Within the Colombian literature Jesus Antonneio Bejarano levelled criticism at high levels of mechanisation 
despite the abundant internal supply of labour. See Bejarano, Jesus Antonneio (1978). "Industrialization and 
Economic Policy 1950-1976." In Arrubla, Mario et.al. (Eds.), Colombia Hov. Bogoti: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 
p.224.
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mechanised crops in Colombia and perhaps explains the high degree of mechanisation already 
prevailing in the Cauca Valley in the 1950s, indicated in the table below98.
Table S2.15
Mechanisation Intensity According 
to the Most Mechanised Geographic Zones, 1959, 1972.
Column i ii iii iv
Departmen
t
HP/1000 
ha of 
arable land
HP/1000 ha 
of cultivated 
land
Arable
Ha/Tractor
Cultivat 
ed Land 
(Ha)/Tr 
actor
Year 1959 1972 1959 1972 1959 1972 1959 1972
Cauca
Valley
969 1233 804 1116 47 45 54 52
Tolima 365 582 641 1136 120 100 68 51
Cundinam
area
354 534 967 1281 123 108 45 45
Total for 
Colombia
190 249 395 740 230 226 110 76
Source: Constructed from FEDESARROlJX> /1976L op.cit.. p.36. FEDESARROL LO chart derived from: Arable
Hectares: DANE Agricultural Census; Cultivated Hectares: Caja Agraria; Horse Power and number of tractors: 
Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1974a). "La Agricultura en Colombia, 1950-1972." Boletm Mensual de Estadistica. 
No.276, pp.75-169.
Table S2.15 refers to production in the three most highly mechanised departments. Column
i represents horsepower per hectares of total arable land (the amount of land that can be 
feasibly cultivated) and demonstrates mechanisation intensity per department. Column ii 
provides data on mechanised intensity on cultivated land. A comparison of columns i and
ii illustrates the extent to which a department is mechanised, e.g. if there is a large difference 
between the columns we observe that mechanisation is more prevalent in a certain area of 
the department. Column iii gives hectares of arable land per tractor and compared with 
column i provides an idea of the degree of power intensity of mechanisation. Column iv 
displays hectares of cultivated land per tractor and if compared with column ii, tractor horse
^El Desarrollo Agropecuario en Colombia. Tomos I. II (1990). Bogoti: Ministerio de Agricultura, p.302.
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power can be estimated. Cane growing tasks are generally power extensive in contrast to 
power intensive tasks such as harvesting root crops, thus we should observe lower power 
intensity in the Cauca Valley. In cane growing, machines were needed primarily for 
plantation preparation such as irrigation network construction and ploughing". First, 
column i demonstrates that horsepower/1000 hectares for arable area was the highest for both 
1959 and 1972 in the Cauca Valley. Thus we observe an early high intensity of 
mechanisation. In fact an intensity so high in 1959 that Cauca Valley figures are not 
surpassed by other departments until 1972. All the colums show a high degree of intensity 
in the Cauca Valley in 1959. In the other departments mechanisation levels increased from 
1959 to 1972, whereas the Cauca Valley experienced a decrease. This would appear to 
support the argument that Cauca Valley mill owners "over-mechanised" early, so much so 
that mechanisation levels dropped in later years. Easy access to information and investment 
funds encouraged producers (capitanes de industria and hacienda) to use capital-intensive 
techniques too quickly and consequently over-mechanise cultivation. Adequate levels of 
efficiency could be reached with much less capital100.
Arable hectares/tractor (column ii) were extremely low in the Cauca Valley for 1959 
and 1972, and cultivated land/tractor ratios decreased only marginally between the two years. 
This shows that much of the Cauca Valley was mechanised before 1959. In other areas of 
Colombia the decrease was much larger, confirming the relative early speed of mechanisation 
in the Cauca Valley. Furthermore as expected with cane growing, arable ha/tractor in the 
Cauca Valley were the lowest in 1959 and 1972, demonstrating that mechanisation was used
"interview with Juan Carlos Osorio (Feb. 1992), Field Preparation Agricultural Engineer, Manuelita, Palmira, 
Colombia.
100See Sugar Part I.
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for extensive tasks such as tilling. When this is compared with hp/1000 ha of cultivated land 
it is observed that power intensive tasks, those which machines can most effectively perform, 
are used to a greater extent in Cundinamarca and Tolima and less in the Cauca Valley by 
1972. Thus mill owners tended to mechanise earlier than was necessary.
How does Manuelita data compare to sectoral trends? Manuelita data allows an 
analysis of mechanisation intensity (tractor accumulation) on an individual mill. In 1921 
Manuelita first imported machinery for ploughing101. But oxen continued to be used for 
ploughing until the 1950s102. Despite the early introduction of machinery for ploughing, 
field department records show that for all other tasks human and animal power was the norm. 
For planting manual methods predominated until the mid-1970s when some tasks started to 
be mechanised103. For other field tasks such as irrigation, input application and harvesting 
there was little mechanisation until the mid-1970s104. This confirms that mechanisation was 
primarily used in land preparation: in 1990 almost 100% of ploughing was mechanised 
except for areas of rocky terrain105. For the 1971-1990 period Manuelita data reveal that 
although mechanised planting gradually expanded and predominated from 1978, manual
l01Manuelita Una Industria Centenaria. 1864-1964. (1964), Bogoti: Plazas & Perry, p.202.
‘“ According to Weekly Workers Notes there was a space for oxen drivers. After 1953 this space had 
disappeared. Manuelita S.A. Archives, Week No.6, 2-8 Feb. 1939; Week No.21, 18-24 May 1944; 28 Nov.-4 Dec. 
1946; Week N o .l, 29 Dec- 4 Jan. 1949; Week No.50, 10-16 Dec. 1953; Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
‘“ Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Irrigation Department 1971-1990; Superintendencia de 
Campo, Monthly Reports of Cultivation Department 1970-1990; Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of 
Harvest Department 1970-1990; Interviews with Carlos Navia (27 Jan. 1992, 13 Feb. 1992), Head of Field 
Department Manuelita, Palmira, Colombia.
,04See Appendix S.2. Interview with Carlos Navia (27 Jan. 1992, 13 Feb. 1992), Head of Field Department.
‘“ Interview with Juan Carlos Osorio (Feb. 1992), Field Preparation Agricultural Engineer, Manuelita S.A., 
Palmira, Colombia; see Appendix S .l.
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planting continued (Figure S2.2).
Figure S2.2
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Source: Manuelita S. A. Archives: Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Cultivation Department, 1970- 
1990, Palmira, Colombia.
The peak of manual planting was reached in 1975, followed by a dramatic decline during the 
following three years. This corroborates regional analysis which show that from 1974 to 
1978 there was relative labour scarcity in the Cauca Valley106. After the trough in 1978, 
the use of manual labour again increased until 1983 when the relative and absolute levels of 
manual and mechanised planting stabilized.
Data on tractor hours per hectare were collected based on aggregate sums of tractor 
hours and hectares. These statistics include both Manuelita-owned land and land which was 
controlled via participation and rental contracts. The data demonstrate an erratic if increasing 
tendency during 1971-1977, followed by a slow decline.
l06Roldan, D iego (1985), op .cit.. p. 184.
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Figure S2.3
Evolution of Tractor Hours per Hectare at Manuelita, 1970-1990.
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Source: Manuelita S. A. Archives: Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Cultivation Department, 1970- 
1990, Palmira, Colombia.
Between 1971 and 1977 labour figures show an increase of tractor drivers (Table S2.21) 
which reinforces the argument that there was increased use of capital and labour. Thus the 
data show that capital did not entirely displace labour, and that early mechanisation of the 
sector did not imply a rapid expansion of capital-using techniques.
The trend of early mechanisation in the Cauca Valley diverges from the experience 
of other sugar producing countries. Typically in developing countries, cane was considered 
a beneficial crop because of the high amounts of relatively unskilled labour that could be 
incorporated into the production process107. In Colombia even cane field preparation was 
mechanised very quickly and early compared with other crops. Technology for the 
mechanisation of all tasks from ploughing to harvesting was available for other crops such 
as rice or wheat. Why did partial mechanisation occur first in sugar? The issue of relative
,07See Sugar Part I.
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factor prices appears to be irrelevant to these cane farmers/mill owners. These cultivators 
apparently preferred to use machinery to labour even if labour could perform the same task 
efficiently. Producers were not small growers who would be more likely to use oxen for 
land cultivation. Rather the valluno cane landowner was a large-scale operator who preferred 
to invest in and use machinery for all tasks except harvesting for which machinery was not 
available at the time108. Cane growers had easy access to capital because of informal and 
formal institutions that were established within the Cauca Valley which allowed them to 
mechanise quickly.
Despite preferential treatment and the consequent early mechanisation, this early 
reliance on foreign technology did not lead to future dependence109. Thus, although the 
process of agricultural modernisation began with the importation of ploughs in the 1920s, 
experimentation on the estates and institutional support for the sugar sector reduced the 
dependency on imported technology.
108See Sugar Part I.
,09As can be observed in appendix S .l technical changes in soil preparation (category 1) were initially externally 
induced but later, from the 1960s, were induced internally.
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According to the Chardon Mission, Colombian technology in field and factory 
in the 1920s was backward compared to other producing areas110. However by the 
mid-1980s Colombia exhibited the highest productivity in cane growing in the world 
and was also highly competitive in cane processing~a factor that underlay increasing 
levels of exports111. Productivity gains were not simply a function of importing 
foreign technology. Other complex processes were at work, some of which have 
been hinted at above. Before exploring these factors a discussion of specific technical 
changes, the impact of foreign capital on change, and the discontinuous nature of 
change in the Cauca Valley will be provided. Although a myriad of changes have 
occurred within the factory, only major advances will be discussed here, such as cane 
patio, choppers, heaters, and centrifugals. The changes have been selected because 
of their high labour requirements. Since milling is a capital-intensive process, those 
processes that underwent capital deepening will not be reviewed112. Deepening is 
not as important to the thesis as changes which replace capital for labour113.
The industry initially relied to a large extent on foreign technology. Later 
modernization was propelled by domestic research, experience and the adoption of 
imported equipment—a process fostered by the strong institutional bases established
110Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982). Articulaci6n Social v Cambio T6cnico: La Producci6n de Azucar en 
Colombia. San Jos6: Institute Interamericano de Cooperacidn para la Agricultura, p.293.
11‘Interview with Ricardo Villaveces (various times), President, ASOCANA, Bogotd, Colombia.
“2See Sugar Part I.
113As a guide, a summary of the historical evolution of technical change in the field and its biases is 
provided in Appendix S .l.
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in the Cauca Valley for research and development. The early importance of foreign 
capital can be seen in the establishment of Manuelita. The first steam-driven sugar 
mill was imported by Manuelita from England in 1901114. Foreign capital was used 
to purchase heavy equipment for the mills such as the choppers, heaters, and 
centrifugals. But in later years much of this machinery was manufacturerd in 
Colombia, particularly heaters115. The establishment of large mills the in 1940s and 
1950s (see Table S2.5) can be attributed to government policy which favoured capital 
goods imports. According to Jos6 Antonio Ocampo, the beginning of agricultural 
modernization took place in the post-Second World War years when policy 
mechanisms designed to promote industrialisation was implemented116. Tariff and 
exchange arrangements that were devised to meet industrial needs had the unintended 
effect of promoting the rapid growth of capital-intensive agribusinesses as land 
owners made use of these measures to import machinery.
As the data on capital inflows is insufficiently disaggregated, it is difficult to 
demonstrate directly the impact of these policies on modernization in the sugar sector. 
However the establishment of mills in the 1940s and 50s demonstrated that many 
were set up when these tariff and exchange policies were in effect. Hence it can be 
argued that government policies indirectly promoted modernization in cane 
processing. Other factors such as structural economy-wide events might have also 
impulsed investments in productive activities. Nonetheless, informal institutions
luEder, Phanor James (1981). op.cit.. p.530.
,15Interview with Oscar Gerardo Ramos (Feb. 1992), Historian at ASOCANA, Cali, Colombia.
n6Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio (1991), op.cit.. p.260.
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within the Cauca Valley which ensured that the sugar sector had preferential access 
to capital goods imports were critical to modernization. Processing machinery 
imports set off a chain reaction within the mill, stimulating related developments 
elsewhere in stages of sugar-making. The experiences of mill establishment were as 
varied as the number of mills, but the case of Manuelita illustrates these larger trends.
In 1936 the central Manuelita mill was located on Hacienda Rita. In 1953 the 
mill with refining capabilities was installed on Hacienda Rosario. Manuelita milling 
machinery was imported from England and the USA. Milling capacity is the most 
useful overall quantitative indicator of technical change in the factory117. As can 
be observed in figure S2.4. Manuelita milling capacity steadily increased118.
"Qualitative indicators such as product modifications and innovations in the use of byproducts
accompanied increases in capacity are also important examples o f modernization. However they are 
difficult to incorporate into the analysis. Interview with Gerardo Ortiz (14 Feb. 1992), Head of Factory 
Operations, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
118See Appendix S.3.
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Figure S2.4
Average Tonnes of Cane Milled/Hour at Manuelita S.A., 1936-1990.
O)
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Year
Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Factory Productive Data, Three Volumes: 1925-1953, 1953-1970, 
1971-1990, Palmira, Colombia.
The number of days per annum the plant operates is another quantitative factor that 
demonstrates mill efficiency. Despite ideal climatic conditions, year-round harvests 
did not occur until 1978119. According to mill engineers, this was due to mill 
efficiency, not cane growing capacity. The greater efficiency from 1978 onwards was 
due to the increased capacity o f the mill and the rise in the use of locally- 
manufactured spare parts120. This shows that despite labour-using field techniques 
(ploughing was the only field activity fully mechanized until the 1970s) cane output 
kept pace with mill demand. In 1901 the Manuelita mill had an installed capacity of
" 9Ibid.
'“ Interview with Gerardo Ortiz (14 Feb.1992), Head of Factory Operations, Manuelita S. A., Palmira, 
Colombia.
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50 tons cane/day (MTCD) during a shift of 12 hours121. In 1953 the capacity of 
the new mill varied between 1,300 and 2,200 MTCD per 24 hour day(Table S2.9).
Another quantitative indicator of general mill efficiency was sucrose 
extraction. According to Manuelita engineers, extraction was very low at 89% during 
the 1940s. However Appendix S.3 (column 6) data demonstrate that the range of 
sucrose extraction was to 89-95% between 1936 and 1990, and levels show a cyclical 
trend. High levels of extraction, i.e. 96%, were only obtained in 1941 showing that 
some areas of milling achieved technical efficiency before the installation of the 
modern mill in 1953.
Figure S2.5
% of Sucrose Extracted as a % 
of Initial Cane Sucrose Levels
96
*o
O)
88
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Year
Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Factory Productive Data, Three Volumes: 1925-1953, 1953-1970, 
1971-1990, Palmira, Colombia.
l2lEder, Phanor James (1981), op.cit.. p.526.
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Levels of sucrose extraction were cyclical but the peaks coincided with the years 
when new milling equipment was installed (see Figure S2.5 and Table S2.16). 
Namely, when mill capacity expanded there was an insufficient amount of cane so the 
additional capacity was used to extract a higher proportion of sucrose.
Table S2.16
Benchmarks of Increases in Manuelita Milling Capacity, 1953-1990.
Year Average Milling/Day (MTCD)
1953 1,300-2,200
1965/66 3,200-4,200
1970 6,800
1984 7,500-12,000
Source: Manuelita S.A. Factory Milling Performance jo g Book of Three Volumes: 1936-1950; 1951-
1980; 1980-present, Palmira, Colombia; Interview with Gerardo Ortiz (14 Feb. 1992), Head of Factory 
Operations.
However when extra cane became available it was more efficient to extract less 
sucrose/ton and to process larger amounts of cane. This sequence proves that the 
foundation and expansion of mills was driven by the ability to import foreign 
technology rather than a processing bottleneck provoked by an excess supply of cane.
Another two mills, again imported from England, were installed in 1965 and 
1966, raising average milling capacity to 4,200 MTCD. Between 1970 and 1984 a 
new tandem of mills from the USA were installed and cranes were purchased in order 
to repair the new acquisitions. Though all heavy equipment was purchased abroad 
and imports continued thereafter, important technological innovations occurred 
internally. An important innovation of this period was the subsitution of steel for iron 
cylindrical crushers to improve cane adhesion. The new cylinders were more durable 
than the old, had been manufactured to a Manuelita design and were produced in
126
Part II: La Manuelita Sugar Mill 
Colombia122. This reduced reliance on imports123. Another example of internally 
induced innovation in Manuelita occurred in 1984 when an spiral, self-cleaning blade 
was substituted for multiple bladed choppers. By 1984 milling capacity reached 
7,500 MTCD with an excess capacity of 12,000 MTCD124.
Manuelita was also modifying production structures in order to reduce 
operating costs and generate income from byproducts. Further technical change in 
the mill occurred in the heater section: betweem 1953 and 1962 three heaters 
designed to burn bagasse and fuel oil were installed. By 1965 Manuelita started to 
sell surplus low grade bagasse to Propal, one of the largest paper manufacturers in 
Colombia, which demonstrated a modern and wider manipulation of cane instead of 
the traditional by-product use of bagasse. In order for this to occur further changes 
in the heater section were necessary so that bagasse was sufficiently dry. New 
equipment—ventilators and heaters—constructed in Colombia were installed. These 
pieces of machinery were amongst the first of national equipment used by Manuelita. 
These developments enabled a phasing-out of fuel oil as an energy source. Now the 
mill was totally fueled with dried bagasse which substantially reduced fuel costs. 
These changes which occurred on the estate showed increasing levels of technical 
sophistication.
Technical changes in cane transport coincided with or slightly preceded mill
I22The old grey iron cylinders lasted ten years, when damaged they were difficult to repair and spare 
parts could only be procured after a delay. Interview with Gerardo Ortiz (14 Feb. 1992), Head of Factory 
Operations, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
I23lnterview with Hugo Mosquera (9 Feb. 1992), Factory Engineer, Manuelita S. A., Palmira, Colombia.
,24Ibid.
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improvements. At the time of the installation of the new mill in Manuelita in 1953, 
cane was transported from field to factory by two methods, light railways constructed 
around the cane plots or carts pulled by tractors125. Cane was moved within the 
patio by small carts and cranes and then lifted in bunches held together by chains and 
dumped onto feeding beds which conveyed cane into the mill. The largest share of 
factory labour was to be found in the cane patio. In 1953 approximately ninety men 
(thirty per shift) were required to weigh cane, to secure bunches and gather chains 
once cane was unloaded126. The major change that occurred during the 1960s was 
an autodumping system for the carts. The intermediate task of bunching cane was 
eliminated. Now tractors would pull carts alongside cane tables and dump directly. 
Labour in the section was reduced by eighty percent: six men per shift (18 per day) 
now did the work of thirty (90 per day in 1953). Patio capacity increased from up 
to ten to fourteen tons/cart as compared to two to three tons of the earlier method and 
signalled a potential increase in milling capacity. Yet the 1953 scales were still used 
in 1990 in addition to the modern electrical scales that had been acquired in the 
1980s. This demonstrates that in the face of new technology, old technology is often 
maintained until the new technology can completely replace the old. Historically, this 
technical overlay is common127. Examples can be found with the steam revolution 
and the computer. For example, often a typewriter is used alongside a computer to
,25This section heavily relies upon interviews held with Gerardo Ortiz, Head of Factory Operations, 
(during 2-6 Feb. 1992), Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
’“ Interview with Hugo Mosquera (9 Feb 1992), Factory Engineer, Manuelita S. A., Palmira, Colombia.
127David, Paul (1990). "The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern
Productivity Paradox." The American Economic Review. 80(2), p.357.
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fill out forms or quickly type labels. This is the case in Manuelita; the mechanical 
continue to perform the same function only with less precision when compared to the 
electrical scales. Their virtue rests in their higher capacity and improved 
performance.
An example of the importance of foreign capital late in the period was 
collaboration between Manuelita and Caterpillar in the 1980s to design an integrated 
system of cane transport from field to factory. The joint project resulted in the 
production of a vehicle fitted with special tyres that allowed it to operate on harvested 
fields and lift and transport cane directly to the mill where it was automatically 
dumped onto feeder tables128. The previous system required labour for lifting and 
loading in the plots and unloading in the patio. This capital-intensive technical 
change resulted in massive labour saving.
As can be observed from other parts of the world, most techniques were 
capital using129. Many of the original techniques were imported and later refined 
in Manuelita. Gerschenkron considered technical change on a global level and 
recognized the importance of new techniques for international competitiveness130. 
He maintained that ’backward’ countries could develop more rapidly than ’developed’ 
countries by taking advantage of the new techniques on the market. Governments 
could provide the leadership necessary for adoption of new sophisticated technologies.
‘“ interview with Eric Halliday, (Nov. 1991 and Feb. 1992), Sales Department, Manager of International 
Sales and Acquisitions, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
,29See Sugar Part I.
130Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, pp.8-9.
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A backward country could thereby take a short-cut in their development course and 
narrow the gap between them and the technological bellwethers. Technical change 
in the later period was internally induced and reliance on foreign capital faded. This 
pattern corroborates Gerschenkron’s theory that LDCs can take short-cuts to reach 
technological sophistication. Because substantial technical changes in sugar 
production did not occur in the twentieth century the catch-up phase was much easier 
to obtain as were modifications. The lag in adopting new technologies in other parts 
of the mill was directly related to the types of technical change which enlarged mill 
capacity. For example, as soon as more choppers were purchased this created 
bottlenecks elsewhere in the production process and induced organizational and 
technical changes in field and factory. Thus the initial import of mill machinery 
initiated a process of change throughout sugar production.
As stated in part I, the introduction of a new method reverberated in other 
areas of the process, which in turn stimulated new techniques to be adopted in these 
areas. This is illustrated by low-cost technical changes introduced into the field.
The use, adoption and adaption of low-cost techniques was prevalent until 
1990 in cane fields in the Cauca Valley. This shows that a capital-intensive milling 
process does not necesarily signify capital intensity in every area of production. 
Low-cost technical change was very important. For example in 1936 field 
techniques, except land preparation which was mechanized, were conducted on a very 
primitive basis and processing was limited to crude sugar131. Generally, techniques
13,See mechanisation discussion above.
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prior to the 1950s were labour and capital using and progressive increases in labour 
and capital per unit of land were the overarching tendency132. For example in the 
1930s there was little sophisticated land preparation in the Cauca Valley. Ploughing 
was undertaken by oxen or tractors and the distance between stems of cane was not 
systematic, ranging from 1.5 to 4 metres. Oxen and mules were also used for 
harrowing133. Weeding was usually carried out by hand. After 1950 techniques 
became progressively land saving. In the 1960s significant low-cost technical changes 
started taking place: plot size and shape were redesigned to make plots and planting 
distances uniform throughout the plantation. Changes in the distance between 
plantings resulted in productivity increases with planting, input application, weeding, 
cutting, and harvesting (piling, loading and transport)134. Since labourers had 
smaller distances to walk between plants, all these tasks could be conducted more 
efficiently and accurately because output per plot could be reliably estimated. These 
changes represented significant low-cost, output increasing changes. In the 1970s soil 
analysis became widespread and ensured adequate input applcation and irrigation. 
Around the same time, with the introduction of new varieties, plot sizes were 
redesigned, changing the distance between plants so that each would receive adequate 
amounts of sunlight and water.
As was discussed in part I, the first "shock" to field technical change was 
impulsed by the introduction of new varieties in the 1930s when POJ 2878 entered
l32Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982), op.cit.. p.298; See Appendix S .l.
l33Ibid., p.294.
134Interviews with Henry Cubillos (Feb. 1992), Statistician for Superintendencia de Campo and Juan
Carlos Osorio (Feb. 1992), Field Preparation Agricultural Engineer, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
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Colombian sugarcane fields. This took place after a five to ten year time-lag 
following the discovery and planting of the new variety135. Despite attempts from 
the late 1940s to import and cultivate other varieties, POJ 2878 continued to be the 
dominant variety in the Cauca Valley until the mid 1970s136. By the 1960s and 
1970s Canal Point 57603 started to be adopted because of its 20% higher yielding 
nature137. In 1974, studies based on fifteen sugar mills that constituted 70% of the 
total sugarcane area, indicated that 68% of the total cane area was still planted with 
POJ 2878138. However POJ 2878 remained dominant until 1974 when it was 
displaced by CP 57603 and a robust new variety, bred in Colombia, the Mayaguez 
(MSC 74275). This was another example of domestic technical advance. The use 
of POJ 2878 until the 1970s is not particularly due to its high yields nor disease 
resistance but because it saved cane fields in the 1920s when the Cauca Valley was 
hit by Mosaic Disease139. The new varieties, particularly CP 57603 and MSC 
74275 displaced POJ 2878 as table S2.17 shows.
,35See Sugar Part I.
,36Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982), op.cit.. p.297; Rojas, Josd Maria (1983). Sociedad v Economia en el 
Valle del Cauca: Empresarios v Tecnoloeia en la Formacidn del Sector Azucarero en Colombia. 1860- 
1980. Bogoti: Banco Popular, p. 165; and see Appendix S .l.
,37Interview with Carlos Arias, director of the Field Department (Feb.12, 1992). Manuelita S.A., 
Palmira, Colombia.
138Junguito, Roberto, et.al. (1975), op.cit.. p.212.
,39Interview with Oscar Gerardo Ramos (Feb. 1992), Historian at ASOCANA, Cali, Colombia; 
Junguito, Roberto et.al. (1975), op.cit.. p.212.
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Table S2.17
Distribution of Sugarcane Area According 
to Variety Cultivated for 
Mill Processing in Colombia, 1988.
Variety % Variety % Variety %
CP 57603 30.9 Co 421 5.6 PR 1141 2.4
MZC 74275 20.3 Mex 5229 5.1 Y1 1.4
POJ 2878 12.1 PR 61632 2.8 CP 72356 1.4
PR 61632 10.8 CP3834 1.9 Misc. .3
Source: Table constructed from ASOCANA (1990), Aspectos Generates del Sector Azucarero 1988-1989.. 
Bogota ASOCANA, Table 19.
’‘‘Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding and exclusion of negligible statistics concerning 
experimental varieties, seed beds, and ’other’.
Statistics for 1988 prove that by this time 30.9% of cane fields were planted with 
Canal Point and 20.25 % with Mayaguez140. If the table is compared with Junguito 
evidence presented above it also demonstrates the considerable decline of POJ within 
fourteen years. The most prevalent variety at the beginning of the century and into 
the 1970s, had dropped to a mere 12.1 % of total cane cultivated in the Cauca Valley 
by 1988. Variety displacement demonstrates the swift rate at which technical change 
was diffused in the Cauca Valley.
Table S2.12 also shows that several varieties were cultivated in the Cauca 
Valley in 1988. What does this signify? It indicates that the decision to cultivate 
new varieties was discontinuous as a gradual transformation of varietal mix did not 
take place. The decision to cultivate Canal Point was abrupt. Although it had been 
discovered in 1957 it was not cultivated to a large extent until the 1980s at the same 
time other varieties were planted. Though no data is available, a possible explanation 
is that the discovery of a new variety in Colombia, Mayaguez, prompted growers to
l40Aspectos Generates del Sector Azucarero. 1988-1989. (1990), Bogot£: ASOCANA, Chart 19.
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be more adventurous and experiment with several varieties on a wider scale. Thus 
by 1988 the dominant varieties, CP 57603 and MZC 74275, accounted for 
approximately 50% but another four varieties comprised a further 30% of area 
planted. No one variety predominated as had POJ 2878 throughout most of the 
twentieth century.
The use of anti-fungal and anti-viral treatments and seedbeds also occurred in 
Colombia after a time-lag. Anti-viral and anti-fungal treatment started in the 1960s 
and seedbed improvements by the mid-1970s141. Yet by 1984 only 60% of Cauca 
Valley mills were treating seeds142. This shows that although the concentration of 
large-scale sugar production in the Cauca Valley led to rapid diffusion of new seed 
technology (varietal switch occurred at a fast rate), these circumstances did not foster 
the speedy adoption of all new techniques. Adoption rates might be explained better 
by the benefits of the new technique and not to farm size.
The adoption of new seed varieties in Manuelita followed a similar pattern to 
the Cauca Valley143. The land-saving nature of varietal adoption is illustrated by 
Manuelita cane sucrose levels. Data were available from 1936 onwards. As can be 
observed in the graph, after 1946 sucrose levels fell.
M,See Appendix S .l.
U2E1 Valle del Cauca: Tierras v Gentes. (1984), Cali: SAG, p.64.
‘"Interview with chief engineer of Manuelita S. A. Sugar Mill, Gerardo Ortiz, (20 Feb 1992), Manuelita 
S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
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Figure S2.6
Manuelita Cane Sucrose Levels, 1936-1990
15.5-
o  13.5-
11.5
1936 1942 1948 1954 1960 1966 1972 1978 1984 1990
Year
Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Factory Productive Data, Three Volumes, 1925-1953, 1953-1970, 
1971-1990, Palmira, Colombia.
This represents an application of land saving technical change. The period between 
cuts became more systematic with the result that maximum sucrose/ha/month was 
obtained. A land saving tendency coincides with a period of increased cultivation and 
land acquisition144. It is a change which is not biased towards owners of capital, 
and easily implemented by any size producer. This is an example of low-cost 
technical change which occurred prior to 1950, well before export production and the 
period identified by historians as the era of commercial crop production.
Another example o f the discontinuous nature of change is irrigation. 
Systematic irrigation networks did not develop as quickly as field mechanisation and
l44See land usage above.
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most likely played a secondary role as the region is characterized by adequate levels 
of rainfall. Thus irrigation was not imperative for successful sugar production; 
investments in other areas of cutivation and processing were more cost effective. 
Low-cost irrigation techniques were used initially; ditches were dug unsystematically 
and water would simply flow through the plantation145. This resulted in two major 
problems: puddles formed in the lower parts while higher areas remained dry. The 
practice was still common in 1944 and proved extremely inefficient as it misused 
natural resources, i.e water and land146. By 1949 this changed and projects for 
irrigation and water control commenced in Bugalagrande in Valle del Cauca, 
primarily for cane and rice cultivation147. Furthermore the CVC provided a 
framework for more infrastructure and sophisticated systems to be developed. For 
example irrigation was intensified and extended. As mentioned earlier, this was a 
period when land became scarcer so land saving methods of cultivation were 
attractive. These systems largely remained unchanged until the 1970s when 
microlevelling, a capital-using method, was introduced from Peru148. This created 
even plots across which water could flow without creating puddles. Systematic 
irrigation did not develop as quickly as mechanized land preparation. However by 
the 1970s irrigation techniques became more mechanized falling into line with other 
areas of cultivation. These changes occurred roughly at the same time as new
U3Piniero, Martin (1983), op.cit.. pp.293-294.
146Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983). op.cit.. p. 171.
,47Fals Borda, Orlando (1982). Historia de la Cuesti6n Agraria en Colombia. Bogot£: Carlos Valencia
Editores, p. 104; see Map S2.1.
148Piniero, Martin (1983), op.cit.. pp.284-296.
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varieties were planted149. By the early 1980s modern irrigation systems were 
common and the sugar sector in the Cauca Valley accounted for 80% of total 
Colombian private irrigation150. Thus showing the sophistication and modernisation 
of the region.
Manuelita data conform with the Cauca Valley trend. The first well in 
Manuelita was dug in 1956. By 1992 roughly sixty percent of the water came from 
the Cauca River and 40% from wells151. In 1973 microlevelling was applied. To 
complement the sophisticated irrigation system, the drainage network also became 
denser and highly integrated. Thus the discontinuous nature of change is again 
revealed with many new capital using technical change introduced in the 1970s. By 
1990 most irrigation methods were gravity driven. Only a negligible portion, 
approximately 20 hectares was irrigated by aspersion methods.
Chemical input application in Colombia also experienced a lag. Manuelita had 
a long tradition in the use of cachaza as fertilizer but chemical fertilizers were only 
used after 1962152. Initially, cane was fertilized once per productive cycle
U9Interview with Carlos Navia (27 Jan. 1992, 13 Feb. 1992), Head of Field Department, Manuelita 
S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
I50Thomas, Vinod (1985). Linking Macroeconomic and Agricultural Policies for Adjustment with
Growth: the Colombian Experience. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 167; For data on the 
late 1980s see also Plusquellec, Herve (1989). "Two Irrigation Systems in Colombia." Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank Working Papers.
,5,Interview with Carlos Navia (Feb.1992), Head of Field Department at Manuelita S.A., Palmira, 
Colombia; see Appendix S .l.
,32Ibid.
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according to the foreign suppliers recommendation153. However by the 1970s 
reliance on foreign knowledge declined as internal tests established that fertilizer was 
best applied twice per cycle at lower dosages154. This represented a process of 
technical adaptions. Manuelita started using pesticides in 1955. Application was by 
shovel155. The method changed only in 1982 with the importation of a hydraulic 
agitation tank for pesticide mixing and twenty hand-held pumps156. This switch 
increased application efficiency from 1.5 ha./man/day to 3 ha./man/day157.
Imports for field and factory triggered capacity expansion which required 
appropriate adjustments within the entire production process. Technical change did 
not follow a smooth trend, but occurred in discrete discontinuous phases determined 
by milling demands. However, as will be obvious from earlier remarks, changes on 
the production side induced by processing technology changes also had an impact on 
patterns of land use and labour absorbtion. Labour will be explored in more detail 
below.
133Interview with Jorge Alberto Vallejo (Feb. 1992), Cane Variety Agricultural Engineer, Manuelita 
S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
154"Innovaciones Tecnologicas en Manuelita S.A." Document written by Reid Department. Signed 
by Alberto Anzola Jimenez, Vice President. Undated, must have been written post 1988.
‘“ Interview with Juan Carlos Osorio (Feb. 1992), Field Preparation Agricultural Engineer. Manuelita 
S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
156"Innovaciones Tecnologicas en Manuelita S.A.", op.cit.. p.3.
I57Interview with Carlos Navia (Feb. 1992), Head of Field Department, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, 
Colombia.
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LABOUR: changes in the use of. cane cutters, the effect of technical change and
Manuelita analysis.
Cane labour supply in the Cauca Valley derived from a variety of sources: 
small landowners, sharecroppers, urban-rural migrants, rural-rural migrants and small 
commodity producers158. Thus it is difficult to generalize about labour. As already 
stated, a very important aspect of sugar production in the Cauca Valley is that due 
to the climatic conditions harvesting can be conducted year-round. Thus migrant 
seasonal labour, characteristic of other parts of the world for the traditionally labour- 
intensive harvest period, did not apply in Colombia159. Does this mean that mills 
offerred stable employment conditions in the Cauca Valley? First, analysis of 
employment trends will focus on relative changes in use of labour as compared to 
other agricultural crops in Colombia as well as comparisons of relative changes in 
distribution of labour-use within the sugar sector and Manuelita. Second, this will 
be followed by a discussion of the impact of modern technology on labour, starting 
with the most labour-intensive area (the harvest) and continuing with other labour- 
intensive tasks. Third the impact of modern technology will be analysed. Lastly, 
specific Manuelita data will be presented, some of which could not be analysed with 
large aggregate data. Sectoral trends will be established before moving to analyse 
Manuelita data.
In the case of bananas, regional data on housing and health were used as a 
proxy for changes in the welfare of labour. Similar proxies cannot be used in the
,58See Adams, Dale (1969). "Rural Migration in Agricultural Development in Colombia." Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 17(4), pp.527-539 on rural-rural and urban-rural migration.
,39See Sugar Part I.
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case of sugar. Located in the fertile Cauca Valley, sugar competed for labour with 
other agricultural and industrial activities which had an impact on the wages and 
welfare of sugar workers. These activities also make it difficult to attribute to sugar 
the creation of regional labour markets and establishment of infrastructure in the 
Cauca Valley160. Despite sugar’s importance as a foreign exchange earner from the 
1970s onwards, in 1985 only 20% of total agricultural incomes in the Cauca Valley 
derived from sugar161. Therefore, because of the commodity’s lesser importance 
(in contrast to the role of bananas in Magdalena and Uraba), this analysis must take 
a different tack in order to analyze the impact of the sugar industry on labour working 
conditions. Nonetheless although it is difficult to construct an argument about the 
condition of Cauca Valley labour from trends in the sugar sector, the quality and 
variety of data available for the sector is much better than for bananas and potatoes.
Sectoral data when disaggregated is broken down into field and factory or blue 
collar and white collar, defined by the manner in which they are paid, i.e. weekly 
wages vs. bi-monthly salaries respectively162. Since 1936 sugar output rose, and
‘“ For literature on the development of Cali see Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio (1984). Colombia v la Econoima 
Mundial. 1830-1910. Bogota: Siglo Veintiuno Editores; Vdsquez, Edgar (1990). "Historia del Desarrollo 
Econdmico y Urbano en Cali." Boletin Socioecondmico. No.20, pp. 1-28.
,6lBanguero, S. (1990). "El Sector Azucarero Colombiano: Evaluacidn de su Impacto Econdmico y 
Social en la Nacidn, la Regidn, los Departamentos y Municipios en su Area de Influencia.” Cali: 
ASOCANA, p. 151.
,62When analyzing labour in Colombia, the distinction between employee and labourer (whether 
permanent or seasonal) must be made. Much labour legislation is confined to employees and not applicable 
to labourers, and laws that do concern labourers are in general not as protective. According to law, an 
employee is one whose mental activities exceed physical activities. The other most notable distinctions is 
that all employees are engaged by writted contracts, whereas contracts are not required for labourers. 
Because of this, aseasonal agricultural labour is mainly lured by high wages since other benefits are not 
included. See PRO, Foreign Office (30 Dec. 1943). "Social Legislation in Colombia" FO371.38044, 
Registry Number AS 469/195/11 and also, for an excellent recent analysis see Reyes, Alvaro (1987).
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absolute employment levels for permanent cane workers progressively increased until 
the industry high (41,782 direct and indirect workers) was reached in 1970 and 
thereafter declined163. In addition to the advantage of non-seasonal employment 
enjoyed by sugar workers, wages in the sugar sector have been consistently higher 
than in the agricultural sector as a whole. Although differentials increased from 1960 
to 1970 and then dropped quickly in 1974, they have remained substantial. For 
example in 1960 sugar sector wages were 36.4% higher than the agricultural average; 
in 1970 38.1% higher and by 1974 16% higher164.
Data on the distribution of field/factory labour shows that the proportion of 
field hands had declined almost continuosly over time. In 1960 field workers 
constituted 75% of the total work force; in 1970, 73%; 76% in 1975, 75% in 1980 
and 70% in 1990.
Table S2.18
Labour Structure of Sugar Mills, 1960-1990.
Year % Field % Factory % Administration
1960 75 22 4
1970 73 21 6
1975 76 16 8
1980 75 17 8
1985 75 16 9
1990 70 17 13
ASOCANA, p.52.
"Tendencias del Empleo y la Distribuci6n del Ingreso." In Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio and Ramirez, Manuel 
(Eds.), El Problema Laboral Colombiano: Informes de la Misi6n Chenerv. Bogot&: Controlaria General 
de la Republica.
163Urrea G., Fernando (1987). "Competencia y Cambio T6cnico en el Sector Azucarero en la D6cada
del 80." Cuademos de Agroindustria v Economia Rural. No.19, p . l l .
164Junguito, Roberto, et.al. (1975), op.cit.. p.272.
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The share of factory jobs exhibited a linear trend, experiencing a decline during 1960- 
1975 which then stabilized around 16% and 17% for the rest of the period. 
Administrative employment in contrast displayed an increasing trend with no cyclical 
fluctuations. Thus, as can be expected, by the end of the period when techniques 
were more capital-intensive, labour in field and factory decreased and that in 
administrative posts increased. In terms of the distribution of the labour force among 
different sized mills, the data varies greatly. Data from 1963 showed that labour use 
in relationship with output was more balanced with the seven smallest mills 
representing 12% of output and employing 19% of the work force. The four largest 
mills (including Manuelita) produced 57% of the ouput and also employed 57% of 
the labour force165. During the 1981-1987 period these proportions change 
substantially. The four largest firms (again this included Manuelita) employed an 
average of 28.4% of the total work force in the sector during the 1981-1987 
period166. The seven smallest firms accounted for 44.87% of the total employment 
and represented 17.4% of the production167. This data serve as a good illustration 
of the distribution of labour force and also confirm the trend towards capital-intensity 
of the largest mills. Furthermore since the largest share of labour is employed in the 
field, it also supports the hypothesis in the land usage section that if capital is 
available, as it was for the largest mills, they prefer to employ capital using methods,
'“ASOCANA (1964), op.cit.. pp.40-118; figures are based on seventeen sugar mills reporting. Knight, 
Rolf (1972), op.cit.. chart 7, p.62; Manual Azucarero de Colombia. (1964) Cali: ASOCANA, pp.40-118.
I6SMachado, Absalon (1991). El Modelo de Desarrollo Agroindustrial de Colombia. 1950-1990. Bogoti:
Siglo Veintiuno Editores, p.329. Data on production levels for the four largest mills were incomplete.
l67Machado, Absalon (1991). op.cit.. p.329.
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regardless of the abundance of labour168.
Where did the bulk of the labour force orginate? As discussed in part I, the 
analysis of land distribution in labour procurement is germane when analysing rural 
areas. Table S2.12 illustrates that an average of 53% of holdings were less than 5 
ha. throughout the 1960-1986 period. Thus it would demonstrate that there were 
considerable amounts of small producers that could supply labour to the growing cane 
sector. However according to Dixon’s definition 53 % of holdings under five hectares 
is a small relative share169. Dixon argued, by methods set out above, that because 
of the proprotionately small share of small holdings in Latin America, the use of 
wage labour would be high. In conformity with Dixon’s observation and other 
analysts, land consolidation expanded the labour market as it divested small and 
medium sized producers from their land170. Both of these conditions characterise 
the Cauca Valley (Tables S2.12 and S2.13). Did this result in the proletarianization?
Proletarianization occurred rapidly in the Cauca Valley and transitional stages 
such as those that occurred in Cuba, Guyana and the Dominican Republic were not 
observed. Knight contends that from the 1930s labour was proletarianized, being 
recruited from non-landowning rural proletariat remaining from the ’plantation’ 
stucture of earlier times:
By the early 1930’s the majority of these workers appear to have been native to the
Cauca Valley ’plantation’ region but only a small minority retained ownership or use of
‘“See Table S2.18.
‘“ Dixon, Ruth (1983). "Land, Labour, and the Sex Composition of the Agricultural Labour Force: An
International Comparison." Development and Change. 14(3),table 2, pp.347-372. In the study, areas
characterized by high relative amounts of small landholdings (<5ha.) were Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 
with 80% of plots in this category. Central and South America had the lowest relative amounts with 47%.
170See Sugar Part I.
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garden and house plots. They were basically a ’rural’ proletariat. . . Movement from 
job to job was quite usual and labor instability was accepted for many of the large 
number of ’single’workers housed in batay barracks171.
Rojas also observed a trend of proletarianization in 1961172. The long term trend 
of rural proletarianization was difficult to affirm as land distribution data during the 
1960-1986 period showed that small and medium producers survived. However, 
given the aseasonal demand for cane workers and the high growth rates of Cali and 
the Cauca Valley in general, it is possible that labour was recruited from nearby 
towns and cities. A study conducted by Orozco showed that most of the labour force 
originated from urban areas in 1983173. Observation of the map of mill location and 
minor cities shows that most of mills are located near an urban centre (Map S2.2). 
Thus it may be possible that workers were proletarianized in the 1930s, but soon 
moved to urban areas. They became "urban agricultural workers", living in urban 
areas and commuting to nearby cane fields to work. Thus the cane worker had an 
additional advantage of year-round employment coupled with permanent establishment 
in a nearby town where access to public goods was superior. Rojas also underlines 
the nature and significance of employing labour from urban centres. He discovered 
that in certain cases that it gave mills, located closer to towns, an advantage. Many 
times smaller mills were able to offer lower wages and maintain their labour force 
in circumstances of labour scarcity. The explanation was that workers were located 
closer to home (the urban centre) thus transportation and food expenditures were
171Knight, Rolf (1972), op.cit.. pp.38-39.
172Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983), op.cit.. p. 123.
173Orozco, Guillermo (1983), op.cit.. table 42, pp.109, 114. Of a sample size of 1,156, 87% resided 
in towns and cities near mills.
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lower as a member of the family could deliver their lunch174. Therefore the case 
of small commodity producer cum cane worker and rural proletariats might have only 
occurred during the first third of the century and possibly as early as the 1950s (when 
urban centres started growing more rapidly) the nature of the labour force in the 
Cauca Valley became primarily urban based.
Harvesting has always constituted the largest element of cultivation costs. 
There is an extensive body of literature on cane cutters, much of it written by 
sociologists focusing on various aspects of rural labour relations and the intransient 
employment of cutters. These issues will not be considered here. Rather the analysis 
will consider changes in nominal wages and working conditions, triggered by 
technological innovations.
High wages and an under-supply of labour have characterized cane cutting in 
the Cauca Valley175. This is reflected in cutters earning well above the average 
wage rate during the entire history of Manuelita176. The practice of contracting 
cutters for the harvest was not common in Colombia until the 1970s. Between 1970 
and 1990 more harvest labour was secured through indirect contracting177. In
‘"Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1984), op.cit.
'""Interviews with Carlos Navia (27 Jan. 1992, 13 Feb. 1992), Head of Field Department, Manuelita 
S.A., Palmira Colombia; Rafael Rodriguez (Feb. 1992), Cane Cutter Instructor from SENA; Palmira, 
Colombia; Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982). op.cit.. p.75; Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983). op.cit.. pp.183-185; 
Junguito, Roberto, et.al. (1975). op.cit.. p.219.
'"Manuelita S.A. Archive Room #2, Weekly Workers Notes Week N o .6 ,2-8 Feb. 1939; Week No.21, 
18-24 May 1944; 28 Nov.-4 Dec. 1946; W eekN o.l, 29 Dec- 4 Jan. 1949; Week No.50, 10-16 Dec. 1953; 
Week No.39, 20-26 Sept. 1956; 17-23 Nov. 1960; 28 June-4 July 1965; 26 Oct.-l Nov. 1970; Week 
No.49, 4-10 Dec. 1972; Week No.38, Sept. 1976; Week No.52, 16 Dec. 1979.
,77Urrea G., Fernando (1987). op.cit.. p .18; for a discussion on contracted workers see Sugar Part I.
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Colombia a worker is considered indirectly contracted (enganchado) when his name 
and national identity number (cedula de ciudadanfa) are registered in the contractor’s 
notebook. The worker then acknowledges his duties and accepts verbally a code of 
conduct and the fee offerred to him per ton of cane cut178.
Why did the use of contracted labour start relatively late and expand rapidly 
in the Cauca Valley, contrary to trends described in part I? First, rural proletarians 
were hired in the 1930s as permanent or temporary labour and the widespread use of 
contracted labour did not occur until the late 1970s. For example between 1978 and 
1985 the percentage of contracted labour used in the harvest increased more than 
200% from 7.7% in 1978 to 29%179. The increase can not be explained by labour 
scarcity as it has always been characteristic of the Cauca Valley throughout the 
period. Secondly, the increased use of contracted labourers in the Cauca Valley 
occurred during a period when labour saving tasks were introduced such as cane 
lifting. In the face of highly labour saving technology, different methods of labour 
acquisition were employed to maintain flexible payrolls. Thirdly, it can be argued 
that increases in population levels facilitated labour recruitment. As in the case of 
bananas, later in the period rural networks become more sophisticated, more 
interaction occurred between rural and urban sectors and workers became more 
mobile. Thus, it became easier to contact and attract workers180. Fourthly, in 
contrast to union-organization in Peru, an excess supply of labour in the Cauca Valley
,78de Restrepo, Maria (1985), op.cit.. p. 121.
,79Urrea G., Fernando (1987). op.cit.. p.29, citing SENA-UNIVALLE statistics.
180See Banana Part n.
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induced workers to accept lower standards of working conditions. This allowed 
employers to reduce social security benefits hence the total wage bill (see Table 
S2.23).
From the perspective of labour in some cases contracted work was desireable. 
As was discussed in Part I, labour opted to become contracted workers to supplement 
income. A study conducted by Maria de Restrepo confirm these results. De 
Restrepo showed that labourers elected contracted work because it represented a way 
to obtain temporary work and earn quick cash. It was not considered a means of 
steady income181. Particularly with aseasonal harvests, labour can migrate to the 
Cauca Valley during the ’dead time’ of other crops. Above it was argued that much 
of the agricultural labour in the Cauca Valley originated from here and became urban 
residents. In later years, when contracting arose, migrant labour was attracted to fill 
these temporary positions. At the same time the permanent workers who remained, 
continued to live in nearby towns and cities. This result concurs with Knights 
observations that the decline of labour contracting brought about qualitative changes 
in the work force. One of which was the relocation of residency from rural areas to 
cities182. Thus the proletarianization of labour in Colombia occurred during the 
early stages (1930s) of sugar expansion. Over time, sugar proletariats moved to the 
towns and cities. However during this mature stage of the capitalist transformation 
a new mode of labour acquisition arose, witnissing yet another qualitative change for 
labour. The trend of increased contracted or temporary labour is also comparable to
181de Restrepo, Maria (1985). "Los Trabajadores de la Cana y la ContratacidnIndirecta." Boletfn Socio-
Econ6mico. No. 14-15, pp. 121-172.
l82Knight, Rolf (1982), op.cit.. p.335.
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the circumstances of Uraba, however not with potato.
An important change to the harvest was the switch to a new machete. The 
data below derive from Manuelita, however sectoral trends can be extrapolated as 
cane cutters are trained by regional instructors hired by the Sistema Nacional de 
Aprendizaje (SENA) which move from mill to mill183. With the adoption of new 
varieties in the 1970s a different machete was needed to effectively cope new cane 
conditions as the most prominent new variety grew more erect. The Australian 
Machete was substituted for the traditional Red Sable Machete, used since 1936. The 
displacement of the Red Sable machete resulted in an increase in the average cane 
cut/man/day. In 1975 workers who utilized the Red Sable had a daily average output 
of 3.8 tons as compared to cutters using the Australian Machete who averaged 7.7 
tons184. By 1977 average output climbed to 8 tons, and the most efficient hand 
averaged up to 13 tons185. This effected higher wages for all cutters. Furthermore, 
use of the Australian Machete was also characterized by decreases in accident 
incidence186. Red Sable cutters averaged 300 accidents per month and those using 
the Australian Machete experienced an average of 30 per month187.
At the same time, the order of the cut was reorganized within the plots. In
183Much of this section relies on interviews with Rafael Rodriguez (Feb. 1992), Cane Cutter Instructor 
for SENA, who is in charge of training cutters in all the mills, thus he has a general knowledge o f the 
different harvest organisations in the Cauca Valley.
184"Innovaciones Tecnoldgicas en Manuelita S.A." (1988). op.cit.. p.2.
‘“ Interview with Rafael Rodriguez (Feb. 1992), Cane Cutter Instructor from SENA, Manuelita S.A.,
Palmira, Colombia.
‘“ Interview with Juan Carlos D£vila (20 Feb. 1992), Director of Occupation Health, Manuelita S.A., 
Palmira, Colombia.
,87Ibid.
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1977 each cutter was assigned less lines (15) to cut because the new variety was 
planted at a closer distance. The cutter would cut up and down the lines, piling cane 
every third row188. In 1978 lines/cutter were decreased further to seven because 
the fifteen line approach was slow and often left the automatic lifters waiting. During 
1979/80 a new technique reduced lines to five lines/cutter, and the width between 
plants decreased to 1.5 metres. This also increased cutter productivity. The width 
was important because the cane cutters cut lines according to width189. If the space 
between plants is optimized, daily cane cutter averages can be increased significantly 
by two or three tons. These changes indicate integrated technical change with the 
entire cultivation process, e.g. changes in variety, mechanized cutting, change in plot 
design and machetes. The introduction of burning fields also facilitated the work of 
the cutter190. According to a FEDESARROLLO sugar mill survey, Manuelita 
burned 11.7% of the harvested cane in 1974. In 1990 this figures almost reached 
100%191. However due to the negative environmental effects of cane burning it 
may be prohibited in the near future. It also had negative health consequences for 
field hands as they had to work within the ash which obstructs breathing and 
vision192.
I88Ibid.
189Interview with Rafael Rodriguez (Feb. 1992), Cane Cutter Instructor from SENA, Manuelita S.A., 
Palmira, Colombia.
,90See Sugar Part I.
’’’Interview with Fernando Giraldo (Feb. 10, 1992), Chief Agricultural Engineer in Harvest 
Department.
I92Interview with Rafael Rodriguez (Feb.1992), Cane Cutter Instructor from SENA, Manuelita S.A., 
Palmira, Colombia.
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Did these qualitative output-increasing productivity changes result in higher 
wages? Although cane cutting was not mechanized, productivity increased 
substantially due to improved plot configuration, machete engineering, and seed 
varieties. Thus, because of the piece-rate system, the cutters directly benefitted from 
productivity-increasing technical changes. Taussig, who conducted research on cane 
cutters in the Cauca Valley, agrees with Karl Marx that the piece-rate wage system 
has many advantages from the point of view of the employer.
As compared with a time-rate method of payment, the piece-rate system offers far more 
opportunities to the employer to intensify labour, atomize the workforce, maintain the 
sense of individualization, set the workers in competition with one another, and reduce 
the average daily wage193.
Some of these points are unsubstantiated. Piece-rates do not necessarily set workers 
in competition with one another because workers are not competing to cut more on 
the same plot. If workers cut more they directly benefit and their performance has no 
influence on other workers earnings. The likelihood of piece-rate wages changing 
from season to season is unlikely given the relative scarcity of cane cutters.
Furthermore the system ensures that a certain amount of cane will be cut. For 
example if certain plots must be cut in one day, cutters will be hired for that 
particular day. If a slower cutter is on a particular plot, another ’slow’ cutter can be 
added. The expense of two ’slow’ cutters will be the same as one ’fast* cutter. Daily 
wages are not necessarily decreased as a result of this system and from the point of 
view of the employer, once the required cane is cut, contracted workers can be 
dismissed. Furthermore, in the face of technical change the piece-rate system can be 
advantageous for workers. Now to discuss the impact of modern technology on
I93Marx, Karl (1867) Capital Vol. I. New York (1967): International Publishers, pp.551-558.
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labour.
Labour, as discussed in part I, was most heavily demanded for the harvest. 
However in some regions labour has been entirely replaced by mechanized 
techniques194. What occurred in Colombia? In Colombia employment growth has 
been limited as the cane industry is capital-intensive. Data displaying the share of 
labour employed according to crop demonstrate that the share of labour employed in 
commercial crops was the smallest next to plantation crops, and higher in coffee and 
mixed crop cultivation during the 1950-1971 period195. However due the extension 
of cultivation, the share of labour used in commercial cropping increased substantially 
from 1950 to 1971. In 1950 commercial crops employed 4.8%, 10.9% in 1960 and 
11.7% in 1971 of the regional labour force. For a later period (1976, 1980 and 
1984), amongst commercial crops, cane production absorbed the largest share196. 
However labour demand was still lower than traditional crops crops such as maize, 
plantain and potato.
Similar to Cauca Valley trends, contracted cutters did not play an important 
role in Manuelita until the 1970s. Thereafter data from harvest ledgers show that the
,94See Sugar Part I, particularly the case of Cuba.
'“ Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1974b). "La Agricultura en Colombia, 1950-1972." Boletin Mensual de 
Estadfstica. No.277, table 4A, p.111. See Appendix S.7.
'“ Interview with Ricardo Villaveces (Nov. 1991), President, ASOCANA, Bogota, Colombia.
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presence of permanent cutters diminished substantially197. Moreover, in the early 
1970s a new accounting system was introduced to accomodate the growing numbers 
of contracted workers198. The changes that took place in Manuelita prove that 
labour contracting was used to maintain a flexible payroll in the face of technique 
adaption. Major harvest re-organizations did not take place in Manuelita until the 
1970s199. During the 1936-1976 period manual lifters were demanded in a 1:2 
proportion to cutters200. The switch to mechanical lifters (1977/1978) was the most 
drastic labour saving technical change that took place in the field. By 1990 virtually 
all cane was mechanically lifted, but mechanized cutting had only been adopted by 
a few mills. Appendix S.8 demonstrates that there had been an increase in contracted 
cutters from 1974. According to Fernando Giraldo, Chief Agricultural Engineer for 
the harvest, Manuelita labour statistics were the following:
197Manuelita S. A. S. A. Archive, Manuelita Old Archive Room #2. Workers Weekly Notes from Week 
No.6, 2-8 Feb. 1939; Week No.21, 18-24 May 1944; 28 Nov.-4 Dec. 1946; Week N o .l, 29 Dec- 4 Jan. 
1949; Week No.50, 10-16 Dec. 1953; Week No.39, 20-26 Sept. 1956; 17-23 Nov. 1960; 28 June-4 July 
1965; 26 Oct.-l Nov. 1970; Week No.49, 4-10 Dec. 1972; Week No.38, Sept. 1976; Week No.52, 16 
Dec. 1979.
‘“ Interview with Marco Tulio Carvajal (Feb. 1992), Director of Accounting Department, Manuelita 
S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
‘"See above.
“ “Manuelita S.A. Archive, Manuelita Old Archive Room #2. Workers Weekly Notes from: Week 
No.6, 2-8 Feb. 1939; Week No.21, 18-24 May 1944; 28 Nov.-4 Dec. 1946; Week No.39, 20-26 Sept. 
1956; 17-23 Nov. 1960; 28 June-4 July 1965; 26 Oct.-l Nov. 1970; Week No.49, 4-10 Dec. 1972; Week 
No.38, Sept. 1976; Week No.52, 16 Dec. 1979; demonstrate this ratio.
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Table S2.19
Displacement of Harvest Labour Force in Manuelita 
Upon Introduction of Mechanical Lifting, 1977-1978.
1977 1978
Manuelita Cane Cutters 1,200 750
Manuelita Cane Lifters 450 —
Contracted Cane Cutters 300 600
Contracted Cane Lifters 150 80
Various Tasks 350 250
Source: Interview with Fernando Giraldo (Feb. 10, 1992), Chief Agricultural Engineer in Harvest
Department, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
Between 1977 and 1978 the change from manual to mechanized lifting took place. 
The switch to mechanisation resulted in a decline of cutters from 1,500 in 1977 to 
1,350 in 1978. The drop in total cutters can be explained by increased productivity 
brought about by machete substitution and plot re-design. A similar trend for lifters 
is also witnessed. All of the estate lifters were made redundant though Manuelita 
retained more than half of the contracted lifters. Manual lifters were employed in 
areas of rough terrain where mechanical lifters could not enter. Manual work in 
uneven, rocky terrain would also require more physical exertion and could be 
assumed to lead to more accidents, resulting in higher labour costs if permanent 
Manuelita workers were used. Mechanical lifters also enabled manual lifters to be 
released, and to be relocated as cutters, as they continue to be a scarce factor. The 
reduction in total estate cutters and lifters and the increase in total contracted workers 
evidences that with the introduction of new technology contracted work is preferred.
In 1987 research on continuous cane lifters commenced in Manuelita201.
201"Innovaciones Tecnol6gicas en Manuelita S.A." (1988), op.cit.. p.3.
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Furthermore in 1987 a machine was introduced that chops cane uniformly in the field 
once cane is cut so that transport vehicles can be more densely loaded202. In 
Manuelita, this could indicate that manual cane cutters will soon be phased out. The 
largest area of Manuelita employment will be reduced which will make both the 
industrial and agricultural processes capital intensive. A move which reduced 
significantly employment possibilities for labour.
What happened to the workers who were made redundant in 1977? In the case 
of contracted workers, machines were substituted entirely for labour. According to 
Fernando Giraldo, Manuelita cane cutters and lifters in 1977 were not laid off but 
relocated to other areas of the company. After mechanical cutters were introduced, 
a hiring freeze was activated for eleven years until 1988203. Mechanical cutters did 
not lead to the direct unemployment of permanent cutters rather future employment 
opportunities at Manuelita were reduced for eleven years. It must be emphasized that 
Manuelita is one of the largest sugar mills in the Cauca Valley and smaller sugarcane 
enterprises have less room for relocation of labour. Thus smaller mills employ a 
larger percentage of total Cauca Valley labour; yet when labour must be reduced, 
larger enterprises have more possibilities to keep existing workers employed.
Interviews with top administrators in Manuelita claimed that mechanized lifting 
would have tremendous social repercussions and mill owners would have to confront
202Ibid.
203Interview with Fernando Giraldo (Feb. 10, 1992), Chief Agricultural Engineer in Harvest
Department, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
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sugar workers, both unionized and non-unionized204. Rojas expressed a similar 
view, stating that the enterprises were behaving very cautiously with respect to the 
introduction of mechanisation205. However cutter scarcity contradicts the social 
repercussions of the switch from manual to mechanized cutting. If mill owners were 
to adopt mechanical cutting techniques the reasons would be related to relative 
resource prices and not social awareness as Gabriel Londono, head of industrial 
relations and other sugar mill administrators suggested206. Relative resource prices 
in the Cauca Valley, primarily the high costs of purchasing automatic harvesters, are 
conceivably the most crucial factor. Furthermore purchase of the machinery is only 
the first part of the chain that must be linked to accomodate this technical change. 
As was discussed in part I, the reconstruction of appropriate transport networks, 
installment of new equipment for the patio, appropriate feeder tables, and a new 
design of choppers and separators to deal with the excess waste generated would be 
needed207.
The Manuelita work force increased steadily from 1948 reaching a high of 
2,979 permanent workers in 1990 (Figure S2.9). This is in contrast with sectoral 
trends which showed a decline from the 1970s. The Manuelita indirect work force 
almost quadrupled after 1948 while the direct force more than doubled. The share
^Interviews with Gabriel Londono Dominguez, (February 1992), Head of Industrial Relations and 
Gerardo Ortiz, Head of Factory Operations (February 1992), Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
M3Rojas, Jos6 Maria (1983), op.cit.. p. 184.
206Interviews with Gabriel Londono (18 Feb. 1992), Head of Industrial Relations and Carlos Navia (13
Feb. 1992), Head o f Field Department, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
207See Sugar Part I.
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of the direct labour in the total work force declined slightly from 92% to 87% during 
the 1948-1990 period208.
Figure S2.7
Manuelita Indirect and Direct Work Force, 1948-1990
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Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Administrative Department, Reports to President Anzola on "Direct 
and Indirect Work Force Benefits." (1990); Manuelita Accounting Statements (1956-1988), Palmira, 
Colombia.
The largest proportion of the direct force was employed in the field. The indirect 
work force has always been concentrated in the administrative branch of Manuelita. 
During the 1950-1990 period labour costs have dominanted between 24-36% of the 
cost structure. There appears to be cyclical trends with no significant increase nor 
decrease in labour costs.
208Direct work force is defined as that which is paid wages and indirect work force is paid a salary.
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Figure S2.8
Break-Down of Costs (Material and Labour) for 
Manuelita Field and Factory
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Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Administrative Department, Reports to President Anzola on "Direct 
and Indirect Work Force Benefits." (1990); Manuelita Accounting Statements (1956-1988), Palmira, 
Colombia.
Data disaggregated into field and factory demonstrate a marked change in labour 
costs. Manuelita data from 1952 displayed a small increase in the share of cane costs 
through the years and a decrease in labour costs. Because no radical change occurred 
in this ratio this shows an increase in both capital and labour using techniques. From 
1950 to 1988 costs o f indirect work force in field and factory remained relatively 
constant comprising the same share while costs of direct labour fluctuated. For the 
factory alone, data were broken down into two areas: maintenance and the industrial 
process. As can be expected, the industrial process had extremely high material costs 
which dominated 70% of the bill.
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Figure S2.9
Break Down of Industrial Costs (Material and Labour) for 
Manuelita Factory, 1976-1990.
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Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Administrative Department, Reports to President Anzola on "Direct 
and Indirect Work Force Benefits." (1990); Manuelita Accounting Statements (1956-1988), Palmira, 
Colombia.
Direct labour force was next highest, occupying roughly 12-20% while that of 
indirect labour force stayed constant at around 10%. Costs for labour in maintenance 
were relatively high (30%) at the beginning of the period but by 1987 they had 
dropped to about 20%.
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Figure S2.10
Break Down of Costs (Material and Labour) for 
Maintenance, 1976-1987
Year
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Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Administrative Department, Reports to President Anzola on "Direct 
and Indirect Work Force Benefits." (1990); Manuelita Accounting Statements (1956-1988), Palmira, 
Colombia.
Concurrently, the share of material costs and salaries (indirect labour force) remained 
relatively stable. Thus, the most variable cost in field and factory was labour force 
wages. The fact labour costs have remained promininent, signals their relative 
importance in production. Furthermore it shows that a significant relative reduction 
of labour costs did not occur later in the period (1950-1990) when the majority of 
capital using, labour saving techniques were implemented209.
What were the trends in Manuelita in terms of field labour use? Did capital- 
using methods significantly displace labour? On balance, Manuelita methods were 
labour using. Although machinery was used, in many cases labour was
209See Appendix S.l.
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complementary. Until the end of the period (1976-1990) only some tasks became 
fully mechanized. Between 1970 and 1990 planting was conducted predominantly by 
hand, thereafter mechanisation was introduced.
Figure S2.ll
Evolution of Manuelita Manual and Mechanised Planting, 1971-1990
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Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives: Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Cultivation
Department, 1970-1990, Palmira, Colombia.
Although Manuelita was quick to import tractors, statistics from 1971-1990 reveal 
that manual planting was still prominent210. The data demonstrated that although 
manual planting levels o f the 1980s were equivalent to those of the 1970s, they 
proved to be notable, representing roughly one-third o f total area planted211. Thus 
even late in the period, when mechanized planting was common virtually world-wide, 
Manuelita still employed hard labour. Continued use o f labour was not necessarily
2l0See above.
2uSee Appendix S.2.
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due to the dearth of capital, but rather related to difficulty in mechanising certain 
tasks, and the imperative to invest capital to expand mill capacity, purchase 
replacement parts and construct transport networks212.
It was argued earlier that the Cauca Valley was over mechanized in 1959 and 
by 1972 departmental statistics demonstrated a tendency of de-mechanisation. An 
interesting trend for the 1970-1990 period was the practice of alternating mechanized 
with manual techniques. As will be seen below, machines were used to a wider 
extent in the late 1970s however by the mid-1980s production processes switched 
back to more labour-intensive methods. Thus it shows the flexibility of these 
producers to switch back and forth from capital to labour using techniques, and that 
the switch to mechanisation did not necessarily advance a sequence where higher 
levels of mechanisation would follow.
Irrigation has been present since before 1936213. According to weekly 
worker’s pay roll, in the agricultural process irrigation was the third most labour- 
intensive job after cutting and lifting during the 1939-1990 period. Direct labour 
force data indicate increasing amounts of labour employed in the irrigation division 
until 1965 (see Table S2.20). The decrease from 1965 is attributed to the upgrading 
of irrigation and drainage systems in the 1960s which thereafter required less
2,2See Sugar Part I.
2,3Interview with Carlos Navia (27 Jan. 1992, 13 Feb. 1992), Head of Field Department, Manuelita 
S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
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labour214.
Table S2.20
Most Labour Intensive Tasks in the Agricultural Process 
in Manuelita, 1939-1990 (workers employed/week).
Year Irrigation Cane Cutters Cane Lifters
1939 40 192 83
1946 69 249 216
1949 80 63 85
1953 155 240 118
1956 148 257 122
1960 165 376 166
1965 182 497 175
1970 132 435 177
1972 130 574 190
1976 110 870 293
1979 n.a. 967 116
1985 n.a. 1280 n.a.
1990 n.a. 1659 n.a.
Source: Manuelita S.A. archives. Weekly workers Notes: Week No.6, 2-8 Feb. 1939;Week 
No.21, 18-24 May 1944; 28 Nov.-4 Dec. 1946; Week N o .l, 29 Dec-4 Jan. 1949; Week No.50, 
10-16 Dec. 1953; Week No.39, 20-26 Sept. 1956; 17-23 Nov. 1960; 28 June-4 July 1965; 26 
Oct.-l Nov. 1970; Week No.49, 4-10 Dec. 1972; Week No.38, Sept. 1976; Week No.52, 16 
Dec. 1979; Superintendencia de Campo, Monthly Reports of Harvest Department 1970-1990, 
Palmira, Colombia.
According to table S2.20 irrigation became important in the 1950s. Previously 
irrigation labour figures were low and during the 1949-1953 period the number of 
workers employed in irrigation nearly doubled. If the irrigation labour force is 
compared to cutters an idea of increased land extension versus labour force deepening 
can be analyzed. The number of cutters demonstrate the extent to which cane is 
being cultivated, i.e. cane must be cut during a particular period in its life cycle, 
whereas irrigation labour figures are not easily interpreted since they are weather-
2WMInnovaciones Tecnologicas en Manuelita S.A.", op.cit.. p.9.
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related. Between 1939 and 1960 labour in irrigation quadrupled while cutters only 
doubled. This demonstrates that the up-grade of irrigation techniques were labour 
using. Furthermore early irrigation advances indicate agricultural modernization 
before the 1960s which was a result of mill expansion and not export markets. From 
1965 there was a relative decline in numbers of irrigation workers. As varietal 
switch took place in the mid-1970s it can be asserted that labour was maintained until 
that period and thereafter numbers declined as no other significant technical changes 
occurred in the field that would affect irrigation.
According to cultivation statistics dating back to 1946, manpower used in soil 
preparation increased in absolute terms until 1976 (Table S2.21) whereas land 
extension only increased substantially until 1950 (Table S2.5).
Table S2.21
Tractor Operators in Manuelita, 1946-1976.
Source: Source:
Year Tractor Drivers
1946 14
1949 9
1953 27
1956 24
1960 15
1965 64
1970 54
1976 77
Dec. 1946; Week N o .l,
29 Dec- 4 Jan. 1949; Week No.50, 10-16 Dec. 1953;Week No.39, 20-26 Sept. 1956; 17-23 Nov. 
1960; 28 June-4 July 1965; 26 Oct.-l Nov. 1970; Week No.38, Sept. 1976. Manuelita S.A., 
Palmira, Colombia.
Furthermore the increase in labour force between 1960 and 1970215, during a period
215See Appendix S.5.
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of stagnant land extension, demonstrates the labour using, land saving nature of 
cultivation practices. Therefore labour continued to be used to a large extent.
Analysis of remuneration in Manuelita will be based on direct and indirect 
labour. Aggregate industry data from the mill demonstrated an expansion of workers 
in machinery repair and equipment maintenance (i.e. pneumatic, hydraulic and 
electrical plants and electric instruments for cultivation and processing) and a decline 
in the less-qualified jobs such as work in the patio216. Aggregate field data 
demonstrated an increase in both direct and indirect labour (see Appendix S.5). Of 
the changes that occurred in Manuelita, the least substantial were those in the 
industrial process. Consistent with trends mentioned in part I, as milling capacity 
increased, absolute labour figures for the factory increased but at a much slower pace. 
The majority of direct labour in Manuelita was still employed in the field.
The first wage series data presents the evolution of the basic wage rate. This 
basic wage rate is not the average rate for workers at Manuelita but refers to the 
lowest paid workers. It is useful because all other unskilled worker’s wages are 
related to this minimum scale. Thus an increase or decrease had repercussions on all 
other rates. The figures in this series were not collected systematically but efforts 
have been made to compile data for the earliest month of the year217. Because 
harvests are conducted year-round, this should not affect adversely the quality of the 
information. In table S2.22 cold climate agricultural wages, average national 
agricultural wages, and Manuelita wages are displayed. Agricultural wages in
216Urrea G., Fernando (1987). op.cit.. pp. 18-20.
217Eighty-one per cent of the data is composed of wage data originating from the first six months o f the 
year.
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national accounts are differentiated between cool and tropical climates. Cool climates 
include commodities such as coffee, wheat, flowers and rice are cultivated. Crops 
grown in the tropical climates include sugarcane, fruit, and generally less profitable 
agricultural commodities. Manuelita wages consistently remained above the other two 
indices during the 1935-1970 period and the rate of increase was also faster except 
between 1967 and 1969.
Table S2.22
Comparison of Colombian Agricultural Basic Wage Rates 
and Manuelita, 1945-1970.
Year Cold 
climate 
(Cundina 
marca) 
ag wages
Index Colombian 
ag. wages*
Index Manuelit 
a basic 
wage 
rate
Index
1945 1.00 100 1.09 100 2.00 100
1947 2.50 125
1950 2.30 230 2.52 231 3.36 168
1954 4.50 225
1955 3.25 325 3.46 317
1959 7.50 375
1960 5.25 525 5.51 505
1965 11.60 1160 11.28 1035 24.00 1200
1966 12.60 1260 13.17 1208 27.00 1350
1967 14.20 1420 14.07 1291 30.00 1500
1969 17.22 1722 17.03 1562 32.1 1505
1970 18.80 1625 34.10 1605
Source: Urrutia, Miguel (1979). Cincuenta Anos de Desarrollo Economico Colombiano. 
Bogotd: La Carreta, pp.208-209, Manuelita S. A. archives. Administrative Department, 
Report to President on minimum wage rate in Manuelita (1972), Palmira, Colombia. 
*Global Colombian data collected from DANE official statistics.
Colombian agricultural wages were usually higher than those paid in cool climates. 
This may be because cool climate wages were collected in Cundinamarca where lower 
wages can be offered because of the presence of a large urban centre (Bogoti), and
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the easier access to labour. Movements in wage rates can also be interpreted to 
represent labour scarcity. Higher wages had to be paid to attract or sustain an 
adequate supply of labour in the Cauca Valley.
Another aspect of the basic wage rate is that it does not include social security 
benefits (prestaciones sociales), which have ranged from 19-33% (Table S2.23) of 
Manuelita’s total labour costs. Social security in Manuelita take the form of vacation 
pay, increased pay on holidays and Sundays, medical care, subsidized food purchases 
at the Manuelita cooperative (roughly in operation between 1950-1975), and 
subsidized transport and housing. According to data gathered during 1954-1988, at 
the beginning of this period a larger percentage of labour costs comprised social 
security benefits, a proportion which declined thereafter.
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Table S2.23
Social Security Costs as a Percentage of Total Labour Costs 
in Manuelita, 1954-1988.
Year % of aggregate labour costs wage bill: % of salaries that % of wages that are social
that are social security are social security security
1954 31.82 - -
1955 29.01 - -
1956 33.29 — -
1957 32.67 — -
1958 32.27 — -
1976 19.62 9.27 22.78
1979 19.02 9.04 21.46
1980 19.36 8.59 22.30
1981 19.00 9.07 21.78
1982 19.10 8.99 21.90
1983 18.66 9.06 21.28
1984 19.09 9.54 21.63
1986 20.60 12.60 22.93
1988 19.96 13.43 21.95
Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives, Figures 1954-58: Letter to Universidad de los Andes, Economics 
Department on Social Security Benefits (1959); figures 1976-1988: Administrative Department Report to 
President Anzonla on "Direct and Indirect Work Force Benefits" (1990), Palmira, Colombia. See Appendix 
SA.6.
The data show that 1956 was the year in which the highest percentage (33.29%) of 
the labour bill was deducted for these benefits. This figure decreased throughout the 
decades and remained fairly stable in the 1980s at 20%. The drop in the percentage 
of aggregate labour costs can be explained partially by the decrease in direct work 
force and increase in indirect labour. Data commencing in 1976 demonstrated that 
a much smaller share of the total Manuelita wage bill was directed towards social 
security benefits as compared to indirect labour (an average of 10% versus 22%). 
This can partially explain the decline in social security costs; there has been a decline 
in the direct and an increase in the indirect workforce. Though, if 1976 figures are
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inferred from 1954 to extrapolate indirect and direct work force, there is no denying 
that Manuelita appears to be devoting a smaller portion to this aspect of the bill in 
1990. Furthermore the increase in contracted field workers since the 1970s also 
reduced the share of social security in the total wage bill. This evidence is the 
reverse of Knights observation in Peru-the modernization of the work force in Peru 
led to increased social benefits.
In table S2.24 the minimum wage rate at Manuelita and cane prices are 
indexed in order to observe the magnitude of relative price increases of both. The 
price of cane increased at a much slower pace than that of the labour force which 
increased roughly twice as quickly, indicating reasons for labour saving technical 
change. However labour using techniques continued to be employed considerably in
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the field.
Table S2.24
Nominal Cane and Labour Prices for Manuelita, 1936-1971*.
Year Cane Price 
(Pesos/Ton)
Index Wage Rate 
(Pesos/Week)
Index
1936 $1.68 12
1937 $1.23 9
1953 $14.31 100 $2.56 100
1956 $19.69 138 $4.70 183
1959 $29.64 207 $7.50 294
1961 $28.68 200 $10.00 391
1963 $67.65 480 $15.55 607
1964 $96.67 676 $35.05 1369
1971 $94.20 658 $36.60 1429
Source: Manuelita S.A. Archives, Cane price derived from Reports to the Banking Supenntendency 1936, 
1937, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1964, and 1971. Wage rates derived from Weekly Workers Notes: 
Week No.6, 2-8 Feb. 1939 Week No.21, 18-24 May 1944; 28 Nov.-4 Dec. 1946; Week N o .l, 29 Dec- 
4 Jan. 1949;Week No.50, 10-16 Dec. 1953; Week No.39, 20-26 Sept. 1956; 17-23 Nov. 1960; 28 June^ 
July 1965; 26 Oct.-l Nov. 1970; Week No.49, 4-10 Dec. 1972 Week No.38, Sept. 1976; Week No.52, 
16 Dec.1979. Archive rooms ft2 and 3, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, Colombia.
♦The table only reaches 1971 because in that year accounting practices changed and the price of cane was 
aggregated with all other material field prices.
In the 1950s the price of cane was substantially higher than labour. When field 
activities were broken down into two tasks, the harvest and general operation, the 
costs of the harvest were consistently dominated by labour, particularly wage labour. 
Within the general operation the costs between material and labour were divided 
approximately 40%/60% in the 1980s218. This micro-Manuelita trend is also 
consistent for the agricultural sector as a whole. According to a study of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, in the 1980s the most marked trend in agricultural cost structures was 
the systematic increase in the cost of the labour and the decrease in chemical and
218Interview with Gerardo Ortiz (Feb. 1992), Head of Factory Operations, Manuelita S.A., Palmira, 
Colombia.
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machinery inputs219. Thus field labour costs increased until the mid-1970s and 
thereafter declined. This can be explained by widespread field technical change. In 
terms in relative costs, labour share remained stable during 1950-1990.
Labour was used extensively and manual methods persisted until 1990. 
Although output increased until 1990, sectoral trends demonstrated a decrease in 
labour employed from 1970. The substantial increases in labour productivity of the 
1970s can explain the drop in the use of labour. Proletarianization occurred early in 
the Cauca Valley. Later, rural proletarians largely moved into the cities and became 
urban agricultural workers. In constrast with world trends, contracted labour was 
employed late in the capitalist transition. The shift to contracted work was related 
to maintaining payrolls flexible in the face of adopting major technical changes in the 
field and reducing labour costs. Mills were able to shift to this method because a 
more mobile labour force was willing to migrate to the Cauca Valley in order to 
supplement income. Moreover, increases in population levels were a cause of 
workers willingness to accept less than optimal labour conditions. Although labour 
productivity increases in the 1970s might have placated labour demands as they 
resulted in increased wages.
Manuelita trends diverge slightly from sectoral trends as total labour employed 
increased until 1990. However in terms of technical changes, trends converge. The 
continual use of labour is evidenced both with data of cost structures and absolute 
numbers of labour employed in particular tasks. Furthermore the enormous relative
219Ministerio de Agriculture and Departamento Nacional de Planeacion (1990). El Desarrollo 
Agropecuario en Colombia. Tomo I. Bogotd: Ministerio de Agriculture, p.302.
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increase in labour costs relative to cane, shows the prominence of labour in 
production. The discontinuous nature of technical change is implicitly evident in this 
section with the related harvest changes in the 1970s. Labour received high wages 
relative to Colombian agricultural labour. However the long-term differential 
between Colombian and Manuelita figures declined. Furthermore social security 
benefits also decreased. This coupled with the increase use of contracted labour 
signals a quantitative and qualitative decline in labour standards.
CONCLUSION
Agricultural transformation in Cauca Valley sugar production mainly occurred 
in the twentieth century in contrast with the earlier trends discussed in part I. As in 
other sugar growing areas the agroindustrial structure has become highly oligopolistic. 
By 1990 the existnce of only three refining mills out of a total fourteen modern mills 
in the Cauca Valley illustrate the large amounts of investment required to establish 
modern processing operations. Capital deepening was also visible in sugar exports.
At the beginning of the period cane was grown throughout the Cauca Valley 
to be processed in small-scale trapiches or modern mills. The data demonstrated that 
most panela producers were displaced by the modern industry. Thus as in the case 
of Australia, higher technical levels resulted in the disappearance of small-sized 
producers. However in the Cauca Valley this could be due to structural elements of 
the region charcterized by large-scale commercial cropping which also influenced the 
displacement of cane-panela production.
By the 1960s and 70s independent suppliers became more important to the
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industry. However the data showed that most of these units were medium- to large- 
scale. Between 1960 and 1986 medium- to large-sized (lOO-lOOOha) agricultural 
production units increased while total land area of small and enormous-sized plots 
diminished. Moreover the definition of small farms has been generous, in many 
studies, 10 to 50 hectare farms are considered medium-sized and anything above this 
would be large. From this perspective, Cauca Valley land ownership would be yet 
more concentrated. From a departmental level also, gini coefficients confirm the high 
levels of land concentration in the Cauca Valley. The data from Manuelita exhibit 
similar trends. Most Manuelita land was acquired before 1950 and independent 
suppliers were not needed for additional cane supplies until the 1960s.
Technical adoption and modernisation were more closely linked with domestic 
conditions. Within Colombia technical levels were low at the beginning of the 
period. The importation of mill machinery impulsed field technical changes to occur 
when the majority of large-scale mills were established during the 1940s and 1950s. 
Colombia’s entrance into the international sugar market in 1964 did not necessarily 
increase the number of mills as most were established by 1960. Rather, prior to 1964 
as population grew, sugar demand increased, land became more scarce, and the 
incentive to adopt land and labour saving technical change became stronger. It was 
not the external market that motivated these changes, rather they were related to firm 
survival in the Cauca Valley. In addition, informal institutions and political links 
assisted the sugarmill owner to obtain machinery and inputs. The large-landowning 
structure was crucial for cane cultivation and procurement of milling machinery.
External purchases of machinery did not set a precedent for complete further
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reliance on technological improvements. According to Pineiro, most of the technical 
changes in sugarcane cultivation were induced by exogenous factors220. If one 
looks at the technical change chart (Appendix S.l), a generalization of this nature 
cannot be sustained. Major contributions of internally induced technical change 
included, the fabrication of farm implements, new methods of cane transport from 
field to factory, and the discovery of the new see variety, Mayaguez,~to mention 
only the major domestic innovation.
In the agricultural process most transformational changes were labour and land 
saving. Although labour continued to be an important aspect of cultivation and 
harvesting, recently some methods were modified to become labour using once again. 
Technological advances in seed varieties and inputs have been notable in the fifty-five 
year period observed. This may signal a barrier for the small-scale producer because 
of the difficulty in obtaining credit, purchasing heaving machinery and the lower 
likelihood of receiving knowledge of technical innovation. However, various modes 
of land contracts appeared which enabled these producers access to new techniques 
provided by sugar mill owners. At the time when independent suppliers started being 
contracted, many small producers had already been displaced. In addition, the 
oligopolistic structure of processing allowed mills more leverage in the arrangement 
of contracts. Hence the small-scale producers and independent suppliers were at a 
clear disadvantage.
Sectoral labour force trends were characterized by a relative increase of 
indirect and a decrease in direct labour. The field accounted for a much higher
^Pineiro, Martin, et.al. (1982). op.cit.. p.308.
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percentage of workers than the factory. It is difficult to ascertain which of the two 
areas has undergone the highest degree of technical change. If one considers 
proportional changes in the direct labour force of the industrial and agricultural 
process, the industrial process demonstrates the most substantial transformation. 
However, this method of analysis only takes into account changes in capital to labour 
ratios. Changes in techniques such as new plot design, innovative curvature of the 
machete, and improved seed variety do not exhibit changes in this ratio, also prove 
significant for increasing labour productivity.
Have cane workers benefited from technical change and development in the 
Cauca Valley? Qualitatively sugar workers situation improved, however 
quantitatively wages and benefits declined. First, it is clearly observed that some 
technical changes have augmented worker’s productivity which translated into higher 
salaries when pay is based on the piece-rate system. Second, qualitative changes in 
the labour market such as the gradual shift of labour to urban areas represents 
improved standards of living. Third, quantitative data show a closing of the gap 
between higher than average agricultural wages in the sugar sector as compared to the 
rest of the primary sector. Lastly, social security benefits clearly declined in the 
Manuelita.
Comparatively, technical changes in the Manuelita mill were not as labour 
using. First, the modern factory technology of 1953 did not require much labour. 
This has continued to be true, and absolute labour demand has been on the decline 
since the mid 1960s. Increases in demand for trained labour for repairs and 
maintenance demonstrated a qualitative change in labour force composition in the
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factory. The field does not show as much sophistication. But, this could be a 
question of accounting practices. Technicians and maintenance workers were 
aggregated in the factory data; some of which also work in the field. The field does 
not hire any mechanical technicians per se.
From an economic perspective, sugar production has been successful. It is 
characterized by stable growth and profitable internal and external sales. Because of 
the nature of sugar nature, the commodity can be used as an industrial input and for 
direct sale. In addition, many of the byproducts derived from cane can be redirected 
into the productive process or sold as inputs to other industrial processes such as the 
paper or plywood industry. Historically sugar exports, have existed since the 
nineteenth century, but did not gain importance until the middle of the present. Mill 
owners were geographically concentrated in a fertile and relatively violence-free 
region in Colombia. Because the area was already characterized by large haciendas 
of earlier times, land tenure-related conflicts were uncommon. Land claims 
originated from the Spanish Crown and legalization of title was the tradition. Though 
land titles have been flexible in certain periods such as the wars of the nineteenth 
century and "la violencia" of the twentieth, land concentration persisted. Furthermore 
many mill titles were established prior to the 1950s, before other agricultural pursuits 
became more modern and productive. Thus, increased demand for land (post-1950) 
occurred when titles were fixed leaving no room for dispute.
From a labour perspective, the sugar industry has had very few conflicts and 
still employs large amounts of manual labour as compared to other commercial crops. 
However when labour figures are compared to small commodity producers, the
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percentages of work force employed by the cane industry is marginal. The level of 
Manuelita labour absorption also confirms this trend. Manuelita experienced rapid 
technical changes and productivity increases during the 1936-1990 period. Increases 
in worker productivity induced a release of some of the labour force. However, its 
growth in Manuelita offset these lay-offs. Work force figures demonstrated continual 
increased employment levels. Some of the direct work force in the sugar industry 
such as cutters receive very high wages in comparison to the agricultural sector as a 
whole, and Manuelita always ranked above average agricultural wages paid in 
Colombia. Nonetheless, since employment levels as compared to the agricultural 
sector are low, its contribution to stimulating internal markets remains low.
On a strictly economic level, the process of rural transformation associated 
with sugar in the Cauca Valley could be considered advantageous. From a socio­
economic standpoint, the excessive land concentration and low use of labour would 
rate the agroindustry less desirable. The industry provides acceptable working 
conditions for the direct labour force, and generates foreign receipts. However the 
increase in indirect contracting and the decrease in the proprotion of the wage bill 
directed towards social security evidences declining conditions for labour. Levels of 
labour generation are extremely low when compared to the agricultural sector as a 
whole. This, coupled with concentration of means of production has suppressed the 
development of an internal market in the Cauca Valley; profits remain in the hands 
of the owners of capital and land, and development of a middle class is stifled.
Land tenure was consistently skewed throughout the period. Land conflicts 
have not been prevalent because these large landowners have been able to maintain
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land throughout periods of instability. This is in contrast to other areas of the 
Colombian countryside where violent conflicts have taken place. Another advantage 
for the landowners is the initial high-capital requirement for sugar mill establishment; 
because of this, other possible land conflicts have not arisen. Namely, it is difficult 
to enter into this business. Furthermore the early development of informal and 
formal institutions has furnished impressive support for the nascent sugar complex. 
The development path of the sugar industry has followed a gradual transformation: 
consolidation occurred by the 1960s. Because of this stability and the initial patterns 
of land ownership in the Cauca Valley, the sugar industry has experienced less 
obstacles in to modernization than other crops in Colombia.
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Banana
Bananas are one of a limited number of tropical agricultural commodities to 
be exploited to a large extent in Latin America. Banana production and commerce 
experienced a development boom around the beginning of this century and since then 
trade expansion has been sustained more or less constantly1.
Figure B l.l
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Source: International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1941-42 to 1945-46. Vol II: International 
Trade. (1947), Rome: FAO. pp. 152-161; International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics
Vol.IV. part 2 (1951), Rome: FAO, table 12, p.36; International Yearbook of Agricultural 
Statistics (1941), Rome: International Institute of Agriculture, table 77, pp.284-287; World Crop 
and Livestock Statistics 1948-1985 (1987), Rome: FAO, table 56, pp.516-521; The State of Food 
and Agriculture 1990 (1991), Rome: FAO, table 6, p. 192.
In terms of importance on international commodity markets, bananas were the fourth
largest foreign exchange earner in 19892. Because of the historic growth of the
trade, banana receipts could be considered a steady source o f export income, though
not necessarily in all cases. Sources of supply have increased as world production
'See Figure B l.l .
Commodity Review and Outlook (1991), Rome: FAO, p. 13.
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has shifted and competition has pushed some banana-growing regions out of the 
market while new ones have entered. At the outset of the banana trade prospects 
were favourable: bananas were virtually the only fresh fruit available for twelve 
months of the year at reasonably steady prices3. Thereafter, demand was affected 
by the availability of other fresh fruits. Today in many markets, more fruits have a 
non-seasonal supply and thus the substitution effect has diminished relative banana 
demand. Nonetheless, with population increases and expansion of global markets, the 
banana trade during the 1936-1990 period has expanded (except for a short period in 
the 1970s). In Colombia, bananas have featured irregularly in the export schedule 
and in 1990 were the third highest export earner behind coffee and cut flowers. 
Colombian export-banana production has been concentrated in two regions: 
Magdalena on the central Atlantic Coast and Uraba located in the Darien Gulf4. 
Magdalena was the leader in Colombian banana exports until 1966 when export levels 
dropped drastically. At this point exports from Urab£ grew so that by 1990 
production there represented 63% of national export-banana output5. In part I a 
comparative regional examination of the transformation of export-banana production 
and aspects of international marketing will be conducted followed by analysis of the 
Colombian experience in part II. Because the majority of export banana production 
throughout the period was concentrated in Latin America many of the examples are 
derived from the continent, though efforts will be made to underline regional 
divergences and varied production patterns. Growers who cultivated for local
’Arthur, Henry, Houck, James and Beckford, George (1968). Tropical Agribusiness Structures and 
Adjustments: Bananas. Boston: Harvard University Press, p. 13.
4See Maps B 2.1 and B2.2.
5See Appendix B.3.
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markets will not be analyzed because of the difficulty in obtaining data. Typically 
production for domestic markets was dispersed throughout the countryside and often 
intercropped. Therefore data for individual crops were difficult to disaggregate6. 
Moreover as late as 1970 the majority of bananas were consumed where they were 
produced7. The repercussions of non-export bananas on national economies were 
distinct in terms of employment of labour, capital requirements, land usage, related 
institutional support, and of course their impact on the balance of payments. The 
emergence of new rural environments with the arrival of export-banana production 
and the effect it had on modernisation will be discussed by analyzing the nature of the 
crop and the development of markets and institutions. This will be followed by a 
review of technical changes precipitated by the trade and the cumulative influence it 
had on labour. This chapter will not discuss labour disputes and social unrest as 
these issues are not central to the thesis and have been addressed elsewhere8. 
Moreover because TNCs were one of the strongest impulses to the establishment of 
export banana production they will often be at the centre of discussion. In addition 
to these issues, concerns specific to the banana industry will be explored. Have 
TNCs contributed to a region’s instability due to their forceful entrance, development 
and later decline or have they ’kindled the fire’ which in later years was to be 
nurtured by native growers? Did the influence of international trade affect the rate
6See Hill, Polly (1989). Development Economics on Trial. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
for a discussion of the problem of rural statistics in the tropics.
7Grunwald, Joseph and Musgrove, Philip (1970). Natural Resources in Latin American Development. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, p.364.
•For this type of analysis see for example: Kepner, C.D. (1936). Social Aspects of the Banana 
Industry. New York: Columbia University Press; Bourgois, Philippe I. (1989). Ethnicity at Work: Divided 
Labor on a Central American Banana Plantation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; The 
Human Cost of Bananas (1979). Manila: ICL Research Team.
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and factor-bias of technical change?
Part I
CROP CHARACTERISTICS
Plantains and bananas9, cultivated by small producers, have been an integral 
part of the crop mix for centuries in tropical and semi-tropical areas10. Growing 
conditions require a minimum average monthly rainfall of four inches and a mean 
temperature of eighty degrees fahrenheit. Soil requirements are diverse as the banana 
plant can be grown in soil ranging from sand to heavy silt. The root system of the 
plant is shallow and the above ground rhizome is weak, thus ideal planting areas are 
those which are protected from harsh winds11. Similar to sugarcane, the banana is 
a rhizome which is harvested on a ratoon basis. Each rhizome produces numerous 
suckers12 which are ready for harvesting in 9-12 months and capable of producing 
consecutive crops over a number of years13. This cycle can continue in a profitable 
manner for five to twenty years if disease does not hit and heavy winds do not
’Plantain is a subspecies of the genus Musa, of which the banana belongs. The plantain is larger and 
is used green as a cooked vegetable, in contrast to the banana which is eaten raw (The Hutchinson Softback 
Encyclopedia Unabridged (1992) Oxford (2nd edition): Helicon Publishing Ltd., pp.75, 656-657).
l0Fawcett, William (1921). The Banana: its Cultivation. Distribution and Commercial Uses. London 
(2nd ed.): Duckworth & Co., pp. 15-16. Reynolds, P.K. (1927). The Banana: its History Cultivation and 
Place among Staple Foods Boston: Houghton Mifflin, pp.34-37; Grunwald, Joseph and Musgrove, Philip 
(1970), op.cit.. p.366; Production and Marketing of Bananas from the Associated African States and 
Madagascar (1971). Brussels: Commission of European Communities, p .l; Davies, Peter (1990), op.cit.. 
pp.21-25.
"Cobley, Leslie S. An Introduction to the Botany of Tropical Crops London: Longmans, pp.258-260; 
Arthur, Henry, et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p. 149.
,2Suckering is defined as, " . . .  reproduction by new shoots arising from an existing root system rather 
than from seed." The Hutchinson Softback Encyclopedia (1992) Oxford (2nd Ed.): Helicon Publishing, 
p.792.
,3See Maingot del Barco, Anthony P. (1991). "La Guerra del Banano en el Caribe: Anticipando 
Cambios Globales." Foro Internacional. 32(1), p.66; May, Stacy and Galo, Plaza (1958). The United Fruit 
Company in Latin America. Washington D.C.: National Planning Agency, p.28; Arthur, Henry et.al. 
(1968), op.cit.. p.47.
182
1 I
Parti: Banana
damage the plant14. These characteristics (short gestation period and relatively long 
productive cycle), make the fruit an attractive selection for the crop mix as it can 
generate earnings relatively quickly in comparison to many other tropical crops15. 
In the case of other tropical or semi-tropical cash crops such as coffee or cocoa 
several years must pass before the first harvest.
For the small farmer who often does not possess savings, bananas are a 
feasible option for the crop mix and for commercialisation16. After obtaining access 
to land, the only vital element needed is suckers. This is particularly true at the 
beginning of the period when many banana techniques did not necessarily require high 
levels of capital for input purchases, and techniques were mainly labour using17. 
Bananas are also advantageous for small farmers because the large wide leaves of the 
plant provide shade for the other crops18. Thus they are extensively intercropped 
with nursery crops such as coffee, cocoa, nutmeg and foodstuffs such as kidney beans 
or maize.
l4Interview with Nestor Guitierrez (Nov. 1991), agricultural engineer, UNIBAN, Urabl, Colombia; 
Arthur, Henry et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p.47; Ellis, Frank (1983). Las Trasnacionales del Banano en 
Centroamerica. San Jos6: Editorial Universitario Centroamericana, p.81.
l5Nutmeg, cocoa, and coffee plants all require several years before a harvest can occur; thus long-term 
investment must be taken on.
I6Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.4.
17Discussed below. See Appendix B .l.
l8Thomson, Robert (1987). Green Gold: Bananas and Dependency in the Eastern Caribbean. London: 
Latin American Bureau Ltd., p.46.
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INSTITUTIONS and MARKETS: International Trade. Producers. Exporters and 
TNCs
This section will examine the structure of international trade and marketing. 
The first section will briefly discuss historical antecedents underlining the nature of 
the market and illustrating its emergence by means of a description of the industry 
leader, the United Fruit Company (UFCO) and land usage of banana suppliers. This 
will be followed by an analysis of other actors which formally joined the trade: 
TNCs, commercial houses, private or public exporters and associate producers. 
Lastly, TNC theory will be presented which will be followed by evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of the export trade.
Bananas have been widely traded throughout the twentieth century. The 
literature claims that the majority of export bananas are traded on open markets19. 
However due to the structure of international marketing, barriers to entry are high, 
thus making access difficult, and markets less than free. Though preferential 
agreements exist, banana policy, internally and externally, is not as contentious a 
political issue as for sugar. Another salient feature of commerce is that only one or 
two varieties are traded internationally20. These varieties are selected for their high 
yields, robustness to withstand long distance transport, low propensity to bruise and 
their invariable unblemished appearance.
l9The World Banana Economy 1970-1984. (1986), Rome: FAO, p.3; Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. 
p.17.
“ There are more than 200 banana varieties, see The Observer. (25 Oct., 1992), "Lowdown on 
Bananas”.
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Figure B1.2 displays a general scheme of the organisation of the banana trade. 
Though marketing channels have experienced changes over time, this captures the 
most common stages of production, packaging and distribution. In some cases, one 
company integrated all these stages. In others, separate firms might be involved in 
each aspect of the process.
Figure B1.2
Location-Specific Stages of 
Banana Marketing
Production
Centres
Overseas Transport
Consumption
Centres
Vessel
Cleaning and Packaging Stations
Transport and Ports
Collection Agents
Banana Farms
Wholesalers
Consumer
Ripeners
Retailers
Ports
Source: Constructed from Philp, D.A. (1967). "The Marketing of Bananas." In Warly, T.K. (Ed.) 
Agricultural Producers and Their Markets. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.286-287; Interviews with Camilo 
Penalosa (March 1992) Head of International Marketing for UNIBAN, Bogota.
Within the producing regions there were four major stages. First, bananas were 
harvested and moved from the farm to cleaning and packaging stations. These 
stations were usually located on individual farms, and either organised by the 
independent farmer, a cooperative, the State or an export agent. From here bananas 
were moved to port and then shipped to the overseas destination. Within the
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stations were usually located on individual farms, and either organised by the 
independent farmer, a cooperative, the State or an export agent. From here bananas 
were moved to port and then shipped to the overseas destination. Within the 
consuming country the fruit was moved from ports to ripening centres, onto 
wholesalers, retailers and consumers.
Because bananas are a fresh fruit and highly perishable there are not any 
trading centres nor commodity markets as for coffee, cocoa, sugar and other 
commodities. Therefore highly synchronised, direct links must be made with 
distributors or wholesalers in centres of consumption so that the commodity arrives 
fresh to markets21. In the early years of the trade, links between local growers and 
export firms were tenuous. Much of the commerce relied upon a ship arriving to 
port, the summoning of local producers to harvest, and loading of the ship. 
According to one historian describing Honduras:
During the 1870s and 1880s most bananas were grown by local farmers or fever-ridden 
immigrants who worked small plantings in clearings near the mouths of rivers or creeks 
and sold fruit to a generally erratic clientele of shipmasters and produce firms22.
By the turn of the century shippers became involved in production and many 
companies established plantations. The principal impulses to the trade were technical 
and entrepreneurial; the development of refrigerated shipping and the activities of 
Captain Baker and his associates23. Captain Baker, after successfully shiping
21Philp, D.A. (1967). "The Marketing of Bananas." In Warly, T.K. (Ed.) Agricultural Producers and 
Their Markets. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.285-296; Interview with Camilo Penalosa (March 1992) Head 
of International Marketing for UNIBAN, Bogota, Colombia.
22Wilson, C.M. (1947). Empire in Green and Gold: The Story of the American Banana Trade. New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, p.8.
“ Taylor, J.A. (1967). "World Situation and Outlook for Bananas." In Warley, T.K. (Ed.), Agricultural 
Producers and Their Markets. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.274.
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consuming country the fruit was moved from ports to ripening centres, onto 
wholesalers, retailers and consumers.
Because bananas are a fresh fruit and highly perishable there are not any 
trading centres nor commodity markets as for coffee, cocoa, sugar and other 
commodities. Therefore highly synchronised, direct links must be made with 
distributors or wholesalers in centres of consumption so that the commodity arrives 
fresh to markets21. In the early years of the trade, links between local growers and 
export firms were tenuous. Much of the commerce relied upon a ship arriving to 
port, the summoning of local producers to harvest, and loading of the ship. 
According to one historian describing Honduras:
During the 1870s and 1880s most bananas were grown by local farmers or fever-ridden 
immigrants who worked small plantings in clearings near the mouths of rivers or creeks 
and sold fruit to a generally erratic clientele of shipmasters and produce firms22.
By the turn of the century shippers became involved in production and many 
companies established plantations. The principal impulses to the trade were technical 
and entrepreneurial; the development of refrigerated shipping and the activities of 
Captain Baker and his associates23. Captain Baker, after successfully shiping 
bananas to the USA for several years, established the United Fruit Company (UFCO) 
in 1899 with Minor Keith, who was involved in railway construction in Costa
2IPhilp, D.A. (1967). "The Marketing of Bananas." In Warly, T.K. (Ed.) Agricultural Producers and 
Their Markets. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.285-296; Interview with Camilo Penalosa (March 1992) Head 
o f International Marketing for UNIBAN, Bogota, Colombia.
22Wilson, C.M. (1947). Empire in Green and Gold: The Storv of the American Banana Trade. New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, p.8.
“ Taylor, J.A. (1967). "World Situation and Outlook for Bananas." In Warley, T.K. (Ed.), Agricultural 
Producers and Their Markets. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.274.
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Rica24. The United Fruit Company, was to become involved in all areas of 
production and distribution. The UFCO purchased tracts of land, organised banana 
plantations, constructed transport networks within plantations and from plantations to 
port, purchased ocean liners (later known as the "Great White Fleet"), constructed 
housing, established water supply systems, owned ripening centres in the USA, and 
sold bananas directly to retailers25. In Honduras banana companies (including the 
UFCO) were called the octopus {el pulpo) because of their omnipresent influence in 
the economic and political arenas26. The growth in the number of banana exporting 
centres was rapid and by the turn of the century vertical integration of the industry 
was apparent.
On March 20, 1900, Andrew Preston’s cautious report to his 361 stockholders put the 
"reasonable" value of all United Fruit’s tropical investments at 17 million dollars. The 
new federation of banana firms owned 212,394 acres in Costa Rica, Cuba, Honduras,
Jamaica, San Domingo and Colombia, of which 66,000 acres were under cultivation- 
about half of this in bananas, most of the remainder in sugar-cane fields and coconut 
groves. United Fruit also owned 11,945 head of cattle, 1,977 horses and mules, 112 
miles of light railways with 17 boats, launches, wharfs, and docks, and 10 small 
steamships27.
24For literature on the UFCO see Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935). The Banana Empire. New 
York: The Vanguard Press; McCann, Thomas P. (1976). An American Company: The Tragedy of United 
Fruit. New York: Crown Publishers; Adams, Frederick Upham (1976). Conquest of the Tropics. New 
York (reprint): Arno Press; Davies, Peter (1990). Fvffes and the Banana: Musa Sanientum a Centenary 
History 1888-1988. London: The Athlone Press. Heinzen, Barbara (1984). "The United Brands Company 
in Cameroon: A study of the tension betwen local and international imperatives." Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies; Posada, Eduardo (1992). "Imperialism, 
Local Elites, and Regional Development: The United Fruit Company in Colombia Reconsidered, 1900-
1945." Paper presented at the Congress of Americanists, New Orleans: Tulane University; "Palmer, Jesse 
T. (1932). "The Banana in Caribbean Trade." Economic Geography 8 (3), pp.262-273; Wilson, C.M. 
(1947). Empire in Green and Gold: The Storv of the American Banana Trade. New York: Henry Holt and 
Company; May, Stacy and Galo, Plaza (1958). The United Fruit Company in Latin America. Washington 
D.C.: National Planning Agency.
“ Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. chapters 1,6 and 7; McCann, Thomas P. (1976), 
op.cit.. p.34; Davies, Peter (1990). Fvffes and the Banana: Musa Sapientum a Centenary History 1888- 
1988. London: The Athlone Press, chapter 2.
“ See MacCameron, Robert (1983). Bananas. Labour and Politics in Honduras: 1954-1963. Syracuse: 
Syracuse University, p. 13.
“ Wilson, C.M. (1947), op.cit.. p. 118.
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The extent of the vertical-control persisted and was also visible through international 
trade data. For instance until 1956 the UFCO’s operations, were integrated such that 
neither f.o.b. (transport costs: free on board) nor c.i.f. (cost of insurance and 
freight) statistics could be uncovered for certain trade flows. The first place at which 
market prices could be observed was at the f.o.r. (free on rail) stage in importing 
countries28.
At first glance, the history of banana companies and their political influence 
in banana growing regions disguised the fact that many banana suppliers from the 
onset of the trade in the 1860s until 1990 were small- to medium-scale growers29. 
Throughout the period land tenure patterns were diverse and a strict paradigm cannot 
be established. First small scale production in the Windward Islands and Ecuador 
will be examined. This is followed by a review of large scale operations in 
Honduras.
In the 1930s the Windward Islands started exporting bananas, most of which 
were cultivated by small growers30. From 1956 to 1958, and 1961 the majority of 
landholding were under 5 ha. with the highest concentration in Grenada31. Even in
28The World Banana Economy 1970-1984 (1986), op.cit.. p.8.
29For accounts of the political clout of banana pioneers see McCann, Thomas (1974), op.cit.: Wilson, 
C.M. (1947), op.cit.
^Davies, Peter (1990), op.cit.. p. 184.
3lPersaud, Bishnodat (1966). "An Abstract of West Indian Banana Statistics". University of West 
Indies, table 3, p.6; Arthur, Henry (1968), op.cit.. p.74.
188
Parti: Banana
the 1980s production was mainly by smallholder32. One of the most prominent 
banana producers of the twentieth century, Ecuador, also relied mainly on small 
independent growers. Ecuador was the largest exporter in the 1950s, and obtained 
most exportable output from small scale production. Small and medium planters still 
were common in the 1960s and early 1970s33. Between 1971 and 1984 cultivated 
area fell by more than one-half from 124,000 ha. to 50,000 ha34. During this period 
medium and large size farms increased to the detriment of small farms35. The 
section below on associate producers and local commercial houses will explain why 
these small producers survived.
Large scale production by TNCs was most clearly observed in the Central 
American republics. Concessions were established with the government in return for 
the construction of basic infrastructure. Through these arrangements large tracts of 
land were often acquired; sometimes as much as 500 ha per title36. In Honduras 
local producers supplied TNCs at the onset of the trade. However by 1930 
independent producers had disappeared entirely37. Yet in the 1950s the UFCO 
started to stimulate the development of local producers and in the 1960s Standard
“ Welch, Barbara Marian (1989). "Institutional Structures as a Factor in Land-Use Decisions: The 
Impact of Banana Growers Associations in French and Commonwealth islands in the Eastern Caribbean." 
PhD Dissertation, University of London, University College; Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. pp.55,68.
“ Parsons, James (1957), op.cit.. pp.201-216, Arthur, Henry, et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p.56; For figures 
of the 1970-72 period see also Production and Marketing o f Bananas from the Associated African States 
and Madagascar (1971), op.cit.. table 19, p.50.
“ The World Banana Economy 1970-1984: Structure. Performance and Prospects. (1986). op.cit.. p. 16.
“ Ibid.
“ Karnes, Thomas L. (1978), op.cit.. p.29.
“Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p.36; Karnes, Thomas L. (1978), op.cit.. p.29.
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Fruit Company followed their lead38. This change in corporate strategy will be 
examined below. At this time (1960) UFCO and Standard Fruit holdings totaled 
approximately 200,000 ha. of the country’s best agricultural land which represented 
8% of all land under cultivation39. However local growers (who were usually 
smaller in scale than the TNCs) supplied an average of 50% of export bananas 
between 1960 and 197740. By 1984, 84% of total hectarage was cultivated by 
independent growers although the majority of large plantations continued to be 
dominated by TNCs (Standard Fruit and United Brands)41. General tendencies of 
of land tenure patterns are difficult to map as production centres have been shifting 
and, as indicated, TNC policy has changed dramatically over time42.
The term trans national corporation (TNC) will be defined as any enterprise 
involved in more than one market or producing centre which makes decisions based 
on global resources and opportunities43. The phrases commercial house and export 
firm will be applied to those exporting from one country and will be used 
interchangeably.
38Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p.38.
39MacCameron, Robert (1983). Bananas. Labor and Politics in Honduras: 1954-1963. Syracuse: 
Syracuse University, p. 122.
"Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p.37; The World Banana Economy 1970-1984: 
Structure. Performance and Prospects. (1986), op.cit.. p.23.
41The World Banana Economy 1970-1984: Structure. Performance and Prospects. (1986), op.cit.. p.23. 
A discussion o f TNCs will be provided below.
42Taylor, J.A. (1967). "World Situation and Outlook for Bananas." In Warly, T.K. (Ed.) Agricultural 
Producers and Their Markets. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.273-284.
43For debates on the difficulties of definition see Hamilton, F.E.I. (1986). "The Multinationals:
Spearhead of Spectre?." In Dixon, D.J. and Drakakis-Smith, D. (Eds.). Multinational Corporations and
the Third World. London: Croom Helm, pp.2-3.
190
Parti: Banana
As described above, the trade initially consisted of a few irregular traders. 
The UFCO was the first major exporter to organise in 189944. Later, the Vacarros 
Brothers founded the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in 1923, although their 
presence in the banana business dated back to the turn of the century. In 1964 fifty 
per cent of Standard Fruit stock was acquired by Castle and Cooke and by 1968 it 
became a wholly-owned subsidary45. The UFCO had a more turbulent history. In 
1954 the US Attorney-General filed a complaint against the UFCO because of its 
alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 73 of the 
Wilson Tariff Act46. The US Supreme Court ruled against the UFCO and forced 
the company to relinquish some of their control of banana imports. In particular, 
their ’jobbing’ or ripening centres had to be abandoned and they were forced to sell 
fruit to ripeners and not local distributors47. In 1969 the UFCO became invoved in 
a take-over attempt by the AMK Corporation, the resultant company being renamed 
United Brands48. Del Monte Corporation entered in 1966 after it bought the West 
Indies Fruit Company49. Subsequently the US tobacco conglomberate, R.J. 
Reynolds, acquired Del Monte in 197950. Still by 1990 these were the three major
“ The UFCO had many subsidiaries which operated in different countries. For example Elders and 
Fyffes Ltd. has been a wholly-owned subsidiary since 1913, see Davies, Peter (1990), op.cit.. p.216.
“ Read, Robert A. (1986). "The Banana Industry: Oligopoly and Barriers to Entry." In Casson, Mark 
(Ed.), Multinationals and World Trade London: Allen and Unwin, p.325.
“ Clairmonte, Frederick F. (1976). "World Banana Economy: Problems and Prospects." Economic and 
Political Weekly. 11(5-7), p.285.
47MacCameron, Robert (1983), op.cit.. p.51; Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p. 17; 
McCann, Thomas P. (1976), op.cit.. p.65.
“ Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.326.
“ Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p. 105; Sectoral Study of Transnational Enterprises in Latin America The 
Banana Industry (1975), Washington: Organisation of American States, p.2.
“ Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.326.
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TNCs involved in the trade.
The extent to which the TNCs dominated international markets between 1950 
and 1980 is illustrated in table B l.l.
Table B l.l
Share of the Transnational Corporations in World Banana Trade,
1966-1980.
TNC 1950
(%)
1966 
(1000s 
of tons)
% 1972
(1000s of 
tons)
% 1980
(1000s of 
tons)
%
United
Brands
80.0 1807 34 1973 30.5 1966 28.7
Castle and 
Cooke
8.9 652 12.3 1168 18 1451 21.2
Del Monte — 58 1.1 356 5.5 1053 15.4
Total 88.9 2505 47.2 3497 54 4470 65.2
Source: Constructed from The World Banana Economy 1970-1984: Structure Performance and 
Prospects. (1986), Rome: FAO, Table 5, p.8; Sectoral Study of Transnational Enterprises in 
Latin America The Banana Industry (1975). Washington: Organisation of American States, Table 
12, p.23.
In 1950 TNCs commanded 88.9% of world trade, the majority of which was 
controlled by United Brands. However with the entrance of other TNCs, United 
Brands’ share declined. After a sharp drop between 1950 and 1966, TNC share of 
international markets gradually expanded to 65.2% in 1980. United Brands decreased 
its participation in world markets but continued to be the prominent TNC. Castle and 
Cooke nearly doubled its share from 12.3% in 1966 to 21.2% in 1980. Del Monte 
proved to be even more dynamic, jumping from 1.1% in 1966 to 15.4% in 1980. 
The dominance of TNCS in world trade was sustained throughout this period, 
however increasingly banana companies pulled out of production responsibilities.
Not only did TNCs dominate world markets but they also absorbed a large 
share of the retail price. In a 1976 article, Frederick Clairmonte maintained that 11
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or 12 per cent of the retail price accrued to the producing countries although in some 
countries, where TNCs were absent, the figure was lower51. Research conducted 
by Robert Thomson in the 1980s in the Windward Islands maintained that banana 
farmers of the Eastern Caribbean received little more than 10% of final retail price. 
But as costs of inputs and labour must be subtracted from the figure the real incomes 
were lower52. It is widely held that the majority of income received from banana 
sales was amassed by marketing firms. This could be construed as indicating scale- 
bias in marketing.
Because of the need to obtain large amounts of bananas to fill ships during a 
short time period, organisation was crucial to move bananas from field to packaging 
areas then finally to ports. A similar feature in cane growing (rapid perishability 
between field and processing centre) in addition to other factors, particularly high 
capital requirements for modern mill construction, resulted in concentrated industry 
structures53. High levels of investment for converting bananas into a tradeable 
commodity were also necessary. Thus it is the nature of the commodity, coupled 
with the fact that bananas were grown in exchange-scarce areas which allowed TNC 
monopolistic tendencies to arise. Of course, some States challenged these tendencies 
and in some cases modified TNC behaviour54. But in the final analysis in many 
areas, TNC banana control persisted into the 1980s. For example, as late as 1983,
5IClairmonte, Frederick (1976), op.cit.. p.281.
52Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit..p.45.
53See Sugar Parts I and n.
MFor literature on the State vis-a-vis banana TNCs see for example: Gamier, Leonardo; Gonz&les, 
Gladys; Comick, Jorge (1988). "Costa Rica: Las Vicisitudes de una Politica Bananera National" In
Cambio v Continuidad en la Economfa Bananera. Torres-Rivas, Edelberto and Eckhard Deutscher (Eds.) 
San Jose: FLACSO, CEDAL.
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bananas (primarily exported by TNCs) continued to represent the largest single 
foreign exchange earner in Costa Rica55.
Yet, alongside TNCs, local commercial houses or marketing bodies were 
formed. Similar to TNCs, these organisations usually embraced a wide range of 
functions such as providing technical assistance and credit to growers, collection and 
packaging fruit, chartering ships and seeking buyers in importing countries. These 
organisations were either formed by the State, independent collectors or producers. 
Three examples will be given below to illustrate the diversity of these agents and their 
responsibilties.
One of the first commercial house was the Jamaica Producer’s Association 
which was organised in 1929 and financed by the British Colonial government56. 
The Association provided centralized export services for over 6,000 small growers57. 
In 1933 the UFCO attempted to force the Association to retreat by purchasing 
bananas from growers at higher prices than those sold to consumers. State 
intervention protected the Association and established general guidelines for all 
exporters58. In 1936 an agreement was reached which allocated 25% of the UK 
market to to the Jamaican Producers Association and 75 % to Fyffes, a subsidiary of 
United Brands59. After Independence in 1947 the Jamaican Banana Board (now the
35Bourgois, Philippe I. (1989), op.cit.. p. 18
“Davies, Peter (1990), op.cit.. pp. 145-147; Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.327; Kepner, C. D. 
and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. p.296.
“ Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.34.
“ Davies, Peter (1990), op.cit.. pp. 148-151; Sealy, Theodore and Hart, Herbert (1984). Jamaica’s 
Banana Industry Kingston: The Jamaica Banana Producers Association, chapter 12.
“ Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.80.
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Banana Company of Jamaica) was created to provide insurance against losses from 
hurricanes and administer all banana exports60. In the 1960s the Association 
acquired ripeners. However Jamaica exports were declining as between 1966 and 
1984 exports dropped from 200,000 tonnes to 11,000 tonnes61. But TNC exports 
also diminished and by 1984, 60% of Jamaican bananas exported to the UK were 
controlled by the Association62. Nonetheless the history demonstrates that-with 
official support-the Association was able to confront TNCs and provide a range of 
services to small growers, enabling them to compete in world markets63. This 
example shows that export activites of local export agents were similar to those of 
TNCs.
Another major switch to local administration occurred in Ecuador. Although 
the UFCO established a small plantation in Tenguel during the 1930s, the bulk of 
exportable fruit was obtained from independent producers64. After 1946 due to the 
opening of the fertile interior, readily-available low-rate shipping and favourable 
government policy, major growth through expansion in local production by natives 
was brought about65. TNCs established plantations, but the government had 
restrictive policies on land ownership66. Much of the export trade relied on brokers
"For each bunch of fruit a set amount was paid into a fund. See Sealy, Theodore and Hout, Herbert 
(1984), op.cit.. p.93; Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.327.
“ Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.80.
“Sealy, Theodore and Hout, Herbert (1984), op.cit.. pp.3, 73.
“ See Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. pp.80-81.
MLarrea, Carlos (1987). "Auge y Crisis de la Produccidn Bananera (1948-1976)." In Larrea, Carlos, 
(Ed.) El Bananao en el Ecuador Quito: FLACSO, p.73; Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.328.
“ Parsons, James (1957). "Bananas in Ecuador: A New Crop in the History of Tropical Agriculture." 
Economic Geography 33(3), pp.203-204; Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.328.
“Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.328.
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or middlemen who collected bananas from local growers and sold them to 
exporters67. Though various were formed, the prominent Ecuatorian export agent 
was the Exportadora Bananera Noboa (EBN)68. During the 1950-1990 period the 
role of the State was fundamental: infrastructure-roads and ports—were modernised, 
credit was provided to small producers, the land market was regulated to prevent 
TNCs amassing plantations, wages were controlled, banana prices were fixed and a 
national shipping line was established69. From 1977 increasing amounts of banana 
were exported solely by the TNCs70. Nonetheless, the rise in TNC involvement did 
not necessarily displace small independent producers71. With so much State support, 
the obvious question is why did TNCs survive? Their survival could be attributed to 
their ability to establish operations throughout the world which would enable them to 
spread risks. TNCs also preferred to maintain their links with Ecuador as the 
country’s outlying geographic location was important to ensure a supply of bananas 
in case of bad weather other parts. This was particularly so as Standard Fruit and the 
UFCO predominated in Central America throughout the period.
^See Larrea, Carlos (1988). "Los Cambios Recientes en el Subsistema Bananero Ecuatoriano y Sus 
Consecuencias Sobre los Trabajadores: 1977-1984." In Cambio v Continuidad en la Economia Bananera. 
Torres-Rivas, Edelberto and Eckhard Deutscher (Eds.) San Jos6: FLACSO, CEDAL, pp.72-29; Parsons, 
James (1957), op.cit.. p.214.
“ Larrea, Carlos (1988), op.cit.. p. 165.
“ Ibid.,
70Larrea, Carlos (1987), op.cit.. p.76.
71 Although Carlos Larrea demonstrated an increasing concentration of farms between 1965, 1970 and 
1980, small and medium farms were not completely displaced as in 1983, 85% of banana farms averaged 
33.6 hectares. However, their participation in export markets was low with 68% of the exportable output 
originating from large estates (> 200  ha.). This may indicate a future displacement of small producers. 
See Larrea, Carlos (1987), op.cit.. pp. 166-167; also see Table 1, p. 168; Charvet, PaolaSylva (1987). "Los 
Productores de Banano." In Larrea, Carlos, (Ed.) El Bananao en el Ecuador Quito: FLACSO, p. 127; 
Charvet, Paola Sylva (1987), op.cit.. pp. 131-132.
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A later example was the Windward Islands Banana Growers Association 
(WINBAN), established in 1958, which was responsible for controlling disease, 
organising extension services, purchasing export quality bananas from independent 
growers, boxing, delivering and selling to the exporter (Geest)72. This association 
was only established to negotiate prices between growers and Geest and did not aim 
to export as in the Jamaican case. It was not intended to become an autonomous 
marketing body. For instance, Thomson reported that its attitude towards Geest was 
subservient (and not antagonistic as in other countries): the Association was fearful 
of Geest pulling out73. WINBAN’s role as an intermediary gradually diminished and 
by the 1980s its function had collapsed as the bulk of exported banana were bought 
through direct contracts with TNCs74. But Geest remained closely associated with 
WINBAN and does not own much land in the Windward Islands75. Therefore 
although a local agency was formed to foment banana production exports remained 
in the domain of the traditional TNCs and little organisational changes took place.
As stated earlier, local growers in some regions such as Ecuador and the 
Windward Islands, would also supply TNCs. In yet other areas TNCs would directly 
stimulate the growth of independent growers, or as denoted by the TNCs, ’associate 
producers’. One of the regions where the UFCO associate producer programmes
^Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.34.
73Ibid., pp.35-36.
74The World Banana Economy 1970-1984: Structure. Performance and Prospects. (1986), Rome: 
FAO, p. 17.
75Geest only owned 10,000 acres in 1986. See Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. pp.36-38.
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started earliest was Colombia during the 1910s and 1920s76. Another early example 
was on the Pacific Coast in Costa Rica in 193577. Later, by the 1950s and 1960s 
associate producer programmes became widespread as the UFCO faced problems 
retaining lands-estates were expropriated in Guatemala, Cuba and Ecuador78. 
Therefore, though programmes were established as early as the 1920s, later TNCs 
actively fostered the development of associate producers because they aimed to 
decrease private land holdings, shift production responsibilities (UFCO in the 1950s 
and Standard Fruit in the 1960s), and also to strengthen and diversify local support 
for the UFCO79.
With regard to associate producer programmes, Frederick Clairmonte took a 
dependency stance and argues that the system of associate producers reinforced the 
relationship between "an indigenous caste oligarchy and large corporate power" which 
would in turn result in an effective type of indirect economic rule80. He supports 
this view by reference to the entrance of Del Monte after the mid-1960s and the 
eventual sale of UFCO land to Del Monte in Guatemala by 1971, showing that the 
banana business continued to be dominated by a few, enormous TNCs and regional
76See Banana Part n.
^Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952). "Evolution of the Banana Industry of Costa Rica." 
Economic Geography 28(1), p. 10. For examples of Standard Fruit see Karnes, Thomas L. (1978). Tropical 
Enterprise: The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, p.9. However due to the outbreak of Sigatoka most exportable bananas were cultivated 
in UFCO plantations. Sigatoka eradication costs were more difficult to bear for independent producers.
78President Arbenz expropriated much of UFCO land during 1951 to 1954; see McCann, Thomas 
(1976), op.cit.. p.61. The UFCO lost $58 million because of the Cuban Revolution; see McCann, Thomas 
P. (1976), op.cit.. p.78. However the UFCO regained land in Honduras.
79Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p.38.
“ Clairmonte, Frederick F. (1976). "World Banana Economy: Problems and Prospects." Economic and 
Political Weekly. 11(5-7), pp.285. For the seminal work on dependency see Cardoso, Enrique and Faletto, 
Enzo (1979). Dependency and Development in Latin America Berkeley: University of California Press.
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elites81. If an analysis is based narrowly on international marketing and distribution 
aspects, it would be difficult to dispute Clairmonte’s claims. However in terms of 
banana growing itself, small-to medium-growers have been prevalent throughout the 
history of the trade and in some areas promoted the establishment of other marketing 
agents. In some cases associate producers were developed as a result of stricter state 
controls on the TNCs. Moreover the associate producer programme could be 
considered beneficial as it allowed local planters to obtain capital for estate 
improvements and disease control.
The banana trade was clearly developed by foreign capital investing in 
marketing and production centres. TNCs were often denoted as an empire possessing 
extensive landholdings, railways, ships and ripening centres. However as the trade 
matured local agents either displaced or competed with TNCs. Therefore it can be 
argued that TNCs kindled a flame that would in later years be tended by local and 
foreign investment. Local enterprises were either compliant (as in the case if 
WINBAN) or competitive (as in the case of Jamaica) agents who substituted or 
complemented TNC activity. Despite the entrance of local export firms, profits 
continued to remain concentrated in the hands of marketing firms whether they were 
TNCs or commerical houses. Since shareholders were usually nationals or native 
banana growers, it was believed that in conjunction with the changing TNC role, 
surplus generated by banana exports would be channelled into the domestic economy. 
Nonetheless, TNCs and commercial houses continued to receive a great majority of 
the income earned from sales. In other words, most of the retail price accrued to
81Clairmonte, Frederick F. (1976), op.cit.. p.285.
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either foreign-controlled TNCs of locally-controlled commercial houses.
After discussing the role of TNCs in the banana trade in different regions and 
periods, this section will school the literature on TNCs. This will be followed by an 
analysis of the benefits and costs of TNC investment in host countries. With 
reference to Latin America Rhys Jenkins delineates four schools: developmental ism, 
economic nationalism, dependency and internationalisation of capital82. Of 
importance to this thesis is the internationalisation of capital. This concept was 
formulated in the mid-1970s83. It intended to take a broader view of the 
development of capitalism. This framework maintained that TNC involvement was
“Jenkins, Rhys (1984). Transnational Corporations and Industrial Transformation in Latin America. 
London: MacMillan, pp.4-21. Briefly the first three schools will be discussed. First, in the 1950s and 
1960s developmentalism was the mainstream economic view. Developmentalism underlined the beneficial 
aspects of direct foreign investment (DFI). DFI increased the rate of capital accumulation, allowed imports 
of machinery which would not have been possible without foreign capital and introduced new technologies, 
management techniques and therefore benefitted local labour. Although developmentalists recognized that 
DFI had adverse social consequences, the it was argued that the benefits outweighted the costs. By the 
1960s and 70s economic nationalism reemerged. Proponents of economic nationalism concluded that TNCs 
tended to wield oligopoly power and diffused technical packages which displaced rather than supplemented 
local labour. Oligopolistic power fundamentally led to replacement of local firms for foreign, and higher 
profits for TNCs. Therefore the effects of TNCs were damaging. In the late 1960s, as a criticsm of 
developmentalism, dependency theorists also levelled attacks at the TNCs. In this framework TNCs were 
viewed as pernicious because they shifted investments from traditional sectors to manufacturing which 
resulted in a long term reliance on foreign capital. Instead of reducing balance of payments deficits, they 
heightened the vulnerability of host countries. Therefore surplus was essentially drained. For literature on 
developmentalism see Prebisch, R. (1969). "The System and the Social Structure in Latin America" In 
Horowitz, J. de Castro and Gerassi, J. (Eds.) Latin American Radicalism. New York: Vintage Books and 
La CEPAL v el Analfsis del Desarrollo Latinoamericano (1969) Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria. 
For literature on economic nationalism see Caves, Richard E. (1982). Multinational Enterprise and 
Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kindleberger, Charles P. (1969). American 
Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment. New Haven: Yale University Press; Hymer, 
Stephen (1976). The International Operations of National Firms: A study of Foreign Direct Investment. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. For literature on dependence in general see Cardoso, Enrique and Faletto, Enzo 
(1979). Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press; Mandel, 
Ernest (1968). Marxist Economy Theory. New York: Monthly Review Press.
“ Palloix, C. (1975) las Firmas Multinacionales v el Proceso de Intemacionalizaci6n. Madrid: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores; Vernon, Raymond (1977). Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real Issues. London: 
MacMillan; Jenkins, Rhys (1984), op.cit.. p. 16.
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an aspect of a global integration of the capitalist economy. The emergence of a 
unified capitalist system resulted in standardisation of production processes and 
commodities. Indeed, both local firms and TNCs became involved in this process 
and aimed to stay competitive and in the black.
It is argued that, TNC investment was an effect of the internationalisation of 
capital. Similar actions taken by local firms confirm this. Earlier studies of TNC 
banana operations in Latin America have been described as enclave economies84. 
For this analysis, the use of enclave economy was limiting as it implied that no 
economic or social change occurred within the region. This research emphasises that 
social and economic change can result from TNC involvement in commodity 
production and trade. Was TNC investment desireable?
Initially, the arrival of foreign firms was seen by local governments as a way 
to obtain foreign exchange, technological know-how, and sometimes infrastructure 
development. When world trade in bananas began in the nineteenth century, most 
producing regions were viewed as stagnant, isolated regions of their perspective 
national economies. One of the most serious obstacles banana entrepreneurs had to 
face were jungle conditions. Emerging political parties and nascent national 
governments in most cases were willing to assist these entrepenuers (because of they
MSee for example, Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980). Emnresas Transnacionales v Agricultural 
El Caso del Enclave Bananero en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Universitaria; Bucheli Gomez, 
Marchelo (1991). "El Surgimiento y la Caida de un Enclave Agricola: Estudio de las Zonas Bananeras de 
Magdalena y Urabd, 1948-1968." Masters Thesis, Universidad de los Andes; White, J. (1978). Historia 
de una Ignominia. Bogotd: Editorial Presencia Ltda. For studies of enclave economies in general see: 
Levin, Jonathon V. (1960). Las Economias de Exportaci6n: su Modelo de Desarrollo en Perspective 
Hist6rica Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 165-202; Singer, H.W. (1950). "The Distribution of 
Gains Between Countries which Invest and Borrow." American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings. 
pp.473-485.
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benefits they conferred), and thus were amenable to sell land or grant concessions. 
As Victor Bulmer-Thomas stated, in cost-benefit terms, the opportunity cost of land 
appeared to be zero, and so it was easy for local governments to allow TNCs to 
establish operations85. Referring to the UFCO MacCameron declared:
They brought ingenuity and capital to an area of Honduras that had stagnated 
economically throughout the colonial period and had begun only at the end of the 
nineteenth century to generate pockets of prosperity in the form of independent banana 
growers86.
Theodore Sealy and Herbert Hart maintain this view regarding Jamaica.
The island owes a great deal to the UFCO as well as to other American companies, such 
as the Atlantic and Standard Fruit Companies, which invested considerable amounts of 
capital, introduced a great deal o f expertise and set a great example both in respect of 
wages paid to their employees and the quality of the housing provided for them?7.
Contemporary opinion in the early years of the trade argued that TNC presence was
desireable and provided many positive effects in terms of fomenting economic activity
and providing favourable conditions for banana workers.
The commencement of export banana sales also promoted settlement. In Costa
Rica workers were encouraged to establish themselves along the main line railroad
between Palmar and Golfito (two banana growing areas) in 194188. Colonisation
was fostered so that extra labour was available for loading operation at the port of
Golfito and construction of new plantations and other ’rush activities*89. During the
dead period settlers would grow food on small plots for themselves and the local
“ Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (1987). The Political Economy of Central America Since 1920. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 16.
“ MacCameron, Robert (1983), op.cit.. p. 13.
^Sealy, Theodore and Hart, Herbert (1984). Jamaica’s Banana Industry Kingston: The Jamaica Banana 
Producers Association, p.71.
“Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952), op.cit.. p. 13.
89Ibid.
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market. A permanent polyvalent peasant population appeared to be forming, living 
from the land and temporary employment obtained from the banana trade. Regarding 
Ecuador, James Parsons saw the establishment of the banana trade in the late 1940s 
and throughout the 1950s as beneficial because it opened up areas to colonisation90. 
He attributed easier acces to title of public lands (baldfos) to the nature of the banana. 
As settlers had to put 25% of their claim into cultivation within five years, bananas 
offerred a quick return on investments, making them attractive to those wanting to 
obtain title91.
Physical infrastructure construction such as ports railways, roads and irrigation 
networks, schools and hospitals can also be considered beneficial. Describing the 
UFCOs establishment of the Golfito Division between 1938 and 1948, Clarence Jones 
and Paul Morrison stated:
In a decade the United Fruit Company brought the activities of the division up to a high 
level. It built 246 kilometers of railway lines; constructed modem banna shipping 
facilities at Golfito, with equiment for loading 4000 bunches of bananas an hour; built 
a town of some 7000 people, with a modem hospital, stores, construction shops, 
communication, recreation, and other modem facilities; developed near Golfito a dairy 
farm with 50 head of cows and a modern pasteurizer; and brought into production 
thousands of acres of bananas92.
In terms of health care during the first half of the twentieth century, the UFCO aimed 
to increase efficiency by maintaining a healthy work force93. The UFCO was 
actively involved in medical research on tropical disease94. As Posada maintained,
^Parsons, James (1957), op.cit.. pp. 204, 216.
91 Ibid., p.204.
^Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952), op.cit.. pp. 12-13.
93Posada, Eduardo (1992), op.cit.. p.24; Crowther, Samuel (1929). The Romance and Rise of the 
American Tropics. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday Page & Co., pp. 10-12, 199, 315, 354-355; Adams, 
Frederick Upham (1976), op.cit.. p.53.
94Wilson, C.M. (1947), op.cit.. p. 189.
203
Parti: Banana
the UFCO "did build and run its hospital, where neither the state nor the private 
sector had developed a health service"95. For several decades, health care 
improvements in tropical regions was associated with the continuing operations of 
TNCs96. For example in the Atlantic coast of Guatemala the incidence of malaria 
amongst UFCO personnel declined from 21.9% to .3% between 1929 and 195597. 
Also, after the 1972 earthquake near Managua, the UFCO organised an assistance 
programme, Nicaraguan Earthquake Emergency Drive (NEED)98.
TNCs, also offered higher than average wages (in some regions, in particular 
periods) to attract the quality of labour they sought99. In 1950 banana workers 
salaries were three times higher than the agricultural average in Honduras100. In 
the 1950s Ecuatorian banana workers were also paid relatively higher wages101. 
Thomas McCann after visiting El Golfito plantations in Costa Rica argued that the 
UFCO greatly improved the physical quality of workers existence102. In this light, 
TNCs can be considered as the a vehicle for the penetration of capitalism, creating 
land and labour markets and building infrastructure. Indeed wages were higher in 
banana growing regions, although often cost of living was also higher which resulted
95Posada, Eduardo (1992), op.cit.. p.25.
96In McCann’s account of 1957 the UFCO operated hospitals in El Golfito. See McCann, Thomas P. 
(1976), op.cit.. pp. 131, 141-142.
^May, Stacy and Galo, Plaza (1958), op.cit.. p. 188.
^McCann, Thomas P. (1976), op.cit.. pp.205-207.
"Lebergott, Stanley (1980). "Returns to US Imperialism, 1890-1929" The Journal of Economic History 
40 (2), pp.240-245; Rippy, J. Fred (1976). The Capitalists and Colombia. New York (reprint from 1931): 
The Arno Press, pp. 190-191; Jenks Our Cuban Colony p.301; Kepner, C.D. (1936), op.cit.. p. 129.
100Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p. 19.
,0lLarrea, Carlos (1988), op.cit.. p. 176.
I02McCann, Thomas P. (1976), op.cit.. p. 142.
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in lower standards of living. Nonetheless, real wages over time dropped. This 
argument will be expanded below in the labour section.
The main costs of TNCs centred around their monopolistic tendencies. As 
Kindlberger argued, monopoly advantages in goods markets or increasing returns to 
scale are usually the principal reasons why firms decide to invest in a foreign 
country103. TNCs control of surplus land (more than necessary for commercial 
operations) was definitely a cost for host countries. In order for TNCs to control 
production effectively it was necessary to become a large landowner to either 
mobilize rural labour, or act as a restraint against native banana or foodstuff 
cultivators. By 1952 the UFCO owned or controlled 3 million acres of land in 
Central and South America but only 139,000 were planted with banana104. Slutzky 
and Alonso observed similar trends in Honduras (from the onset of TNC 
establishment until 1950), "Both companies [UFCO and Standard Fruit] controlled 
property or extensive concessions which only a marginal amount of economic activity 
developed"105. Even in 1960 the UFCO and Standard Fruit Company in Honduras 
had holdings that totalled approximately 200,000 hectares of the country’s best 
agricultural lands106. The companies successfully monopolized large amounts of 
high quality land.
103Kindlberger, Charles (1969). American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment New 
Haven: Yale University Press, p. 16.
104McCann, Thomas P. (1976), op.cit.. p.39.
105Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p. 15, (author’s translation).
106MacCameron, Robert (1983), op.cit.. p. 122. Although between 1960 and 1977 the land area 
controlled by both companies reduced nearly one-half from 230,000 ha to 122,000 ha, the amount was still 
sizeable. See Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p.30.
205
Parti: Banana
Another manifestation of monopolistic behaviour was that independent 
suppliers obtained inputs and credit from the TNC and, in turn, were contracted to 
sell output to the TNC. For example in the Philippines David Randolph, et.al. 
describes producers as entering into a spiral of indebtedness in the 1970s. They 
attributed this spiral to fruit companies which extended loans, offered technical 
assistance, sold inputs and established ’anomalous’ prices for output107. In the 
1980s this can be observed in Somalia, where the private exporter was also the sole 
importer of agricultural inputs108.
Moreover, because supporting activites were organised by TNCs there was no 
incentive for locals to become entrepreneurs involved in other activities, e.g. 
foodstuff production, merchant trade, construction109. An example of this was the 
TNC commissary. Goods could only be purchased through coupons, which were 
issued to workers as part of their pay110. Although coupons were often sold 
illegally to non-company employees at a discount, and did not necessarily coerce 
workers to buy their goods there, they still forced economic transactions to be made 
in the commisary. In other words the commisary did not function vis-a-vis Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand. Kepner and Soothill and Lebergott maintained that 
commissaries replaced monopolistic local merchants and protected workers from their
107See David, Randolf S. et.al. (1983), op.cit.. pp.53-76.
108Samatar, Abdi Ismail (1993). "Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? Bananas, Boom and
Poverty in Somalia." Economic Geography 69 (1), p.27.
,09For example independent exporters in the Atlantic Coast of Costa Rica started exporting in 1943. 
See Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952), op.cit.. p.7.
u0Karnes, Thomas L. (1978), op.cit.. p.48.
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exploitation111. This may be true in some areas. However in others where 
monopolistic merchants did not exist, they did little to expand the market for 
competitors. In fact, TNC commissaries had a competitive advantage over small 
merchants because of their ability to buy in bulk as well as their easier access to 
railways, ports and international markets112. In many cases they antgonised local 
merchants by offering higher quality goods, lowering prices or pushing out local 
competition113. In terms of encouraging domestic activity this can be viewed as 
detrimental. The lack of the development of enduring economic activity is also 
visible by observing figures of banana bank establishment. Throughout Central and 
South America there was only one bank that was created based on income generated 
from the banana trade114. TNCs did most transactions outside the banana producing 
country and financial interaction with the domestic economy was very limited, except 
of course for the credits extended to native banana planters.
A general analysis of the costs and benefits of the entire banana trade is 
difficult as regional experiences were diverse. But some tentative conclusions will 
be drawn. First, the presence of TNCs was favourable because it activated market 
formation (factor and product) and transformed some areas into competitive actors on 
the international market. This is observed through prosperous independent producers
mKepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. p.319; Lebergott, Stanley (1980), op.cit.. pp.244- 
247.
1,2There is dispute as to whether commissaries undercut local merchants prices-this occurred in some 
areas but not in all. See Rippy, J. Fred (1976), op.cit.. p. 182; Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), 
op.cit.. p.320.
ll3Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. p.320; Rippy, J. Fred (1976). The Capitalists and 
Colombia. New York (reprint from 1931): The Arno Press, p. 182.
1MBulmer-Thomas, Victor (1987), op.cit.. pp.7-8.
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and the establishment of domestic producers association and export agents. 
Furthermore TNCs positively contributed to regional development through 
infrastructure construction, payment of high wages and indirect promotion of 
settlement. The costs of TNCs were mainly related to their monopoly power and the 
resultant constraint on local initiative. Also, it can be argued that they often 
displaced local entrepreneurs through their involvement in the establishment of 
physical infrastructure, commisaries and foodstuff production, further hindering 
internal market establishment. Moreover social difficulties that were not examined 
in this mainly economic analysis also illustrate other costs. It is argued that changes 
that took place were a result of the rapid internationalisation of capital~a process in 
whch the banana trade was largely stimulated by the involvement of TNCs. It will 
be seen in part II that TNC or local investment mainly resulted in qualitatively similar 
modernisation paths.
TECHNICAL CHANGE: indicators, production-biases and patterns of diffusion 
This section discusses the types of organisations and institutions that have been 
responsible for research, development and technical diffusion. First, an examination 
of the indicators of agricultural transformation will be provided. Secondly, the 
existence of technology- and scale-bias will be considered. Thirdly, a discussion of 
the effects the export market had in technique selection will be analysed. This 
discussion is related to themes addressed above as production technology and the 
diffusion of technology are influenced by relations between banana growers and 
export agents, and patterns of land usage.
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Throughout this century technical change occurred in all stages of banana 
cultivation, transportation and marketing. As with sugarcane, frequently a technical 
change in one area of the production-distribution chain motivated changes throughout 
the rest of the links115. The most important change of the twentieth century was 
varietal switch from Gros Michel to Cavendish. This set off a chain reaction in the 
production process. Varietal change occurred as early as the 1940s in some 
plantations and as late at the 1970s in others116. Upon switching to this variety, not 
only were entire plantations uprooted, but new irrigation and drainage canals had to 
be constructed, methods of transport redesigned and materials for new packing 
methods had to be manufactured. Therefore when technical changes are discussed, 
it is necessary to consider related change in other areas of the production process. 
When variety switch occurred in one region, it can be assumed that the region also 
modified infrastructure so that production methods could effectively absorb the 
innovation117. Though many changes were country specific, over time they spread 
to other banana growing regions.
Setting up a plantation involved land clearing, construction of irrigation and 
drainage ditches (if necessary), initial planting, and the organisation of weed and pest 
control. Irrigation also enabled banana farmers to time harvests sequentially. A
u3Stewart, Frances (1977), op.cit.. pp.58-59. See Sugar Part n.
n6See Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. pp.88-89; Standard Fruit Company started replacing Gros Michel 
variety with Cavendish due to the destruction caused by Panama Disease. In some areas such as Urabd the 
switch to Cavendish did not occur until the 1970s. This is not necessarily a sign o f slow technical adoption. 
Rather, the zone had never been affected by Panama Disease thus there was no reason to switch to a more 
resistant variety.
u7Appendix B. 1 summarises technical changes that occurred in banana production during the 1936-1990 
period.
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continual banana harvest could be effected throughout the year when irrigation was 
carefully monitored. This was in contrast to sugar where in most areas an annual or 
biannual zafra (harvest) existed118. Good drainage was of paramount importance 
since banana roots will rot if covered by water for more than three days119. The 
extent of irrigation and drainage systems was in turn determined by rainfall levels and 
soil type. While most plantation tasks were initially performed by hand, machines 
in some regions came to predominate. Large TNC-owned plantations often used 
machinery for land preparation and excavating drainage and irrigation ditches. By 
the late 1960s machinery was also used to uproot Gros Michel plants120.
Bananas cultivated for export, unlike cane-sugar have undergone one major 
variety switch. Gros Michel was the traditional variety cultivated in Latin America. 
The advantages of Gros Michel were numerous: it ripened uniformly, survived rough 
handling and a lengthy transport period, and had a longer shelf life than other 
varieties121. However due to the infection and devastation of plantations with 
Panama Disease, growers switched to disease-resistant Cavendish122. As can be 
observed in table B1.2 Cavendish was generally land saving in comparison with Gros 
Michel. In some regions Cavendish became the dominant variety as early as the
,18See Sugar Part I.
ll9Wylie, Kathryn (1942). The Agriculture of Colombia. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Agriculture 
Bulletin No. 1, United States Department of Agriculture, p.68.
'“ Interview with Juan Guillermo Villada (Nov 1991), Director o f Statistics, UNIBAN, Medellin, 
Colombia.
12lArthur, Henry, et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p.50.
I22Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.87; Grunwald, Joseph and Musgrove, Philip (1970), op.cit.. p.368.
Panama Disease will be discussed below.
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1950s.
Table B1.2
Planting Density According to Variety, 1962
Variety Number of Plants per Hectare
Gros Michel 400
Giant Cavendish 360
Dwarf Cavendish 730
Valery Cavendish 1,300
Source: Constructed from Valles, Jean-Paul (1968). The World Market for Bananas. 1964-1972: Outlook 
for Demand. Supply and Prices. New York: Praeger Publishers, Table 38, p .l 14, citing J. Champion, Le 
Bananier (1963). Paris: C-P Maisonneuve et Larsoe.
Innovations developed later in the period made the new variety hardier. In the 1960s 
and 1970s suckers were soaked in pesticides before planting to make them resistant 
to nematodes and borers123. During the 1980s, experiments were conducted on 
different cross-breeding techniques aimed at the genetic breeding of banana suckers 
(meristems). Genetic breeding, if successful, would allow a myriad identical disease- 
resistant suckers to be produced124.
The most damaging diseases to the plant were Panama Disease and 
Sigatoka125. Panama disease is an anaerobic fungus which penetrates the plant 
through roots and fibres of the stem126. Panama Disease first appeared in Bocas del 
Toro plantations in Panama in 1903127. From 1903 to the 1950s disease control was
'^Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.47; Interview with Oswaldo Jaramillo (Nov. 1991), disease- 
control and input applier, UNIBAN, Urab£, Colombia.
,24Interview with Nestor Guitierrez (Nov. 1991), agricultural engineer, UNIBAN, Uraba, Colombia; 
Soto, M. (1985). Bananos. Cultivo v Comercializaci6n. San Jos6: Litografia e Imprenta, p. 187.
125Moko is the third threat to plants but easier to control than the other two. See Ellis, Frank (1983), 
op.cit.. p.89 and Parsons, James (1957), op.cit.. p.211.
126Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952). "Evolution of the Banana Industry of Costa Rica."
Economic Geography 28(1), p.6; Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.87.
I27Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.87.
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effected by relocating plantations as no methods were developed to disinfect the soil. 
Plots were then left fallow to de-disease the land128. This process required large 
amounts of capital outlay for heavy hydraulic work needed for ditch construction, as 
well as large tracts of land for fallow and new plantings. There were examples in the 
literature where entire plantations were literally picked up (including entire railway 
networks) and moved to another location129. Finally, the most effective method of 
disease control was varietal switch to Cavendish. Standard Fruit started planting 
Cavendish in 1955130. Later in the 1960s and 1970s most plantations were 
cultivated with Cavendish.
Yellow Sigatoka (first appeared in the 1920s and 1930s in Central America) 
and Black Sigatoka (first appeared in 1972 in Honduras) are airborne spores that 
attack the leaves of the plant131. This results in spots and can quickly destroy entire 
plantations132. Since the late 1930s Bordeau mixture was applied to eradicate the 
fungus133. Either it was applied manually with a knapsack pump or distributed by 
airplane dusting134. Because airplane dusting was inefficient specially contracted 
pipelines were placed throughout the plantation which effected distributed Bordeaux
l28Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952), op.cit.. pp.5-6, 18.
129Acker, Alison (1988), op.cit.. p.66.
I30Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.89; Arthur, Henry, et.al.. (1968), op.cit.. p. 140.
t3ILarrea, Carlos (1987), op.cit.. table 6, pp.80-81.
l32Grunwald, Joseph and Musgrove, Philip (1970), op.cit.. p.366.
I33Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.91; Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952), op.cit.. pp. 16-
17.
134Airplane dusting however was not successful because the substance did not adhere easily. For manual 
methods see Arthur, Henry et.al. (1968), op.cit.. pp. 140-142.
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mixture135. From the mid-1950s a petroleum based mixture was applied through 
low volume aerial dispersion136. This method was used first on large-scale 
plantations137. Eradication of Black Sigatoka has not been perfected and has 
resulted four times more costly than that for Yellow Sigatoka138. Aerial dispersion 
of fungicides has been the principal technique.
Throughout the 1936-1990 period, plantation harvesting consisted of a 
sequence of tasks: removal of bananas from the stalk, transport to sorting and 
cleaning areas and then loading onto wagons and ships. Initially movement from 
stem to the point of embarkation was conducted by mules or oxen. On many 
plantations this was replaced by light railways as early as the late nineteenth century. 
Between 1947 and 1952 tractors replaced mules on the plantation139. This was 
clearly a capital-using, labour-saving technical change but tractors had adverse effects 
because they compacted the soil140. Between 1965 and 1970 tractors were replaced 
by a suspended cable system which eliminated these negative side-effects. Harvested 
bunches were hung on hooks suspended from cables, then connected together and
l33Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.90. Research on the treatment of Sigatoka Disease was conducted by
the United Fruit Company throughout Central America and Bordeaux solution was invented by W.C.
Dunlap of the UFCO, see Valles, Jean-Paul (1968), op.cit.. p.111.
136Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.91; Arthur, Henry, et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p. 142.
I37Small farmers often had access to this method if they were able to pay the per hectare fee. Interview 
with Oscar Gonzdlez (Nov. 1991), Director of Urabd Operations, UNIBAN, Urabd, Colombia.
138Larrea, Carlos (1987). "Empresas Exportadoras y Concentraci6n Econ6mica." In Larrea, Carlos, 
(Ed.) El Bananao en el Ecuador Quito: FLACSO, pp.80-81.
139Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p. 181.
140A problem that is also facing sugarcane growers who mechanise a large proportion of cultivation
tasks. For problems with soil compaction see Binswanger, Hans and Donavan, Graeme (1987). 
Agricultural Mechanization: Issues and Options. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
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pulled manually or by a small-sized tractor to the cleaning and packaging areas141.
Bananas were originally transported on the stalk and sold according to piece, 
not weight. At this time, sorting and cleaning was done at the point of embarkation 
in order to observe all possible damages to the fruit. However transportation by stalk 
was inefficient on many counts. First, quality control was wasteful in that if a stalk 
did not meet the minimum number of hands standard, the bunch could not be 
shipped142. Secondly, the entire harvest was cumbersome: banana stalk
requirements were usually nine hands per bunch, which resulted in an almost 
unwieldy stem143. Thirdly, this type of shipment was inefficient as the stem itself 
accounted for 7-8% of total weight and unprotected bunches were easily bruised144. 
As the trade expanded, bananas were sold by weight. However, changes in shipping 
methods did not universally occur. Sometimes bananas were sold in prepackaged 
containers, others were transported in crates. Shippers switched to boxed bananas in 
1956 and by 1960 the first packing plants in Honduras and Costa Rica were 
established145. By this time, sorting and cleaning tasks were also modified and re­
located to the banana farm proper. Here, bananas were washed, sorted, stickers 
applied, packed in plastic bags then placed in boxes. Banana cleansing was not
“ ‘interview with Nestor Guti6rrez (Nov. 1991), agricultural engineer, UNIBAN, Urabd, Colombia.
M2Interview with banana stevedore in Urabd, Manuel Arias, Nov. 1991. He also complained that 
banana bunches were much more cumbersome and work was not as systematic as with banana boxes and 
pallets. Valles, Jean-Paul (1968), op.cit.. p. 128.
I43Interview with Camilo Penalosa (March 1992) Head of International Marketing for UNIBAN, 
Bogotd, Colombia.
144May, Stacy and Galo, Plaza (1958), op.cit.. p.36.
U5Soto, M. (1985), op.cit.. p.371.
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always conducted; it was only necessary when the fruit was sprayed for Sigatoka146. 
By 1990 bananas were almost always washed due to the intense use of chemical 
inputs147.
Because bananas can be tainted easily during the growing season due to insect 
damage and the elements, special care must be taken to protect the fruit. During the 
early period (1936-1960) international standards of quality and size were not 
demanding but were still important. Shipment in boxes facilitated quality control and 
stickers were affixed to differentiate bananas. The UFCO introduced the "Chiquita 
banana" in order to distinguish their produce from the rest148. This was the first 
step towards quality control and brand loyalty.
In the 1960s, polyethylene sleeves were introduced to the cultivation 
process149. Sleeves were placed on the developing bunch to protect the fruit 
throughout the growing season. Some were coated with insecticides while others 
were simply used as physical barriers against pests. Plantations usually used a mix 
of both types in order to lower costs (those coated with pesticides were more 
expensive)150. This method introduced more waste into production. Many times 
sleeves were inappropriately disposed of and resulted in ecological problems. Not 
only was polyethylene a non-biodegradable material but the chemicals coating these 
bags also posed considerable ecological threat and endangered the health of banana
146Jones, Clarence F. and Morrison, Paul C. (1952), op.cit.. p.7.
,47Interview with Oswaldo Jaramillo (Nov. 1991), disease-control and input applier, UNIBAN, Urabd, 
Colombia.
l48Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. pp.323-324; McCann, Thomas P. (1976), op.cit.. pp.74-75.
149The World Banana Economy 1970-1984 (1986), op.cit.. p.61.
,30Nestor Guitierrez (Nov. 1991), agricultural engineer, UNIBAN, Urabd, Colombia.
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The different incentices that faced small and large producers in banana 
cultivation were clear and the existence of capital-bias is also evident. Large units 
utilised comparatively higher levels of capital whereas smaller units used more 
labour, showing capital-bias in large units. For instance, fixed costs on large 
plantations accounted for a very large share of operating costs. Evidence from 
plantations in La Ceiba, Honduras demonstrated that about two-thirds of annual 
operating charges derived from fixed costs in the 1960s152. In the case of small 
growers, bananas were intercropped and farm costs were dependent on the nature of 
the other commodities. For example in Jamaica and the Windward Islands, successful 
banana cultivation was related to the ability to intercrop with other staples and cash 
commodities with low capital requirements.
Other crops. . . such as arrowroot, cocoa, nutmeg, limes and bananas were more suited 
to islands’ smaller estates and required less capital investment from the owners who 
could not compete with large capital intensive operations in other colonies153.
Thus it is argued that production size determined techniques and capital-use. Small 
farms tended to use low-cost techniques and large farms employed capital intensive 
methods.
Empirical evidence suggested that economies of scale existed. Arthur Henry
15lDiscussed below.
152These fixed costs included setting up plantations and infrastructure networks. See Arthur, Henry,
Houck, James and Beckford, George (1968), op.cit.. pp.53-54.
153Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.2.
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observed, "production costs tend to be lower on large than small banana farms"154. 
Another study stated, "Among Latin American countries Costa Rica has the lowest 
[costs of production] and Ecuador the highest costs", adding that scale-bias influences 
other factors which included labour costs and material prices, business structure, 
organisation and cooperation, and cultivation techniques thereby affecting production 
costs155. Therefore due to scale-bias small businesses were increasingly dropping 
out of the export business in the 1960s156. Regarding production and marketing bias 
Read states: "For the large plantation based banana companies scale economies 
existed not only in production, but also in shipping and in the final market in ripening 
and distribution facilities"157. Moreover, in the absence of official support, small 
and medium scale growers were driven out of production as fruit companies 
established a dominant position through control of transport and marketing158. 
Davies, researching Jamaican producers, also emphasized the monopolistic nature of 
banana firms in conjunction with the possibilities that bananas cultivated by small 
growers were of a lower quality:
It was felt that the very strong position occupied by the one, large, producer and buyer 
enabled it to effectively control the terms of sale. This was undoubtedly true, but the 
underlying reason for the moderate prices received by Jamaican growers was that better 
quality bananas were being produced in Central America and in Colombia where costs
154Arthur, Henry et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p.72; see also Adams, Frederick Upham (1914). Conquest of 
the Tropics. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, p.80~ he discusses the necessity of economies 
of scale for banana production before 1914.
l55Production and Marketing of Bananas from the Associated African States and Madagascar (1971). 
Brussels: Development Aid Series No.4., pp. 24, p.37.
'“ Ibid., pp.46-47.
l57Read, Robert A. (1986), op.cit.. p.321.
'“Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980). Empresas Transnacionales v Aericultura: El Caso del 
Enclave Bananero en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Universitaria, pp.36, 40.
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were extremely low159.
These examples show that small producers were at a disadvantage both in terms of 
production costs and market structures controlled by international firms. This 
suggested that scale-bias existed with regard to export-banana production. Yet despite 
the disadvantages suffered by small producers, they produced significant amounts of 
bananas for the export market160. Were economies of scale a simplistic economic 
explanation for the decline of small producers? Or did the prevalence of small 
producers demonstrate their ability to survive adverse conditions and overcome 
conditions of scale-bias?
First, the low-cost nature of technical change in banana growing during the 
early part of the century enabled small producers, less likely to receive credit, to keep 
pace with technical change and expand production161. The importance of labour in 
many areas of production, allowed small farmers to capitalize on their ability to use 
family labour. Family labour, as with sugarcane, proved particularly adroit for 
delicate tasks that could only be efficiently performed by motivated manual 
labour162. Thus, the implications of the continual importance of labour made 
bananas advantageous for small producers who were short of capital and had limited 
access to credit. Enormous drainage and irrigation networks were not necessary
,39Davies Peter (1990). Fvffes and the Banana: Musa Sapientum a Centenary History 1888-1988. 
London: The Athlone Press, pp.81-82.
l60See above.
I61For different accounts of credit scale-bias see Bharadwaj, Krishna (1985). "A View on 
Commercialisation in Indian Agriculture and the Development of Capitalism." Journal of Peasant Studies.
12(4), pp.7-25; El-Ghonemy, M. Riad (1990). The Political Economy of Rural Poverty. London: 
Routledge.
,62See Sugar Parts I and n.
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because the plot was manageable and could be watered by hand if necessary. Ester 
Boserup signalled this as a feasible low-cost technique; water control could be 
effected by labour intensive operations163. Investment in seeds was also 
unnecessary since the banana is a perennial and only two major exportable varieties 
existed in the twentieth century. Moreover, into the 1980s employment of manual 
pest control was high in some areas, for example Dominica164. Regarding soil care, 
weeds must be controlled. They could either be eliminated through herbicide 
application or slashing with a machete. The first method was both labour- and 
capital-using while the second was clearly labour-using. Usually the small farmer 
who did not have sufficient levels of capital resorted to the second165. As Boserup 
argued, low-cost techniques for weed control could be prevented by repeated manual 
weeding, and the removal of parasites by hand were low-cost methods of week and 
pest control166. Most fertilizer application methods and weed control (whether it 
be with a machete or chemical inputs) until the 1960s were applied by hand. Some 
areas used the shovel method (for fertilizer) or a hand-held pump (for fertilizer and 
insecticides). These low-cost techniques were important for maintaining independent 
banana producers in the business.
In areas where there was less involvement of the State and non-TNC export 
agents, scale-bias was evident. Scale and capital bias did exist as large plantations 
operated with economies of scale and had easier access to capital. In extreme
lwBoserup, Ester (1981). Population and Technology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.25.
164Approximately 60% was conducted manually, see Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.49.
l65Ibid., p.48.
IS6Boserup, Ester (1981), op.cit.. p.24.
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circumstances, when TNCs monopolized the market small producers had to retreat. 
In other areas favourable policy (TNC and State) and the ability to employ 
competitive low-cost techniques allowed small producers to survive. The concept of 
scale-neutrality does not recognize these points, as statisticaly it may appear that small 
and large units have similar output levels, yet the mechanisms work differently. 
Small producers tended to use low-cost techniques while large producers employed 
capital-intensive techniques.
The nature of the crop influenced the organisation of technical change. 
Kindleberger maintained that annual crops encouraged agricultural experimentation 
by individual farmers, whereas, perennial crops took a long time to bear their first 
harvest making it difficult for individual farmers to finance research167. Research 
facilities did exist in banana-growing regions, although these centres were created 
with foreign capital, usually equipped with foreign experts, with research aimed at 
improvements in export-banana cultivation. It can be argued that this type of 
technology was exactly what LDCs needed. However the effect of recruiting foreign 
personnel for these tasks not only stimulated few multiplier effects within the country 
but also could be responsible for generating some of the social unrest common to 
banana producers areas. Stewart maintained:
The shortage of local people and the need to import people from advanced countries 
together make for an escalation in salaries of skilled people, so that differences between 
skilled and unskilled tend to be higher than those in the advanced countries168.
167Kindleberger, Charles (1965). Economic Development. New York: McGraw Hill, p.77.
‘“ Stewart, Frances (1977). Technology and Underdevelopment. London: The Macmillan Press,Ltd., 
p.76.
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In a general sense in agriculture, many discoveries did not necessarily need large 
amounts of public expenditure169. Often local craftsmen and mechanics could build 
machines or adapt and fabricate improved tool design170.
Moreover, many export-banana techniques were not appropriate for local 
growers and new innovations were typically applied only within export-banana 
growing areas and seldom diffused to banana cultivators who supplied domestic 
markets. According to a World Bank study:
The creation of privately supported crop research institutes for export-crops, sugarcane, 
coffee and banana, has been an acceptable alternative, but since basic research by and 
large is a "public good" it remains to be seen whether private efforts will be 
adequate171.
Clearly privately support export-banana research did not benefit growers not involved 
in the trade. For instance banana discoveries were aimed at pristine banana 
appearance. This was achieved through applying higher dosages of chemical inputs 
and covering bunches with polyethylene bags to protect the growing fruit. These 
innovations, were only applied on TNC land or were diffused to independent 
producers, supplying bananas to export markets. These methods were highly 
sophisticated, capital-intensive and unnecessary as such high quality produce was not 
essential for internal consumption.
Because of the higher receipts earned from banana production, has it pushed 
out the production of foodstuffs? Some empirical studies such as those of Steven
169See Binswanger, Hans (1986). "Agricultural Mechanization, a Comparative Historical Perspective." 
The World Bank Research Observer. 1(1), pp.50.
I70See sugar section for various examples of local craftsmen’s innovative contributions to field and 
factory processes.
l71Colombia: Economic Development and Policy Under Changing Conditions (1984) Washington D.C.: 
The World Bank, p. 108.
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Sanderson, J.M Marie, A.H.J. Helmsing, Jorge Garcia, Gabriel Montes and Salomon 
Kalmanovitz emphasized that export agriculture often displaced the production of 
domestic staples. A country that specialized in export production frequently used 
foreign exchange for food imports172. Bulmer-Thomas argued:
" .. .that the development of export specialization in Central America in the half century 
up to 1930 had led to the neglect of agriculture for domestic use and food imports in 
1929 represented some twenty per cent of the import biir173.
Later, in areas such as the Windward Islands, and the Phillippines the presence of 
export banana growing clearly pushed out foodstuff production. In the 1970s in the 
Philippines domestic foodstuff production was also limited as TNCs did not allow 
independent producers to intercrop174. Therefore this made small planters and 
workers more dependent on imports or plantation shops for basic foodstuffs. In the 
1980s Thomson stated that in the Windward Islands domestic food production was the 
most disadvantaged agricultural sector characterized by a chronic lack of financing 
as most resources were channelled into export commodities175.
As in the case of sugarcane foreign capital was intrinsic to the development 
of export-banana production. For sugarcane many field technical changes were low- 
cost and made for local diffusion, allowing most of the capital expenditure to be 
concentrated in the mill. Furthermore as the sugarcane agroindustry matured,
172Sanderson, Steven E. (1986). The Transformation of Mexican Agriculture. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; Marie, J.M. (1979), op.cit.. pp. 19,21,40-41,51; Helmsing, A.H.J.(1986). Firms. Farms, 
and the State in Colombia. Boston: Allen and Unwin, Inc.; Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1974), op.cit.. p.143. 
For a discussion of competitive agricultural imports turning the terms of trade against domestic agriculture 
see Garcia, Jorge and Montes, Gabriel (1989). Trade. Exchange Rate and Agricultural Pricing Policies in 
Colombia. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, pp.25-26.
173Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (1985), op.cit.. p. 143.
I74David, Randolf S., et.al. (1983), op.cit.. p.56.
175Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.62.
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reliance on foreign technology diminished176. A different experience was witnessed 
in export-banana production. Low-cost techniques were crucial to small producers 
however technical change in banana production continued to be imported by 
producing countries (such as eradiation of Sigatoka disease, varietal switch, disease 
control through polyethelene bags, and banana boxing) throughout the twentieth 
century exerting little impetus to internal technical change. As J.M. Marie rightly 
argued for Dominica between 1961 and 1970, there were high intra-industry 
transactions and few inter-sectoral transactions177. As has been argued above and 
will be elaborated below, because of the relative abundance of capital available to 
some producers, it was often ineffectively employed.
Access—or denial of access—to credit influenced production techniques. Easy 
access to capital may have led TNCs to over use chemical inputs178? While 
differences in efficiencies resulted from small producers restricted access to capital 
and land. After 1950 the Ecuatorian industry, which mainly relied on small 
producers, was often considered inferior because of low input application levels (i.e. 
producers did not have enough capital)179. In the 1950s small producers in 
Cameroon were not able to use ecologically sound methods because of cash restraints, 
and their short term outlook of the domestic trade. Small- to medium-sized producers 
viewed banana growing as a quick method to earn easy income and then abandon
,76See Sugar Parts I and n.
177Marie, J.M. (1979), op.cit.. p.40.
I78For literature on sustainable development see Redclift, Michael (1987). Sustainable Development: 
Exploring the Contradictions. London: Methuen; and Pearce, David, Barbier, Edward and Markandya, 
Anil (1990). Sustainable Development: Economics and Environment in the Third World. London: 
Earthscan.
,79Parsons, James (1957), op.cit.. pp.209-211.
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production when the high return, low investment period expired, Heinzen described 
this as a ’rapid mining technique’180.
Second, land usage arrangements were also a barrier to utilizing ecologically 
sound practices. Small producers in the Windward Islands were considered 
environmentally harmful due to the soil erosion they caused by planting on rocky 
mountain slopes in the 1970s181. Banana cultivation on slopes was an ecological 
risk because of the banana plant’s shallow root system and the resultant threat of soil 
erosion. This pattern of land tenure was also observed in the French Islands in the 
Eastern Caribbean182. This was also an outcome of the imperfect land tenure 
structures where small producers, because of their lack of capital, political clout, or 
inability to defend their plot, were pushed into undesirable areas. Thus in order to 
obtain ecologically sound methods proper incentives must be established to adjust 
inefficient land markets and socio-political bias183.
Third, pest control methods must be considered. Analysts examining the 
Phllipines argued that the frequent use of pesticides and insecticides on large-scale 
banana plantations drove pests to nearby non-banana growing areas, thereby causing 
negative externalities184. Moreover, TNCs tended to favour the most
180See Heinzen, Barbara (1984), op.cit.. pp.29, 36.
181Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.73.
182Welch, Barbara Marian (1989). "Institutional Structures as a Factor in Land-Use Decisions: The 
Impact of Banana Growers Associations in French and Commonwealth islands in the Eastern Caribbean." 
PhD Dissertation, University of London, University College, p.534.
,83For a detailed study of the influence of institutions on banana production see Welch, Barbara Marian 
(1989), op.cit.
184David, Randolf S.; Rivera, TemarioC.; Abinales, P.N. and Teves, Oliver G. (1983). "Transnational 
Corporations and the Philippine Banana Export Industry." In Political Economy of Philippine Commodities. 
Quezon City: University of the Philippines, p.54.
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technologically advanced techniques and, in effect, forced small producers to employ 
similar methods so that banana quality was homogeneous. For example Sigatoka 
control was conducted by the marketing firm, or cooperative organisation as early as 
the 1950s in Jamaica and Ecuador. Some agents charged on a hectare basis, while 
others charged a technical service fee per box, thereby penalizing those with higher 
productivity levels185. There have been studies conducted regarding the safety of 
manual banana input application in the 1980s. In many countries, safety regulations 
were not fully followed and/or plantations were located in geographically unsuitable 
areas which resulted in lethal chemical run offs into the ground water, causing 
sterility or birth defect in future generations186. For instance in the 1970s in the 
Philippines the most common illness on plantations was allergic reaction to chemicals 
used in production187. The same report also recorded that baggers acquired lung 
infections from polyethlene bags coated with chemicals188.
Despite these differing practices, on a very general level TNCs tended to be 
more generous with fertilizer and pesticide application because they viewed banana 
cultivation as a long-term venture. Thus it was in their interest to take optimal care 
of their banana plantation, however this was often to the detriment of regional 
ecosystems. Small producers faced different ecological problems with their
185David, Randolf S., et.al. (1983), op.cit.. p.44.
186Pettifer, Julian (1993), "Banana Wars," BBC Assignment Tonight.: Country Report. First Quarter 
1994 Costa Rica. Panama London: Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 14. For a discussion of the inappropriate 
chemical inputs (e.g. the use of pesticides in LDCs some of which were banned in the USA) by TNCs in 
LDCs see Burbach, Roger and Flynn, Patricia (1980). Agribusiness in the Americas. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, pp. 115-118.
187The Human Cost of Bananas (1979). Manila: ICL Research Team, pp.41, 42, 94.
188Ibid., p.42.
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production methods as access to land and capital was difficult but because they had 
to meet banana exporter’s standards, they also became involved in ecologically 
damaging techniques associated with TNCs. Low-cost techniques were crucial to 
small producers. Although the data on production size varied, it is posited, as in the 
case of sugarcane, that capital-intensive techniques pushed out small producers189. 
Technical change in banana production continued to be imported by producing 
countries thoughout the twentieth century exerting little impetus to local 
experimentation in contrast to sugarcane and potato. Because of the centralized 
structure of exports (akin to that of cane milling) production practices often became 
homogeneous as the agribusiness modernised. This further illustrated the process of 
the internationalisation of capital.
LABOUR: the effect of technical change
First, the influence technical change and the consequent increase in task 
specialization had on labour will be analysed. Did labour specialization, induced by 
technical change, improve worker welfare? The second issue to be discussed is the 
qualitative changes in labour’s well-being. How did the profit structure of the trade 
affect workers standard of living190? Throughout the discussion it is important to 
state that the conditions of bananas workers were diverse and often there were 
differences amongst TNC- and locally-employed workers.
,89This will be examined in Banana Part n.
l90Lipton, Michael and Longhurst, Richard (1985). Modem Varieties. International Agricultural 
Research and the Poor. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, p.4.
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As stated earlier, the general trend was labour and land saving technical 
change. Nonetheless, labour continued to be used extensively. Land clearing and 
railway construction were conducted by both labour and capital using techniques. 
Initial banana plantings were carried out by labour and continued to be so in 1990. 
Other notable techniques included banana plant care which consisted of proper 
pruning of suckers sprouting at the stem of the plant, and construction of irrigation 
and drainage networks. There was very little precise scientific control of the 
cultivation process and technical advances in varietal selection and input application 
for disease and pest control occurred post-1930. In the 1940s and 50s (later in some 
regions) the most significant change was varietal switch which affected man hours 
demanded per hectare. New varieties could be planted closer together which 
increased man hours per hectare191. In addition, the corresponding change to boxed 
bananas increased labour absorption in Honduras and other parts of Central 
America192. In some areas packing plants accounted for 25% of total workforce in 
banana divisions193. Labour was needed to apply banana stickers, vacuum-pack 
bananas and load them onto pallets or trucks. One researcher claimed that with new 
varieties, labour costs increased less than proportionally, and as payment was mainly 
piece-rate, concluded that this effected an increase in labour productivity in the mid 
1960s in Ecuador194.
The International Labour Organisation estimated that the introduction of cables
,9,See Table B1.2.
I92Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p.33; Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p.181.
,93Ellis, Frank (1983), op.cit.. p. 190.
,94See Valles, Jean-Paul (1968), op.cit.. p. 120.
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in the 1960s and 1970s in the plantation for harvesting, reduced labour demand by 
50% in Panama195. This method was one of the most labour saving technical 
changes to occur in banana cultivation although it could not be implemented 
universally~it was only economically viable on large flat plantations. Moreover, 
manual pulling was detrimental to the workers. Instead of operating tractors which 
transported bananas, labourers were responsible for pulling rows of fastened bunches 
through muddy plantations, a task that was physically demanding and represented a 
decrease in the quality of work. Irrigation and drainage tasks could either be labour- 
or capital-using, depending on plot size and capital availability. If the technique was 
labour-using then labour was usually only demanded temporarily for the specified 
period of time required to re-design the plantation. After irrigation networks were 
constructed, labour was needed to maintain canals clean and free of debris. Thus the 
intermittent nature of this work increased instability in banana growing regions.
Despite aseasonal harvests, job instability was common to banana production. 
This was attributed to patterns of production characterized by many specialists and 
few divergences in quality196. As Henry Arthur observed:
There are no significant by-products or variations in processing and handling and favour 
sideline industries. Almost all operations, from grower down to ripener-wholesaler, are 
carried on with specialized facilities by banana specialists197.
After the formative phase, plantation labour became differentiated. It can be argued 
that it was more specialized than for any other agribusiness at the time. For example,
195Situaci6n v Perspectivas del Emnleo en Panama (1974) Geneva: International Labour Organisation,
p.68.
196Parsons, James (1957), op.cit.. p.204.
197Arthur, Henry et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p .161.
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in 1900 the UFCO demanded stevedores, plantation workers, banana planters, banana 
harvesters, railway workers, administrative posts, etc. In later years some of labour’s 
tasks were replaced with capital-using techniques, while other manual jobs surfaced 
and labour composition became more heterogenous with the entrance of each new 
technique. Heterogeneity ranged from the semi-skilled labourer who checked leaves 
for Sigatoka spots to the stevedore responsible for quality control198. As a result 
of specialization, wage differentials and the number of payment methods also 
increased. Employees (white-collar workers) were paid monthly, banana harvesters 
according to stems picked, railway workers on a flat weekly rate and unskilled labour 
would receive daily or hourly wages199. Differentiation was clearly observed from 
Windward Island wage rates complied by Bishnodat Persaud who found 23 different 
systems of payment200.
Alain De Janvry posited that with the introduction of new techniques, new 
positions were created which affected and sometimes induced social change201. As 
divisions occurred, fragmentation resulted in more tensions in the countryside. 
However this analysis overemphasizes the role of social structures and failed to take 
into account overall economic conditions. For example, job specialization did not
,98For a further discussion of labour specialization see MacCameron, Robert (1983), op.cit.. p. 14.
'"Ibid., p. 14.
“ ‘'Persaud, Bishnodat (1966), op.cit.. table 14, p.21. For another example of the considerable division 
of labour see The Human Cost of Bananas (1979), op.cit.. Appendix A, pp. 120-124 displays 26 different 
tasks.
“ 'de Janvry, Alain (1984). "The Political Economy of Rural Development in Latin America: An 
Interpretation." In Eicher, Carl and Staatz, John (Eds.) Aericultural Development in the Third World. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.92. See labour section for further discussion.
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result in tension and conflict among sugar workers in the Cauca Valley202. 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, the nature of the erratic demand for labour also 
introduced added instability. If the work force is one which is geographically 
concentrated with few opportunities in other sectors of the economy this 
differentiation can make labour relations tenuous.
As stated above, extensive infrastructure (including hospitals, schools, 
housing) was often established by TNCs both to grow bananas and attract labour. 
Nonetheless, most accounts of export banana regions have stressed the poor 
conditions of banana workers. First, because of unpleasant conditions of potential 
bananas growing areas (i.e. high levels of humidity, rainfall and temperature) they 
were usually not densely populated. For example in Honduras most of the population 
was located on the more pleasant mountain slopes203. In sunny, tropical areas 
disease was endemic. In the early years of the trade, the arrival of fruit companies 
was associated with improved tropical living conditions204. However, as the trade 
matured, investment in workers well-being diminished. In addition to declining real 
salaries mentioned above, living conditions were unsatisfactory. Poor living 
conditions were often characteristic of TNC banana producing regions post-1950205.
^ S ee Sugar Part n.
“ ’Slutzky, Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p. 18.
^ S ee above.
^For accounts of poor living conditions see: Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.: Slutzky, Daniel and 
Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.: Sierra Botero, Diego Miguel (1986). "Urabd Banano y Bienestar Social." 
Revista Augura. 12(2), pp.39-45; MacCameron, Robert (1983), op.cit.: Larrea, Carlos (1988). "Los 
Cambios Recientes en el Subsistema Bananero Ecuatoriano y Sus Consecuencias Sobre los Trabajadores: 
1977-1984." in Cambio v Continuidad en la Economia Bananera. Torres-Rivas, Edelberto and Deutscher, 
Eckhard (Eds.), FLACSO, CEDAL: San Jos6; Flores Valeriano, Enrique (1979). La Explotaci6n Bananera
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A consultant to the UFCO in 1964 stated, "[A banana plantation]. . is a poor place
to live unless you’re a banana."206. According to The Sunday Times in 1978 living
conditions were described as: "drab and stark. . . less than ten square feet. The 
cooking facilities are primitive. There is no running water, there is no electricity. 
There are not sanitation facilities"207. However Bourgois study of UFCO workers 
in the 1980s in Costa Rica concluded that " . . .  children of banana workers were 
considerably healthier than those of the peasants on the periphery of the
plantation"208. Therefore the nature of the conditions of TNC and non-TNC 
workers is contestable and can only be determined by the time and place of 
production.
Secondly, because of the unappealing conditions, high relative wages were at 
first imperative to lure migrants to producing regions209. In later years, high wages 
continued to be an important element to the banana trade, although infrastructure 
construction was abandoned. Despite high wages, according to a New York Times 
article of 1954, the standard of living of Honduran banana workers declined 
dramatically between 1932 and 1954210. Other evidence from Honduras
corroborated that wages did not keep pace with inflation.
Average fruit workers* salaries had been maintained at a maximum of $1.50 per day for 
more than twenty years <  1934-1954 > .  Meanwhile the price of consumer goods had
en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Editorial de la UNAM.
^Bourgouis, Philippe (1989), op.cit.. p.3, citing consultant’s report to the United Fruit Company by 
Laidlow & Co. (1964); see chapter 14 for a compete review.
^The Sunday Times (13 Aug. 1978).
^Bourgois, Philippe I. (1989), op.cit.. p.38.
209Ibid.
210New York Times (22 May 1954), p. 14.
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increased appreciably"211.
Larrea also documented a 39% decrease of real purchasing power in unskilled 
Ecuatorian banana workers wages from 1952 to 1984212. Apparently, as more 
actors entered the business, competitive forces motivated management to lower costs. 
For instance, a method used in the Philippines by Del Monte was kabit (attached 
worker). In this method essentially two workers were hired for the price of one. 
One of the workers would sign his name and subsequently appear on the payroll to 
receive all the wages and benefits. The agreement between the two workers was such 
that wages were to be shared213.
Lastly, in the literature there were many accounts of the exploitative nature 
of banana companies. MacCameron and Slutzky and Alonso refer to numerous 
strikes as indicators of labour dissatisfaction. Philippe Bourgouis, Robert Thomson 
and the ICL Research Team attributed exploitation to arduous working conditions 
common to banana growing areas and poor living conditions coupled with the 
above214. Deplorable conditions were reported in the 1970s for UFCO plantations 
in the Philippines. Men and women lived in bunkhouses consisting of 24 people per 
room (8 sets of 3 tiered bunks with no mattresses) that were so crowded that only one
21‘MacCameron, Robert (1989), op.cit.. p.22.
212Larrea, Carlos (1988), op.cit.. table 6, p. 177.
2,3See David, Randolf S., et.al.. pp.47-48.
2,4See MacCameron, Robert (1983), op.cit.. pp.21-29; Bourgois, Philippe I. (1989), op.cit.: Slutzky, 
Daniel and Alonso, Esther (1980), op.cit.. p.28; The Human Cost of Bananas (1979), op.cit.. p.95. 
Furthermore, some studies show that banana work became more difficult. In Dominica one woman 
commented that new packaging system was less efficient and harder than previous boxing arrangement see 
Thomson, Robert (1987), op.cit.. p.76.
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small desk and two chairs could fit215. Bourgois observed that throughout the 
history (until 1989) of the banana trade workers tended to be less educated and more 
easily ’exploitable’ in Costa Rica216. The ICL Research Team in Manila reported 
unfair methods of luring workers. According to their study migrant workers were 
decieived into obtaining jobs and were promised much higher salaries (almost double 
of what they actually received)217. The changing conditions of the labour force 
have been such that workers were initially offered housing and other benefits while 
later TNCs competed for methods to make abundant labour cheap. This trend is also 
evident in the case of sugarcane with the increased use of labour contracting218. 
Thus, with both crops, instead of conforming to stricter labour regulations vis-a-vis 
the developing State, recruiting methods were introduced to circumvent worker 
protection legislation.
The arrival of the banana trade signified rapid changes to the labour force. 
The introduction of technical change resulted in a highly stratified, erratically- 
demanded work force. Many were attracted to unpleasant tropical areas by high 
wages and favourable living conditions. As the trade progressed these conditions 
often became less desirable. However the experiences among different regions were 
distinct and labour was subject to different experiences. Banana companies 
sometimes offerred higher than average wages. Nonetheless, subsequently real wages
215The Human Cost of Bananas (1979), op.cit.. p.95.
2,6See Bourgouis, Philippe I. (1989), op.cit.. chapter 13.
217The Human Cost of Bananas (1979), op.cit.. p.34. They were promised 8 pesos/day and only 
received an average of 4.75 pesos/day during the first year. After the first year payment was increased 
to 5.25 pesos/day.
218See Sugar Parts I and n.
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appeared to have decreased. The banana trade had conflicting effects on labour. 
Although in many areas they started a process of internationalisation of capital by 
monetizing the economy, often wages were so low that accumulation was difficult. 
Also, in some regions long term effects such as infrastructure construction was often 
abandoned in later years and living conditions deteriorated.
CONCLUSION
TNCs clearly started a process in banana producing countries and represented 
an early initiative to the internationalisation of capital. The presence of TNCs 
sometimes resulted in the emergence of a competitive local producers association and 
stimulated the construction of physical infratruction, the promotion of colonisation, 
the establishment of higher than average wages and the provision of worker’s 
housing, schools and hospitals. However, over time, these conditions eroded. 
Moreover, due to the monopolistic practices of TNCs there were clearly costs. In 
some host countries the knock-on effects were minimal resulting in little capital 
deepening. In the long-run the lack of local initiative, stifled by TNC monopolistic 
tendencies, distorted market mechanisms and slowed-down what might have been a 
gradual development of internal markets. In other regions the development of export 
agents resulted in more local enterprise. Evidence ranges from the wide use of 
independent suppliers to the involvement of export agents in disease eradication, 
plantation insurance and exporting. However, because most of the profits accrued to 
the export agent, the influence land usage and production levels had on agricultural 
accumulation to supply capital to the industrial sector were less than proportional.
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Unlike sugarcane, variety change was limited, with only two prevailing 
throughout this century. Most technical change was related to varietal switch which 
impulsed transformations throughout growing and marketing processes. The existence 
of capital bias was clear with large TNCs. But scale bias, was period specific and 
the practices of TNCs. Scale-neutrality simply did not exist in a neoclassical sense. 
Although small producers were a major supplier of bananas, their survival was related 
TNC and state policy. If monopolistic tendencies were not regulated, small producers 
withdrew. If TNC activities were monitored and a suitable insitutional framework 
was organised, independent growers endured.
Because the influence these companies had on techniques, many production 
decisions were made from the top (TNCs) and trickled down to the producers. 
Particularly in later years, this situation favoured the use of capital and resulted in 
less than optimal production patterns, which were often ecologically unsound. 
Independent producers faced monopsonistic buyers and had little potential for internal 
market sale. They were forced to follow international guidelines and could not resort 
to other marketing channels. This was not the case of sugarcane which could be sold 
to a nearby mill, or the producer could transform it into panela and sell the 
imperishable product on the internal market. Or the case of the "democratic" potato 
in which high yields could be achieved on relatively small plots of land and marketed 
internally.
Labour continued to be an important aspect of banana production. This can 
be observed in the areas of cultivation, input application, and packaging. Labour was 
particularly important factor of production for the small-to medium-sized producer
235
Parti: Banana
who was able to use low-cost, labour-intensive techniques and keep pace with 
technical levels of larger capital-intensive plantations. With many methods labour 
was needed for a particular period of time, thereafter the plantation was updated and 
labour became redundant. Sporadic demand resulted in instability in banana regions. 
Though wage-labour might have benefitted from the establishment of TNC 
plantations, without the accompanying development process, when the labourer lost 
his job, there were usually no regional alternatives. The standard of living of labour 
was contentious as some accounts clearly showed deteriorating real wages while 
others demonstrated that TNC banana workers, in relative terms, experienced superior 
conditions. To properly weigh the costs and benefits of the modernisation of the 
world banana economy during the 19360-1990 period would be facetious with only 
secondary sources. However some issues were analysed that will be expanded in the 
Colombian case study.
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Plantains have been grown in Colombia for centuries by small commodity 
producers dispersed throughout the countryside. In recent decades bananas have 
come to signify the ’arrival’ of foreign capital1. How this ’arrival’ has affected and 
shaped agricultural transformation in Colombia will be analyzed below. At the turn 
of the century, the establishment of a large banana plantation complex in the Santa 
Marta region was hailed as a sign of progress. Subsequently the consolidation of 
plantation production in the region was held to be responsible for large-scale socio­
economic strife. Later similar problems arose in the ’new’ banana area, the Uraba 
Gulf. Why has a crop that has led to frontier settlement and generated foreign 
exchange since the turn of the century fail to promote economic development in these 
regions?
Santa Marta export bananas experienced a boom in the late 1920s which then 
tapered off until the United Fruit Company (UFCO) relocated activities to Uraba in 
the 1960s. A period of export expansion ensued into the 1980s which was 
accompanied by substantial changes in organisational patterns. In this section, the 
transformation of banana growing in Colombia will be analyzed during the 1936-1990 
period. Magdalena banana growing in 1936 was on the wane, thus an examination 
of its evolution will be provided in order to place the development of Uraba in 
context with previous transformations. The general discussion in part I also provided 
a context from which Colombian trends can be compared.
'Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1988). Economia v Naci6n: una breve historia de Colombia. Bogot&: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, p.251.
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INSTITUTIONS. MARKETS and TECHNOLOGY: Modernisation in Santa Marta
This section will give a description of location of production and export 
trends. Secondly, State response to the UFCO will be examined. Thirdly, the 
importance of independent local growers as a source of exportable bananas will be 
investigated. Fourthly, technical change in the region will be discussed until the late 
1960s when productivity levels surged in Uraba. Lastly, an assessment of the 
benefits and costs of the trade will be presented.
Banana growing in Colombia is highly heterogeneous because a large number 
of small, medium and large-sized producers cultivate bananas. Since it is a traditional 
crop, changes over time have been complex, and several modes of production have 
coexisted. This implies different technologies and production techniques. According 
to a 1990 survey by the Ministry of Agriculture, plantation bananas are primarily an 
export crop. Dispersed production on small- to medium-sized plots is principally 
directed towards the domestic market and there is also much subsistence production2. 
But this dichotomy is often overdrawn and research indicates that for the greater part 
of the period studied small- and medium-sized growers produced both for domestic 
consumption and export.
The commencement of export banana production was largely impulsed by 
foreign and domestic investments in 18913. A North American company, The
2E1 Desarrollo Aeropecuario en Colombia. Tomo I. (1990) Bogoti: Ministerio de Agriculture and 
Departamento Nacional de Planeacidn, p. 129. See also Am6rico Castillo, Jos6 (1967). Notes on Recent 
Developments in Colombian Agriculture. Cali: Universidad del Valle, p. 14.
3Wylie, Kathryn (1942), The Agriculture of Colombia. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Agriculture 
Bulletin N o .l, United States Depart of Agriculture, p.66.
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Colombian Land Company (predecessor of the UFCO), bought land in the Santa 
Marta area in 1894 on which bananas were cultivated for export4. The banana 
growing region, which will be denoted as Santa Marta, actually extends from a 
northern boundary twelve miles north of Santa Marta and stretches southward to 
Fundacion5 (see Map B2.1). The UFCO gradually transformed Santa Marta into one 
of the largest producers of export bananas in the world. Prior to the arrival of the 
UFCO coastal agriculture was diversified, cattle ranching, cane-panela, banana and 
cocoa being the prominent activity6. Between 1900 and 1929 growers expanded 
banana production7. The region experienced much success and by the 1920s the 
boom years had been reached. In 1929 Colombia was only surpassed in world 
exports by Jamaica and Honduras8. The value of banana exports figured prominently 
in Colombia’s diversified export schedule from 1905 to 1935 which also featured 
coffee, petroleum (later in the period), tobacco, hides, gold and platinum (see 
Appendix B.4).
Between 1936 and 1990 the share of bananas in Colombian exports decreased
4LeGrand, Catherine (1994). "Notary Records and the Formation of the Santa Marta Banana Zone: 
Part II." Unpublished article, pp.4-5.
5DOT (1925). "Report on the Commercial and Economic Situation in the Republic of Colombia." p.57; 
Estudio Sobre las Condiciones del Desarrollo de Colombia. (1958) Bogoti: Presidencia de la Reptiblica, 
Comit6 National de Planeaci6n, p. 136.
6LeGrand, Catherine (1994), op.cit.. pp.8-11.
7The early expansion of the trade in Santa Marta was a complex process. For accounts of this see 
LeGrand, Catherine (1994), op.cit.. part II."; Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979). Zona 
Bananera del Magdalena. Historia v L6xico. Bogoti: Instituto Cano y Cuervo, chapter 2; Posada, Eduardo 
(1992), "Imperialism, Local Elites, and Regional Development: The United Fruit Company in Colombia 
Reconsidered, 1900-1945.", Paper presented at the Congress o f Americanists, New Orleans: Tulane 
University; White, J. (1978). Historia de una Ienominia. Bogoti: Editorial Presencia Ltda.
“LeGrand, Catherine (1984). "Colombian Transformations: Peasants and Wage-Labourers in the Santa 
Marta Banana Zone." Journal of Peasant Studies. 11(4), p. 179.
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but continued to play an important subsidiary role. On the world scene, however 
Colombia has sporadically been an important participant (see Appendix B.2). 
Colombia maintained a 5-10% participation in world trade throughout the 1936-1990 
period, and during the 1980s the proportion exhibited a slow increase, indicating a 
new export boom. With the entrance of Uraba into world markets in 1964 Colombian 
participation in the global scene became less volatile and it was characterized by a 
gradual increase. This could be explained by more favourable international market 
conditions as opposed to the vicissitudes characteristic of the 1910-1950 period, 
induced by World Wars I and II and the Great Depression, in addition to promising 
local conditions.
The lesser prominence of bananas in the export schedule shaped the trajectory 
of production in Colombia and made the role of the commodity quite distinct from 
that in the Central American ’banana republics’9. Although reticent after the loss of 
Panama in 1903, government policy favoured foreign capital in banana cultivation, 
and like many Latin American countries, viewed it as a way to obtain investment, 
enter foreign markets, and diversify export revenues10. Policy-makers also feared 
too great a reliance on coffee. The conservative president, Rafael Reyes (1904-1909), 
after the economically-damaging War of 1000 Days, hoped to put the country back
®May, Stacy and Galo, Plaza (1958), op.cit.. p. 175; Pettifer, Julian (1993), "Banana Wars," BBC 
Assignment Tonight.
,0See Bushnell, David (1993). The Making of Modern Colombia. Berkeley: University of California 
Press; Bucheli G6mez, Marcelo (1991). "El Surgimiento y la Caida de un Enclave Agricola: estudio de 
las zonas bananeras de Magdalena y Urabd, 1948-1968." Masters Thesis, Bogotd: Universidad de los 
Andes, p.48; Rippy, J. Fred (1976), op.cit.. chapter 16.
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on its feet. One of the instruments was to promote and protect export activities such 
as coffee and banana and subsidize capital and primary good imports11. As well, 
development of banana growing regions was fomented by State financial assistance 
directed at establishing plantations12. From the mid-1910s the UFCO also persuaded 
independent growers to establish plantations through contracts which offerred loans. 
Credit was aimed to assist new producers with start-up costs or established growers 
to recuperate plantations damaged by blow-downs13. Until 1928 the State was not 
active in promoting independent planters nor supporting labour and in many conflicts, 
sided with the UFCO14.
In later years government policy changed to active protection of workers and 
local growers. The turning point for State protection of labour is widely considered 
to be the banana strike of 1928. This thesis does not attempt to analyze the factors 
which precipitated this strike nor any direct repercussions it had on the banana 
economy in Magdalena. Many other sources have dealt with this topic and are listed 
below15. An event of this sort was not to transpire again, at least until 1990. The
"Bejarano, Jesus Antonio (1991). "El Despegue Cafetero (1900-1928)" In Ocampo, Jose Antonio, (Ed.) 
(1991). Historia Econdmica de Colombia. Bogoti (3rd edition): Siglo Veintiuno Editores, pp. 174-177.
,2Pardo P., Alberto (1972). Geograffa Econdmica v Humana de Colombia. Bogoti: Editorial Tercer 
Mundo, pp.303-304; Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. pp.7-8.
13Posada, Eduardo (1992), op.cit.. p. 13.
“Notwithstanding Law Number 30 or 1931 which further tied independent producers to sell bananas 
to the UFCO see Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. pp.292-294.
15See Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.: White, J. (1978), op.cit.: Cortes 
Vargas, Carlos (1979). Los Sucesos de las Bananeras Bogoti (2nd edition): Editorial Desarrollo (originally 
published in 1929).; Castaneda, R (1981). "La Zona Bananera del Magdalena". In Arango, C. (Ed.). 
Sobrevivientes de las Bananeras: Fonnegra, Gabriel (1980). Bananeras Testimonio Vivo de una Epopeva. 
Bogoti: Ediciones Tercer Mundo; Gaitin, Jorge Eliecer (?). La Masacre en Las Bananeras Documentos 
Testimonios Bogoti: Ediciones Los Comuneros; Gilhodds, Pierre, (1967). "La Colombie et l ’United Fruit 
Company", Revue Francaise de Science Politique 17 (11), pp.307-317; LeGrand, Catherine (1986).
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significance of the event for this research lies in the activation of less favourable 
attitudes towards foreign capital and more State awareness and intervention in support 
of workers and farmers involved in the banana trade. Nonetheless, Santa Marta and 
Uraba have been plagued with intense economic and social difficulties throughout the 
period. The commencement of a Liberal regime in 1930 gave momentum to the 
decline of the company’s highly vertically-integrated operation in Magdalena. State 
policy supported labour movements and established more stringent employment laws. 
The "revolution en marcha", a government programme implemented by President 
Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (connected with his 1934-1938 term), was aimed at putting 
social and economic reform on the national agenda16. In this general context, the 
State became a stronger actor within the export-banana sector. The banana strike was 
an important event, but was only one of many in Colombia which triggered a shift 
of government policy to become more involved in social reform, one of the main 
areas were modifications to labour legislation. Moreover, this change was also part 
of a larger Latin America trend towards increased government intervention in general 
in the economy.
Due to the damage inflicted on their operations in the 1928 strike, the world
Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia. 1830-1936. Albuquerque: University o f New Mexico 
Press; Botero, Fernando and Guzmin Barney (1977). "El Enclave Agricola en la Zona Bananera de Santa 
Marta." Cuademos Colombianos N o .ll , pp.313-317; Gilhod6s, Pierre (1970). "Agrarian Struggles in 
Colombia" In Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movement in Latin America. New 
York: Anchor Books; Melo, Jorge Orlando (1978). "The Conservative Republic." In Arrubla, Mario, et.al. 
(Eds.), Colombia Hov. Bogoti: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, p.97.
16Abel, Chris and Palacios, Marco (1991). "Colombia 1930-1958." In Bethell, Leslie (Ed.) Cambridge 
History of Latin America Vol. VII. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 597; Tirado, Alvaro 
(1981). Aspectos Politicos del Primer Goverieno de Alfonso L6pez Pumarejo. 1934-1938. Bogoti: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores;P6caut, Daniel (1987). Orden v Violencia: Colombia 1930-1954. V ol.l. Bogoti: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, chapter 2.
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economic recession, and less favourable State policy, the UFCO started to scale down 
its activities. As the UFCO withdrew, the State stepped in. With each extension of 
government initiatives the company further was encouraged to depart. This process 
can be observed in four areas: banana growing, fruit buying, credit and technical 
assistance. The UFCO started withdrawing from cultivation, and in 1931 supplied 
only one-third of total production from its own estates. This enabled the Company 
to control price, while shifting the burden of risk onto independent producers17. By 
1938 the UFCO had further decreased land ownership and retained only 20% of total 
banana hectarage18. To compensate for their reduced output, the UFCO increased 
the proportion of fruit purchased from native growers who were still largely financed 
by the UFCO19. As the crisis deepened, the State responded more forcefully to 
growers* complaints and in 1932 compelled the Company to implement a more 
equitable system of banana contracts20. A year later when the UFCO was unable 
or unwilling to extend credits, the State organised a producer cooperative to finance 
growers21. Later in 1936 a more formal arrangement resulted. A bill was passed 
to transfer full control of Santa Marta fruit production to a quasi-official agricultural
17PRO, Foreign Office (23 March 1937). "Colombia: Annual Report for 1936." Registry Number 
A2851/2851/11, FO371.20624; Jim6nez, Margarita and Sideri, Sandro (1985). Historia del Desarrollo 
Regional en Colombia Bogoti: CEREC, p. 140.
18DOT (1938). "Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions of the Republic o f Colombia." p. 17.
19PRO, Foreign Office (18 May 1937). "Economic Section of Annual Report on Colombia for 1935." 
F0371.20624, Registry Number A4084/2851/11.
’^May, Stacy and Plaza, Galo, op.cit.. p. 12. Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. 
p. 11. Another example of government pressure on the Company in 1932 was ceding o f the Santa Marta 
Railway. Ownership of the line was transferred to the government but it was leased back to the UFCO 
until 1947.
2lKepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. p.291. The Cooperative extended loans to planters 
at an interest rate of 6% which were financed through 25% deduction of the value of each banana shipment.
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credit bank in association with the planters themselves (Cooperative Bananera de 
Magdalena). Planters no longer had to rely on the UFCO for credit22. Further 
legislation-laws 1 and 125--followed in 1937 which also served to curb the 
monopolistic power of the UFCO. These statutes regulated land adjudication, 
producer credit and export contract terms for independent planters as well as health 
care for workers and water supply23. Specifically, Law 1 formalized the 
establishment of the Cooperativa and sanctioned various social measure24. Law 125 
concentrated on combating Sigatoka disease which struck in 1936 and 193725. A 
Mexican technical mission was contracted in 1937 to analyze the situation. In the 
long run, half of total eradication costs were borne by the Government26. The 
cumulative effect of increasing government intervention was that from 1934 the 
UFCO’s subsidiary, the Magdalena Fruit Company, gradually pulled out of 
production and abandoned its financial and technical services to independent 
producers27.
Thereafter the situation for the UFCO worsened. There was a general decline
“ PRO, Foreign Office, (23 March 1937). "Annual Economic Report on Colombia for 1936." 
F0371.20624, Registry Number A2851/2851/11.
“ PRO, Foreign Office (11 April 1938). "Annual Economic Report on Colombia for 1937." 
F0371.21444, Registry Number: A3465/152/11; DOT (1938). "Report on Economic and Commercial 
Conditions of the Republic of Colombia." p. 17; Arango, Mario Aurelio (1938). Memoria de Agriculture
1938. Bogoti: Imprenta National, p.29.
“ Arango, Mario Aurelio (1938), op.cit.. pp.21, 29. The Cooperativa was authorized to issue twenty- 
year loans at 8% per annum. Provision was also made for medical services: facilities had to be provided 
by operators employing more than five workers.
“ Ibid., p.33.
“ DOT (1938)."Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions of the Republic of Colombia", p. 17; 
Wylie, Kathryn (1942), op.cit.. p.69.
“ Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 11.
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in exports due to the ravages of Sigatoka, repeated wind damage and the Second
World War which in the early 1940s virtually paralysed trade (see Appendix B.2).
And critically for the Company relations with the government continued to
deteriorate. This is illustrated by a 1938 British Foreign Office report:
Colombian organisation is subject to official investigation on charges of corruption, i.e. 
distribution of surreptitious funds in order to maintain the monopoly of banana export 
trade. The manager of the local company, a US citizen, was arrested and held in prison 
for over one month28.
Given these circumstances the UFCO’s subsidiary had virtually ceased banana 
operations in Colombia. This contrasted with the the position of independent growers 
who were estimated to have 10,000 hectares in production in 194129. With the aid 
of the State, national growers persevered, attempting to sustain exports while at the 
same time diversifying their activities. Law 152 of 1942 set up the Compahia 
Agricola de Magdalena Ltda. (CAM), to replace the Cooperativa Bananera30. The 
aim was to diversify Magdalena agriculture. The CAM was comprised of 230 
associates involved in cane-sugar, banana and coffee production31. In 1947 the 
Compania Agricola de Magdalena shipped bananas with the West Indies Fruit Co. to 
Miami32. Another initiative followed in 1950 with the foundation of the Federation
“ PRO, Foreign Office (11 April 1938). "Annual Economic Report on Colombia for 1937." 
F0371.21444, Registry Number A3465/152/11.
29PRO, Foreign Office (11 June 1947). "Annual Economic Report on Colombia for 1946." 
F0371.61271, Registry Number: AS3769/446/11.
“ Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 11.
3lPRO, Foreign Office (30 Dec. 1943) "Situation in Colombia 1943." F0371.38043, Registry Number
AS393/195/11; Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p . l l .
“Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 12.
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de Exportadores de Bananeros to systematise exports33. These were amongst the 
first successful export efforts by local producers. Earlier attempts had been largely 
frustrated by the UFCO. For example, in the early 1930s three independent 
companies connected with Colombian growers, attempted to break the UFCO export 
monopoly34. The first two failed to make any shipments and the third only 
succeeded briefly, before its activities were foiled by the UFCO35.
By the late 1940s and early 1950s considerable export recovery had taken 
place36. The outlook appeared to be upbeat and further State infrastructure 
investment was promised while organisational structure was strengthened37. In 1954 
the Federation de Exportadores de Banano split into the Federacidn de Productores 
de Banana and the Consorcio Bananera38. By 1957 over 70% of exported bananas 
were obtained from local producers growing under contract39. Finally, a local 
banana bank was established in 1959, the Banco Bananera de Magdalena. It was to
33Ibid.
34Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935). The Banana Empire. New York: The Vanguard Press, 
pp.287-289.
35Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 10; Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. 
(1935), op.cit.. p. 189.
36See Appendix B.2; PRO., Foreign Office, (12 Sept. 1949). "Colombia: Economic Report Period July 
and August 1949." F0371.74676, Registry Number: AS5163/1101/11; PRO, Foreign Office, (11 June 
1947). "Annual Economic Report on Colombia for 1946." F0371.61271, Registry Number: 
AS3769/446/11.
37PRO, Foreign Office (22 Jan. 1951). "Colombia: Economic Report Period December 1950." 
F0371.90805, Registry Number AL1101/2. For example port modernisation and the construction of a new 
quay were mentioned.
38Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 12.
39May, Stacy and Galo, Plaza (1958), op.cit.. p. 175.
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defend and develop local producers40. This clearly demonstrated the decline of 
UFCO cultivation, extent of government support and the fortitude of Colombian 
banana farmers.
Nonetheless, despite progress made by local growers, the UFCO continued to 
be the largest exporter. In 1947 the Seville Fruit Company (another subsidary of the 
UFCO) replaced the Magdalena Fruit Company, with the object of sustaining the 
Company’s export presence41. By the 1950s the UFCO had re-established banana 
growing operations in Colombia, the Seville Fruit Company had 4,000 hectares under 
cultivation and also began to export bananas purchased from the Federation and the 
Consorcio42. But this recovery was temporary. In 1966, with the loss of a 
substantial portion of UFCO-owned plantations, ha. due to a hurricane, the Company 
withdrew from Colombia43. When the Seville Fruit Company pulled out, 2,400 ha. 
of banana and 800 ha. of unproductive land (potreros) were sold to the Federacidn, 
the remaining were transferred to the Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria 
(INCORA)44. As the UFCO had once again become the main agent responsible for
H errera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 12.
4,Ibid.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., pp. 12-13.
“Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 13. This thesis will not analyze the land 
reform policy of 1961 as this has been exhausted by others. Only policies that directly affected crop 
modernisation will be reviewed. For literature on the land reform see Adams, D.W. and Montero, L. 
(1965). "Land Parcelization in Colombia." Inter-American Economic Affairs 19 (3), pp.67-72. Adams, 
D.W. and Schuman, S. (1967). "Minifundia in Agrarian Reform: A Colombian Example." Land
Economics 43(3), pp.274-283; Felstehausen, Herman (1968). "Local Government and Rural Service 
Barriers To Economic Development in Colombia." Madison: Land Tenure Center Paper No. 57; Franco, 
Barbier (1962). "Distribuci6n de Tierras y Reforma Agraria." Revista del Banco de la Republica 35 (421), 
pp. 1371-1376; Hirschman, Alfred O. (1974). "La Tenencia de la Tierra y la Reforma Agraria en 
Colombia." In Estudios Sobre Polftica Econdmica en Am6rica Latina. Madrid: Aguilar, pp.106-181;
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technical assistance and input distribution their exit left a significant gap in the 
organisational structure45. This produced yet another response by the State which 
again tried to replace UFCO activities.
Once again the State became involved in providing financial and technical 
assistance to growers. In response to the ravages of the hurricane and Panama 
Disease the INCORA imported 50,000 Cavendish cuttings in 1966. One year later 
the Federation and Consorcio Bananera imported 53,000 cuttings from Ecuador and 
Martinique46. By 1968 the INCORA established a programme to regenerate the 
banana zone and subsidized the switch to Cavendish with grants of 12,000 
pesos/ha.47. Technical assistance for seed imports and extension and improvement 
of canal network and other infrastructure was also planned. In addition, the Central 
Bank through Resolution number 65 of 1968 opened a special credit line for loans to 
restore banana lands and diversify agriculture either through Caja Agraria or 
Commercial Banks loans48. Possibly banana growers were encouraged to restore 
plantations by Decree 444 of 1967 which directly promoted exports by granting a tax 
credit of 15 % of exports redeemable within one year (Certificado Abono Creditario
Tenencia de la Tierra v Desarrollo Socio-Econ6mico del Sector Agricola (1966), Washington: Comitd 
Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola; Arroyo, M.A. (1954). "El Origen de la Propeided de la Tierra en 
Colombia." Economfa Colombiana 3(8), pp.351-354; Havens, Eugene A. and Flynn, William (1970) 
Internal Colonialism and Structural Change in Colombia New York: Praeger Publishers, chapter 1; 
Reforma Agraria v DesatTollo Rural en Colombia. (1979) Bogoti: INCORA; Ospina Gloria R. (1981) 
"Policy Implementation in Developing Countries: The Colombian Agrarian Reform Law of 1961." PhD 
Dissertation, Georgetown University.
45Cr6dito v Fomento (1969), op.cit. p. 180.
“ Ibid., p .181.
47Ibid., p.84.
“ Revista del Banco de la Republica. 41 (493), pp. 1496-1497; Cridito v Fomento (1969), op.cit.. pp. 
85,181.
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(CAT))49. However expectations appeared to be low as in 1969 only 3,000 hectares 
of land were under banana, located principally in Riofrio and Orihueca50. In 1972 
the Compania Exportadora de Banano Ltda., with 65 affiliates was organized to, as 
indicated by the name, to export bananas51.
This period saw renewed TNC interest in banana cultivation. The UFCO 
(Seville Fruit Company) once again re-entered the Santa Marta in 1973 and Standard 
Fruit (Baltime de Colombia, S.A.) entered in 197652. Nonetheless, from the 1970s 
onwards Santa Marta only supplied a small share of bananas to the export market53. 
As early as the late-1950s the UFCO recognized the advantages of switching 
operations to Uraba, a region of higher and more regular rainfall than Santa Marta 
and which was effected less by hurricanes.
This course of events shows how TNC strategy evolved over time, how 
government became increasingly involved in regulation and promotion, and how local 
producers responded new institutional arrangements and economic opportunities. It 
shows the dynamics of interactions amongst foreign corporations, government and 
local interest groups. As in other regions of the world the UFCO was initially drawn 
to Colombia by favourable government policies. However with the passage of time
49For more information on Decree 444 see for example, Bejarano, Jesus Antonio (1978). 
"Industrialization and Economic Policy 1950-1976" In Arrubla, Mario, et.al. (Eds.) Colombia Hov Bogota: 
Siglo Veintiuno Editores, pp.242-249; Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1988), op.cit.. pp.439-442. The CAT was 
implemented largely to promote non-traditional exports, nonetheless bananas were included.
“ Crddito v Fomento (1969), op.cit.. p. 180.
51Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 14.
“ Ibid., p. 14.
“ See Appendix B.2.
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thoses policies and the nature of the UFCO’s activities changed. While the nature of 
its activities evolved the Company always retained control of the most profitable 
aspect: marketing and distribution. The way in which the UFCO operated in
Colombia created and at the same time limited opportunities available to local 
producers. These opportunities were influenced by State policy, particularly after the 
1920s. For example, although Colombian planters tried to gain a foothold in the 
trade, the UFCO maintained a monopoly over exports in the region until the early 
1980s. As discussed in part I this was because they controlled international markets 
and owned crucial elements of transport and irrigation. The State, was a reluctant 
participant before 1928, but later it took a more active role. Therefore it is seen that 
government policy was not the principal force which influenced the exit of the 
UFCO. State policy was initially reactive. When the UFCO began to curtail its 
operations, official organisations were set up to support local producers. Later 
government policy became proactive which further encouraged the UFCO to reduce 
the scale of its operations in Colombia. Nevertheless, the success of independent 
planters, arguably due to government initiatives, created a favourable environment for 
the survival of TNC operations in the areas of marketing and distribution. But other 
factors such as adverse climatic conditions and disease made the region unattractive 
for all producers.
During the first years of the UFCO’s operations in Santa Marta the Company 
pursued expansionary policies, investing heavily in transport networks from 
plantations to port, general communications, irrigation systems and commercial and
250
Part II: Santa Marta and Urabd Export Bananas 
credit outlets so as to gain control of the banana business. The UFCO acquired large 
tracts of land, the majority of which remained underdeveloped and served as a means 
to monopolize productive lands54. Their establishment in the area was gradual, and 
with assistance of local capital and planters, output rose.
The distribution of output, as hinted above, was mainly dominated by 
Colombians. For example, in 1908, 283 non-UFCO owned banana farms accounted 
for 75% of the total production55. However data for banana farms and growers 
from Santa Marta in 1908 demonstrate that land ownership was highly skewed (Table 
B2.1).
Table B2.1
Santa Marta Land Tenure Data, 1908 
Break-down of Growers and Farm Size and Respective Percentages
Size (Ha) Number of Growers % Total Hectares %
1-5 173 60.9 482 9.7
5-20 74 26.1 724 14.6
20-50 19 6.7 661 13.4
50-100 12 4.2 847 17.1
100-500 5 1.8 1107 22.4
<500 1 .4 1129 22.8
Total 284 100 4950 100
Source: Posada. Eduardo (1990), op.cit., p.76, citing Colombia Mision de Rafael Reyes, pp.4\5-49.
♦Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Large estates ( >  100 hectares) represented over 45 % of banana growing land. But 
large-scale plantation owners accounted for only 2.2% of the total number of 
growers. Small planters (1-5 ha.) constituted 60.9% of the planters which comprised
^LeGrand. Catherine (1984). op.cit.. p. 184.
“ Posada, Eduardo (1990). "The Colombian Caribbean: A Regional History: 1870-1950." D.Phil 
Thesis, Oxford University, p.75.
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only 9.7% of the banana land. In addition there were a large number (266) of small- 
to medium-sized (l-50ha) farms, the bulk of which were less than five hectares. In 
the 1920s, Company ownership remained lower than in the Central American 
republics. In 1925, 20,235 hectares were planted with banana, 55% of which were 
owned by the UFCO and the remaining by private individuals56. By 1929 Santa 
Marta was comprised of 650 plantations with a total area of 24,000 ha., 43% of 
which were owned by the UFCO57. This demonstrates a decline in UFCO land 
planted with banana from 11,129 ha. to 10,320 ha. and a further expansion of local 
growers.
Within the context of State and TNC activity it is argued that independent 
local growers were a vital element to the Colombian banana trade. From the data in 
the table, most of the producers must have been small (87% of planters cultivated 
plots of less than 20 ha.) and the sheer numbers involved would appear to indicate 
that small-sized cultivators must have been successful (table B2.1). The numbers 
would seem to confirm debates in the theoretical literature about the ability of small- 
scale producers rather than capitalist producers to prevail in the case of adverse 
conditions58. Small independent growers did not have the advantage of TNCs to 
spread risks throughout different countries but because banana plants mature relatively 
rapidly (returns on banana plants materialize within 9-12 months) small producers can
^DOT (1925) "Report on the Commercial and Economic Situation in the Republic of Colombia." p.57.
^DOT (1930). "Republic of Colombia Commercial Review and Handbook 1929", p. 119.
^ o r  the survival of small commodity producers in the face of adverse conditions see for example, 
Chayanov, Teodor (1966). The Theory of Peasant Economy. Manchester: Manchester University Press.; 
Sen, Amartya (1968). Choice of Techniques. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
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gain quick returns on their investment. Moreover small producers appeared to be 
surviving despite difficulties obtaining land title. The literature argues that producers 
often led a precarious existence as they were sometimes squatters {colonos), not 
owning legal title to land59. Some squatters were pushed off the land when the 
UFCO arrived and as T. Lynn Smith describes the UFCO continued to exert pressure 
on them:
During the decades preceding 1947, though, the problem of squatters or "colonos" was 
pre-eminent. From the banana zone, near the Caribbean Coast on the north, where the 
invasions of the highly developed banana plantations paralysed banana operations . . .60.
Thus it emerges that small- to medium-sized producers were a strong element in 
banana growing during at least the first half of the century. They could be considerd 
a risk takers (i.e. they were profit-oriented) though in some cases they did not have 
legal title to land. Regardless of title, a squatter was willing to bear risk if there 
were possibilities of generating income. Second, the literature shows that squatters 
would cultivate banana on UFCO property because it was the only way to gain access 
to land. Third, it was also feasible for small producers to cultivate since banana start­
up costs did not require as much capital during this time, and therefore legal land title 
was not necessary to gain credit.
Other arguments for the survival of small scale producers relate to low-cost 
labour-intensive techniques. Because of the perceived scarcity of labour on the
59According to Posada, small growers were not necessarily landowners, sometimes they were 
sharecroppers, renters, or squatters see Posada, Eduardo (1990), op.cit.. p.76.
“LeGrand, Catherine (1986). Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia. 1930-1936. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, p. 115; LeGrand, Catherine (1984), op.cit.. p. 184. For 
more discussion of private appropriation fo pulbic lands see Palacios, Marco (1980). Coffee in Colombia. 
1850-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 8; Smith, T. Lynn (1967). Colombia: Social 
Structure and Process of Development. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, p.85.
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Colombian coast it was difficult for large plantations to obtain sufficient amounts of 
labour to achieve adequate yields61. Small to medium-sized farmers could more 
intensively cultivate because of their access to family labour and closer links with 
rural labour markets62. The application of more man hours per hectare would result 
in higher yields. Further evidence proves that sophisticated agricultural techniques 
were isolated in the export sectors of banana farming (located in Northern Magdalena) 
and cattle ranching (located to the South) whereas the production of foodstuffs 
received little care63. Labour, because of its scarcity, was applied only to lucrative 
activities. In a 1929 article Clarence Jones reported:
In contrast to excellent methods of banana production, subsistence crops, including corn, 
cassava and beans show primitive conditions. Planted in small scattered patches cleared 
of brush and unplowed, crops received no attention except cropping of weeds64.
The use of labour-intensive techniques in banana production on the coast was
detrimental to foodstuff production. The displacement of local foodstuff production
was evidenced in part I. Moreover one cannot sustain the argument that little
attention was given to other crops because of the lack of technical sophistication.
Below it will be proven that in potato production output-augmenting techniques such
as variety diversification, manuring, and weeding were used at least as early as the
61Many historians emphasize the scarcity of labour in rural areas during the beginning of the century, 
see LeGrand, Catherine (1986). Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia. 1830-1936. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, p.38; Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1988). op.cit.. p.285; 
Ocampo, Jose Antonio, (Ed.) (1991). Historia Econ6mica de Colombia. Bogoti (3rd edition): Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores.
“ Taussig, M. (1982). "Peasant Economies and the Development of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cauca 
Valley, Colombia." In. Harriss, John (Ed.) Rural Development. London: Century Hutchinson Ltd.
63DOT (1925). "Report on the Commercial and Economic Situation in the Republic of Colombia." p.57.
^Jones, Clarence F. (1929). "Agricultural Regions of South America." Economic Geography 5(4), 
p.410.
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1920s65.
Finally, government efforts to substitute UFCO assistance and capital also 
encouraged local growers to stay in production as well as protected them against 
market fluctuations through crop diversification promoted by the State from the 1930s 
onwards. Therefore, it is evident that because of the labour-intensive production 
methods and labour scarcity, small producers had an advantage over TNCs. 
Moreover producers appeared to be risk-averse as planters without title to land also 
cultivated bananas.
The zenith of UFCO production in Colombia was in the 1920s. A period 
when most techniques were land and labour using66. Although irrigation networks 
had been constructed, the use of inputs appeared to be minimal. Soil exhaustion and 
blight in the 1930s and 1940s could be considered a result of failure to fertilize in 
previous decades67. When Sigatoka hit plantations in the mid-1930s, eradication was 
conducted through spraying. The initial costs of spraying machines, fungicides and 
wages and salaries of those on the campaign were paid by the State, demonstrating 
the importance of State support and the absense of UFCO assistance68. The area 
also benefitted from the late arrival of Panama Disease in 1956, therefore plantation
“See Potato Part n.
“See Banana Part I.
“ LeGrand, Catherine (1984), op.cit.. p. 191.
“ Arango, Mario Aurelio (1938). Memoria de Agriculture 1938. Bogoti: Imprenta Nacional, p.34.
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relocation was not necessary until that time69. As indicated above, recovery of 
plantations in the 1950s and 1960s was done with the assistance of the Consorcio 
Bananero and the Seville Fruit Company. Spraying against Sigatoka was carried out 
under contract70. Chemical fertilizers were also used by the 1960s71. However 
these efforts appeared to be inadequate as an official US report stated in 1966 that, 
". . . the application of adequate fertilizer, and the control of ’Sigatoka’ have been 
used only to a limited extent"72. Nonetheless, the use of pesticides demonstrated 
high relative levels in 1965. In 1965, of the total pesticide consumption in 
Colombian agriculture, bananas represented the crop with the highest percentage.
Table B2.2
Consumption of Pesticides in Colombia 
for the Crops with the Highest Consumption, 1965 
(Metric Tonnes)
Crops Insecti-cides Fungicides Herbicides Total Pesticides % of 
Total
Potatoes 18 1424 — 1442 129%
Bananas — 3580 - 3580 320%
Cotton 2536 — 99 2635 23.6%
Rice 790 81 396 1267 113%
Sugarcane 12 — 390 402 36%
Agricultural Total 3889 5603 1692 11184 XD
Source: "Estudio Sobre el Mercado de Fertilizantes en Colombia", (1966) Institute de Investigaciones, 
Mimeo, Tibaitati: ICA, p.28.
Thirty-two percent of total pesticide consumption was dedicated to banana growing. 
It can be assumed that most of the fungicides were used in export banana production
69DOT (1938). "Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions of the Republic of Colombia", p. 17.
70Krogzemis, James R. (1967), on.cit.. p.38.
71Ibid.
^Agricultural Development in Colombia (1966) Bogot£: USAID Rural Development Staff, p.62.
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and not for domestic commercialisation for three reasons explained in part I. First, 
export bananas demand higher levels of inputs than those grown for internal 
consumption. Second, producers not located in export banana regions do not have 
access to sophisticated techniques. Third, fungicides were primarily aimed at the 
treatment and prevention of Sigatoka Disease.
Between the 1930s and the 1960s harvesting was conducted by manual labour 
which carried bananas to the edge of plantations and placed bananas on oxen pulled 
cars which transported them to the railway. Harvesting was by hand and modes of 
transportation were diverse. Either human, animal of mechanical power moved 
bananas from the field to plantation borders. From here bananas were either loaded 
onto the railway, barges in the Magdalena River, or continued to be transported by 
oxen. By the 1960s tractors moved bananas from border of plot to farms loading 
station along the Magdalena River73.
New technologies of the 1960s in areas such as pest control and transportation- 
-polyethylene bags, cables and banana boxing-were was not used in Santa Marta. 
This demonstrates a significant lag in technical adoption in the region. Only later 
were these technologies disseminated by the UFCO or official agencies which 
obtained them from abroad. The lag was due to production instability, primarily 
brought about by unstable external markets and adverse weather which resulted in 
weak organisation consolidation. Within this context research and development in the 
region was not established and producers hoped to obtain technology either from State 
or TNC initiative which imported innovations from abroad. This is in contrast to
73Krogzemis, James R. (1967), op.cit.. p.38.
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Colombian sugar producers who mainly sold to bouyant internal markets (until the 
1960s) and experienced early organisational consolidation.
The increased involvement of independent producers probably inhibited the 
trend towards homogeneous practices associated with the internationalisation of 
capital. This, coupled with the reduction in hectarage and exports in the 1930s and 
1940s and the gradual withdrawl of the UFCO most likely contributed to a decrease 
in the availability of new technology. According to James Krogzemis, after the boom 
years many farmers pulled out of production altogether. Other cultivators attempted 
to diversify production, still devoting an area of farms to export banana. Yet others 
continued banana monocropping74. Frequent blow downs also encouraged 
cultivators to switch production to more profitable, less risky crops75. Moreover, 
producers tended to rely on technologies imported from abroad—a trend that was also 
witnessed in part I and continued in Santa Marta, and will be seen in Urate.
Within the Colombian banana literature, Bucheli and Rippy take an imperialist 
stance, describing banana production as an enclave which resulted in few internal 
effects76. Others such as LeGrand concentrate on transformations that occurred as 
a result of foreign capital, implicitly addressing the changes brought about by the 
trade77. Posada also foceses on the wider-economic implications of the trade,
74Krogzemis, James R. (1967). "A Historical Geography of the Santa Marta Area, Colombia." Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, pp.37-44.
73Iturralde, Jos6 M. (1965). "Mai de Panama" Medellin, p. 12.
76Bucheli, Marcelo (1991), op.cit.: Rippy, J. Fred (1976), on.cit.
^LeGrand, Catherine (1984), op.cit.. pp. 178-200.
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aiming to show its long-term economic effects78. It is argued that the UFCO 
enabled locals to become involved in banana cultivation; and the establishment of 
local hospitals (1913-1914), schools and railways enhanced regional welfare. Other 
activities may have appeared advantageous at the onset such as colonisation, farm 
infrastructure, provision of housing for workers, credit extension for Colombian 
growers and a local commissary to provide food staples and clothing for workers79. 
However in the long run these proved to be detrimental. The UFCO operated 
unfairly in matters such as credit extension, land adjudication and exports which had 
long-term negative effects on the region.
What were the positive and negative effects? According to the Department of 
Trade the Santa Marta Railway was one of the best equipped, adding that if it were 
not for banana cultivation, the region would be devoid of modern transport 
facilities80. Physical infrastructure such as irrigation was advantageous as the UFCO 
would charge lower prices to planters than public services in the 1920s81. Also, the 
provision of health care was desired as many workers migrated to the areas to receive 
proper medical attention and medicine82. Quantitatively, in terms of the range of 
services available, labour appeared to have better treatment than other Colombian 
workers during the first third of the century, " . . .  labourers of banana regions were
^Posada, Eduardo (1992), op.cit.
79Rippy, J. Fred (1976), op.cit.. p. 182.
“ DOT (1930). "Republic of Colombia Commercial Review and Handbook 1929", p.44.
81Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. p.290.
“ LeGrand, Catherine (1984), op.cit.. p. 186. For more on the benefits o f health care see Posada, 
Eduardo (1992), op.cit.. pp.24-25.
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probably better paid than any workers in Colombia"83. Even Rippy has to admit 
that UFCO wages were generally above the standard wage paid by the government 
in 193184. However in absolute terms, wages were low.
In terms of regional develoment, Posada argues that the UFCO was beneficial 
in many aspects, bringing forest land into agricultural usage, giving opportunities to 
local planters, attracting labourers from other regions, monetizing the economy, 
construction of physical infrastructure, and increased cattle ranching on the Coast 
activated by increased population in Santa Marta85. These transformations took 
place, however most were time-specific occurring before the 1930s.
Yet the UFCO created few lasting developmental effects with the immediate 
area, for it crowded out local investment. For instance, Krogzemis reported that 
despite wealth in Cienaga during the boom, since then nothing has happened86. A 
prime example of this was the substitutive effect (primarily with foodstuffs) of the 
UFCO commissaries. There were first set up by the company in 1916 and continued 
until 196287. The system of commissaries meant that backward linkages were 
limited and that the UFCO was less involved with the national economy88. For
wDOT (1930), "Republic o f Colombia Commercial Review and Handbook 1929", p. 120.
“ Rippy, J. Fred (1976), op.cit.. p. 191.
“ Posada, Eduardo (1992), op.cit.. pp. 18-28.
“ Krogzemis, James R. (1967). "A Historical Geography o f the Santa Marta Area, Colombia." Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, pp.32-33.
“Jim&iez, Margarita and Sideri, Sandro (1985), op.cit.. p. 139.
“ Bucheli G6mez, Marchelo (1991), op.cit.. p.74.
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example returning banana boats were stocked with cheap foodstuffs89. This was a 
way to keep food prices down, hence reduce the cash wage bill. Quantitative data 
of 1926 corroborates this as a significant amount of food in this area was imported90.
. . . outside of the UFCO, who, through their chain of commissaries are the biggest 
distributors, the merchants do not have sufficient turnover to be able to purchase large 
quantities of goods91.
Clearly, this demonstrates the difficulty local merchants had in competing with the 
UFCO.
Local food production was discouraged. Due to cheaper imported foodstuffs, 
it was difficult for the small commodity producer to compete. This explanation does 
not tell the whole story as it has been documented by LeGrand that many small 
commodity producers arrived in the area in response to increased population levels 
of the Santa Marta area primarily due to in-migration92. Commissaries not only 
created tension with those involved in the banana trade, but also antagonized small 
commodity producers by undercutting food prices93.
Overall, the effects of colonisation-much vaunted in the banana literature— 
were negative. According to Le Grand, "Many of the local dominant classes 
ransacked family trunks for old property title, while others applied for public land
wLeGrand, Catherine (1984), op.cit.. p. 185.
^Posada, Eduardo (1983), op.cit.. p.48.
91DOT (1925). "Report on the Commercial and Economic Situation in the Republic of Colombia."
p.58.
^LeGrand, Catherine (1984), op.cit.. p. 182.
93Ibid., p. 185.
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grants from the government or simply fabricated new property claims"94. Posada 
underlines the increased demand for land by the UFCO and locals during the 1900s 
and 1910s95. Although the UFCO activated land markets and locals also participated 
in the titling boom, vague title demarcation and confusion of title records later led to 
rural conflict.
Another cost, as alluded to above, was the monopolistic control of banana 
marketing96. In 1925 banana growers had little leverage when negotiating with the 
UFCO. The UFCO had a vertical monopoly over the banana industry97. Inevitably, 
all fruit steamers were chartered by the UFCO98. Kepner and Soothill describe 
efforts made by the Company to maintain its maritime transport monopoly, 
challenging in the English courts attempts by independent Colombian producers to 
ship bananas with the Leyland Line99. Rippy also underlines that during the 1920s 
and early 1930s the company was able to buy bananas from independent producers 
at a monopoly price100. Possibilities to sell poorer quality output on regional 
markets were negligible since rural commercial networks in general were weak at this
^LeGrand, Catherine (1984), op.cit.. p. 183.
"Posada, Eduardo (1992?), op.cit.. p.9; Posada, Eduardo (1990). "The Colombian Caribbean: A
Regional History: 1870-1950." D.Phil Thesis, Oxford University, St. Antony’s College, p. 106.
"See Banana Part I. For accounts of the 1920s and 1920s see Posada, Eduardo (1992?), op.cit.. pp. 14-
15.
"D.O.T. (1925) "Report on the Commercial and Economic Situation in the Republic of Colombia." 
p.31.
98Ibid., pp.57-58.
"Kepner, C. D. and Soothill, J. H. (1935), op.cit.. p. 189.
‘“ Rippy, J. Fred (1976), op.cit.. p.181.
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time (pre-1950), and urban centres were difficult to reach101. In addition to
monopoly of exports, the UFCO also controlled credits and the water supply.
Because the UFCO had distributed credit to growers, the company could take or leave
as much of the crop as it found convenient in relation to world market
requirements102. Given a control of irrigation, it is reported that the company
would flood independent planters’ plots if they rebelled103. The extent of UFCO
dominance was widely recognized.
The United Fruit Company against which the banana law is aimed has been in business 
in Colombia for very many years and has become all powerful in the banana districts.
It is difficult to separate rumour from fact regarding the actions o f this company but it 
is certain that by financial assistance to planters, control of water supply, ownership of 
docks and cold storage ships, etc. it has attained an influence which has made 
competition by other entities difficult if not impossible104.
Nevertheless, as indicated above, the company gradually pulled out of production in 
the 1940s but retained control of exports during the 1950s and 1960s105.
Lastly, notwithstanding the literature which points to relatively high wages in 
the banana sector, worker welfare was deficient in Santa Marta. Working conditions 
were poor, there were many strikes the most notable are those of 1918, 1928, 1934 
and 1949 and their were many complaints against the labour contract system, critics
,0,For a discussion of poor communication between regions see McGreevey, William Paul (1971). An 
Economic History of Colombia 1845-1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 10.
Interregional transport difficulties are also discussed in Sugar Part II and Potatoes Part n.
,02DOT (1930). "Republic of Colombia Commercial Review and Handbook 1929".p. 16
I03Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p.24.
iwpRo, Foreign Office (24 Jan.1938), "Annual Report on Colombia for 1937", F0371.21447, Registry
Number: A1267/1267/11.
‘“ Herrera Soto, Roberto and Castaneda, R. (1979), op.cit.. p. 12.
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argued that the Company failed to comply with Colombian labour law106. Further 
evidence of poor working conditions is provided by the inadequacy of housing. 
Qualitatively, despite modest periodic improvements, housing in Santa Marta 
appeared to be generally unsatisfactory throughout the period107. An official 
document from 1958 states that plantation housing, including UFCO worker barracks, 
and was cramped and insanitary108.
Hence it can be seen that many positive transformations resulted from the 
development of the banana trade. But, it is argued that transformations most likely 
would have been far-reaching if the UFCO had not monopolised factors of 
production. The UFCO crowded out local investment, limiting the development of 
what otherwise might have been the growth of strong internal markets. Obviously, 
without the presence of the UFCO the trade were never have existed. But the 
monopolistic behaviour of the Company must have inhibited local entrepeneurial 
formation, the availability of which was demonstrated by the experiences of the 1930s 
and 1940s--when the UFCO started pulling out local businesses thrived. At this point 
it was national and local organisations that extended credit, fostered the recovery of 
production and trade, and promoted agricultural diversification in Santa Marta. It 
could be that adverse regional conditions were not so much the responsibility of the
I06Cort6s Vargas, Carlos (1979). Los Sucesos de las Bananeras Bogota (2nd edition): Editorial 
Desarrollo (originally published in 1929), pp.32-34.
,07For instance, immediately after the strike of 1928 the UFCO constructed two emergency hospitals, 
adopted a weekly pay day, abolished scrip (for the commissary) and constructed a few schools. See Rippy, 
J. Fred (1976), op.cit.. p. 188; citing Cort6s Vargas, pp. 149-150. For examples of poor conditions see 
Fonnegra, Gabriel (1980). Bananeras Testimonio Vivo de una Epopeva. Bogoti: Ediciones Tercer Mundo 
pp.51-59.
108Estudios Sobre las Condiciones del Desarrollo de Colombia (1958). Bogot&: Aedita Editores, p. 136.
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UFCO as the nature of the industry. Further research must be conducted on the later 
investments of the early banana capitalists to assess whether the export trade 
stimulated long term accumulation on the coast. Also, the implications of the 
internationalisation of capital on regional development needs further examination. As 
will be shown in the section below, the strength of local initiative combined with 
State support resulted in "export-led modernisation". However was local initiative 
necessarily more desirable than TNC?
INSTITUTIONS. TECHNOLOGY and LABOUR: late modernisation in Uraba
The Uraba export banana area extends from Chigorodo until Turb6 which is 
located in the northern parts of the department of Antioquia109. By 1990 the central 
axis of banana growing region was in the municipios of Apartadd, Chigorodo, Turbo 
and Carepa110.
Due to the tropical climate, and insalubrious conditions Urabd has not been 
a highly populated region. In 1903, the loss of Panama brought more attention to this 
border area. To facilitate access to the prospective Panama Canal, the development 
of the "highway to the sea" (which was to traverse Urabd) was promoted by 
Departmental and National Governments. Nonetheless, only in the 1950s did 
significant growth occur. During the 1960s growth was bolstered primarily by the
l09Canasta Bananera. (1983), Medellin: Augura, p. 11. See Map B2.2.
I10"Urabd al Borde de la Pardlisis." (26 July 1992), El Tiemno.
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introduction of export-banana production111. What factors can account for the 
sustained success of banana exports since 1966?112 An easy answer was the 
establishment of the UFCO in Uraba. The UFCO’s subsidiary, the Seville Fruit 
Company, promoted the establishment of banana plantations. However the 
explanation is more complex. First, the institutional support in Uraba will be 
analyzed. Secondly, an examination of colonisation and land distribution will be 
conducted. Thirdly, patterns of technical change will be reviewed. Lastly, the affect 
these transformations had on labour will be discussed.
The first signs of a proactive State in the region was the arrival of a branch 
of the INCORA in 1963113. INCORA was the agency responsible for administering 
the agrarian reform that was established by laws 135 of 1961 and law 1 of 1968. The 
main objectives were to redistribute land, grant title to those who were already 
involved in economic exploitation or to peasants who did not possess title, extend 
credit, and support colonisation114. In 1968 the Corporation del Desarrollo de 
Uraba (CORPOURABA) was established to face growing problems of fast 
development such as the provision of public services115. The objective was to
111 An early attempt to cultivate bananas in 1909 by Germans failed; in 1914, when the first bananas 
were ready for export, WWI had just broken out and there were no German vessels to ship the bananas. 
See "A History of Turbana and UNIBAN in Banana Growing in Colombia." (1989), Bogota: TURBANA, 
p.9.
U2See Appendix B.2.
113Botero Herrera, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p.76.
1MReforma Aeraria Colombiana. (1970). Bogot&: INCORA, pp.9-11.
115Vellinga, M. Nd Kruijt, D. (1982). Industrialization and Regional Development in Colombia. Bogot4: 
CEDLA, p. 126.
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implement an integral development plan for the region. However due to 
CORPOURABA’s low budget little was seen until the late 1970s116.
In 1962 foreign investors arrived to develop African palm and banana 
production117. In 1963 the UFCO, with the aid of the Corporacidn Financiera de 
Bogota, hoped to set up a successful export-banana growing region118. By the end 
of 1963 Colombian investors also quickly consolidated their position, creating the 
Asociacion de Agricultores y Bananeros de Uraba (AUGURA) to defend their 
interests119. Because the Company did not renew its original contracts in 1965 the 
UFCO’s position weakened. This stimulated the establishment of the first commercial 
house, Uni6n Nacional de Bananeros (UNIBAN) which was set up by of 197 
landowners and fruit producers in 1966120.
UNIBAN, as other export houses, was to become involved in forward and 
backward commercialisation. Backward commercialisation involved the extension of 
credit, technical assistance and sale of inputs and tools to growers. Forward 
commercialisation consisted of international transport and marketing121. Local 
export agents became a substitute for and/or complementary to UFCO activities until 
1983 when the UFCO and Standard Fruit completely withdrew. UNIBAN either sold
116Ibid.
U7Ramirez, Margarita (1983). "Consolidacidn de la Actividad Bananera de Urabd." Revista Augura. 
9(2), p.79; Botero Herrera, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p.35.
n8Ramirez, Margarita (1983), op.cit.. p.79; Bucheli G6mez, Marchelo (1991), op.cit.. pp.76-77.
U9"Producci6n, y Comercializacidn del Banano." (1986), op.cit.. p. 118.
120Uniban: 1966-1989. (1989), Medellin: Editorial Colina S.A, p.9.
12IInterview with Camilo Penalosa (March 1992) Head of International Marketing for UNIBAN, 
Bogotd.
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bananas at FOB (international) prices to the UFCO or, unlike its predecessors, 
marketed bananas overseas122. In 1970 Turbana Corporation was created as a 
subsidiary of UNIBAN to direct marketing in the USA, and signified further 
autonomy123. A second commercial house, Bananeros Colombianos S.A. 
(BANACOL), was organized in 1981. In 1983 Promotora de Banano S.A. 
(PROBAN) was established.
The success of Colombian export agents in establishing a foothold in 
international markets was apparent by the 1980s. Figures from 1986 show that 
UNIBAN marketed 9% and BANACOL and PROBAN were responsible for 4% and 
2% of world trade, respectively124. Furthermore UNIBAN extended operations 
internationally, operating banana farms in Costa Rica125. The evolution of 
Colombian banana marketing between 1964 and 1987 is illustrated in table B2.3. The 
UFCO dominated exports until 1981.
,22Interview with Camilo Penalosa (March 1992) Head of International Marketing, UNIBAN, Bogotl, 
Colombia.
l23Uniban: 1966-1989. (1989), op.cit.. p.9.
124Botero, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p. 104.
‘“ Interview with Arturo Hernandez (March 1992), Vice-President for Planning and Development in 
UNIBAN, Medellin, Colombia.
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Table B 2 3
Colombian Banana Exports According to Commercial House, 1964-1987.
Years UNIBAN UFCO BANACOL PROBAN Standard Fruit 
Company
1964-68 — 100 — — —
1969-77 46.4 53.6 — — —
1978-81 64.4 37.7 - — 15.8
1982-83 48.8 31.2 12.2 — 7.8
1984-85 55 — 23.0 22.0 —
1987 55.8 - 23.1 21.2 -
Source: "Produccion v Comercializacion del Banano". (1986) Revista Augura. Year 12(2). p. 128: Rev de 
Marulanda, Nohra and Cordoba, Juan Pablo (1988). "El Sector Bananero de Urabd: Perspectivas
Econ6micas Actuales y de Mediano Plazo." Bogota.
However, by 1982 and 1983 UNIBAN exports exceeded those of the UFCO. If this 
table is compared to appendix B.5 a decrease in the UFCO export share since 1970 
in Uraba is observed. Although between 1974 and 1976 the UFCO exported the bulk 
of bananas, the remaining years were dominated by Colombian commercial houses. 
The decision of the UFCO to pull out of Colombia was most likely due to their lack 
of monopolistic control in the area, a result of the control of local commercial houses. 
Evidence in part I and in the section on Santa Marta proves that the UFCO was 
anxious to maintain monopolistic control of marketing. However in Urab£ they were 
unable to achieve this so they pulled out.
As in other countries, marketing and distribution was the area where most 
profits were generated. According to Fernando Botero, for each banana sold abroad 
11% was received by the producing country and the remaining 89% were absorbed 
in transportation, export and commercialisation126. UNIBAN states a higher 
percentage, for each banana sold abroad, 30% of the price was received by the
,26Botero, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p.86.
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producing country and 70% was shared by the companies that make up the 
distribution and marketing chain127. The percentage received by the producing 
country specified by UNIBAN is higher than those presented in Part I. This can be 
explained by the fact that UNIBAN was initially a cooperative organised by local 
growers who obtained most of the profits. Nonetheless, the Colombian initiative to 
become involved in the marketing aspect has not effected any significant changes in 
the labour force nor in patterns of production. More of the profits remain in the 
hands of the few who established these commercial houses and the increasingly large 
scale planters128. Hence the dominance of a large-scale, concentrated structure of 
distribution and marketing remains. As was argued in part I and will further be seen 
below, foreign capital has been replaced with domestic. Now to examine the 
influence export banana production had on land usage.
Colonisation had a major impact on patterns of land usage and distribution. 
In-migration played an important role in increasing the Urabd population. The War 
of 1000 Days impulsed the migrations of many Liberal veterans and people from 
coffee-growing areas to Uraba129. Other notable migrations were those of the Sinu 
Indian tribes, attracted to the lumber industry which demanded manual labour. Later 
migrations caused by the violencia of the 1948-1958 period stimulated movements to
127Uniban: 1966-1989. (1989), Medellin: Editorial Colina S.A., p.25.
,28See below.
I29Bucheli, Marcelo (1991), op.cit.. p.30.
270
Part II: Santa Marta and Urabd Export Bananas 
colonisation areas to escape the violence130. The completion of the Carretera al 
Mar to Turbo in 1954 and the subsequent decision of the UFCO to assist in the 
establishment of export banana production opened the way for settlers131.
Population growth in the banana zone increased rapidly after the 1950s and 
accelerated between 1964 and 1973. Parsons data for Turb6 (a municipality in 
Urabd) may be used as a proxy for the region as a whole. Turbo had a growth rate 
of 31.9% between 1938 and 1951, and between 1951 and 1964 population grew at 
172.6% compared with approximately 230% for Urabd132. Extrapolating from 
Parsons’ data and table B2.4, it becomes clear that the region experienced the fastest 
growth after the 1950s.
I30Zamosc, Leon (1986). The Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movement in Colombia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; See Sugar Part II for sources on la violencia.
I31Parsons, James (1968). Antioaueno Colonization in Western Colombia. Berkeley (revised edition):
University of California Press, p.93.
l32Parsons, James (1968), op.cit.. table 4, p.93.
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Table B2.4
Absolute Population and Population Density in the Urabi Region 
and Total of Colombia, 1951-1988.
Year Urab£
Population
Uraba
Population
Density
(People/km
2)*
Total
Colombia
Population
Total
Population
Density
(People/km2)
*
1951 15,739 1.57 11,548,000 10.1
1964 49,207 4.90 17,485,000 15.35
1973 83,838 8.34 22,487,000 19.74
1985 150,650 14.83 n.a. n.a.
1988 168,991 16.81 31,000,000 27.21
Source: Constructed from Botero Herrera. Fernando (1990). op.cit..p.82. from DANE census cited by 
Marulanda, Rey and Cdrdoba, J.P.; Helmsing, A.H.J. (1990). Cambio Econ6mico v Desarrollo Regional. 
Bogota: CEREC, Table A5.2, p.226; Colombia Censo 1985.(1986) Bogotd: DANE, p.24.
♦Population Density calculated from 1,138,915 km2, total for Colombia based on Colombia Censo 1985 
(1986).
Rates of growth slowed thereafter but nonetheless population continued to expand. 
But relative to total Colombian population densities, Uraba remained under-populated.
The effects of colonisation were both positive and negative. Colonists who 
were attracted to the area, before the arrival of the UFCO, initiated foodstuff 
production for the domestic market. For instance coconut and livestock activities 
expanded in the 1950s in response to the establishment of African Palm Oil (a joint 
Dutch-Colombia venture)133. At this time other crops grown in the zone were 
mainly traditional staples—cocoa, rice, maize and plantains134. Most of these crops 
could be grown by colonists and temporary banana workers because of the low levels 
of capital investment required135. This shows that foodstuff production predates
133Parsons, James (1968), op.cit.. p.95.
134Botero Herrera, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p.30.‘
l35Plan de Desarrollo de Urab£: Diversificaci6n v Bienestar Hacia la Industrializaci6n. (1984),
Medellin: CORPOURABA, pp. 105-108.
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export-banana cultivation. Moreover the arrival of banana production did not displace 
foodstuff production, rather it was accompanied by increased levels of population and 
food production. In 1989, 11 % of total national maize production derived from this 
region and plantain and cocoa were also important crops136.
In addition to export bananas, the development of export-plantain production 
was established as UNIBAN and BANACOL initiated plantain exports to the 
USA137. Unlike export banana production in the region, plantain production has 
opened up opportunities for small commodity producers138. For example 70% of 
UNIBAN plantain exports derived from farms of less than 10 hectares in 1990139.
As stated above, the UFCO and State agents offered credits to those who 
agreed to clear land, construct appropriate drainage ditches, and produce bananas for 
the company. Indeed, this entrance of foreign capital would appear to be beneficial 
to small commodity producers in the area140. However, a prerequisite for obtaining 
credit was ownership of legal land title141. This proved discriminatory towards 
small producers and the combined effect was the absense of squatters in production 
and the increased land concentration of banana production.
136Borrero, Camilo (1989). "Urabd: Banano y mucho m£s: la huelga bananera obliga nuevamente a 
probar soluciones de fondo para la regidn." Cien Dias Vistos nor el CINEP 2(8), p.20. For further 
discussion o f small producers in Urabd see Cdrdenas, Hector (1984). "Tres Productos que Sustentan la 
Monetizacidn de la Pequena Explotacidn Parcelaria en Urabd." Revista Augura 10(2), pp.41-46.
137Arango, Mariano, et.al. (1991), op.cit.. p.91.
138For a review of export-plantain sector in Uraba see Arango, Mariano; Mesa, Sadi; Rhenals, 
Remberto and Velisquez, Jaime (1991). Una Nueva Visidn de la Economia Campesina Colombiana. 
Medellin: Universidad de Antioquia, pp.90-95.
,39Interview with Humberto Uribe (Nov. 1991), Head of Operations for UNIBAN, Urabd, Colombia.
140Arthur, Henry, et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p.55.
MIBotero, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p.73.
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Before the commencement of export banana cultivation, population density was 
low so there was less need to title land (Table B2.4). The people who resided in 
Uraba at this time would have had difficulty titling land and/or receiving credit due 
to the absence of the State and other modernising forces. Therefore commercial 
agriculture was either financed by urban land owners who could receive credit in 
urban areas or foreign investors. However the dearth of legal titles cannot be the 
explanatory variable for the lack of agricultural transformations. In the case of 
Urabd, land titling was associated with the development of export banana production. 
In later years, with the increasing importance of capital for plantation establishment, 
and input purchases, land became increasingly more valuable as a source of collateral 
for loans. Thus in a situation of production characterized by capital-intensive 
techniques, legal land ownership was difficult for the squatter to circumvent. The 
colono could no longer rely upon his capability to procure labour, but now needed 
capital for plantation construction and input purchases. The situation in Uraba 
supports Villamizar’s findings in that capital/ha is higher on titled land. This does 
not necessarily signify that if more land is titled in LDCs increased in capital/ha will 
follow. Rather it is possible that land titling occurs as a result of agents in the region 
which will provide credit, technical assistance and therefore effect a demand for legal 
titles. Legal land title does not necessarily push forward transformational changes, 
but is a consequence of the formation of credit markets, input markets, and the like.
Yet, as in Santa Marta, the costs appeared to have outweighed the benefits. 
First, export banana production often displaced peasants. Prior to the 1960s 
colonisation was characterized by spontaneous, peaceful land invasions. The arrival
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of export commodity production and the necessity of land title legalisation signalled 
the commencement of the second phase of colonisation. Fernando Botero argues that 
that Colombian Land Reform of 1961 was more beneficial to large-scale farmers 
entering the region to cultivate bananas than to the established colonists. According 
to his research based on the Medellin newspaper, El Colombiano. the easier access 
to land meant that enterprising businessmen were more agile at obtaining title than 
the residents. Agents of the UFCO and other entrepreneurs divided up large estates 
into smaller plots and posed as colonists so that title could be obtained more 
rapidly142. By 1964 title fraud was rampant: fifty people were convicted of holding 
illegally obtained land titles. Most of these convictions were subsequently 
revoked143. Most of the original colonists thought their case was futile so they 
abandoned their rights and according to Parsons many colonists ended up as peons 
in their own farms144.
Secondly, because of banana activity, farm infrastructure significantly 
expanded, but social physical infrastructure such as hospital and school construction 
was absent from TNC and State strategy. Once again corroborating the trends 
towards internationalisation of capital, and showing that there was little qualitative 
difference in TNC and domestic investment. Moreover until the mid-1980s no signs 
of this type of initiative were present145.
u2Botero Herrera, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p.38.
143Ibid., pp.37-38.
‘“ Parsons, James (1961). La Colonizacidn Antioouena en el Occidente de Colombia. Bogot£: Banco
de la Republica, p.97.
U5See below.
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In the initial period in Santa Marta in-migrants were largely responsible for 
banana production, but as Krogzemis documents by the 1960s many had become 
absentee landonwers146. The development of export banana production in Uraba 
had less permanent effects on settlement. The evidence suggests that the majority of 
the owners of banana plantations did not reside in the region147. According to data, 
producers who resided in Uraba were mainly medium-sized property owners with an 
average farm size of 43 ha. In other regions the average farm size was 119 ha.
Table B2.5
Residences of Urabd Export-Banana Growers, 1987.
Urabd Other Regions Total
Number of Producers 28 143 171
Number of Hectares 1,192.5 19,144.5 20,337.0
% of Producers 16.4 83.6 100
% of Hectares 6.0 94.0 100
Source: Ramirez, Margarita and Henao, Ricardo (1988), op.cit.. p.88, Table 6.
This offers an explanation why construction of public goods was still absent in 1990. 
There was no rising middle class in the area that would invest in basic public goods 
nor organize and pressure governments to do so. Moreover, according to 
CORPOURABA in 1984, the high economic growth rates that coincided with the 
arrival of the export banana in the 1960s reached their peak during that decade148. 
And, the multiplier effects it had in the region in construction declined after the late
W6Krogzemis, James R. (1967), op.cit.. p.42.
U7Interviews with Ricardo Vargas (May 1992), Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, Bogota, 
Colombia and see table B2.5.
u8Plan de Desarrollo de Urabd: Diversificacidn v Bienestar Hacia la Industrializacidn. (1984), op.cit.. 
p.38.
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1970s and early 1980s149. Lastly, the fast colonisation post-1950 and the lack of 
public services in the region probably fueled guerilla groups. According to 
Kalmanovitz, colonising populations constituted the most important social base for 
guerilla movements in Colombia150.
Table B2.6 also indicates that there was a dynamic market for farms under 
export-banana production and land concentration has remained relatively low. A 
study conducted by the Departamento Administrative Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) 
in 1971 calculated Lorenz curves on three different levels: one for the Urabd banana 
zone, the region of Urabd, and Colombia as a whole. According to the study, the 
banana zone had the lowest land concentration of the three151. An obvious 
explantation for this is purely statistical. Because of the desolate nature of the region 
(see Table B2.4), there was more land to distribute, in relation to population thus land 
distribution could perhaps appear more equitable.
In the mid-1960s, Uraba farm sizes ranged from 12-750 acres with an average 
size of 110-125 acres, comparatively larger than those of Santa Marta152. Apart 
from the initial land acquisitions in the mid-1960s, a trend of increasing concentration 
of banana farms is observed between 1977 and 1986.
M9ibid.
130Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1978). "Capitalist Development in the Colombian Countryside." In Amibla, 
Mario (Ed.) Colombia Hov. Bogotd: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, p.274. For more on this aspect of 
colonization see Martin, Gerard (1986). Desarrollo Econ6mico Sindicalismo v Proceso de Paz. Bogota: 
Universidad de los Andes; Pecaut, Daniel (1987). Cr6nica de dos D6cadas de Politica Colombiana 1968- 
1988. Bogot£: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, pp. 177-178.
151Plan de Desarrollo de Urabd: Diversificaci6n v Bienestar Hacia la Industrializaci6n. (1984), op.cit..
p. 112 citing DANE (1971).
‘“ Arthur, Henry, et.al. (1968), op.cit.. p.55.
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Table B2.6
Number of Banana Farms in Urabd According to Area (Ha), 
1977-1986.
1977 (#) 1980 0<f) 1986
W
1977 (%) 1980 (%) 1986 (%)
>10 16 5 2 5.9 2.3 .7
10.1-30 74 42 34 27.2 18.8 12.8
30.1-60 94 83 102 34.6 37.2 38.5
60.1-90 41 33 37 11 14.8 19.3
90.1-120 30 33 37 11 14.8 14
120.1-150 6 7 22 2.2 3.1 8.3
<150 11 20 n.a. 17 4.0 6.4
Source: wProducci6n v Comercializacidn del Banano". (19861 Revista Augura. Year 12(21. p .121.
During the 1977-1986 period the number of small (0-30ha) producers has been 
declining and medium and large sized producers appear to be gaining ground, 
particularly those plots between 30-60, 90-120 and 150ha and above. By the mid- 
1980s there were twenty-two properties owned by individuals or societies that 
controlled one-half of the planted area in Urab&153.
The decline of small farms was due to several factors. First, inadequate credit 
services, insecurity in the region, or the appeal of high land prices motivated small 
owners to sell land. The expansion of medium to large sized growers could also be 
due to enlargement of small and medium sized farms. Or to other businessmen, after 
witnessing satisfactory performance, accumulated more capital and entered into the 
business. A corollary would be that because capital needed to establish a large 
banana farm was relatively high, it would be reasonable to assume that those entering 
the banana business were already established entrepreneurs or farmers with capital.
l53Castellanos, Camilo (1988). "La encrucijada de Urabd." Cien Dias Vistos por CINEP 1(2), p.6.
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Moreover, in the late 1960s fertilizer in Colombia was in short supply, and because 
of the high demand of land tax authorities were making land more expensive by 
valuing the plantations upwards, thereby increasing plantation expenses154. Only 
in later years when profits were generated were planters able to expand plantations.
Secondly, it appears that during the 1977-1990 period there has been a land 
concentration process in Colombia as a whole. Explanations from this range from 
violence and guerrilla warfare to the land concentration in general that characterized 
the Colombian countryside of the 1980s. The narco-dollars that flowed into the 
country in the late 1970s and 1980s were to a large extent invested in land155. The 
increased demand pushed up land prices and land became a feasible investment for 
only the very rich. According to the Caja Agraria, by 1990 approximately 80% of 
the country’s best land was owned by drugs traffickers156. Furthermore, many 
small producers opted to leave the area than risk harm caused by paramilitary or 
guerrilla groups. Thus, land concentration in Urabd was not necessarily related to 
the nature of the structure of export-banana enterprise, but rather structural elements 
of the national economy.
The absence of domestic private or public initiatives prior to the UFCO 
indicate the weakness of both these sectors to influence the transformation to export-
i54"A History of Turbana and Uniban and Banana Growing in Colombia." (1989), Bogotd: Turbana, 
P-13.
'“ Interview with Ricardo Vargas, (March 1992) Advisor the the Minister o f Agriculture, Bogoti, 
Colombia; Castellanos, Camilo (1988), op.cit.. p.7; Ospina Gloria R. (1981) "Policy Implementation in 
Developing Countries: The Colombian Agrarian Reform Law of 1961." PhD Dissertation, Georgetown 
University.
‘“Servill, Michael (1994) "Is it the Last Battle?" Time 144(6), p.20.
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oriented production. The State’s presence was seen in the establishment of INCORA 
and CORPOURABA in the 1960s. However their effectiveness in administering titles 
and regulating expansion was negligible. The presence of commercial houses was 
qualitatively similar to TNC involvement of the period. After the 1960s TNCs 
participated to a much lesser extent in social physical infrastructure, as were 
commercial houses. Although export agents did not enjoy monopoly power in the 
area, they also did not become actively involved in infrastructure construction and the 
prevalence of absentee farm owners led to a situation of temporary settlement. It 
appears that the colonisation which occurred, was independent, or at least indirectly 
impulsed by banana production in the region. Commercial houses may represent, at 
face value, a positive Colombian initiative, but similar to other trends of banana 
production centres later in the period, they were unwilling to invest in substantial 
infrastructure investment and further indicated the rapid internationalisation of capital 
in export banana production.
Initially in Uraba there were not any basic research centres. Of importance 
to the Uraba case, was the existing stock of technology in Magdalena which could be 
easily transferred. However, some of the techniques in Uraba were different157. 
Technology, as in Santa Marta, was also obtained from banana growing areas in 
Central America, the Caribbean and Ecuador158. In later years minor research and
l57"Resena Semestral del Departamento de Magdalena." (1964) Revista del Banco de la Republica 37 
(444), p. 1288.
,58Rosero Ruano, Alvaro (1983). "Sistema de Evaluacidn para Determinar la Eficiencia en la Ejecucion 
de Prdcticas Culturales en una Finca Bananera." Revista Augura. 9(5); Cr6dito v Fomento (1969), op.cit..
p .181.
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development facilities were established by independent commercial houses159. Data 
in this section derives from UNIBAN. Farm level data, similar to that researched in 
Manuelita were not available. UNIBAN will serve as an appropriate case study as 
many farms relied virtually exclusively on their commercial house for technology and 
inputs160. As argued earlier, advances in one area of production impulsed changes 
in the rest of the operation. Secondly, technical change of export banana production 
was mainly stimulated by innovations in other regions therefore were induced 
externally, thereby exacerbating the reliance on external markets. First to discuss 
sectoral trends which will be followed by an examination of technical changes.
Technical change, conventionally defined can most directly be observed 
through changes in total factor productivity (Figure B2.1). Banana exports per 
hectare increased markedly between 1964 and 1990, from 3.87 MT/ha. to 35.06 
MT/ha161.
,39Interview with Marta Cecilia Ramirez Arboleda (March 1992), Director of Planning, AUGURA, 
Medellin; Crddito v Fomento (1969), op.cit.. p.181; Ministerio de Agriculture Programas Agricolas 1976
(1975), Bogot£: Ministerio de Agriculture, p.41.
'“ Descriptions of technical changes will only be provided if the method diverges from standard 
practices already discussed above in part I and illustrated in Appendix B .l.
,61See Appendix B.3.
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Figure B2.1
Uraba Banana Exports MT/Ha, 1964-1990
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Source: See Appendix B.3.
In addition, the figure illustrates that technical change was land intensive as 
tonnes/ha. increased almost nine-fold. The vicissitudes of the export market, and not 
lagging technical diffusion, can explain the erratic levels which are visible since 
1982162.
Despite the emergence of Colombian commercial houses, concerted 
institutional organisation for research and development has been lacking. In 1966 
USAID reported that effective agricultural extension, credits, infrastructure 
construction and market facilities could make the area competitive163. Later, 
research and development efforts were organised within each commercial house
'“ interview with Marta Cecilia Ramirez Arboleda (March 1992), Director of Planning, AUGURA,
Medellin.
'“ Agricultural Development in Colombia (1966), op .cit.. p .63.
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however these centres were not responsible for substantial discoveries164. Even as 
late as the 1970s and 1980s, when exports were booming, Lazaro Mejia Arango 
continued to criticize the sector for lack of local research and development 
initiatives165. Mejia Arango argued that commercial houses did not advance
research and development, he maintained that TNCs had contributed to the region in 
earlier decades and that their action was slow and diffuse166. This analysis supports 
the argument that techniques induced externally resulted in a less internal multiplier 
effects and ended in the use of less than optimal techniques.
The only indication of internal research and development was the selection of 
plantation location. Due to favourable soil conditions in Urabd fertilizers have not 
played a large role. Instead of seeking appropriate fertilizers, planters employed the 
Institute Geografico Agustin Codazzi to locate optimal soils for plant until the 
1970s167. Thus in some of the areas where national institutional was involved the 
application method appropriate to Colombian climatic and geographical conditions 
were promoted. Initially, the only fertilizer applied was urea168. An official report 
from 1968 stated that in some farms productivity was very low because of the lack 
of fertilization and bagging of fruit169. However practices tended towards
,64Interview with Juan Guillermo Villada (Nov 1991), Director of Statistics, UNIBAN, Medellin.
'"Mejia Arango, Ldzaro (1986). "Algunas Consideraciones Sobre la Politica de Promoci6n de las 
Exportaciones Agricolas en Colombia (el caso bananero)." Revista Augura 12(1), pp. 12-13.
I66Ibid.
I67Botero, Fernando (1988), op.cit.. p.69.
!68«producci6n, y Comercializaci6n del Banano." (1986), op.cit.. p. 119.
169Plan Cuatrienal para las Exportaciones de Algodon. Azucar. Banano v Tobaco 1968-1971 (1968) 
Bogotd: Ministerio de Agriculture, p. 11.
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homogeneity as in the 1970s and 1980s inputs were applied to a similar extent due 
to the system of commercial houses which promoted and diffused optimum 
techniques.
Similar to other parts of the world, the strongest impulse to technical change 
was the replacement of Gros Michel with Cavendish in 1970170. Data from 1974 
show that 9,800 ha. were planted with Cavendish and 3,300 with Gros Michel in 
Uraba171. By 1975, 90% of the planted area was dedicated to Cavendish172. As 
in other regions, varietal switch resulted in significant changes to the production 
process. The new strain required substantial modifications in the drainage systems 
which were previously designed for Gros Michel173. Canal re-excavation continued 
throughout the 1970s174. With the introduction of Cavendish, bananas were shipped 
in boxes. To accommodate this change, UNIBAN purchased tugboats, barges and 
conveyors to load banana boxes onto the ships in the early 1970s. This investment 
was made possible by loans from the Institute de Fomento Industrial (IFI)175. In 
1977 UNIBAN, again with government loans, invested in a cardboard box plant to 
supply growers with all packaging materials: boxes, stickers, plastic bags, etc.176.
l70"Producci6n, y Comercializaci6n del Banano." (1986), op.cit.. p .119.
171Ministerio de Agriculture Programas Aericolas 1976 (1975), op.cit.. table A .l, p.40.
172"Producci6n, y Comercializaci6n del Banano." (1986), op.cit.. p. 119.
173Because Urabd has an abundance of rainfall and there is little need for irrigation, rather drainage is 
the more important aspect.
I74"Producci6n, y Comercializaci6n del Banano." (1986), op.cit.. p. 120.
!73"A History of Turbana and Uniban and Banana Growing in Colombia." (1989), Bogotd: Turbana,
p.18.
,76Interview with Arturo Hemdndez (March 1992), Vice-President for Planning and Development in 
UNIBAN, Medellin.
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The importance of this progression is the impact a technical change in one area had 
on the entire production process which motivated changes through the agribusiness. 
Also, domestic private initiative substituted what might have been TNC investment.
The use of chemical inputs was present in 1965; and production structures of 
the 1980s demonstrate that they have been integrated into the process to a wider 
extent177. Many banana farms purchased a high percentage of inputs from 
commercial houses178. Black Sigatoka penetrated the region in 1981179. 
Eradication costs increased ten-fold from 10,000 pesos per ha. (for Yellow Sigatoka) 
to 100,000 pesos/hectare180. The lack of pioneering research and development in 
the region has resulted in lower competitive levels, as eradication costs are very high.
Transportation within banana farms has changed substantially for the harvest. 
Initially, bananas were transported from farms to packaging areas by oxen carts and 
later tractors were employed181. In 1968 plans were made to finance the 
construction of cables and to intensify the research on Cavendish182. Finally aerial 
cable systems, installed during the 1972-1975 period183. The first two modes of
,77See Canasta Bananera. (1983), Medellin: AUGURA, pp.32-33.
I78Ibid., p. 11.
,79Ibid.
180Ibid.
l81Plan Cuatrienal para las Exportaciones de Aleoddn. Azucar. Banano v Tobaco 1968-1971 (1968) 
Bogotd: Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 12; "Producci6n, y Comercializaci6n del Banano." (1986), op.cit.. 
p. 119.
l82Plan Cuatrienal para las Exportaciones de Aleod6n. Azucar. Banano v Tobaco 1968-1971 (1968), 
op.cit.. pp. 12,69,71.
,83Interview with Nestor Guti6rrez (Nov. 1991), Agricultural Engineer, UNIBAN, Urabd, Colombia; 
Botero, Fernando (1990), op.cit.. p. 106; "Producci6n, y Comercializaci6n del Banano." (1986), op.cit.. 
p. 119.
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transport proved slow, troublesome, and more damaging to the plantation as described 
in part I.
Banana growing in Uraba became less and less dependent on the UFCO for 
its survival. Credit was granted by State Agrarian Banks and the domestically-owned 
commercial houses offered technical and financial assistance. Despite these 
investments, concerted efforts towards research and development within the region 
have been inadequate, with most techniques obtained from abroad. The nature of 
export-oriented banana production and the non-”free" nature of the international 
market led to a situation where government policy and the oligopolistic control of 
international markets dictated transformational decisions.
Uraba has faced labour difficulties and social strife; conflicts which range 
from the dubious methods of land acquisition in the 1960s to widespread guerilla 
warfare of the 1980s184. For example between January and March of 1988 there 
were more than 100 assassinations in the Urabd area185. This section will discuss 
the affect technical change had on labour analysing changes in total banana 
employment, the direct effects of technical change, and the increased division of 
labour and its repercussion on wage rates. This will be followed by a discussion of 
the qualitative changes.
,84For a detailed review see Botero Herrera, Fernando (1990). Urabd: Colonizaci6n. Violencia v Crisis 
del Estado. Universidad de Antioquia: Medellin, pp. 133-194.
,85Matayas Camargo, Eduardo (1988). "Genocidio, no s61o en Urabd." Cien Anos Vistos nor CINEP. 
1(1), p. 15; "Cidnaga Entre la Euforia y el Miedo." (7 Oct. 1991), El Tiempo: "Urabd al Borde de la 
Pardlisis." (26 July 1992), El Tiemno.
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Although a number of capital using technological processes have been 
implemented, manual labour remains an important factor to production. Regardless 
of many capital using technical changes, the demand for labour between 1979 and 
1986 has increased186. Total employment has risen both in terms of direct and 
indirect work force. Permanent workers comprised the bulk of the work force. In 
1979 they represented 68% and in 1986, 63%.
Table B2.7
Employment in the Urabd Banana Zone, 1979 and 1986.
1979 1986
Permanent Workers 11,100 12,240
Occasional Workers 1060 1,224
Direct Employment 12,160 13,460
Middle Management Personnel 1,740 1,632
Total Direct Employment 13,900 15,096
Indirect Employment 2,340 4,300
Total Banana Employment 16,240 19,396
Source: Ramirez. Margarita and Henao. Ricardo (1988). op.cit.. Table 2. p.81 citing Augura and 
Universidad de Antioquia: Centro de Estudios Econdmicos.
The proportion of indirect work force increased from 14% to 22% between 1979 and 
1986. This can be explained by improvements in cultivation techniques. Though this 
table spans only seven years it appears that as technical change progressed in Uraba, 
the proportion of permanent workers declined as in other regions. Indeed, a factor 
which enforced the mobile character of the work force.
Technological changes such as advanced irrigation systems and subterranean 
drainage have resulted in labour saving techniques. Initially these techniques were
186Ramlrez, Margarita and Henao, Ricardo (1988), op.cit.. p.80.
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labour using however recently in Urabd land excavation has been mechanised187. 
Once canal re-excavation was completed (to accommodate changes in varietal switch) 
a drop in the demand for labour was precipitated188. The introduction of the new 
variety impulsed the use of boxed bananas, which created new job opportunities, such 
as banana boxers, vacuum packers and pallet loaders. The bunches connected to 
cables in most of Urabd farms were pulled by manual labour to the preparation and 
packaging areas189. Qualitative data shows that banana production appears to be 
capital intensive.
Technical change, as illustrated in part I, also resulted in increasing division 
of labour and stratification of wage rates. Table B2.7 illustrates the stratification of 
the work force in Urabd. Not only are different types of jobs paid in a different 
fashion but within jobs such as cleaning of primary, secondary and tertiary irrigation 
canals there were wage rate differences. The table also illustrates the highly variable 
wages rates between semester I and II. For instance, banana packer’s wages varied 
up to 80%.
187Interview with Oscar Gonzdlez (Nov. 1991), Director of Urabd Operations, UNIBAN, Urabd, 
Colombia.
'“ Interviews with Oscar Gonzdlez (Nov. 1991), Director of Urabd Operations, UNIBAN, Urabd, 
Colombia; Marta Cecilia Ramirez Arboleda (March 1992), Director of Planning, AUGURA, Medellin, 
Colombia; See also Banana Part I.
'“ Interviews with Marta Cecilia Ramirez Arboleda (March 1992), Director of Planning, AUGURA, 
Medellin, Colombia; Humberto Uribe (Nov. 1991), Head of Operations for UNIBAN, Urabd, Colombia.
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Table B2.8
Wages and Types of Payment of Banana Workers 
In Urabd, 1987 (Colombian Pesos)
Task Unit of 
Payment
I Semester 
$/unit
n
Semester
$/unit
% Varia­
tion
De-leafing excess leaves on banana plant Ha. 68 102 50
Removal of flower at base of banana bunch Ha. 58.73 79.3 35
Re-Planting Plant 14.26 22.11 55
Fertilization Bag of 
Fertilizer
108.9 181.73 67
Placement of Protective Bags on Banana Bunches Ha. 87.63 144.01 64.3
Cutting banana bunches from plant (harvest) Banana
bunch
7.41 14.03 89
Banana Packing Box 12.09 21.82 80.5
Cleaning of Irrigation Canals I Metre 6.66 9.0 35
Cleaning of Irrigation Canals II Metre 5.14 6.85 33.3
Cleaning of Irrigation Canals in Metre 3.68 4.94 34.2
Re-digging Portions of Irrigation Canal I Metre 20.40 28.45 39.5
Re-digging Portions of Irrigation Canal II Metre 16.62 23.22 40
Re-digging Portions of Irrigation Canal HI Metre 14.69 16.45 12
Source: Constructed from Ramirez. Margarita and Henao. kicardo (1988). op.cit.. Table 5.
This variation not only demonstrates the changing demand of tasks needed on banana
farms but also the relative difficulty in finding labour for certain jobs during
particular semestres.
Regarding the stratification of the work force Alderman and Sahn theorised:
Techniques that increase peaks in seasonal labour demand will not only drive up wages 
but will also encourage employers to enter into contracts which will smooth the flow of 
income to poor households190.
The the case in Uraba was conflicting. Increases in seasonal variations were
190Alderman, Harold and Sahn David (1989). "Understanding the Seasonality of Employment, Wages 
and Income." In Sahn, David (Ed.), Seasonal Variability in Third World Agriculture. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press , p.86.
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positively correlated to more marked increases in pay. There was not enough data 
to investigate whether contracts smoothed the flow of income to poor households. 
However from the evidence presented in table B2.10 it appears that workers did not 
remain in the area. If banana companies were to smooth the flow of income to 
households this would also imply that there would be adequate infrastructure to keep 
people in the region.
In light of the information presented above: temporary jobs, and increased 
stratification of labour and methods of payment, why did workers migrate to Uraba? 
As in Santa Marta, the answer lies in high relative wage rates. High wages are a 
significant factor that can pull in labour temporarily. Throughout the 1970s wages 
had been higher than the national average to compensate for the adverse conditions 
of the region191. In more recent years from 1984 onwards, a massive process of 
collective negotiations had been started which resulted in comparatively higher wages 
in banana-growing than in other agricultural or industrial and business activities192. 
Between January 1983 and 1986 the wage rate of direct and indirect workers nearly 
doubled193. Improved information flows of changes in wage rates in comparison 
to those of the beginning of the century has resulted in easier recruitment of workers.
191Ramfrez, Margarita and Henao, Ricardo (1988), op.cit.. p.82.
,92Ibid. For more information on labour unions see Sierra Botero, Diego Miguel (1986). "Urabd Banano 
y Bienestar Social." Revista Aueura. 12(2), p.42.
193 Table B2.96
Index of Production Costs, 1983 and 1986.
1983 1986
Indirect 114.44 214.33
Direct 118.77 240.46
Source: Canasta Bananera. (1983), op.cit.. table 7, p.29.
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Labourers need not be lured by hospitals and schools. Banana cultivators have 
learned from the mistakes made in Magdalena and now only invest in plantation 
improvements and infrastructure. The sugarcane agroindustry in the Cauca Valley 
was characterized by a long tradition of hiring labour and maintaining payrolls. In 
the banana agribusiness this was not so.
Besides the ability of export banana farmers to offer higher wages, are there 
any other explanations for high wages in the area? Another factor that may affect the 
wage rate is the contraband that started passing through the port at the mouth of the 
Atrato River in the early 1960s194. A decade later this contraband was in the form 
of marijuana exports. Therefore banana farmers have been forced to offer higher 
wages in order to compete with cultivators of illegal crops.
Although the Urabd zone did not experience substantial levels of migration 
until the late 1950s and early 1960s, development since this time has not shown 
marked improved and in some aspects standard of living has declined. First, the 
work force in Uraba is highly mobile. Figures from UNIBAN demonstrate that after 
almost thirty years of operation, the majority of workers have been employed for 
under five years (Table B2.10).
l94McRae, Patricia B. (1991). "The Illegal Narcotics Trade and the National Front, 1958-1974." Secolas 
Annals 22, p.26.
Part II: Santa Marta and Urabd Export Bananas
Table B2.10
Length of Time Workers Employed in UNIBAN, 1986-1991.
Number of Years 1986 1987 1990 1991
0-5 72% 73% 75% 67%
6-10 23% 22% 18% 25%
11-15 4% 4% 5% 6%
16-20 1% 1% 2% 2%
Source: Constructed from L1NIBAN Informe Social. (1987. 1988. 1991. 1992), Appendix. Table 4 (of al
years).
According to UNIBAN figures turnover rate is high, the number of workers 
employed two years or less with a commercial house represent 56.4% of the banana 
work force195. It appears that many families migrate into the zone and live in the 
transitory housing provided on the farms. After making some money, they leave the 
area.
Secondly, banana production in 1984 constituted 62% of the gross domestic 
product in the Urabd region, yet investment in infrastructure, health and educational 
facilities was meagre. Not until 1985 did commercial houses commence hygiene 
programmes such as providing potable water and improving housing and social 
conditions in the camps196. AUGURA started programmes of construction of 
sewerage systems, increased access to potable water and construction of improved 
living areas since 1985 as well197.
Thirdly, public services in the Uraba area continue to be problematic. 
Electricity coverage is concentrated in the principal municipal centres though there
193"Indicadores Sociales." (1986), op.cit.. p. 139. See also UNIBAN. Informe Social (1989).
,96"Producci6n y Comercializaci6n del Banano." (1986) Revista Aueura. 12(2), p. 140; Plan de 
Desarrollo de Urabd: Diversificacidn v Bienestar Hacia la Industrialization. (1984), op.cit.. p.32.
,97"Indicadores Sociales." (1986) Revista Aueura. 12(2), p. 140.
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is a great variance among the different centres. In 1985 the qualitative deficit of 
housing in the Uraba area reached 80 %198. Deficit is defined as units that require 
partial or total improvements. In the same year seventy-nine percent of workers and 
families lived in farm camps, a transitory living area that the company offerred199.
They lived here either because a)they know the job will only be short-term which 
does not merit investment in housing or b)there is no other option, housing in the area 
is extremely limited. Furthermore, educational levels in the Uraba area are deficient. 
In 1985 twenty-five percent of the people working in the banana agroindustry were 
illiterate and 50% of this population were functionally illiterate200. The level of 
instruction was extremely low and resources for education for those older than fifteen 
years are very limited. In addition to poor levels of education, infant mortality rates 
were the highest within the Department of Antioquia201. Malaria rates in the banana 
region are higher in the Uraba banana zone than in Colombia and South America 
combined202. According to Franco, malaria has a bio-social nature. Though the 
climatic conditions are conducive to breeding the malaria disease, social conditions 
also assist in its propagation or prevention. It is a social phenomena that can be
I98See also Sierra Botero, Diego Miguel (1986), op.cit.. pp.43-44.
,99"Indicadores Sociales." (1986) Revista Aueura. 12(2), pp. 139-144.
“ “"Indicadores Sociales." (1986), op.cit.. p.140. However the percentage o f illiterate people in 1985 
in the Urabd region was 36%, exceeding that of those involved the banana agroindustry. See Franco, S. 
et. al. (1987), op.cit.. p.23.
“ ‘"Indicadores Sociales." (1986), op.cit.. p. 141.
^Franco, S. et. al. (1987). "Malaria, Economia, Cultura y Vivienda en Urabd." Revista Aueura. 
13,(1), p.21.
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correlated with the form of presentation and distribution of the disease203. High 
population mobility, low levels of education, deficient living conditions: inadequate 
sewerage systems, and unhygienic consumption patterns facilitate the spread of the 
disease and hinder the development and welfare of the people who work in the banana 
farms.
The situation of the work force in Urabd qualitatively has deteriorated. The 
internationalisation of capital has resulted in more temporary recruitment of with jobs 
becoming increasing more stratified, accompanied by increased wage variances. 
Wages remained higher in Urabd than in other agricultural sectors—this is the method 
commercial houses have employed to lure labour. Unfortunately commercial houses 
did not kindle any flame of economic development. In part I it was argued that 
TNCs monopolistic behaviour stifled the growth of an internal economy. However 
in Urabd the absence of infrastructure contruction by export agents resulted in 
unsatisfactory working conditions and proved that local initiative did not automatically 
step in. Unpleasant climatic conditions cannot be the explanation as was seen in part 
I, infrastructure construction was able to lure peasants from the mountains to the 
banana producing areas. Hence, in Uraba the State and commercial houses did not 
create the appropriate conditions and incentives to attract a permanent population. 
It must be underlined also that the continual dependence of production on external 
markets for technology, inputs, and trade resulted in few intersectoral transactions.
“ ’Franco, S. et.al. (1987), op.cit.. p.22.
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CONCLUSION
For centuries, many varieties of plantains and bananas have been grown by 
small producers. Only after the 1890s were bananas in Santa Marta produced for 
export. This area was dominated by foreign capital and, in contrast to the situation 
in Uraba, the UFCO came to control banana operations. The position of the company 
in Colombia never parallelled Central American operations and small and medium 
sized Colombian banana producers were a lasting and vital element to the Santa Marta 
trade. Changes in government policy, labour problems, and inclement weather 
proved sufficient grounds for withdrawal. In the 1930’s the company began pulling 
out and gradully abandoned production, concentrating on technical assistance and 
exports. The UFCO relocated to Urabd in 1963 however their exports were 
surpassed by local initiative as early as 1972. In 1983 the UFCO and Standard Fruit 
completely withdrew, leaving exports to locals.
Bananas grown for export purposes are organized under a highly capital- 
intensive system of production. Small- and medium-sized producers also have a role 
in providing bananas for export markets. In Magdalena, because of the UFCO’s 
dominance in many aspects of banana growing, the Company was able to monopolise 
exports and some aspects of production such as transport and irrigation for the entire 
period. In addition, because of its outward oriented structure few links within other 
sectors of the Colombian economy were established. Though the structure of the 
banana trade changed in Uraba due to the rise of domestic commercial houses, 
concurrent changes in impulsing transformations to occur within the internal economy 
did not follow. The new structure allowed Colombians more involvement with the
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banana trade and eventually they were able to organise and force the UFCO and 
Standard Fruit to depart. However conditions for workers and growers remained 
lacking and maybe worse because the infrastructure that the UFCO constructed in 
Magdalena such as schools and hospitals did not occur in Uraba. In addition the 
commercial houses—as TNCs in earlier decades—retained most of the profits.
In the 1960s when banana production for export first materialised in Urabd 
substantial population growth ensued. Prior to this, the area was sparsely inhabited, 
land acquisition was conducted relatively peacefully and the region did not have a 
history of violence as other regions in Colombia. Export banana production changed 
the countenance of the region. With their arrival, the presence of State institutions 
was necessary to grant land titles so that inhabitants would have collateral with which 
to secure loans, enter into contracts with the UFCO, or simply to claim their land 
legally. Despite State presence, land disputes broke out amongst colonists, banana 
businessmen, and indigenous populations. Though laws were passed in order to grant 
colonists land, businessmen managed to gain most of the productive land. After more 
than twenty-five years of banana growing, the distribution of land in the banana 
growing region demonstrated a tendency of increased concentration and small 
landowners gradually faded from the panorama. Though commercial houses were not 
directly in charge of production, they provided technical assistance, sold agricultural 
inputs, and were responsible for the entire process of transport, marketing and 
distribution. Most transformational changes were impulsed by varietal switch, similar 
to trends observed in part I. Thus technical change did not occur in a progression but 
were once-and-for all changes which affected all areas of production. What could be
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an explanation for the decline of small- to medium-sized producers?
Uraba is plagued with high levels of violence originating from guerrilla 
groups, paramilitary groups, and labour conflict. The banana labour force is 
extremely mobile which exacerbates the region’s instability. Over fifty percent of the 
banana workers do not last more than two years in the area. Living conditions are 
poor: potable water, an extensive functional sewerage system, and suitable living 
quarters scarce. Other public services such as education and hospitals are also 
lacking and as can be expected, of the inhabitants in the zone, fifty percent are 
functionally illiterate. The area also has one of the highest incidence of malaria in 
Latin America. Since the quality of life is so deficient and because of the violence, 
many of the landowners do not live in the region but hire mayordomos to guard their 
land. This further dampens the possibilities for infrastructure establishment. Under 
these circumstances, recruits for paramilitary or guerrilla groups are not difficult to 
find. And, a small to medium-sized producer can easily be threatened to leave his 
plot of land. In these conditions, only those who can defend themselves and their 
land will survive: those with large amounts of capital who can afford investment in 
security measures.
Working and living conditions are insufferable. Though many of the 
"underdeveloped" conditions of Urabd could be attributed to low population density 
and malevolent climate, they need not be the overriding feature. Particularly after 
almost thirty years of a booming export commodity which has generated important 
amounts of foreign receipts since its inception. Though banana workers earn high 
wages, the area proves difficult for habitation on a permanent basis due to the lack
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of housing, adequate sewerage systems, accessible educational facilities and hospitals. 
These variables, in turn, make the region a promising situation for guerrilla and 
paramilitary violence.
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Among major food crops, potatoes currently have the highest rate of 
productivity growth in many LDCs1. This either demonstrates slow technical change 
in the past, recent technological discoveries, improved technical diffusion, land 
extension, or a combination of all four. The value of this crop per hectare exceeds 
that of most other food crops in developing countries2. Potatoes can be cultivated 
under less favourable conditions than other crops such as wheat, maize, or rice3. 
The virtue of the potato also rests in its rich nutritive content: high in vitamins, 
minerals, protein, and a good source of calories4.
As in previous chapters, part I will survey the secondary literature and 
underline important issues related to potatoes in Colombia. First, the nature of the 
crop and world yields and growth rates will be discussed. Secondly, explanations for 
disparate world output levels and an examination of potato markets will be provided. 
Lastly, an analysis of the conditions of nineteenth century Ireland will be presented 
to illustrate the circumstances which resulted in wide-scale domestic production and 
consumption. Examples from this case will be drawn upon in part II. Part II will 
focus on Colombia, specifically the prominent producing regions, Boyaca and 
Cundinamarca.
lPotatoes for the Developing World. (1984). Lima: Centro Intemacional de la Papa (CIP), p. 13.
Norton, Douglas (1987). Potatoes: Production. Marketing and Programs for Developing Countries. Boulder: 
Westview Press, p.24.
3Potatoes for the Developing World. (1984), op.cit.. p. 13.
4Salaman, Redcliffe N. (1985). The History and Social Influence of the Potato. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 101-125.
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CROP CHARACTERISTICS and TECHNOLOGY
The most salient qualities of the semestral potato are its high yields, short 
cycles and flexibility it can be consumed by man and beast 5. Another distinct 
feature is that the potato is also the only cheap food which can sustain life if it is the 
only article of a diet6. Rich, fertile land is not imperative for successful harvests as 
the potato and can tolerate a wide variety of soils and will grow on poor land not 
adequate for grain or grazing 1. Because high levels of output can be achieved on 
poor agricultural land, the potato is often selected by small marginalized producers. 
These producers normally sell the higher quality output and consume the remaining 
non-saleable tubers within the household. Household consumption can extend for a 
few months as the potato can be stored moderately well with traditional methods8.
The potato does have its handicaps. It is considered a high risk crop. High 
risk because of its reliance on high amounts of inputs, and relative temperature 
sensitivity during cultivation and after the harvest. In addition potatoes are 
troublesome as compared to grains or pulses for two main reasons. First, potatoes 
have a higher water content than either grains or pulses which makes them more 
difficult to store and transport, though not as difficult as fruits or vegetables9.
30 ’Gr£da, Cormac (1993). Ireland Before and After the Famine: Explorations in Economic History. 1800-1925.
Manchester (2nd Ed.): Manchester University Press, p. 12.
6Davidson, Stanley and Passmore, R. (1965). Human Nutrition and Dietetics. Baltimore (2nd edition): Williams
and Wilkins, p.285.
7Green, E.R.R. and Litt, B. (1956). "Agriculture" In Edwards, R. Dudley and Williams, T. Desmond, The 
Great Famine: Studies in Irish History 1845-52. Dublin: Browne and Nolan Limited, p. 103; Potato Production and 
Consumption in Developing Countries (1991), Rome: FAO, p.5.
8For example in Ireland storage was mainly contained in pits or clamps covered with straw. See O'Gr&da, 
Cormac (1989). The Great Irish Famine. Houndsmills: MacMillan, p.27.
90 ’Grada, Cormac (1993), op.cit.. p. 11, Potato Production and Consumption in Developing Countries (1991), 
op.cit.. p.6.
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Secondly, vegetative reproduction, characteristic of the potato, makes planting the 
tuber more convenient, but breeding seed more difficult. Though seed potatoes exist, 
they are more expensive to multiply and distribute than those of cereals, pulses and 
oilseeds10.
The crop was attractive to small producers because increased output was less 
dependent on ownership of sophisticated machinery and extensive areas of land. This 
was in contrast to other crops which were characterized by lower yields per hectare, 
hence needed more land to maintain subsistence, e.g.wheat and corn11. More 
important factors for successful cultivation were access to high quality inputs and 
labour. This made production land saving and either labour or capital using. Land 
ownership was important in that it made access to credit, machinery and land rental 
easier. But ownership of large expanses of land was not vital for output per se. 
According to studies on pre-famine Ireland many potatoes were grown on small plots 
for subsistence. An acre (.42 ha) under potatoes provided enough food in an average 
year to feed four people12. During the twentieth century in subsistence areas, 
usually less than a quarter of a hectare was planted which on average, yielded over 
a ton of potatoes and was usually enough to meet household requirements13.
Farming systems that cultivated potatoes generally employed methods of
I0Horton, Douglas (1987), op.cit.. p.49; For an extensive analysis o f the history of potato varieties see Salaman, 
Redcliffe N ., (1985) op.cit.. chapter 10.
“Atkinson, Jay (1970), op.cit.. p.92. Within the Irish potato literature the opportunity costs between wheat and 
potato cultivation are commonly discussed. See Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. chapter 2; O’Gr&da, Cormac (1989), 
op.cit.. chapter 1.
I20 ’Gr£da, Cormac (1989), op.cit.. p.62 citing Mokyr, Joel and O Grdda, Cormac (1984). "New Developments
in Irish Population History, 1700-1845." Economic History Review Vol. 47.
13Horton, Douglas (1987), op.cit.
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diversification: in crop composition and livestock14. Because chemical, material 
and labour inputs strongly affected output, small scale farming could compete with 
large scale enterprises since machinery and high-cost technology were not requisites 
for high yields. Thus as with bananas and cane-sugar low-cost technologies kept 
these small-scale producers competitive, however the lack of organized collection, 
transport and distribution networks resulted in a slower development of the market 
for the potato. These bottlenecks existed for the small producer because they were 
usually located on less favourable geographic areas and produced less potatoes15. 
Smaller potato stocks dispersed throughout the countryside were more difficult to 
collect and reach markets than those grown extensively on large plots. Furthermore 
small farmers were usually more dependent on the potato as a foodstuff and thus had 
less output to sell16. These characteristics resulted in distinct development paths as 
compared to bananas or cane-sugar. In many areas, potato cultivation was limited to 
small scale production. Large scale cropping only occurred in the twentieth century 
in capital-rich countries and to a lesser extent after 1950 in LDCs. With sugar, 
plantations were present as early as the sixteenth century and by the late nineteenth 
century bananas were beginning to be cultivated on a large scale.
The indicators of modernisation were increased fertilizer and pesticide 
application, planting of high quality tubers and, later, mechanisation. Technique
14Horton, Douglas (1987), op.cit.. p. 114.
15For discussions on the general belief that most small scale producers in Latin America own land in less 
desirable geographic conditions than large landowners due to the colonization process see de De Janvry, Alain 
(1981). The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Barraclough, S. (Ed.)(1973). Agrarian Structure in Latin America. Lexington Books.
16In pre-famine Ireland commercialisation was the lowest in the West where farms were the smallest and the 
dependence on potato was the greatest. See O’Grada, Cormac (1993), op.cit.. p.61.
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choice depended on a myriad of factors: accessibility to credit and inputs, quality of 
seeds and tubers, infrastructure and transport facilities, climatic and geographic 
conditions, technical diffusion, storage facilities, labour availability and land tenure. 
Furthermore the diverse temperature and soil conditions under which healthy tubers 
could be produced multiplied the number of techniques and varieties that could be 
selected17. In high altitude conditions there were usually fewer pests, though with 
crop intensification this advantage soon disappeared. In hot dry climates insect attack 
was more probable and hot, wet climates fostered fungal and bacterial attack18. If 
pesticides were used, sometimes water scarcity in remote areas restricted 
application19. Moreover, technical diffusion of new varieties was more problematic 
since the large, bulky tubers must be transported instead of the smaller seed. Given 
these variables, how did world yields and production growth rates behave?
MARKETS and INSTITUTIONS: expansion, product markets and pre-famine Ireland 
Yields and growth rates were computed for a sample of countries (Tables PI. 1 
and P I.2). Countries were selected to represent both industrialised and developing 
countries and among these countries certain characteristics were selected. Yields will 
be used as a proxy for modernisation so that a sense of technical levels can be 
obtained. Venezuela and Ecuador were chosen to illustrate trends of countries 
bordering Colombia which have somewhat similar climatic, topographic, and
17Prain, Gordan; Uribe, Fulgencio and Scheidegger, Urs (1992). " ’The Friendly Potato’: Farmer Selection of 
Potato Varieties for Multiple Uses." In Moock, Joyce Lewinger and Rhoades, Robert E. (Eds.) Diversity. Farmer 
Knowledge and Sustainability. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.52-68.
18Potato Production and Consumption in Developing Countries (1991), op.cit.. p. 18.
19Horton, Douglas (1987), op.cit.. p. 120.
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economic conditions. Traditional (Peru and Ireland) and non-traditional (Argentina 
and Canada) producers were selected to show yield differences between ’old’ and 
’new’ producers and the possiblity of technical "catch-up” by the new producers.
Table P l . l
World Potato Yields For Selected Countries, 1948/50-1985. 
(Tonnes/hectare)
Country 1948/50 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Ecuador* 3.8 8.4 6.8 8.9 11.5 12.6 10.6 11.6
Colombia* 9.3 10.3 12.1 11.5 10.9 12 12.2 13.7
Venezuela* 2.5 4.5 7.3 8.4 8.7 10.8 11.3 13.6
Peru* 5.9 5.9 5.5 6.2 6.6 6.5 7.1 8.4
Argentina* 6.1 6.3 8.6 12.2 12.3 12.2 13.9 17.5
Ireland 20.7 18.6 19.3 23.4 25.8 25.1 21.2 22.9
Canada 12.6 14.2 16.4 17.3 19.5 20.7 23.2 25.5
Source: Constructed from World Crop and Livestock Statistics. 1948-1985. (1987) Rome: FAO, pp. 151- 
168.
*LDCs
Throughout the period yield trends were disparate and volatile. Generally potato 
yields demonstrated an erratic upward trend except for Ireland. Less developed 
countries (*) exhibited the lowest yields and appeared to have difficulty catching-up 
(except Argentina). Ecuador and Venezuela did not demonstrate yields comparable 
with Colombia. Both countries had lower yields for the entire period except for 1970 
and 1975 when Ecuatorian exceeded Colombian yields. Traditional producers (Peru 
and Ireland) demonstrated divergent trends with Peru maintaining low yields and 
Ireland showing a cyclical trend. Therefore a traditional producer was not 
characterized by high yields. Non-traditional producers (Canada and Argentina) also 
showed divergent trends. Both demonstrated rapid increases in yields. Colombia 
mainly had the highest yields of selected LDCs throughout the period, but did not
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manage to achieve comparable yields to developed countries. Colombian potato 
yields lagged behind with other LDCs, in contrast to Colombian cane-sugar which 
achieved the highest world yields in 1990. In terms of production expansion, table 
P I.2 demonstrates that during the 1948/50-1985 period Colombia was the only 
country that consistently had positive five-year growth rates.
What are explanations for the slow increases in yields and the fluctuating 
growth rates? The variance of the other countries can be attributed to the fact that 
the potato is a semestral crop and its cultivation can be quickly displaced for another 
more profitable commodity.
Table P1.2
Five-year Potato Growth Rates for Selected Countries, 1948/50-1985.
Country 1948/50-1955 1955-
1960
1960-
1965
1965-
1970
1970-
1975
1975-1980 1980-
1985
Ecuador 188 -24 95 37 -9 -35 31
Colombia 26 13 17 20 45 31 10
Venezuela 67 198 1 -8 -3 -18 65
Peru 17 0 12 21 -14 -16 15
Argentina 27 35 34 -6 -42 16 28
Ireland -29 -15 -10 -11 -31 -14 -22
Canada -7 6 7 20 -12 12 19
Source: Growth rates calculated from production statistics in World Crop and Livestock Statistics. 1948- 
1985. (1987) Rome: FAO, pp. 151-168.
In addition because demand for the potato has a low income elasticity, developed 
countries can be expected to have lower growth as when supply meets demand, 
production will level off. As development proceeds, relative prices fall and food
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habits in many LDCs change to include more potatoes in the diet20. The negative 
growth in other LDCs demonstrates the volatility of production and also underlines 
the success of Colombian producers.
Varied consumption patterns also contribute to the explanation. The potato 
is the main course of meals in Andean regions, is served as an accompanying 
vegetable in the Far East, and sometimes consumed as an additional starch in Central 
America. As stated above potatoes can also be consumed by livestock. In pre-famine 
Ireland less than half of consumption was destined towards humans and the rest was 
fed to pigs and hens21. In LDCs today the majority is consumed by humans or 
saved for seed—livestock consumption accounts for only 10% of total demand22. 
How did international markets affect commercialisation?
International markets for potatoes were not nearly as organized nor extensive 
as those for cereals, pulses, bananas and sugar. The reasons were manifold. First, 
the potato’s bulkiness and high water content made transport and storage more 
difficult23. Secondly, the expense of shipping usually exceeded the value, thereby 
making long-distance trade unprofitable24. For many LDCs, often characterized by
N orton , Douglas (1987), op.cit.. p.215. As a crop becomes modernised relative prices of the commodity drop. 
For a complete review on the role of agriculture in economic development see Timmer, C. P. (1988). "The 
Agricultural Transformation." In Chenery, H. and Srinivasan, T.N. (Eds.) Handbook of Development Economics. 
V ol.l. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publications; Ghatak, Subrata and Ingersent, Ken (1984). Agriculture and 
Economic Development. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.
210 ’Grada, Cormac (1993), op.cit.. p. 12.
“ Ibid.
a O Grada, Cormac (1993). "Health, Work and Nutritional Status in Pre-Famine Ireland." unpublished paper, 
p.2. For a fuller version see O Gr£da, Cormac (1994). Ireland: A New Economic History. 1780-1939. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
24Potato Production and Consumption in Developing Countries (1991). op.cit.. p.118.
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mild to tropical climates, proper transport required refrigerated shipping. This was 
a technological advance which was not common in these regions. Thirdly, more than 
one-hundred varieties of potatoes existed in contrast to less than ten for cereals25. 
This made harmonization and international standards more easy to establish for 
cereals and other commodities26. Lastly, because the potato is a tuber, often 
countries restricted or prohibited their importation because they could carry disease. 
Due to these characteristics international trade was limited and international potato 
monopolies were absent27.
Nineteenth century Ireland has been alluded to in the above discussion. Below 
an examination of the Irish countryside before the famine will be provided to contrast 
the developments in Colombia. The causes and effects of the Irish famine will not 
be considered, only issues of direct relevance for Colombia will be reviewed28. 
Foremost, the literature stresses the reliance on the potato as it was the backbone of 
the Irish diet and was widely fed to animals29. According to Cormac O’Grada, one-
“ Prain, Gordan; Uribe, Fulgencio and Scheidegger, Urs (1992), op.cit.. p.53.
26Two varieties of banana are primarily internationally traded. Variety is irrelevant for cane-sugar as sugar is 
traded according to grades of the processed sugar (e.g. refined, crude, molasses).
27As late as 1990 only 2.6% of world production was imported (world imports=7024301 MT, world 
production=268390000 MT). See FAQ Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics Vol.4 (1991), Rome: FAO, table 43, p.55; 
FAQ Trade Yearbook 1990 (1991), Rome: FAO, table 49, p. 143.
“ See O’ Gr&da, Cormac (1993). Ireland Before and After the Famine: Explorations in Economic History. 1800- 
1925. Manchester (2nd Ed.): Manchester University Press; O’ Gr£da, Cormac (1994). Ireland: A New Economic 
History. 1780-1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Mokyr, Joel (1985). Why Ireland Starved: A Quantitative 
and Analytical History of the Irish Economy. 1800-1850. London: George Allen and Unwin; McDowell, R.B. 
(1956). "Ireland on the Eve of the Famine." In Edwards, R. Dudley and Williams, T. Desmond, The Great Famine: 
Studies in Irish History 1845-52. Dublin: Browne and Nolan Limited; Salaman, Redcliffe N. (1985). The History 
and Social Influence of the Potato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Cullen, L.M. (1972). An Economic 
History of Ireland from 1660. London: Batsford.
29See Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. chapter 1; Bourke, P. M. A. (1965). "The Agricultural Statistics of the 1841 
Census of Ireland, A Critical Review" Economic History Review. 13(2), pp.376-379.
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third of all tilled land was cultivated with potato30. Why was the potato so popular?
Economically, Ireland was primarily agricultural, benefitting from comparative 
advantage and importing industrialised goods from England. Ireland principally 
exported wheat, flour, oats and oatmeal31. In this light, O’Grada underlines the 
inability of Ireland to industrialise and its resultant economic reliance on agriculture. 
O’Grada believes that a significant cause of the famine to be the lack of development 
in the industrial sector32. This This suggests that the delay in industrial 
development, often considered the engine to growth, resulted in a less productive 
agricultural sector. For instance, in 1845 agricultural methods lagged behind those 
of England with output per worker half that of Britain33. Another aspect of the 
argument was that of resource constraints, namely the lack of capital and land34. 
Thus, not only was the country dependent on agriculture, but relied on highly 
unproductive techniques. The potato was a crop that could be grown with little 
capital under adverse geographic conditions and low technical levels.
Population growth rates were high although were waning since 181035. 
Demographic and geographic conditions of rural areas were disparate with the West
“ O’Gr&da, Cormac (1989), op.cit.. p.24.
31Green, E.R.R. and Litt, B. (1956). "Agriculture" In Edwards, R. Dudley and Williams, T. Desmond, The 
Great Famine: Studies in Irish History 1845-52. Dublin: Browne and Nolan Limited, pp.99-101.
32Salaman proclaims that there was little industry, see Salaman, Redcliffe N ., (1985), op.cit.. p.309. However 
O’Gr&da witnesses a period of de-industrialisation post 1810 for his argument see, O’Gr&da, Cormac (1989), op.cit.. 
chapter 1.
33McDowell, R.B. (1956), op.cit.. pp.3-10; O’Grada, Cormac (1989), op.cit.. p.30.
340 ’Grdda, Cormac (1989), op.cit.. p.30.
35For discussion on the Malthusian argument that population pressure eventually would exceed the means of 
subsistence and result in famine see: Malthus, Thomas R. (1826). An Essay on the Principle o f Population. London 
(6th ed.): Murray; Connell, K.H. (1950). The Population of Ireland. 1750-1845. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. chapter 3; O’Brien, George A.P. (1921). The Economic History of Ireland from the 
Union to the Famine. London: Longmans, Green.
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primarily characterized by lower quality land, and high amounts of small producers 
and population. This was in contrast to the East which accounted for more trade with 
England36. Due to these and other factors out-migration was low as mobility of any 
kind (rural-rural and rural-urban) was negligible with the majority of the population 
located in rural areas37. Moreover until the famine, unemployment levels were on 
the rise38. These two conditions, unproductive agricultural techniques and high 
population growth rates characterised many LDCs in the twentieth century. In 
Colombia, population growth of the twentieth century resulted in the reverse outcome: 
the increase in potato land under cultivation and later, more productive methods.
In addition to the economic stagnation described above, land usage was highly 
concentrated. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century land was owned by a 
small class of Protestants39. According to E.R.R. Green and B. Litt estate owners 
concentrated on letting out land and invested little capital40. This rigid system of 
land ownership led to the subdivision of many of leased plots. By 1843 this left the 
majority (81.4%) of tenants confined to units of under 15 acres41. Furthermore 
during the early nineteenth century there was intense conflict among landlords and
36Green, E.R.R. and Litt, B. (1956). "Agriculture" In Edwards, R. Dudley and Williams, T. Desmond, The 
Great Famine: Studies in Irish History 1845-52. Dublin: Browne and Nolan Limited, p. 110.
370 ’Grada, Cormac (1989), op.cit.. chapter 1, p.65. Mokyr states that in 1841 only three per cent of the 
population lived in counties other than where they were bom. See Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. p.45. However in 
terms of emigration, between 1815 and 1845 Ireland provided one-third of all wilful trans-Atlantic movement, see 
O’Grdda, Cormac (1989), p. 15. Furthermore by 1841, over 400,000 of Irish-bom residents lived in England, see 
McDowell, R.B. (1956), op.cit.. p.4. Rural areas were not necessarily so bad if  one bears in mind the availability 
o f cheap food and fuel (primarily in the form of peat) here. See Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. p.8; O’Gr&da, Cormac 
(1989), op.cit.. p.30.
38For a full explanation see O’Grdda, Cormac (1993), op.cit.. pp.38-40.
39Green, E.R.R. and Litt, B. (1956), op.cit.. p.91.
'“Ibid. For a review of this see ’O Grdda, Cormac (1993), chapters 1 and 2.
41For disaggregated farm size data see Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. table 2.4, p .19.
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tenants which drove landlords to evict tenants, rearrange landholdings and convert 
land to pasturage42. This resulted in yet greater land concentration. Traditional 
relations of production and rural violence which led to a consolidation of landholdings 
will be observed in Colombia, particulary for the 1936-1950 period. Although this 
applies to Colombia in general, the change to modern methods of production will be 
observed in potatoes43.
In relation to the land tenure system, there was little wage-labour as cottier or 
conacre rent was common. Cottier tenure was characterized by under-tenants which 
paid their rent to the landowner with their labour44. Conacre rent involved a 
situation in which the farmer provided the land, tilled it and left it ready for 
sowing45. The person involved in conacre was then responsible for all other 
cultivation tasks. Rent was paid from the income obtained from the commercialised 
surplus or by money wages which were proffered only regularly by the gentry46. 
Thus it can be seen that small producers were usually tenants trying to obtain enough 
output for subsistence and that the economy was not widely monetized47. 
Traditional forms of tenancy were also observed in the Colombian potato economy.
In addition to a skewed distribution of land and the low extent of 
monetization, there also was a clear credit-bias. According to the earliest list of
42Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. chapter 5.
43In Sugarcane and Banana Part n  this transformation was also discussed.
“ Green, E.R.R. and Litt, B. (1956), op.cit.. pp.91-97.
45Salaman, Redcliffe N ., (1985), op.cit.. pp.247-248.
“ Green, E.R.R. and Litt, B. (1956), op.cit.. pp.91-97.
47For further discussion on the extent of monetization see Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. pp.20-24.
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account holders at the Bank of Ireland’s Sligo branch, professionals dominated with 
only a marginal amount of farmers48. This, like land tenure, was undeniably 
another indication of the skewed distribution of wealth49. Credit to invest in new 
tools, better inputs and marketing routes was not available to the potato farmer.
Given the biological characteristics discussed above, high levels of population, 
land scarcity, and varying levels of land quality the potato was an obvious crop 
choice. The inability of the Irish economy to accumulate capital resulted in an 
economic slow-down. There was limited labour and capital mobility, and insufficient 
capital accumulation occurred or was directed into the agricultural sector. The main 
causes can be attributed to institutional constraints (land tenure and its resultant effect 
on income distribution) and trading patterns which discouraged the development of 
an industrial sector and jeopardised the subsistence of small growers. Implicitly, 
credit-bias also existed but occurred against much of the agricultural sector and 
towards industry. Many of the reasons behind potato production conditions in 
Colombia during the 1930-1950 period were comparable, however the improvement 
in yields and output levels after 1950, particularly from the 1970s onwards, were due 
to very different reasons. Why and how did production expand in Colombia?
^The distribution of those which had signed the account book in 1846 was as follows: Merchants: 220;
Professional: 46; Manufacturers, builders: 49; Farmers, agents: 17; Other: 16. SeeO ’Gr&da, Cormac (1993), op.cit.. 
p.33.
49For a chart of distribution of families by classes in 1841 see Mokyr, Joel (1985), op.cit.. table 2.3, p. 18.
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The departments of Cundinamarca and Boyaca were grouped together because 
they produced the largest output. However this categorisation may be misleading. 
The capital city, Bogota, is located in Cundinamarca which is advantageous to 
growers because of proximity to credit, technical inputs, labour and commodity 
markets. In contrast Boyaca is more remote from urban centres and their amenities, 
making access to inputs troublesome. Boyaca is also almost three times larger than 
Cundinamarca occupying 63,884 Km2 and Cundinamarca 22,300 Km21. Both 
departments are in a difficult position for international commerce as they are located 
inland, with difficult access to low-cost international trade routes. These factors 
further exacerbate marketing and commercialization problems. The main navigable 
river is the Magdalena, which is difficult to reach from some areas of Cundinamarca 
and many areas of Boyac£2. Also, both departments are characterized by diverse 
topography and some areas of very high altitudes (over 2,500 metres). Throughout 
the analysis these factors should be borne in mind. Early on, parallels with these 
departments can be drawn to nineteenth century Ireland. For instance these were 
areas where international trade was insignificant. Like the rest of Ireland, Boyaca 
was remote. In this part, markets and distribution channels will first be examined. 
Secondly, land usage will be analyzed. Thirdly, patterns of technical change and the 
importance of credit and the existence of credit-bias will be presented. Lastly, labour 
will be analyzed.
^eoerafia Econ6mica de Colombia: Bovaca (1936). Bogota Contraloria General de la Republica, p. 19.
2Ibid., p. 10.
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MARKETS and INSTITUTIONS: the development of domestic markets and
organisations
Similar to cane-panela, bananas and plantains, potatoes were commonly 
intercropped by small growers throughout the countryside during the twentieth 
century3. However, unlike the previous crops there was little large scale production. 
Between 1936 and 1950 the potato was cultivated primarily by traditional methods. 
With the increasing use of capital-intensive techniques, such as input application and 
mechanisation, after 1950 it was classified as a "mixed crop". Mixed crops are those 
defined as cultivated with traditional or modern methods and having cultivators from 
diverse socio-economic backgrounds4. Other examples of mixed crops in Colombia 
were corn, tobacco, and wheat5. Another salient feature was that the potato was 
primarily consumed by humans and had few by-product uses. But in the 1960s 
intermediate processing became important and by 1975 it comprised 36.3% of the 
gross value of production6. This was much higher than the Colombian agricultural 
average of 11.5% in 19757.
Production expansion was directly linked to the internal market. Only
3Potato production in Colombia dates back to at least 2,000 years before the Spanish Conquest. The potato was 
believed to be one of the first crops in the tablelands of Colombia. When migrant populations managed to gain a 
stronghold on these areas, they started intercropping with maize. Gradually, with the introduction of new crops, 
potatoes were intercropped with many other commodities. See Streeter, Carrol (1972). Colombia: Agricultural 
Change: The Men and the Methods. New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, p.47. For a comprehensive 
examination of potatoes in South America before the Spanish Conquest see Salaman, Redcliffe (1985), op.cit.. 
chapters 1,2 and 3.
4Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1974). "La Agriculture en Colombia, 1950-1972." BoletinMensual de Estadistica. No. 
276, pp. 125-129.
5Ibid.
6Campo, Octavio, et.al. (1979). "La Economia de la Papa en Colombia." Revista de Planeaci6n v Desarrollo.
11(1), p.71.
Tbid.
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marginal amounts (less than 3 % of total production) of raw potatoes and crisps were 
exported to Ecuador, Venezuela and Caribbean countries between 1960 and 19908. 
Because trade was limited, Colombian growers did not have to face competition from 
foreign producers. Output expansion was clearly dependent on the domestic market. 
But was it sufficient to promote efficient production?
Per capita consumption figures were not available before 1960. But the 
importance of the potato in the Colombian diet is affirmed by official publications 
during the 1936-1950 period which frequently contained production information abouy 
potatoes as well as other staples like beans, potato, cocoa, maize, bananas, and 
coffee9. Furthermore there was an indication that potatoes were in short supply as 
imports were recorded during the 1936-1946 period (except for 1943) and again in 
195410. Table P2.1 demonstrates that consumption per capita more than doubled 
from 34 kg/year in 1960 to 62.5 kg. in 199011. Will per capita consumption levels 
continue to rise?
8Ministerio de Agriculture Proeramas Agricolas 1973 (1972). Bogotd: OPSA, p. 135; Cifras del Sector
Agropecuario 1980 (1981). Bogot&: Ministerio de Agricultura, table 10, p. 13; Anuario de Comercio Exterior (until 
1973). Bogota: DANE; Silva, Alvaro (1991). "La Apertura Econ6mica: Amenazas y Oportunidades para los 
Papicultores." Revista Nacional de Agricultura. No.896, table 3, p.99.
9PRO, Foreign Office (18 May 1937). "Economic Section of Annual Report on Colombia for 1935", 
FO371.20624, Registry Number A4084/2851/11; (25 July 1950), "Economic Report on Colombia May-June 1950", 
F0371.81494, Registry Number A11101/11; (12 Sept. 1952), "Economic Report No.4, July-Aug.1952", 
F0371.97530, Registry Number AL1101/5; Geografia Econ6mica de Colombia: Bovacd (1936), op.cit.. pp.496- 
508.
10Vaila Martinez, Raul (1949). Boletin de la Economfa Agricola de Colombia. Bogotd: Ministerio de
Agricultura, p. 125; Estudio Sobre Las Condiciones Del Desarrollo de Colombia. (1958). Bogot£: Presidencia de 
la Republica, Comite Nacional de Planeaci6n, p. 148.
“It must be emphasized that these are aggregate figures and throughout Colombia consumption was varied. 
Producing regions such as Cundinamarca was characterized with a per caput consumption of 130 Kg./year, whereas 
the Atlantic Coast only registered 8.4 Kg./year in 1972. See Campo, Octavio et.al. (1979), op.cit.. table 18, p.91.
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Table P2.1
Potato Consumption Per Capita in Colombia, 1960-1990. 
(Kg./year)
Year Consump­
tion
Year Consump­
tion
Year Consump­
tion
Year Consump­
tion
1960 34.0 1968 38.4 1976 48.6 1984 51.4
1961 28.0 1969 33.5 1977 50.7 1985 53.8
1962 42.0 1970 35.1 1978 49.3 1986 55.2
1963 27.0 1971 32.6 1979 48.8 1987 60.6
1964 38.4 1972 30.0 1980 53.5 1988 70.5
1965 33.3 1973 36.6 1981 64.3 1989 66.8
1966 32.4 1974 34.9 1982 64.2 1990 62.5
1967 33.2 1975 44.1 1983 64.2
Source: 1963-1980 figures from Campo, Octavio et.al. (1979), op.cit.. table 20, p.93, based on
calculations by National Planning Department, Agrarian Studies Unit; 1980-1990 data was based on SAC 
calculations, see Silva, Alvaro (1991), op.cit.. p.99.
Ministerio de Agricultura projections from 1971 indicated determined that there would 
be a potato deficit in the diet during the 1971-1980 period12. Data from 
industrialized countries confirm this view. Figures from industrialized countries such 
as Western Germany, Denmark and Austria show an average per capita consumption 
of potatoes and other starchy foods of 112 Kg./ year during the 1961-1962 period13. 
Colombian consumption levels are unlikely to reach such levels given that tubers are 
substitutes in the Colombian diet while potatoes are the principal tuber consumed in 
industrialized countries14. Nonetheless production can be expected to rise.
,2"Proyecto de Ley por la Cual Introduce Modificaciones a las Leyes 200 de 1936, 135 de 1961 y la. de 1968" 
(1971). Bogotd: Ministerio de Agricultura y el Banco Ganadero, Annexes G1-G10, pp.46-54.
13Production Yearbook 1962 (1963). Vol. 16, Rome: FAO, table 96A, p.246. For disaggregated data on 
household expenditure as a percentage of per caput consumption see Smit, C.P.G.J. (1962). "International 
Comparison of Food Consumption Data." Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics 11 (12), table 
2, p.5.
14Gerding, G. (1965). "Posibilidades de Almacenamiento de Papa en Silos Semi-subterr&neos en el Departamento 
de Boyaca." Bogotd: Instituto de Mercadeo Agricola, p.3.
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A considerable bottleneck has been commercialisation. Because of the large 
numbers of disparate producers, collection difficulties, lack of storage facilities, and 
high transport costs the development of organised trade networks has been 
difficult15. These variables often resulted in price volatility16. This was also a 
feature of nineteenth century Ireland17. Lack of suitable storage facilities and the 
dearth of futures markets or production information contributed to the sharp price 
changes. Regional demand, seasonal output and relative input prices dictated 
producer earnings. The main season afio grande in Boyaca-Cundinamarca is July- 
September and the smaller mitaca season is during December-March18. However 
the increase in production in the coffee zones resulted in a decrease in price 
fluctuations as harvests were conducted on a complementary schedule19.
Despite the commercialisation bottleneck, potatoes were an important 
commercialized good since the beginning of the period in both departments. They 
were commonly sold in open markets which resulted in direct trading from producer 
to consumer since at least 193620. As the country urbanized more and more were
15Echavarria, Gustavo (1940), op.cit.. p. 18; Currie, Lauchlin (1950). The Basis o f a Development Program for 
Colombia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, published for the IBRD, p.77; Silva, Alvaro (1991). "La Apertura 
Econ6mica y Oportunidades para los Papicultores." Revista Nacional de Agricultura. No.896, p.99. The agrarian 
reform policy of 1961 emphasized the problems of small cultivators in general. See Reforma Aeraria Colombiana 
(1970). Bogotd: INCORA, pp.9-10; Interview with Augusto del Valle (Tune and July 1992), Manager of
FEDEPAPA, Bogota, Colombia. For a recent study about commercialisation see Vallejo, SAC (to do).
16Estudio Sobre Las Condiciones Del Desarrollo de Colombia (1958), Bogotd: Presidencia de la Republica 
Comite Nacional de Planeacion, p. 148.
17In Ireland Cormac O’Gr&da noted a sharp seasonality which rose 30% from trough to peak. See O’Grada, 
Cormac (1989), op.cit.. p.27.
18Ministerio de Agricultura Pro gramas Agricolas 1973 (1972). Bogoti: Oficina de Planeamiento del Sector 
Agropecuario, Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 135; Campo, Octavio et. al. (1979), op.cit.. p. 100.
19Campo, Octavio, et. al. (1979), op.cit.. p. 100.
20Currie, Lauchlin (1950), op.cit.. p.78.
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sold in cities such as Bogota, Cali, Medellin, Cucuta and Barranquilla. Four types 
of markets emerged: open markets (plazas), small stores, cooperatives and later in 
the period, supermarkets. During the 1940s the Instituto Nacional de Abstecimiento 
(INA) was established to purchase output and support price21. This was one of the 
first State initiatives to organise commodity markets. The INA was a State 
wholesaler which facilitated distribution to cities as there was a general concern of 
inadequate urban food supply22. This general policy was a crucial organisational 
element to potato marketing as small producers had difficulty getting their commodity 
to market. In the late 1960s storage facilities were constructed by the State to offset 
seasonal price fluctuations. However the design was inappropriate and resulted in 
unsuccessful storage23. A benchmark development in distribution networks was the 
establishment of Centrales de Abastos (CORABASTOS) in Cali, Medellin and 
Bogota24. CORABATOS, similar to the INA, was established to improve marketing 
of foodstuff in cities, and was eventually to replace INA activities. Public investment 
began in 1970 and by 1972 CORABASTOS opened in Bogotd25. CORABASTOS 
was a wholesaler with an installed capacity of 20,000 tons with facilities to move and 
sell potatoes, and maintained a daily system of prices26. CORABASTOS became
21Ibid., pp.78-81.
“ Helmsing, A.H.J. (1986), op.cit.. p.210.
“ Interview with Ricardo Vargas, Ministerio de Agricultura (May 1992), Consultant to the Agriculture Minister, 
Bogot£, Colombia. See Gerding, G. (1965). "Posibilidades de Almacenamiento de Papa en Silos Semi-subterraneos 
en el Departamento de Boyaca." Bogota: Instituto de Mercadeo Agricola. For a later study see Ministerio de 
Agricultura Proeramas Agricolas 1976 (19751. Bogota: Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 151.
24Silva, Alvaro and Albornoz, Roberto (1979). "El Comercio de Alimentos en Colombia." Revista de Planeaci6n
v Desarrollo 11(1), p.58.
“ Ministerio de Agricultura Programas Agricolas 1973 (1972), op.cit.. p. 137.
“ Ibid.
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increasingly more important as by 1975, 89% of production was commercialised 
here27. Furthermore in conjunction with CORABASTOS efforts in cities, the 
Federation Colombiana de Productores de Papa (FEDEPAPA) organised a network 
of storage facilities in rural areas since the late 1970s28. As of 1985 thirteen 
FEDEPAPA storage centres were in operation throughout the country29. All of 
these centres resulted in a reduction of physical losses, a decrease in transport costs 
and an improvement in price formation conditions30. This demonstrates that well- 
organised public sources were important to stimulate the development of marketing 
networks. Primarily general State policies encouraged the potato cultivation, however 
it was not untilt he 1970s when the producer’s association was formed to foster 
improved production methods as well as assist in marketing and distribution. 
However, State efforts have been inadequate as the majority of potatoes continued to 
be marketing in traditional networks. For instance, the volume commercialised in 
markets and small stores was considerably higher than integrated retail chains or 
supermarkets throughout the period31. This demonstrates the continued 
predominance of traditional commercial networks in the potato trade. The switch to 
modern chains of marketing was disjointed: in some areas new systems functioned 
while in others exchange continued on a traditional basis.
Data from 1935 demonstrate that potatoes were the second largest agricultural
^Silva, Alvaro and Albomoz, Roberto (1979), op.cit..table 10, p.49, citing "P6rdidas Fisicas en la 
Comercializacion de Productos Agricolas." (1975) CNP-UEA-DC Mimeo.
MSee below for a discussion of FEDEPAPA.
29FEDEPAPA, Boletm Informative. (1985), #70, p.3.
“ Silva, Alvaro and Albornoz, Roberto (1979), op.cit.. p.58.
31Ocampo et.al. (1979), op.cit.. p.97.
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shipment in terms of weight and third largest in terms of value on the railways in 
Boyaca32. Data from Cundinamarca in 1936 show a slightly different trend as potato 
weight and value was fifth33. Although potato freight was clearly not the most 
important on these railways, their presence evidences early commercialisation. The 
transport of other commodities such as wheat and maize can be attributed to their 
importance as foodstuffs (like potato) and coffee movement can be explained by its 
significance on international markets34. Although there was no data on potato 
shipments by road, this was also a probable mode of transport. This was particularly 
so in Cundinamarca as it was characterized by the most extensive road network in 
Colombia, a total of 1628 km. in service in 193535. Boyaca had only half that
Table P2.2
Movement of Rail Freight 
in Cundinamarca (1936) and Boyaci* (1935)
Shipment Cundinamarca 
(Metric Tonnes)
Cundinamarca 
(Value in 
Pesos)
Boyacd (Metric 
Tonnes)
BoyacS. (Value 
in Pesos)
Fruits, Legumes and Vegetables 5861 10139 3166 8980
Potato 3078 4102 16006 61604
Wheat 4081 6682 25207 100505
Maize 12562 21667 4127 11485
Coffee 10591 53672 2425 9630
Other Agricultural Products 3441 9777 2701 9747
Source: Constructed from Geoerafia Economica de Colombia: Bovaca (1936). Bogota: Contraloria General de la
Republica. pp .501. 508: Anuario General de Estadistica 1936 (1937). Bogot£: Contraloria General de la Republica, 
p. 174.
♦Includes Ferrocarril de Nordeste and Ferrocarril del Norte.
33Anuario General de Estadistica 1936 (1937). Bogota: Contraloria General de la Republica, p. 174; see footnote
34Unlike the potato, it was worthwhile to ship coffee overseas.
35Ibid., p.512. For a discussion on State involvement in road construction see pp.512-530.
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extension, 847 km of roads in 193536. Potatoes were seldom shipped by river as 
this mode of transport was not well developed in 1935 in these departments due to 
the lack of combustibles37. During the 1940-1980 period railway and land transport 
continued to be used, and within official documents persistent criticism was levelled 
at poor transport routes38. Even as late as the 1980s serious transport problems 
remained. In 1986, there were complaints from Boyacd-Cundinamarca producers of 
poor road conditions and the lack of jeeps and pick-up trucks39. According to a 
study by COLFECAR, the stock of cargo vehicles was deficient with the majority 
(92%) comprised of double axle vehicles and lorries with a cargo capacity of less or 
equal to ten tons in 198740. Gabriel Martinez’s analysis also echoes the complaints 
of Boyaca-Cundinamarca producers stating that traditional agriculture was usually 
disarticulated with transport networks41. Thus, despite efforts of organisations such 
as INA, CORABASTOS and FEDEPAPA, effective links between producers and 
consumers had not been made as late as the 1980s. Moreover market failure clearly 
occured as there was a demand for improved transport networks however market 
mechanisms did not induce the supply of these services.
36Ibid.
37Ibid., p.490.
38Plan de Bovaci: Inversiones 1954-1958 (1953) Bogot£: Banco de la Republica, p.22; Currie, Lauchlin (1950), 
op.cit.. p.80.
39FEDEPAPA, Boletin Informativo (1986), #85, p.3. Martinez confirms this, stating that traditional agriculture
used small lorries which often had to travel on narrow roads which many times were not paved. See Martinez, 
Gabriel (1988) "Transporte y Desarrollo Agricola en Colombia." Revista Nacional de Agricultura. No.882, pp.87,
94.
“ "Transporte Publico Terrestre de Carga" (1987), unpublished printout, Bogota: COLFECAR and
Departamento de Planeacion.
41Martinez, Gabriel (1988), op.cit.. p.94.
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In addition to raw potato marketing, agroindustrial processing into crisps and 
chips was established late. Colombia experienced an agroindustrial boom during the 
1920s and 30s, although in most accounts chip and crisp factories were not 
mentioned42. Considering land under potato cultivation dropped by 58% between 
1925 and 1937 from 116,390 ha to 67, 446 ha it is probable that most of the 
processing activities did not commence until the 1940s43. According to Mariluz 
Cortes, most of the potato enterprises in the 1940s were small scale and regional in 
nature44. Between 1966 and 1974 the industry showed little expansion as the 
demand for potatoes for industrial processing was virtually the same (2276 MT and 
2342 MT respectively)45. A surge of these enterprises did not occur until the 
1970s46. Firms were created by the cooperation of local traders and raw material 
producers47. By 1976 only three medium-sized industries existed with many others 
still functioning on a cottage-industry level48. The potato industry of the 1980s 
consisted of 4 or 5 large enterprises and many small ones. In Bogota alone there were 
fifty plants49. Technology in these plants ranged from manual and semi-mechanised
“ Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio (1991), op.cit.. p.239; Helmsing, A.H.J. (1986). Firms. Farms and the State in 
Colombia New York: Allen and Unwin, p. 115.
^Productivity only slightly expanded during this period therefore increased outpu/ha. did not compensate for the 
reduction in hectarage. See Helmsing, A.H.J. (1986), op.cit.. table 5.7, p. 123.
“ Cortes, Mariluz, Albert Berry and Ashfaq Ishaq (1987). Success in Small and Medium Scale Enterprise: the 
evidence from Colombia. World Bank: Washington D.C.
45Campo, Octavio (1979), op.cit.. table 24, p.96, citing Encuesta Manufacturera.
“ For instance, in 1972 Jacks’s Snaks de Colombia S.A. de Bogota applied for import licenses for potato factory 
machinery. See Ministerio de Agricultura Programas Agricolas 1973 (1972), op.cit.. p. 134.
“ Cortes, Mariluz, Albert Berry and Ashfaq Ishaq (1987), op.cit.. p. 187.
“ Interview with Augusto del Valle (Tune and July 1992), Manager of FEDEPAPA, Bogota, Colombia; Campo, 
Octavio (1979), op.cit.. p.95.
“ Cortes, Mariluz, Albert Berry and Ashfaq Ishaq (1987), op.cit.. p. 192.
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methods to fully integrated systems. Semi-mechanized methods consisted of the most 
basic machines for cutting and peeling, and pulleys that transported fried potatoes50. 
The low technical levels and slow growth of crisp manufacturing points to low levels 
of capital investment which slowed down the growth of this activity. Both Alvaro 
Silva and Octavio Campo indicated that the crisp industry was only in its early stages 
and there was room for growth in the 1970s and 1980s51. Increased output could 
supply both domestic and export markets52.
Much of the potato expansion occurred under the wings of private initiative. 
However, the government supported production by means of fragmented policies such 
as subsidized credit, infrastructure improvements, and the establishment of INA and 
CORABASTOS. Additional public initiative included experimental farms. The first 
potato research centre was established in Cundinamarca in 192753. By 1935 four 
experimental farms were in operation in the towns of Toca, Duitama, Moniquira, and 
Jenesano in Boyaca54. Much of the improved seeds in Colombia were bred in these 
farms, and represented one of the most significant advances in yield improvements55.
“ Ibid.
51Silva, Alvaro (1991), op.cit.. p. 103; Campo, Octavio (1979), op.cit.. p.95.
52Ibid.
33Interview with Luis Alberto Zamora (May 1992), Subdireccidn de An&lisis Politica, Ministerio de Agricultura, 
Bogota, Colombia. Estudio Sobre las Condiciones del Desarrollo de Colombia (1958), op.cit.. p. 132. An 
experimental farm aimed at potato research was initially established in Picota, but later was transferred to Tibaitata 
where it was located in 1990.
^Informes de los Senores Gobernadores. Intendentes v Comisarios Especiales 1930 a 1934 (1934), Bogota: 
Imprenta Nacional, p.22; Geografia Econdmica de Colombia: Bovaca (1936), op.cit.. p.414.
33Roots. Tubers and Plantains in Food Security: in Sub-Saharan African, in Latin American and the Caribbean, 
in the Pacific (1989). Rome: FAO, p.35.
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Public credit agencies such as the Caja Agraria had also been present in the region 
since at least 1932 and supervised credit schemes were initiated since 1964 by the 
INCORA56.But integrated support was not organised until 1975 with the 
establishment of FEDEPAPA. FEDEPAPA was involved in the dissemination of 
technical knowledge, government lobbying, improvement of distribution networks and 
as a source of general information for producers57.
As indicated above, production expansion has taken place since 1936, both in 
raw potato marketing and crisp manufacturing. Consumption was mainly based on 
domestic output. Post-1960 a small portion was exported, although domestic demand 
remained buoyant. Production exhibited positive growth rates after the 1950s. 
However growth clearly occurred under adverse conditions of distribution, marketing 
and storage. The modernisation of these facilities came late for potatoes, in contrast 
to banana and cane-sugar agroindustries which organised much earlier. Both of these 
crops had easier access to capital and institutional support at regional and national 
levels. Although internal demand was buoyant, sufficient levels of investment for 
effective commercialization were not present which hindered potato modernisation. 
What were the other factors that contributed to constrained growth?
LAND USAGE: land distribution and tenancy
This section will examine potato land usage. First, further examination of the 
potato expansion and prominent producing departments will be provided. Secondly,
^Reforma Agraria Colombiana (1970). Bogot£: INCORA, p.28. See section on credit for further discussion.
^Interview with Augusto del Valle (June 12, 1992), Fedpapa’s Manager, FEDEPAPA, Bogota, Colombia.
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potato farm size and land distribution will be analyzed. Thirdly, types of tenancy 
over time will be examined. Were twentieth century Colombian producers different 
from those in nineteenth century Ireland?
During the early twentieth century the departments of Cundinamarca-Boyaca 
and Narino (the easternmost and westernmost Cordilleras in Colombia) were the 
prominent producers58. As population expanded, production extended into Antioquia 
and Caldas (the middle cordillera). Most cultivation was located on the Andean 
Cordillera. The only exception being Cundinamarca, where in some areas production 
was situated on the tablelands. Production has grown considerably, with the fastest 
growth occurring in Boyaca and Cundinamarca. In 1937 Narino had almost the same 
share of land under potato as Boyaca and Cundinamarca combined (37% and 38% 
respectively) (Table P2.3). However by 1959, Boyacd-Cundinamarca extended land 
under cultivation and represented 61% of the total. In 1968, 1980 and 1988 this 
percentage was 55%, 61%, and 57%, respectively.
^Helmsing, A.H.J. (1986), op.cit.. table 5.7, p. 123. See table P2.3.
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Table P2.3
Percentage Distribution of Land Under Potato, 
1937-1938, 1959, 1968, 1980, 1988.
Year 1937-
38
1959 1968 1980 1988
Department Ha. % Ha. % Ha. % Ha. % Ha. %
Cundinamarca 14402 21 37674 30 26534 29 32000 23 54400 34
Boyaca 11721 17 38039 31 27382 26 39500 28 37800 23
Narino 25252 37 14454 12 3393 16 30000 21 26400 16
Cauca 803 1 3601 3 1143 2 2950 2 5100 3
Antioquia 5021 7 8569 7 5984 9 14220 10 18600 12
Tolima 3293 5 4581 4 4592 4 6900 5 6000 4
Caldas 2529 4 5581 5 4728 7 6200 4 1800 1
Santander 1977 3 6154 5 8674 3 2300 2 4600 3
N. de Santander 966 1 3729 3 2822 3 4600 3 4400 3
Total Potato Growing Land in 
Colombia
67546 12365
2
N.A. 141970 161350
General de la Republica, p. 134; Censo Agropecuario 1960 Resumen Nacional (1961), Bogota: DANE, 
p.270; "Muestra Agropecuario 1968 in Memoria del Sector Agropecuario 1954-1974 Bogota: DANE, 
pp.392-406; Cifras del Sector Agropecuario 1980 (1981), Bogot£: Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 134; 
Anuario Estadfstico del Sector Agropecuario. (1990) Bogot&: Ministerio de Agricultura,
pp.2,12,19,21,33,43,46,51,55.
♦Percentages do not add up to 100 because negligible areas of production are excluded (departments, 
comisanas and intendencias).
Most of the percentual displacement occurred from the departments of Narino to 
Antioquia. The share of output producers in other department hardly changed.
The below land usage tables, as those used in sugar, represent usufruct land 
rights59. The small-sized farm is defined as less than three hectares, medium-sized 
is between 3-10 hectares and the large farm is more than 10 hectares. Because of 
potato’s minifundia nature farm size definitions were reduced. For the other two 
crops the established categories were larger. Has the distribution of potato farm size
39See Sugar Part II for a full definition.
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remained the same over time?
First, data show that average farm size nearly doubled between 1937 and 
1976, nonetheless plot size remained very small. Average farms sizes for the 
following years were as follows: 1937-38, .87 ha; 1959, 1.14ha; and 1976, 1.76 
ha.60. One of the reasons for the preponderance of small plots was the high 
incidence of plot subdivision61. Due to the existence of land fragmentation it is 
possible that the figure for 1976 may be smaller as increasing population pressure 
may have resulted in further plot subdivision62. A similar situation was described 
in reference to Irish land census as land was frequently divided, and census data was 
often inaccurate as owners would not declare subdivisions. Moreover, it is possible 
that plots larger than 10 ha. in 1959 might have contained other crops but nonetheless 
were classified as "potato". Whereas in later surveys classification methods were 
restricted only to land under potato. In any case, it appears that average farm size 
did not change substantially, remaining small in scale.
Secondly, in terms of land area share according to plot size, table P2.4 
displays national potato data for 1959 and 1976.
“ in 1937-38 there were 77,051 farms comprised of 67,546 ha. Anuario General de Estadistica 1936 (1937).
Bogot£: Contraloria General de la Republica, p. 134; Memoria del Sector Agropecuario 1954-1974 Bogota: DANE, 
p.254; Campo, Octavio (1979), op.cit.. table 2, p.111.
“ Production Nacional (1955), op.cit.. p.xxxviii.
“ Campo, Octavio, et. al. (1979), op.cit.. footnote 7, p.77.
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Table P2.4 
Per Cent Distribution of Total Potato Area 
Cultivated by Farm Size 1959 and 1976 in Colombia
Farm
Size
Small (<  3 
ha)
Medium (3-10 ha) Large (>  10 
ha)
Total
Total
Has.
% Total
Has.
% Total
Has.
% Total for 
all plots
1959 24679 20.0 37801 30.6 61172 49.4 123652
1976 69340 55.5 32395 25.9 23215 18.6 124950
Source: Constructed from: Memona del Sector Agropecuario 1954-1974 Bogota: DANE, p.254; 
Campo, Octavio, et. al. (1979), op.cit.. table 2, p.111.
’'‘Percentages do not always add up due to rounding.
The table shows that small and medium farms (1 > 10 ha) expanded between 1959 and 
1976, while those greater than ten hectares contracted. Small plots increased in 
hectarage gaining a large percentage of the land area under cultivation between 1959 
and 1976. The contraction of large farms can be explained by the expansion of 
commercial agriculture and their shift to more profitable large scale crops. However 
it must be noted that the data for 1959 is flawed as the total land area under 
cultivation did not change between 1959 and 1976. This could be because data 
collectors had a difficult time separating the hectarage for mixed cropping. Therefore 
it is possible that plots larger than 10 ha in 1959 might have contained other crops 
as total hectares in 1959 and 1976 were similar, whereas land under potato expanded 
during this time63.
Thirdly, as can be observed by gini coefficients, as compared with the total 
for agriculture, land concentration in potato production was low in 1970, markedly 
lower than gini coefficients presented earlier for the Cauca Valley.
“ See Table P2.2.
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Table P2.5
Concentration Indices for Selected Crops in Colombia, 1970.
Category Gini Coefficient
Agriculture .862
Coffee .586
Rice (dry) .387
Rice (irrigated) .593
Potato .510
Source: Triana, Augusto and Prieto, Fabio (1984), p.79, citing National Planning Department 
Calculations based on the Colombian Agricultural Census 1970, Coffee Federation data, and CIAT 
estimates for rice.
Land was more equally distributed for potato than coffee which was traditionally 
considered a crop dominated by small- to medium-sized producers64. Therefore, like 
coffee, because of the broad base of potato producers, the commodity can be 
considered beneficial to economic development in general. The only crop with lower 
gini coefficients was dry rice. Dry rice, like potato, was another crop grown by 
small producers characterized by little capital investment in contrast to the large-scale 
commercial counterpart of irrigated rice. Therefore the data evidences that potato 
farms mainly remained small and was one of the least concentrated crops in Colombia 
(probably for the entire period).
For an example of lower land concentration in potato production 1963 data
‘“Coffee is often regarded as an exemplary crop for development in Colombia. Primarily because small to 
medium producers characterized the majority of coffee cultivators in Colombia. This group generated strong internal 
markets which in turn resulted in very successful regional (Antioquia) development during the twentieth century. See 
for example: McGreevey, William Paul (1971). An Economic History of Colombia. 1845-1930 Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Arango (1977), Caf6 e Industria. 1850-1930 Bogot&: Carlos Valencia Editores; 
Palacios, Marco (1980), Coffee in Colombia. 1850-1970 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kalmanovitz, 
Salomon (1988). Economfa v Nacidn: una breve historia de Colombia. Bogoti: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
Revisionist literature however argues that coffee production was not so democratic as collection agents were highly 
monopolized, see: Berquist, Charles (1986). Labor in Latin America Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.279- 
304. Felipe Jaramillio argues that the distribution of the proceed was not democratic, remaining largely in the 
pockets of regional collectors, see Jaramillo, Carlos Felipe (1989). "Supply Response and Optimal Pricing for a 
Perennial Crop: The Case of Colombian Coffee." Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University.
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from Ventaquemada, a municipio within Boyaca, will be used65. Although this table 
is from 1963 it can still be compared with later data as it has been observed that 
average farm size did not change significantly throughout the period and the majority 
of producers have remained small scale.
Table P2.6
Distribution of Total Agricultural Production Units 
and Potato Farms which receive Credit 
in Ventaquemada, 1963.
Size of 
Agricultural 
Production Units 
(Ha)
Number 
of Farms
% of 
Total
Size of 
Potato 
Farms (Ha)
Number of 
growers which 
receive credits
% of 
Total
< 3 .2 29 29 <.63 23 23
3.2 to 6.3 36 36 .64 to 1.27 45 46
6.4 to 9.5 15 15 1.28 to 
1.91
8 8
9.6 to 12.8 8 8 1.92 to 
2.56
10 10
>12.8 12 12 >2.56 13 13
Total 100 100 Total 99 100
Source: Gerding, G. (1965). "Posibilidades de Almacenamiento de Papa en Silos Semi-
subterrdneos en el Departamento de Boyacd." Bogotd: Instituto de Mercadeo Agricola, citing 
INCORA, p. 13.
Assuming that all potato growers received credits (hence are included in this table), 
the data illustrate that potato farms were substantially smaller than others in the 
municipality. The overwhelming majority of potato producers cultivated on farms of 
less than 2.56 hectares. The information also evidence that credit was extended to 
very small farms. According to the study, the bulk of producers also owned land66. 
Data from Paipa and Duitama in 1963, other municipios in Boyaca, also corroborated
“ On a departmental level Ventaquemada contributed 6% to total departmental production. See Gerding, G.
(1965). "Posibilidades de Almacenamiento de Papa en Silos Semi-subterraneos en el Departamento de Boyacd." 
Bogota: Instituto de Mercadeo Agricola, p.7.
“ ibid., p. 16. See also Appendix P.3.
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these trends67.
Departmental Boyaca and Cundinamarca data confirm the small scale nature 
of agriculture in general. Table P2.7 evidences that the most common agricultural 
production unit was composed of 1 to 5 hectares in 1954 and 1988. However by 
1988 the share of farms of less than 5 ha. declined from 73.8% to 61% in Boyaca 
and from 64.4% to 61.4% in Cundinamarca. On a national level, in 1988 plots 
between 1 and 3 hectares comprised a larger share in Boyacd and Cundinamarca, 
occupying 29.4% and 28.4% respectively, as opposed to a national average of 
21.5 %68. This demonstrated a higher concentration of small producers in the 
dominant potato growing regions.
CTIbid., pp. 13-14, tables la, b, c, and d.
^Primera Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Total Departamentos (1990). Bogota: Ministerio de Agricultura, 
p.36.
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Table P2.7
Break-Down of Land Distribution of Agricultural 
Production Units (APU) in Boyacd and Cundinamarca, 1954 and 1988
Size of APU (ha) Boyacd: Distribut 
% ion of 
APU
Boyacd: % 
of land total 
(ha)
Cundin Distribut 
amarca ion of 
% APU
Cundinamarca: % 
of total land (ha)
1954 1988 1988 1954 1988 1988
0 >  1 24.6 14.5 .8 24.1 17.6 .9
1 >  3 29.4 5.5 28.4 4.6
3 >  5* 49.2 17.1 6.5 40.3 15.4 5.0
5 >  10 13.3 17.3 12.1 17.0 16.7 10.0
10 >  20 6.9 11.1 15.5 9.2 11.1 13.3
20 >  50 3.7 7.3 22.5 5.2 7.1 18.5
50 >  100 1.3 2.3 15.5 1.0 2.0 12.3
100 >  200 .7 .7 9.9 .9 1.1 13.5
200 >  500 .2 .3 8.3 .2 .5 12.4
500 and up .8 0 3.4 .2 .1 9.5
Source: Constructed from Muestra Agropecuario Nacional (1954). Bogotd: DANE, table 7. p.22: Primera 
Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Bovacd. (1990), Bogotd: Ministerio de Agriculture, table 2, p.34. 
Primera Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Cundinamarca (1990). Bogotd: Ministerio de Agriculture, table 
2, p.34.
♦Data for 1954 was only available for 1 > 5  ha.
Cundinamarca data illustrated that larger plots of land were used by fewer 
landowners. In Boyaca the percentage of total plots characterised by more than five 
hectares was more evenly distributed amongst the different sized landholdings. 
Therefore lower land concentration can be related to regional characteristics of potato 
growing areas. This is similar to the general trend toward banana and cane-sugar 
farm concentration. It also confirms the arguemt in sugar that small scale producers 
were often displaced to less desireable areas.
What were the different types of land ownership? At the beginning of the 
period there was a crisis of the agricultural work force because many were tied to the
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land through rental or sharecropping arrangements69. According to data collected 
by the Contraloria General del Republica in 1937 in cotton and rice production 51% 
and 53% were owners, the rest of the agricultural sector being involved in rental 
arrangements70. In wheat production land ownership was higher at 82% and can be 
considered an indication of the transition to modern forms of production and the 
increased use of wage-labour. By 1964 INCORA reported an insignificant portion 
of land in Boyacd occupied by renters and sharecroppers71. Therefore between 1937 
and the early 1960s there appeared to be an acceleration of land titling. The changes
in land tenancy in 1960, 1970 and 1988 can be observed below.
Table P2.8
Land Tenancy in Boyacd (B) and Cundinamarca (C)
Number and Area of Plots, 1960, 1970, and 1988
column l 11 in IV V VI
Year Depart
metn
Owne
rs
Renter
s
Untit Land 
led
Share Crop 
ping
Other Forms Under than 
more one 
form
Total
No. Ha. No. Ha. No. Ha. No. Ha. No. Ha. No. Ha. No. Ha.
1960 B 11218
2
221497
7
28567 20196
2
6383 769657 n.a. n.a. 2129 101092 20021 473928 16928
2
3761
616
C 95030 110628
2
28216 14008
3
1898 74867 n.a. n.a. 3546 33554 16313 170325 14500
3
1525
111
1970-
71
B 13261
4
250316
6
8226 45038 5355 980389 7138 2393
3
8262 214424 15518 231886 17711
3
3998
836
C 10624
4
120650
1
12814 91572 1872 24193 6102 2123
8
1046
9
79371 14227 184228 15172
8
1607
103
1988 B 16628
7
162064
4
4798 28040 73 3053 4595 3940
3
7274 115099 8538 77419 19156
5
1883
658
C 16130
5
192708
5
9624 94943 547 5898 1463 6721 1600
9
123267 9788 120402 19873
6
2278
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In Memoria del Sector Agropecuario 1954-1974 Bogota: DANE, table 8, p.433; Primera Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Boyaca. (1990), 
Bogota: Ministerio de Agriculture, tables 3 and 4, pp.36-37; Primera Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Cundinamarca (1990), Bogota: 
Ministerio de Agriculture, tables 3 and 4, pp.36-37. For disaggregated data according to plots size for BoyacA and Cundinamarca in 1988 
see Appendix P.3.
The 1960 Agricultural Census showed that 66% and 65% of total plots were farmer
69See labour section.
70Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1937. (1938). Bogoti: Contraloria General de la Republica.
71Plan de Cr6dito Supervisado Para el Departamento de Bovacd (1964), on.cit.. p.34.
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The 1960 Agricultural Census showed that 66% and 65% of total plots were farmer 
owned in Boyaca and Cundinamarca. The share of owned plots increased over time 
in both departments. The number of plots were always higher in Boyacd. Columns 
ii, iii, iv, v demonstrate the extent to which traditional forms have deteriorated. They 
comprised 34% and 35% of total plots in 1960 in Boyaca and Cundinamarca. 
Thereafter they steadily declined however did not disappear. Their stronger presence 
in Cundinamarca may indicate that landowners preferred traditional forms in order 
to maintain land. It also may be another hint of urban "farmers". In other words, 
many landowners in Cundinamarca lived in Bogota or other urban centres and let 
their land72. In Boyaca this practice was more difficult to maintain as urban centres 
were located far away. Moreover in Boyaca land might be considered less desirable 
as many commercial crops were not cultivated in this region (i.e. cut flowers, and 
strawberries). These commercial crops expanded since the late 1960s in 
Cundinamarca73. Thus as with commercial banana and sugar production, as land 
became more valuable, owners were more inclined to maintain or expand 
landholdings.
Were twentieth century Colombian producers different from nineteenth century 
pre-famine Ireland? Similar to Ireland, throughout the period average farm size 
remained small and transition to large scale production hardly occurred. Therefore 
production remained in the domain of small units. Initially, as in Ireland, traditional 
tenancy forms prevailed. Land ownership was skewed with many involved in rental
72See Sugar and Banana Part n.
73Interview with Daniel Vargas (Nov. 1991), Manager of Hosa farm (flowers), Bogotd, Colombia.
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arrangements. However, by the 1960s, land ownership in Colombia 1960s became 
common. Nonetheless traditional forms persisted: to a greater extent in
Cundinamarca. It appears that modernisation of land usage in potato growing regions 
experienced a spurt between 1936 and 1960. Change thereafter continued, but at a 
slower pace. The production of potato was a result of the more equally distributed 
land in these regions. Because of the absence of export crops, land was not highly 
contested. Therefore it was easier for peasants to maintain small plots and survive. 
However, different from Ireland, potatoes were sold as a commercial good. The 
nature of potato production and the difficulty of marketing and storage contributed to 
this slow modernisation. Below technical change will be discussed.
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TECHNICAL CHANGE: expansion, adaption and credit
Technical change is difficult to analyse in the framework set forth for bananas 
and sugarcane. As technical change has not involved the adaption of a series of 
innovations in methods of production and processing, the discontinuous nature of 
change is less apparent. The pace of change was disparate as some regions quickly 
adapted while other lagged behind. This was evident with substantial differences in 
yields within departments even as late as the 1979-1990 period (Appendix P.2). After 
World War II more investment in agriculture in the form of irrigation and 
infrastructure construction took place74. Economic historians such a Kalmanovitz, 
Ocampo and Tirado take the 1945-1950 period as the benchmark for the shift to 
modern methods of production in agriculture75. Clearly, for bananas and cane-sugar 
this did not happen. It is also difficult to fit potatoes into this periodization as many 
technical advances were utilized pre-1945-50 and later technical changes were often 
slow to adopt in particular areas. Advances such as variety diversification were 
present before the period commenced. Post-1945-50 more extensive application of 
inputs and machinery took place, but technological transfer among regions was 
uneven with lags often lasting decades. In the discussion below, changes will be 
examined when they first appeared. First, to analyse aggregate area under production 
and yields which will be followed by a discussion of technical adaption and credit
74Fals Borda, Orlando (1982). Historia de la Cuestidn Aeraria en Colombia. Bogotd: Carlos Valencia 
Editores, p. 104; Debate Aerario: Documentos (1971), Bogotd: DANE, p .19.
75Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1988). Economfa v Nacidn: una breve historia de Colombia. Bogotd: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores; Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio (1991). Historia Econdmica de Colombia. Bogotd (3rd edition): 
Siglo Veintiuno Editores; Tirado, Alvaro, (1977). Introduccidn a al Historia Econ6mica de Colombia. 
Bogotd (7th ed): La Carreta.
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Productivity levels were not as high as those in industrialized countries, 
nonetheless productivity has climbed76. Aggregate production levels, land area and 
yields are displayed in table P2.9. The complete data are shown in Appendix P .l. 
Colombian data is collected on an aggregate level so a complete series of productivity 
differences between different-sized plots cannot be compared. However, because the 
bulk of potatoes continue to be produced by small growers, these statistics should not 
be distorted upwards towards large producers which usually use higher levels of 
machinery and inputs thus achieve higher levels of productivity.
Table P2.9
Potato Production, Area and Yields in Colombia, 1934-1990.
Year Production (1000s of 
Tonnes)
Area (1000s of 
Hectares)
Yield (Tons/Ha)
1934* 225 27 8.3
1937-38** 285 67 4.2
1946*** 460 96 9.0
1950 360 39 9.2
1955 580 56.2 10.3
1960 653 79.6 8.2
1965 760 90.7 8.4
1970 913 106.1 8.6
1975 1,320 110.0 12.0
1980 1,727 142.0 12.2
1985 1,880 153.1 12.3
1990 2,464 161.4 15.3
Source: See Appendix P .l.
76See Table PI.2.
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During the 1934-1990 period productivity almost doubled from 8.3 ton/ha to 15.3 in 
1990. Land extension appeared to have effected higher production levels than output 
increasing technical change as areas under cultivation increased by almost six times 
and yields did not double. Production increased nearly eleven-fold while area planted 
increased six-fold between 1934 and 1990. Yields experienced their fastest increase 
during the 1970s and to a lesser extent in the 1980s. Thus it appears that most 
technical change was absorbed in the 1970s and 1980s. However qualitative evidence 
shows that application of increased amounts of fertilizer and pesticide, and variety 
diversification were present since the beginning of the period77. The sustained 
increase in the 1970s and 80s can be explained by more balanced technical diffusion, 
regardless of plot location and size.
Productivity differences according to plot size illustrate divergences in 
techniques.
Table P2.10
Potato Productivity Differences According 
to Plot Size in Colombia, (Tonnes/Hectare), 1966 and 1980.
Year Small (0-2 ha) Medium (2-10 ha) Large (> 1 0  ha)
1966 4 4.5 8.8
1980 11.4 12.9 16.8
Source: Constructed from Atkinson, Jay (1970). Agricultural Productivity in Colombia, table 7, pp. 24-25. 
Data from 1980 data derived from "Un an&lisis de productos agricolas no transables." (1982). Bogotd: 
National Planning Department, Agrarian Studies Unit, mimeo with information from Fedepapa, Ministry 
of Agriculture-OPSA/ICA.
The table demonstrates that in both 1968 and 1980 large-sized potato growers had the 
highest levels of productivity for both years. Small and medium producers lagged 
behind in 1968, obtaining roughly one-half the yields of large units. However in
^Discussed below.
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1980 the productivity gap between small and medium producers narrowed to 
approximately 28%. Therefore it shows that production scale-bias existed in potato 
production.
Earlier it was stated that the potato was traditionally grown on the slopes of 
the Andes and was frequently intercropped with maize and other commodities. 
However a trend of increased monocropping in the twentieth century was observed. 
By 1954 of the total Boyaca-Cundinamarca production only 11% was intercropped78. 
Furthermore in 1979 Octavio Campo did not mention the presence of intercropping 
and reported that in Boyaca and Cundinamarca small farmers usually rotated potato 
production with other commodities such wheat, barley, maize, pasture land79. 
Therefore most potato producers since at least 1954 primarily commercialised output 
only a marginal amount was consumed on the farm. This is in contrast to nineteenth 
century Ireland where potatoes were mainly grown by small family farmers to be 
consumed within the household.
Qualitative information evidences that variety diversification was prevalent 
throughout the 1936-1990 period80. In 1935 the most common varieties grown in 
Boyaca were Sabanera, Paramuna, Tuquerrena, and Tocana81. By the 1960s the
78Memoria del Sector Agropecuario 1954-1974 Bogotd: DANE, table 5, p. 198.
79Campo, Octavio et.al. (1979), op.cit.. p.79.
^Geoerafia Econ6mica de Colombia: Boyacd (1936), op.cit. p.421; Echavarria, Gustavo (1940). 
Cultivo de la Papa. Bogotd: Lnprenta Nacional, p.6; Gerding, G. (1965), op.cit.. pp. 14-15.
8lGeografia Econ6mica de Colombia: Bovacd (1936), op.cit.. p.421. However throughout Colombia
varities were diverse. In other departments popular varieties included: Argentina, Guata, Manzana, 
Morada, Pamba, Extranjera, Careta, and Colorado see Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1937
(1938). Bogotd: Contraloria General de la Republica.
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most popular varieties in Boyaca remained Tocana, Tuquerrena, and Pardo Pastusa 
entered into the mix82. Different varieties were cultivated in separate sections of the 
plot and were selected to reduce risks from adverse weather conditions and disease 
and pests, further demonstrating a high degree of technical sophistication83. 
Improved seed, combined with a mix of varieties also spread the risk and increased 
productivity. Better seed tolerated disease and increased the returns on other 
inputs84. By 1975 there was a convergence in the cultivated varieties in contrast to 
the array cropped during the 1936-1970 period. For instance, Parda Pastusa and ICA 
Guantiva accounted for 60% of total production in Colombia in 197585. Thus, as 
seed varieties improved in local experimental farms, the need for diversification (to 
reduce disease incidence) within the plot diminished.
Data of the area planted with certified seed was gathered for the 1959-1990 
period. The highest percentage of land planted with certified seed occurred in 1959. 
There were no evident trends in figure P2.1; the early 1960s were a period with very 
little use of certified seed and the late 1970s experienced the most stable use of 
certified seed, and sharp fluctuations took place in the interim period86.
“ Gerding, G. (1965), op.cit.. pp. 14-15.
“ Interview with Luis Alberto Zamora (May 1992), Subdirecci6n de An&lisis Politica, Ministerio de 
Agricultura, Bogota, Colombia.
“ Triana, Augusto and Prieto, Fabio (1984). "Aspectos Econ6micos del Desarrollo del Cultivo y la 
Agroindustria de la Papa en Colombia, 1950-1982." Bogota: Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, 
Unidad de Estudios Agrarios, p.25.
85"Evaluaci6n Econ6mica de las Inversiones Estatales en la Investigaci6n Sobre el Cultivo de Papa" 
(1976) Boletin Investigativo No.45, Bogot£: ICA.
“ According to the ICA, .3% of land was planted with certified seed in 1971; see Kalmanovitz, Salomon 
(1974c). "La Agricultura en Colombia, 1950-1972." Boletin Mensual de Estadistica. No.278, p. 128.
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Figure P2.1
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Source: Atkinson, Jay (1970), op.cit.: Campo, Octavio, et.al. (1985). op.cit.: Silva, Alvaro (1991), op.cit.
Disregarding the 1959 high, another peak for certified seed was reached in 1990. 
This peak only comprised 1.6 per cent of the total cultivated area. However, when 
the expense and difficulty in producing seed is considered this should not be 
surprising87.
A more illuminating factor, is the extent to which high and low quality tubers 
were used in cultivation. In Boyaca there were reports in 1936 that seed-potato 
disinfection was conducted88. Disinfection involved the soaking of tubers in 
solutions o f formalene or copper sulfate immediately before planting89. During the 
1950-1990 period the majority of small producers stored their tubers for next season’s
^See above.
88GeografIa Econdmica de Colombia: Boyacd (1936), op.cit.. p.420; Echavarria, Gustavo (1940), 
op.cit. p .11.
“ Echavarria, Gustavo (1940), op.cit.. p.l 1.
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harvest or acquired them through distribution intermediaries90. On average, one ton 
of small tubers per hectare were planted during the 1970-1990 period91. Medium- 
to large-sized cultivators sometimes produced their own seed-potatoes. If they 
purchased tubers, they were inclined to select medium-sized tubers and plant two tons 
per hectare92. The difference in the ability to choose tubers and plant more per 
hectare demonstrates that in this case technical change for the later period was linked 
to plot size and credit availability. Small producers were unable to afford large 
tubers for planting, and because of their marginalized geographic location and 
inability to purchase adequate amounts of inputs, the tubers they produced were not 
of as high quality as those produced in medium- to large-sized plots93. Price 
fluctuations dictated whether producers reserved the large tubers for the next season 
or sold them on the higher priced potato market for instant returns94. What 
remained for the next season were the smaller (unsaleable) tubers of low quality that 
were often infested with virus and other illnesses95.
^Plan de Cr6dito Supervisado Para el Departamento de Bovac£ (1964), op.cit.. pp.64-65; Fedepapa, 
Boletin Informativo. (1991) #138, p.3. In 1972 the Ministerio de Agricultura reported that there were low 
levels o f sold seed and most producers used their own tubers, see Ministerio de Agricultura Programas 
Agricolas 1973 (1972), op.cit.. p. 133.
91Echavarria, Gustavo (1940), op.cit.. p.27; Silva, Alvaro (1991), op.cit.. p.99.
” Estudio Sobre las Condiciones del Desarrollo de Colombia (1958) Bogot£: Presidencia de la
Republica, Comite Nacional de Planeaci6n, p. 130; Fedepapa, Boletin Informativo. (1991) #132, pp.3-4.
93See the introduction for a general discussion of land distribution. The literature tends to emphasize 
that small producers were located on lower quality land.
94Echavarria, Gustavo (1940), op.cit.. p.27; Interview with Augusto del Valle (June and July 1992), 
Manager of Fedepapa, Bogoti, Colombia.
95Estudio Sobre las Condiciones del Desarrollo de Colombia (1958), op.cit.. p. 130; After reviewing 
Fedepapa’s monthly Boletin Informativo that dates back to 1975, one can assume that low quality tubers 
were still being planted due to a large extent to the constant notifications of this problem; Triana, Augusto 
and Prieto, Fabio (1984), op.cit.. p.26; "Mejoramiento de la Papa" (1957). Revista Nacional de 
Agricultura No.632, p.55.
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Despite the disparate nature of producers and the logistic difficulties in 
diffusing technology, potatoes were one of the few crops that have a history of more 
than forty years of regular fertilizer use96. The importance of fertilizer in generating 
multiplier effects in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy has been 
highlighted by many economists97. Fertilizer also contributed to regional economic 
development because it was land saving and labour using. Labour using methods 
were considered beneficial as they generated employment opportunities and also 
indirectly created internal markets as wage-labourers would spend their wages in 
exchange for goods. Small- and medium-sized producers used a great amount of 
organic material such as animal byproducts and waste in order to regenerate the land 
and give it the necessary acidity throughout the period98. Lime, which is abundant 
in Boyaca, has been traditionally applied by nearly all peasants99. Data between 
1949 and 1951 show the increased potato grower’s purchases of copper sulfate from 
the Caja Agraria100. During the 1960s, commercial fertilizer consumption by potato
96Produccion Nacional (1955), op.cit.. p.xxxviii; Colombia: Sintesis Econ6mica v Financiera No.2 
(1967). Buenos Aires: Oficina de Estudios Para la Colaboraci6n Econ6mica Interaacional, p.54; Atkinson, 
Jay (1970), op.cit.. p.70; Economic Growth of Colombia (1970). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, p.287.
"Johnston, B. and Kilby, P. (1975). "Backward Linkages: Fertilizer and Farm Equipment." In 
Agriculture and Structural Transformation. Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press. They argue that fertilizer can 
represent the one largest backward linkage in agriculture.
"Echavarrfa, Gustavo (1940), op.cit.. pp. 12-13; Triana, Augusto and Prieto, Fabio (1984), op.cit.. 
p.27. Organic fertilizer was often not as beneficial as commercial nutrients because sufficient amounts of 
feed was not given to animals. This resulted in lower yields because lower quality fertilizer diminished the 
effectiveness of higher quality insecticides and fungicides.
"Plan de Crddito Supervisado Para el Departamento de Boyacd (1964). Bogota: Incora, p.64.
'“ PRO, Foreign Office (10 April 1952),"Economic Report No. 1, Jan-Feb. 1952." FO371.97530, 
Registry No. AL1101/2. The Kg. of copper sulfate sold to potato growers were as follows: 
1949=1,213,000; 1950=1,132,000; 1951=2,232,000.
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growers represented one-third of national consumption101. In 1975, of the total 
compound fertilizers used in Colombia, 31% were dedicated to potato growing102. 
However by 1984 data demonstrate that a smaller share of fertilizer was utilized by 
producers. At this time potato, coffee and rice accounted for two-thirds of all 
fertilizer consumed103. From the 1960s onwards it is evidenced that potato 
producers used considerable amounts of fertilizer, further stimulating factor market 
formation.
The use of fertilizer was varied. Some municipalities applied solely chemical 
fetilizer, while in others both chemical and organic fertilizers were used104. 
Insufficient fertilization can be explained by the fact that small-sized farms usually 
did not have easy access to capital nor did they receive technical assistance105. 
They also did not have indispensable agricultural equipment or animals and often had 
to rent these services from medium-sized cultivators106. In 1985 approximately 
1,200 kg/ha of fertilizer were used on small farms. The situation of medium farms 
changed drastically. These households contracted workers and had easier access to
l0IAtkinson, Jay (1970), op.cit.. p.65. State support of fertilizer production will not be discussed. 
However there has been fragmented State policies. The internal industry has been declining since 1980. 
See Thomas, Vinod (1986), op.cit.: Garcia Garcia, Jorge and Gabriel Montes Llamas (1989), op.cit.. see 
appendix P.4 for aggregate fertilizer consumption data.
102Campo, Octavio, et.al. (1985), op.cit.. p. 104.
l03Colombia: Economic Development and Policy Under Changing Conditions (1984). Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank, p. 107.
104Gerding, G. (1965), op.cit.. pp. 10-18.
‘“ Interview with Ricardo Vargas (Sept. 1991), Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, Ministerio de 
Agricultura, Bogotd, Colombia. For further discussion see de Janvry, Alain (1981). The Agrarian Question 
and Reformism in Latin America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p .90.
‘“ Robles, Isabel (1986). Cambio Tecnol6gico v su Efecto en Dos Areas Representativas de la 
Agricultura Colombiana. Bogotd: ICFES and Fundaci6n Universitaria Aut6noma de Colombia, pp.76-80.
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credit. This was evidenced through the application of higher amounts of fertilizer per 
hectare: 1,400 kg/ha107. Large farms owned their land and often divided it up to 
let. These cultivators were defined as agri-businessmen. They had easy access to 
credit and were considered for technical assistance programmes funded by public and 
private agencies. Fertilizer dosage was the highest: between 1,800 and 2,000 
kg/ha108.
What can explain such early input use? Table P 2 .ll displays returns to 
fertilizer.
Table P2.ll
Crop Profitability in the Use of Fertilizer 
for the Most Fertilizer-Responsive Crops in Colombia, 1964.
Crop Yield of check 
plot without 
fertilizer (MT/ha)
Yield with
ferti-lizer
(MT/ha)
Value of 
increased yield 
(pesos)
Cost of
ferti-lizer
(pesos)
Returns over 
cost of fertili­
zer* (pesos)
Potatoes 15 25 2400 731 1669
Corn 1.0 3.0 1180 402 778
Alfalfa 7.0 17.5 7350 845 6505
Wheat 1.0 2.0 830 402 428
Barley 1.6 2.5 792 402 390
Source: El Uso de Fertilizantes en Colombia. (1964). Rome and Bogotd: FAQ and CEPAL. 
♦Returns =  the value of the improved fertilized commodity minus fertilizer costs.
Of the crops studied, potatoes had the highest returns next to alfalfa, although yields 
did not increase with the same magnitude as corn or wheat. Given these returns, the
l07Robles, Isabel (1986), op.cit.. pp.76-80.
108Ibid., p.77.
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advantages of fertilization was clear.
Table P2.12 illustrates pesticide use by crop in 1965. Apart from potato, all 
other crops in the table were mainly those which were characterized as capitalist 
enterprises, employing wage-labour.
Table P2.12
Consumption of Pesticides in Colombia 
for the Crops with the Highest Consumption, 1965 (metric tons)
Crops Insecticides Fungicides Herbicides Total Pesticides % of 
Total
Potatoes 18 1424 — 1442 129%
Bananas — 3580 — 3580 32.0%
Cotton 2536 — 99 2635 23.6%
Rice 790 81 396 1267 113%
Sugarcane 12 — 390 402 36%
Agricultural Total 3889 5603
7---- r-—-— .■ 1_! -B
1692 11184 100
Source: "Estudio sobre el mercado de fertilizantes en Colombia* (1966). Mimeo. Tibaitata: Instituto de 
Investigaciones, ICA.
Potatoes had the highest pesticide consumption next to cotton and bananas. This 
demonstrates that during a time of chemical diffusion (1960s) traditional and modern 
producers (potatoes are a mixed crop) were as inclined to adopt this technical 
improvement as medium and large scale commercial farmers, such as those typically 
involved in banana, sugarcane and cotton farming. The use of organic and 
commercial fertilizer and pesticides demonstrate the early extent of technical 
diffusion. It shows that the most important elements to potato modernization (input 
use) were adopted early and used to a great extent.
Mechanisation was the least visible indicator of technical change. As 
evidenced in sugar, mechanisation was initiated by entrepreneurs of Cauca, Tolima,
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and Cundinamarca109. By 1990 Boyaca was still not considered a department with 
high levels of mechanization110. Cundinamarca mechanization statistics did not 
necessarily serve as a proxy for potato growers in this department due to the wide 
variety of agricultural products that were cultivated in this department, i.e.: wheat, 
vegetables, fruits, sorghum, and in later years flowers. Thus, the relevance of 
extrapolating mechanisation statistics for potato growing in this region is somewhat 
dubious. Particularly because of the low socio-economic status of a great portion of 
growers and their lack of capital. Therefore tractor purchases were less likely. 
Generally, production was either manual or semi-mechanized. Technique choice was 
dependent on the socioeconomic characteristics of the producer and farm size. In the 
main, large farms normally semi-mechanised cultivation111. Semi-mechanisation 
indicated that machinery was used for cultivation and sometimes the harvest.
Machinery was first used for land preparation. Mechanized techniques were 
recorded in large-scale potato farms in Cundinamarca in the 1950s112. However at 
this time most Boyaca producers used primarily manual techniques113. Later 
machinery was used for input application and harvesting. A 1981 FEDEPAPA cost 
structure showed that in Boyaca the majority of ploughing was done with oxen114. 
Machinery used in soil preparation had not been technologically improved and the
l09See Sugar Part II; Fals Borda, Orlando (1982), op.cit.. p. 104.
"°Interview with Ricardo Vargas (Sept. 1991 and May 1992), Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, 
Bogota, Colombia; see also Sugar Part n.
mIbid.
112Producci6n Nacional (1955), op.cit.. p.xxxviii.
II3Currie, Lauchlin (1950), op.cit.. p.376; Within the Boyacd cost structure machinery rental continued 
to comprise only a minority of total costs, see Produccidn Nacional (1955), op.cit.. pp.xxxviii-xxxix, 54.
U4FEDEPAPA, Boletin Informativo (1982), No.50, p.3.
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same type of tractor used in 1976 was still used in 1990115. Moreover, the trend 
during the 1975-1990 period displayed a decrease in percentual costs of land 
preparation. This indicated low levels of machinery investment in general.
In addition, production has two characteristics which made mechanization 
redundant. First, because the majority of potatoes were cultivated on the hilly slopes 
mechanization was virtually impossible116. Secondly, since many small producers 
do not have access to massive amounts of credit, it was economically more rational 
to employ manual techniques. Lower amounts of credit were witnessed indirectly in 
production costs (Table P2.13)117. It is observed that traditional techniques were 
characterized by lower production costs. The gap between the two methods of 
cultivation narrowed slightly only between 1982 and 1984. This demonstrates that 
capital-bias hardly diminished during a large portion of the 1980s.
Table P2.13
Production Costs Per Hectare 
for Traditional and Modern Cultivation, 1982-1988.
(current pesos)
Method 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988
Technified 137716 153067 232721 232721 303508 475966
Traditional 88145 136646 163684 163684 212515 333702
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura (1990), computer print out, unpublished material.
Assuming that traditional methods were employed by small farmers, table P. 13 
demonstrated that costs of traditional methods of cultivation were substantially lower
l,5It can be observed in the FEDEPAPA Boletin Informativo. that land preparation is described as the
same process for the entire decade (1980s). If there were some type of technological change, i.e improved 
machinery, this would have been noted in the footnotes as was done for fertilizer and pesticide usage.
U6Interview with Augusto del Valle (June and July 1992), Manager of FEDEPAPA, Bogota, Colombia; 
Currie, Lauchlin (1950), op.cit.. p.62.
n7For the earlier years see also Echavarria, Gustavo (1940), op.cit.. pp. 13-15.
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than those of technified plots. Moreover, bcause most technified producers cultivated 
on larger plots of land, the data showed a definite capital-bias towards large 
producers. This does not demonstrate that traditional producers were less willing to 
adapt modern techniques. Rather, they were using their resources as efficiently as 
possible. As Horatio Townsend stated regarding small potato farmers,
. . .  A thorough knowledge of the Irish occupier’s means, and an inspection of his 
domestic premises, would not only remove all feeling of surprise for the inferioirty of 
his crops, but would procure for him great credit for the amount of valuable produce 
which under such circumstances he is able to elicit"8.
Comparatively, the Boyacense potato farmer was not as bad off as the small Irish sub­
tenant, however in relation to the resources available to other farmers in Colombia, 
he was certainly at a disadvantage. Now to explore credit.
The use of credit has been implicit to the arguments presented above. Both 
in banana and sugar production credit played a secondary role as modernization was 
not necessary stifled because of its scarcity. However in bananas it was witnessed 
that the UFCO used its position as creditor to become involved in unfair practices. 
Because of the necessity of inputs in potato growing, credit was an important factor 
for all growers, although its relative weight was not as high. In the case of banana 
and sugar perennials credit was most needed during the plantation construction phase 
e.g., construction of irrigation systems and initial plantings. In Magdalena and Uraba 
initial capital was supplied in the main by TNCs or concerted institutional (domestic 
public and private) support. In the Cauca Valley the mills that desired credit either 
were or became large landownwers (capitanes de hacienda or capitanes de industria)
M80 ’ GriLda, Cormac (1993), op.cit.. pp.66-67 citing Horatio Townsend.
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thus with their status were able to obtain credit119. Moreover independent sugar 
growers could receive credit from the mill as extension of credit was stipulated in 
their contracts. Small-to medium sized potato growers did not have any of these 
advantages. First to describe the most important agents which extended credit to 
potato growers. This will be followed by an analysis of their lending patterns.
The majority of credit was obtained through the Caja Agraria, INCORA and 
another portion was loaned by the Fondo Financiero Agropecuario (FFAP). The Caja 
Agraria was created in 1931 primarily with the support of the Coffee Federation. It 
was designed as an instrument of the government to channel credit to traditional 
agriculture with a particular emphasis towards small producers, to support foodstuff 
production, particularly those commodities with the largest weight in the family 
basket of goods120. INCORA was established in 1961 as the formal agency to 
foster the agrarian reform. Relevant aspects of the reform for potato producers was 
its to promotion of agricultural production through the construction of infrastructure 
networks, disbursement of credits to small producers, and redistribution of land121. 
Later to complement the Caja Agraria’s activities, the FFAP was created by Law 5 
of 1973 (March 29) to stimulate investment in the agricultural sector by granting
U9See Sugar Part n.
120Arango, Mariano; Mesa Saul; Rhenals, Remberto and Velasquez, Jaime Alberto (1991). Una Nueva 
Visi6n de la Economia Campesina ColombianaMedellin: Universidad de Antioquia, p.202; Thomas, Vinod 
(1986). Macroeconomia v Politica Agropecuaria. Bogota: Banco de la Republica; El Desarrollo
Agropecuario en Colombia. Tomo I. (1990) Bogoti: Ministerio de Agricultura and Departamento Nacional 
de Planeaci6n, p.309.
121Reforma Agraria Colombiana (1970). Bogoti: INCORA, pp.5-37; Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio; Bernal, 
Joaquin; Avella, Mauricio and Err&zuriz, Maria (1991). "La Consolidaci6n del Capitalismo Modemo." In 
Ocampo, Jos6 Antonio (Ed.) Historia Econ6mica de Colombia. Bogota (3rd edition): Tercer Mundo 
Editores, p.295. For more sources on the reform of 1961 see footnote number 41 in Banana Part n.
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loans at subsidized interest rates. It was operated by the Central Bank and was to 
become the principal organism for granting agricultural loans122. For example, 
$763.5 million pesos were loaned by the Caja Agraria, and the FFAP loaned $135.3 
million pesos in 1977123. The most important subsidy was the difference between 
market interest rates and subsidized development credits for production124. Law 16 
of 1990 created FINAGRO to establish a national system of credit. Before the 
creation of FINAGRO credit was allocated by the monetary junta of the Central 
Bank. The creation of FINAGRO shifted credit resources to the Agriculture Ministry 
which was to be the sole body in charge of agricultural credit125.
Although the initial objective of Caja Agraria credit was to support coffee 
producers, slowly the direction of credit shifted to large scale commercial agriculture 
and cattle ranching. In the early years most of the capital went to the coffee sector. 
Data showed that loans by the Caja Agraria were primarily in small amounts in 
1936126. Between 1932 and 1938 coffee growers received more than 70% of the
l22For a complete description of the law see Revista del Banco de la Republica (April 1973), pp.466- 
475. Decree Number 1778 of 1990 liquidated the funds of the FFAP in order that Finagro could be 
established as the national credit agency, see Revista del Banco de la Republica (Aug. 1990), pp.43-45. 
Finagro was established under law 16 of 1990 (Jan. 22). Finagro was created to become the national 
system of agricultural credit. For a full description of the law see Revista del Banco de la Republica (Tan. 
1990), pp.48-54.
123Campo, Octavio (1985), op.cit. p. 105.
124Bustamente de Henao, Raquel (1983), op.cit.. pp.9-12.
125Tob6n, Santiago (1991), op.cit.. pp. 121-122.
Table P2.14
Loans Granted by Caja Agraria 1936
Amounts Number Total Value
up to 2,000 pesos 29,754 13,701,802.71
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credits127. In 1937, 1938 and 1939 potato growers only received 1%, 2% and 3% 
of total Caja Agraria loans, respectively128. However in later years it appeared that 
the Caja Agraria increasingly extended larger volume loans to large scale agriculture. 
For instance, the first year cattle credits exceeded coffee was in 1938. The 
proportion of cattle credit rose to 43% and those for coffee dropped to 35 %129. 
This trend was to persist130. By 1942 cattle ranching comprised 53% of total 
credits131. Nonetheless, in the 1950s potato growers received an increased share 
as compared to the late 1930s. In 1953 and 1958, 9% of total agricultural credit 
from the Caja Agraria was allocated to potato producers132. In 1965 of the total 
credit disbursed by Caja Agraria and INCORA, potato producers received 2% and 
7% respectively133. In 1966, 80% of the number of ’minor* credits absorbed 33% 
of the value in the Caja Agraria. Inversely 9% of ’major* credit benefitted with 51 %
2,001-5,000 pesos 1,553 5,327,457.96
More than 5,000 pesos 513 4,702,871.73
Source: PRO, Foreign Office (23 March 1937). "Colombia: Annual Economic Report for 1936." 
FO371.20624, Registry Number A2851/2851/11.
127Machado, Absalon (1986). Politicas Agrarias en Colombia 1900-1960. Bogotd: Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia, p.42.
128Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1939 (1940). Bogotd: Contraloria General de la
Republica, table 142, p. 153
l29Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1939 (1940). Bogotd: Contraloria General de la
Republica, table 142, p. 153.
130For 1939-1942 figures see Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1942 (1944). Bogotd: 
Contraloria General de la Republica, table 152, p. 160. For a more recent discussion of the bias of 
spending policy see also Martinez, Astrid (1987). "Colombia: Effects of the Adjustment Poicy on 
Agricultural Development." Cepal Review No.33, pp.98-100.
131Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1942 (1943). Bogotd: Contraloria General de la
Republica, table 154, p. 163.
132Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1953 (1955), op.cit.. table 199, pp.208-209.
,33"Distribuci6n de las Tierras en Colombia" (1968). In Debate Agrario: Documentos Bogotd: DANE, 
table 36, p. 13; Franco, Alberto (1968), op.cit.. table 7, p.23
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of the value of the total budget134. Minor credits were those which were low in 
value and were extended to many, major credits were the inverse135. From 1970 
to 1981 the credit that derived from the Caja Agraria fell from 1,675 million pesos 
to 315 million pesos (in 1970 pesos)136. Institutional credit doubled between 1970 
and 1981, though agricultural credit grew only 15.6% during the entire period137. 
In 1986 preferential treatment for small producers was established which designated 
them a proportion of credit138. Nonetheless despite this preferential treatment there 
was still a greater increase in credit towards large producers (34.4% in contrast to 
32.9% for small producers from 1990-1991)139.
The existence of capital-bias is clearly presented in table P2.15.
134See Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1953 (1955). Bogotd: Contraloria General de la 
Republica, pp.288-289: Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1958 (1959). Bogota: Contraloria 
General de la Republica, pp.473-481; Franco, Alberto (1968). "Aspectos del Crddito Agropecuario 
Institutcional en Colombia." mimeo, Bogotd: Ministerio de Agricultura, p.21-22. Franco also believed 
that credit-bias was stronger in private banks than in Incora and the Caja Agraria. For a disaggreagtion 
of credit to agriculture, commerce, mining, cattle ranching, construction and official entities see also 
Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1958 (1959). Bogotd: Contraloria General de la Republica, table 
262, p.473.
l35Franco, Alberto (1968), op.cit.. pp.21-22.
,36Bustamente de Henao, Raquel (1983). Politica de Crddito Agropecuario 1970-1981. Bogotd: 
Ministerio de Agricultura, OPSA, EC A, p.6.
137Ibid., p. 13.
138Tob6n, Santiago (1991). "Finagro y la Politica de Crddito Agropecuario." Revista Nacional de
Agricultura. No. 894, p. 124.
139Ibid., p. 126.
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Table P2.15
Approved Credit through FFAP according to type of crop and 
producer size: semestral crops, 1980-1990 (’000 pesos).
Year Small % to 
small
Medium
and
Large
% to 
mediu 
m and 
large
Total % of Total Finagro 
Credit
1980 6799.6 50.9
1981 6886.6 51.0
1982 7110.2 48.4
1983 8299.3 48.6
1984 8984.2 48.6
1985 9376.2 51.2
1986 9486.7 49.7
1987 653.4 7 8656.4 93 9309.8 50.7
1988 1421.4 15 7911.9 85 9333.2 51.8
1989 1591.1 15 8623.2 85 10314.4 53.5
1990 2164.1 23 7439.6 77 9603.7 50.5
1/Prices deflated to 1978 by consumer price index.
2/Percent of total is total loans, the other types of crops included in original table include: semiannual 
crops, infrastructure investment, agricultural machinery, cattle raising activities, and commercial farm 
purchases.
Throughout the decade a consistent fifty percent of FFAP credit was directed towards 
semestral crops. It can be observed that the greater part of this credit fell into the 
hands of medium and large producers (an average of 85%). In recent years credit 
still did not reach small producers. This suggests that from 1936 to 1938 when 
commercial agriculture was less developed credit went to coffee growers and other 
traditional producers. When commercial agriculture and cattle ranching expanded, 
resources were directed towards this sector, to the detriment of traditional, and 
usually small scale agriculture. Furthermore credit also appearred to have a crop 
bias. Potato received the vast majority of credit from public sources whereas other
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activities such as cattle ranching received high levels of private credit140. How have 
potato producers fared?
Although a complete series on credit to potato growers was not available other 
evidence given above proved that potato growers received credit since 1936. Table 
P2.6 also documents that credits were extended to small producers in 1963. In the 
early 1970s virtually all potato farms received credits from the Caja Agraria, 
INCORA or the FFAP. However only 67% of growers received credits by 1976141.
,40Franco, Alberto (1968), op.cit.. p.22.
14lCampo, Octavio (1985), op.cit.. p. 105.
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Table P2.16
National Total of Potato Area Planted and Financed 
by Caja Agraria and FFAP, 1971-1985.
Year Area (1000s of 
Hectares)
Index % o f Total Area 
Financed*
1971 87.4 100 99
1972 89.0 101.8 99
1973 72.6 83.0 74
1974 79.0 90.3 86
1975 90.7 103.7 82
1976 79.8 91.3 64
1977 78.7 90.0 61
1978 77.5 88.6 55
1979 97.3 111.3 64
1980 71.2 81.4 50
1981 96.2 114.4 60
1982 81.1 92.8 50
1983 81.6 93.4 51
1984 68.8 78.7 42
1985 56.6 64.6 37
Source: Constructed from FFAP, Caja Agraria, Bulletins and Reports; Ministry of Agricultura: Anuario 
Estadistico del Sector Agropecuario (1985); Robles, Isabel (1986), op.cit.. p. 101.
♦Percentages calculated from Appendix P.l .
Data for the 1971-1985 period demonstrate that in terms of the percentage of area 
financed, absolute levels fell during the 1971-1985 period (Table P2.16). Despite this 
drop, production continued to expand throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Appendix 
P.l). Thus, despite the inadequacy of state subsidized credit, producers managed to 
augment production. This could be explained by market maturation. State credit was 
vital to these producers when they first entered into commercial agriculture. 
However as the market matured and producers accumulated capital, private sources 
of credit became more accessible. Therefore State support was crucial to initiate the
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process of modernisation, thereafter private enterprise could replace State support. 
Another line of argument would be that small producers did not increasingly obtaining 
more credit but converted back to different methods of payment such as exchange of 
labour or land subdivision, similar to what occured in Ireland142. This is possible 
given that average plot size did not change substantially and traditional forms of 
tenancy persisted (see Tables P2.4 and P2.8).
Total potato credit disaggregated according to department in 1978 (Table 
P2.17) illustrates that the department which received the highest value and land area 
of credit was Cundinamarca.
,42See labour below.
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Table P2.17
Potato: Total Credit Financed by the FFAP and Caja Agraria 
According to Department, 1978.
Department Total Hectares Financed 
(semester A + semester 
B)
Value (1000s of 
pesos)
Pesos per 
Hectare
Antioquia 6935 91823.6 13241
Boyaca 17639 211405.2 11985
Caldas 1814 24165.7 13322
Cundinamarca 27869 310675.8 11148
Narino 15924 99728.9 6263
N. de Santander 2265 28335.6 12510
Santander 2826 36760.5 13008
Tolima 3723 33142.2 8902
Valle 1971 19871.6 10082
Source: Constructed from Cifras del Sector Aeropecuario. 1980 (19811. Bogota: Ministerio de
Agricultura, table 114, p. 135, citing Fondo Financiero Agropecuario and Caja Agraria.
Boyaca came second in both of these categories. However the distribution of credit 
throughout Colombia was not equal among departments in terms of credit per hectare. 
Thus it appears that there is also a geographic bias, with Narino and Tolima receiving 
disproportionately lower levels of credit. The quantitative data presented earlier 
suggests the existence of credit-bias. Without a longer series of disaggregated data 
a concrete conclusion cannot be reached for the entire period. Nonetheless qualitative 
evidence on technical change also points strongly to the existence of production scale- 
bias.
The existence of credit bias during the 1938-1990 period may have resulted 
in lower levels of profitability for small farmers. Profitability statistics for 1975, 
1976, 1981, and 1982 (Table P2.18) demonstrate that higher profitability levels were 
achieved in medium and large farms. Given the easier accesss to credit for large
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farms, and the importance of inputs for increased output, it is possible that they also 
achieved higher levels of profitability in the earlier period.
Table P2.18
Profitability* of Potato Production According to 
Plot Size, 1975, 1976, 1981, 1982.
Plot size 1975 (%) 1976 (%) 1981(%) 1982 (%)
Small 37.5 6.5 13.5 46.4
Medium 67.8 13.6 32.8 50.2
Large 59.6 8 38.9 58.6
Department statistics based on data from FEDEPAPA, ICA, Banco de la Republica, Caja 
Agraria, FFAP and OPS A (Ministry of Agriculture).
♦Profitability calculated with the following formula: (Price/Ton-Cost/Ton)/cost/ton x 
100.
Small producers had lower profitability levels during these years, however by 1982 
the gap between medium to large, and small producers virtually disappeared. The 
narrowing of the gap can be explained by increased capital accumulation by small 
producers.
Above, it was observed that producers were mainly dependent on low-cost 
techniques. Technical change was not a significant bottleneck as variety 
diversification, fertilization and use of commercial inputs were all observed early in 
the period. These factors indicated the early presence of modernising factors. These 
trends further illustrate that the effectiveness of a technique was often the most 
important influence to adoption and not farm size. In addition to transport and 
commercialization deficiencies described above, low levels of capital were a 
significant factor that reduced profitability for producers. Moreover, increasingly 
credit has been diverted from small scale agriculture to large scale commercial 
enterprises and cattle ranching. This has discriminated against small growers and
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resulted in fragmented modernisation with many of the gains only received by large 
scale producers. Now to examine labour.
LABOUR: Characteristics of. and the effect of technical change
Greater equity in land distribution and disparate rates of technical adoption 
resulted in a complex labour market. Complete proletarianization in the main did not 
occur as many wage-labourers also rented or owned land. Because the sector was 
diverse it was nearly impossible to follow the transition of potato labourers 
throughout the period. However there were many hints underlying the diversity of 
the development of labour markets in the potato economy. Below the nature of the 
labour market will be discussed, which will be followed by an analysis of the changes 
in the share of labour in the production process relative to other factors of production 
due to the adoption of technical change.
In 1936 one of the chief barriers to agricultural modernization was that labour 
was tied to land, often by precapitalist production relations143. In later years 
changing pattterns of land tenure and increased capital and technical levels resulted 
in diverse methods of procuring labour. Methods ranged from traditional forms of 
exchange (family labour and regional exchanges of labour for labour or payment in 
goods) to wage-labour. Therefore labour was not fully proletarianized in contrast
I43In the 1930s and 40s there was a crisis of the agricultural work force because many were tied to land 
through rental or sharecropping arrnagements. See Kalmanovitz, Salomon (1978). Desarrollo de la 
Agricultura en Colombia. Bogoti: Editorial La Carreta pp.23-38; Bejarano, Jesus A. (1979). El RSgimen 
Agrario de la Economfa Exportadora a la Economfa Industrial. Bogoti: La Carreta. For a more recent 
example of this see Arango, Mariano; Mesa Saul; Rhenals, Remberto and Velasquez, Jaime Alberto (1991). 
Una Nueva Visi6n de la Economfa Campesina Colombiana Medellin: Universidad de Antioquia, pp.65-67.
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with bananas and cane-sugar which employed mainly proletarianized labour 
throughout the 1936-1990 period. Indications throughout the period demonstrate that 
other forms of payment were used besides wage-labour, similar to the Irish case.
Three broad types of labour existed and continue. First, traditional forms of 
labour tied to the land through sharecropping and rental arrangements. Secondly, 
small scale landowners who used family and community labour—these producers also 
entered the labour market to supplement income. Lastly, others were completely 
proletarianized in large scale potato production and other agricultural activities.
First, traditional relations of production, renters or sharecroppers persisted
throughout the period. Over time, traditional tenancy arrangements slowly faded.
In 1960 they comprised approximately 24% of the tenancy arrangements in Boyaca
and Cundinamarca (Table P2.8). However in 1970-71 and 1988 the share had
declined considerably to 10% and 5%. The persistence of these forms continued to
tie labour to land and stifled the formation of a rural proletariat.
Secondly, an example of the use of family and community labour is provided
below. In Colombia the exchange of labour was commonly denoted as a brazo suelto
or cambio de brazo.
Work defined as a brazo suelto or cambio de brazo is frequent, it consists of working 
a few days in a friend’s parcel and then the friend would return this service by working 
in the other’s plot144.
In addition to this type of exchange, often "wages" were paid partly in cash. 
According to a study conducted by the INCORA in 1964 payment was based half in
144Plan de Credito Supervisado Para el Denartamento de Bovaca (1964). Bogota: INCORA, (author’s 
translation), pp.66-67.
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kind and half in cash145. Daily wages from 1966 include food146. During the 
1970s and 1980s FEDEPAPA evidence shows that wages were one aspect of 
remuneration and that workers received food and precarious housing147. These 
patterns of payment were also observed in pre-famine Ireland, although the 
organization of labour was different because it was tied to land through conacre rents.
Moreover, due to the inability to accumulate sufficient amounts of capital, 
polyvalency became prevalent for land owners148. In addition to tending their own 
plot employment was also found in other sectors. Often the head of the family 
worked in the coal mines of the region, and females temporarily migrated to urban 
areas for work in domestic service149. According to a study by Luis Ignacio 
Aguilar and Juan Jose Perfetti the largest concetration of poverty was in rural 
households whose prime activity was in the agricultural sector150. This would 
confirm the need to supplement household income.
145Ibid.
146Manual de Costos (1967). Bogot£: Caja de Cr6dito y Minero.
147FEDEPAPA, Boletin Informativo (1985) Costos de Producci6n Boyaca-Cundinamarca, p.3.
148For a general review of polyvalency in the peasant sector see Samper, Armando and Ardila, Jorge 
(1991). "Estrategias para el Desarrollo Agropecuario de Colombia. Revista Nacional de Agricultura 
No.894, p. 135.
,49Interview with Augusto del Valle (June and July 1992), Manager of FEDEPAPA, Bogota, Colombia.
150Aguilar, Luis Ignacio and Perfetti, Juan Jos6 (1987). "Distribuci6n del Ingreso y Sus Determinantes 
en el Sector Rural Colombiano." Covuntura Econ6mica 17 (1), p. 144. For other surveys of rural poverty 
see Londono, Juan Luis (1990). "Income Distribution during the Structural Transformation: Colombia 
1938-1988." Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University; "El Problema Laboral Colombiano: Diagn6stico, 
Perspective y Politicas" (1986) Economia Colombiana Separata No. 10. For earlier periods this was also 
true as average incomes were lower for smaller farmers, see Debate Aerario: Documentos (1970)Bogota: 
DANE, table 3, p.8.
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Lastly the situation of pure potato proletariats was limited151. According to 
FEDEPAPA’s Boletin Informativo, only the administrators received the official 
minimum salary. Workers were paid according to the specific tasks by piece 
rates152. Wage-labourers were hired on the large-scale commercial potato farms 
most of which were located in Cundinamarca153. Therefore workers could not earn 
enough by solely selling their labour. Again, labour was seasonal therefore workers 
would follow the harvests of potatoes and other crops. In this case migrant 
characteristics developed similar to banana labour. Therefore potato workers either 
worked part-time and had to find additional employment in rural or urban sectors.
Data from 1988 confirm the trends described above. Most of the agricultural 
workers in Boyaca and Cundinamarca were land owners (97.6% and 95.2% 
respectively).
I51Mariano Arango et.al. emphasized the difficulty for peasants to obtain full-time agricultural salaried 
work because the labour generated by commercial agriculture was not sufficient. Possibilities for 
commercial agriculture were limited as the majority of available land in the 1980s could not be mechanized 
due to rough terrain. See Arango, Mariano; Mesa Saul; Rhenals, Remberto and Velasquez, Jaime Alberto 
(1991), on.cit.. p .65. Furthermore underemployment in the agricultural sector is believed to be one of the 
main problems in the agricultural sector. See "El Problema Laboral Colombiano: Diagnostico,
Perspectivas y Politicas" (1986) Economia Colombiana Separata No. 10, p.46.
152FEDEPAPA, Boletin Informativo. #125, p.4.
153Interview with Augusto del Valle (June and July 1992), Manager of FEDEPAPA, Bogota, Colombia.
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Table P2.19
Agricultural Workers: Break down by property size 
or those that do not own land, Boyacd and Cundinamarca, 1988.
Boyacd Boyaca Cundinamarca Cundinamarca
Size of APU (ha) Number of APU % Number o f APU %
APU without land 3495 2.4 7965 4.8
APU with land (ha) 191480 97.6 198579 95.2
0 >  1 27690 13 35003 16.9
1 >  3 56367 27.2 56438 25.6
3 >  5 32755 16.6 30434 15.0
5 >  10 33104 18.5 33124 17.6
10 >  20 21271 12.2 22047 10.6
20 >  50 14029 7.1 14137 6.4
50 and greater 6264 3 7396 3.1
Agropecuaria: Boyaca. (1990), Bogotd: Ministerio de Agricultura, table 20, p.52; Primera Encuesta 
Nacional Agropecuaria: Bovacd. Primera Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Bovacd. (1990), Bogota: 
Ministerio de Agricultura, table 20, p.52.
The largest share of agricultural work force were owners of smallplots-polyvalent 
peasants, working thier own plot and selling their wage-labour. Labour derived 
priamrily from small plots. These results conform with Dixon’s argument presented 
above which claimed that the abundance of small holdings implied a reduction of the 
use of wage-labour154. This was witnessed in particular periods as the share of 
labour in the cost structure decreased. Often labour was used extensively yet was not 
paid money wages. Thus a system of traditional and modern methods of payment 
was employed.
Data for the 1936-1950 period on labour use were unavailable. Given the
,54See Sugar Parts I and n.
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traditional land usage patterns and low levels of mechanization it can be presumed 
that labour was widely used. Appendix P.6 shows that manual methods were used 
comparatively to a much wider extent in 1955 than during the 1975-81 period. This 
can be expected because of the lower share of inputs and mechanization. According 
to appendix P.5, labour costs occupied 16-18% of the cost structure during the 1975- 
1991 period and between 1982 and 1984 labour costs absorbed a much higher 
percentage in the cost structure and after 1982 declined.
Table P2.20
Man-days per Hectare Used in Potato Production, 1967-1991.
Year Man-Days
1967 255
1981 126
1982 118
1984 125
1986 112
1991 108
Source: KbDBPAPA. Boletin Informativo. Caia Agraria. Manaual de Costos. 1967.
Per hectare labour figures during the 1967-1991 period, demonstrated a period high 
in 1967 with 255 man-days per hectare which was then followed by a drop. Almost 
a fifty percent decline occurred between 1967 and 1981. However between 1981 and 
1991 the decrease of man days/ha from 126 to 108 was much slower than that for the 
previous period. Therefore though technical change was conspicuous since the 1930s, 
significant labour saving techniques were not integrated until the 1970s.
Table P2.21 displays potato wages in comparison with land rents in Boyaca 
and Cundinamarca. Daily wages were compiled from FEDEPAPA data. The daily 
wage between 1982 and 1990 comprised approximately 13% of planting costs.
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However the percentage of planting within total labour costs fluctuated. Between 
1982 and 84 planting costs represented 5-6% of total labour costs and during the 
1985-1990 period planting costs diminished to 2-3% relative to other labour costs. 
Thus, there appears to be labour saving techinques in planting. This is consistent 
with qualitative evidence that showed increased average use of machinery. The index 
that compares potato wages and land rents in Boyaca-Cundinamarca illustrates the 
rapid increase in wages as compared to land rents.
Table P2.21
Potato Wages and Land Rents in Boyacd-Cundinamarca, 1975-1990.
Year Land 
Rental/Ha/Seaso 
n (Current 
Pesos)
Index Daily Potato 
Wage (Current 
Pesos)
Index
1975 2120 100 29 100
1982 10000 472 250 862
1983 13000 613 320 1103
1984 13000 613 360 1241
1985 13000 613 452 1559
1986 13000 613 560 1931
1988 15000 708 855 2948
1990 24000 1133 2000 6897
Source: Caja Agraria (1967), Manual de Costos. Bogotii: Caja de Credito y Minero. 
FEDEPAPA Boletin Informativo various issues.
A similar trend was witnessed with cane-sugar in the Cauca Valley155. Rational 
economic behaviour would dictate labour saving practices. However above it was 
determined that capital was scarce and production increases were more related to 
increasing land under cultivation than increasing yields (land saving). This is in 
contrast to the situation in the Cauca Valley where some tasks were mechanized early
153See Sugar Part n.
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and mechanization became more widely employed in fertilization, pesticide 
applciation and aspects of the harvest since the 1970s. Now to analyse real wages.
Despite the shortcomings of wage data due to the diversity of labour force data 
from the 1980s indicate an increase of real wages. Real wages in Boyaca 
Cundinamarca fluctuated substantially during the 1983-1988 period. During this time 
there was a net increase in real wages of 10% (Table P2.22).
Table P2.22
Daily Wages for Potato Production with Food 
for Boyaca-Cundinamarca, 1982-1990.
Year Wage in Current 
Col. Pesos
% Increase Inflation Rate Real Wage 
Increase (% 
increase- 
inflation rate**
1982 250 — - —
1983 320 28 16.7 11.3
1984 360 13 18.3 -5.3
1985 452 26 22.7 3.3
1986 560 24 20.7 3.3
1987 800 43 24.6 18.4
1988 855 7 28.1 -21.1
1989 — — 26.1 -
1990 2000 134 32.4 75.5*
Source: FEDEPAPA, Boletin Informativo. various years.
Inflation Rate= Annual percentage variation of the consumer price index for manual workers, Banco de la 
Republica, Revista del Banco de la Republica. various issues.
The wage for 1966 was taken from the average wage of Boyacd-Cundinamarca in Caja Agraria, Manual de Costos.
Caja de Cr6dito y Minero. Colombia, 1967
♦The real wage increase was computed for 1988-1990.
Note: Changes in real wages were computed by subtracting the inflation rate from the yearly percent increases of 
potato worker’s wages.
Most real gains were achieved in the middle of the 1980s. This could be due to increased 
output and a decrease in man-days (Table P2.20). Particularly, with the introduction of 
technical change, productivity increased and this was accompanied by an increase in real
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wages.
Potato producers mainly followed a path of external proletarianization. Peasants were 
able to gain title to land and work the land independently. This was witnessed by the 
prevalence of small units. They were able to acquire the necessary tools and inputs to adopt 
technical changes. Potatoes were the only example of the crops discussed in which this 
occurred. The trends of the agricultural work force in Boyaca-Cundinamarca were distinct 
from those in the Cauca Valley and in Uraba. Most agricultrual workers owned land and 
were to a certain degree tied to the land. Remuneration for labour was also different, using 
less wage-labour and combining wages with other forms of payment. Traditional methods 
tended to maintain regional stability whereas commercial agriculture resulted in a transiet, 
mobile work force. In these areas labour quickly proletarianized and moved into urban 
centres. Potato labour was not entirely proletarianized. Land tenure changed dramatically 
from 1936 to 1960 as by 1960 the majority of rural cultivators owned their land. However 
by 1990 pockets of renters and sharecroppers existed.
CONCLUSION
Historically potatoes have been cultivated by subsistence farmers or small commodity 
producers who would sold surplus in local markets. Because of the long history of potato 
growing, low-cost techniques such as variety diversification and manuring were common. 
Later technical innovation and diffusion, included chemical inputs, a process that started in 
the 1940s and 1950s. It was observed that innovations were quickly adapted despite the 
traditional nature of many of the growers. Most of the changes that took place were related 
to intensification of input application. Irrigation and more sophisticated harvesting methods
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were not as important. This is in contrast to banana and sugar production in which capital- 
intensive methods were vital to certain areas of production and marketing.
Furthermore most production was located in areas of difficult terrain and the vast 
majority of small producers became land owners. This is contrary to the situation in Uraba 
and less so in the Cauca Valley where small holders were often displaced by large units. As 
potato growing land was not as valueable, title was readily proferred and not seized by large 
capitalist enterprises. Given these circumstances, it was not surprising that land tenure was 
the least skewed of all the crops discussed, and almost of all other commodities in Colombia.
Since potatoes were a cropproduced almost exclusively for the internal market, 
international standards were not imposed upon these cultivators. Some output was sold in 
neighbouring countries, however no lucrative export earnings were gained. Technical change 
was induced internally and there was also early initiative to establish experimental farms. 
Despite the absence of international influence, producers slowly improved cultivation 
techniques. However the lack of capital for commercialisation restrained modernisation. 
Yields increased slowly and positive production growth rates can be observed between 1950 
and 1990. What were factors that determined this growth?
Producers took advantage of agricultural credit although availability contracted in 
recent years. Despite drops in relative and real amounts of credit, increases in extension and 
productivity were registered. Smaller units tended to use less inputs, lower quality tubers, 
and usually did not employ semi-mechanized techniques. In contrast large producers were 
inclined to have more and better quality inputs as well as utilize machinery for land 
preparation. Furthermore credit within Colombia tended to be directed towards lucrative
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large scale commercial crops such as rice, cane-sugar and banana. This shows that small-to 
medium-sized producers were able survive and expand production despite decreasing levels 
of credit and the existence of credit-, scale- and crop-bias. Also, small scale processing 
plants started to appear in potato regions, however development has been stagnant. The lack 
of markets was not a contributing factor for this. A more tenable explanation was the dearth 
of credit for these operations.
Despite the absense of sufficient levels of credit, what were other factors that 
contributed to the success of producers? First, in the case of Boyaca-Cundinamarca, despite 
the poor systems of distribution and marketing, proximity to markets facilitated 
commercialisation. Secondly, because only short term loans were needed, huge amounts of 
credit were not necessary to achieve efficient methods of production. Thirdly, the labour- 
intensive nature of the crops made it possible for small- and medium-sized producers to 
compete with large growers. This, as with banana and sugar, evidenced that, with the 
absence of intervention, only low-cost technology can maintain smaller producers competitive 
with large.
Labour was difficult to separate from the producers themselves. In some cases family 
labour was often used, and in others seasonal labour was acquired. There were also hints 
that wage-labour was not always used in periods of capital scarcity and other methods of 
payment were applied. Furthermore many producers were polyvalent peasants, involved in 
many different economic pursuits, or became kulaks, commericalising potatoes and other 
commodities contained within the plot.
Producers have demonstrated the ability to adopt technological change and produce 
under less favourable government policies in terms of credit, and land tenure. Distribution
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and marketing remain slow to modernise with traditional methods predominating. By 1990 
the majority continued to be sold in open markets with only a small percentage retailed in 
supermarkets. This clearly illustrates the low levels of sectoral organization. In order to 
give producers more opportunities for future development, capital deepening would be 
beneficial in order to continue and contribute to the stability characteristic to this zone. A 
gradual path of agricultural development has contributed to a firm social base. The absence 
of large commercial enterprises and lucrative exports has also allowed small producers to 
obtain land titles and productively pursue their economic livelihood.
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This thesis has contributed to several areas of the study of agrarian 
modernisation. The analysis has centred on a historical, economic and institutional 
examination of the evolution of three crops in Colombia, comparing them with larger 
international trends. The findings of the central questions to the thesis and its 
contribution to theory will be presented below.
The maturation of factor markets was clearly observed with bananas and 
sugar. After sufficient domestic capital was accumulated and political institutions 
were established, the location of production, processing and the control of the export 
trade shifted. However market imperfections such as the monopolistic control of 
TNCs restrained this process. The internationalisation of capital was most clearly 
witnessed with bananas and had a profound effect on production decisions and 
regional development in general. This, combined with the export nature of the trade 
led to little initiation of local economic activity. However in some respects the 
evidence was inconclusive and more research needs to be conducted on long-term 
investments of local banana growers and other business people involved with the 
trade. In the Colombian case, the presence of export banana production, whether 
controlled by foreign or local capital, was detrimental to economic development in 
general. The close link of bananas with external markets stifled growth because there 
was little intersectoral transfer of resources. For instance, technology and capital 
mainly originated from abroad, the product was sold overseas, and labour was 
increasingly used less in the production process.
It was proved that product markets were not so perfect and institutional 
constraints impeded their functioning. Production expansion was either linked to
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increased internal or external market demand. Increases in international trade, were 
largely due to non-free trading patterns which were either dominated by TNCs or 
trade agreements. Moreover, international product markets were subject to 
fluctuations whereas domestic markets were stable and sometimes increasing sources 
of demand. Larger disruptions such as those induced by the World Wars or the Great 
Depression threatened trade. Instability in the sugar and banana markets was related 
to different mechanisms, determined by their distinct trading patterns.
International sugar markets have been highly protected at least since 1900, 
consequently the emergence of sugar producers was sometimes related to political 
relationship with importing countries. However throughout the twentieth century 
sugar producers who supplied domestic markets have become more common and after 
1970, these producers have accounted for the largest impetus to output expansion. 
This was the situation for Colombia throughout the twentieth century and, as has been 
demonstrated, modernised production methods predated large scale growth in exports. 
This trend was also observed in Central America. An element intrinsic to entrance 
into markets was State institutional support for negotiation into protected world 
markets. Therefore institutional change and initiative were precursors or 
accompanied the push to modernise in the sugar sector, which occurred largely before 
exports. This is in contrast to export-banana production which modernised 
exclusively for export, and sometimes did so without significant state support or 
intervention.
The monopolisation of international trade by TNCs throughout the twentieth 
century, made it difficult for banana producers to gain a foothold in product markets.
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Although as early as the 1930s producer’s organisations started exporting, TNC share 
consistently commanded the majority of world exports throughout the twentieth 
century.
The evolution of a commodity which expanded exclusively to meet domestic 
demand was the potato. Potato markets were quite different. First, potato markets, 
product and factor, were primarily domestic. Therefore they received little 
international stimulus and expansion relied solely on domestic capital. Nonetheless 
buoyant internal markets provided sufficient incentive for producers to augment 
production despite deficient access to inputs and inconsistent state support, 
particularly in marketing and distribution. These shortcomings underline market 
failure, and show that stronger institutions were needed to further encourage 
modernisation.
Closely connected to the restraints of the market were those of institutions— 
whether formal or informal, public or private. Institutions were crucial to gain access 
to international markets, regulate monopolistic practices of TNCs, support production 
on regional and national levels, organise research and development centres and 
coordinate marketing and transport. Informal organisations facilitated Cauca Valley 
landowners access to foreign technology. Formal organisations played a fundamental 
role in the expansion of the sugar sector in the Cauca Valley and sectoral 
consolidation. Institutional and organisational support in Magdalena was strong 
however did not necessarily result in a smooth path of modernisation. Because of 
TNC involvement, unstable external market conditions and unfavourable climate 
expansion was erratic. Later, in Urab£, the rise of commercial houses and the
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accompanying institutional and organisational support paved the route to more 
domestic involvement in modernisation. The research also emphasized the vitality of 
small producers. In Colombia it can be argued that because of their survival (assisted 
by State support) the UFCO would not have continued to return to Santa Marta. The 
investigation of small producers per se shifts traditional discussions of TNCs to other 
actors which were intrinsic to the trade, but often neglected in the literature.
It was evidenced that land ownership was often highly correlated to the ability 
to acquire other agricultural resources. Areas dominated by commercial agriculture 
were those which were characterized by higher concentrations of land. Large 
landowners such as those in the Cauca Valley easily obtained the latest technology 
and achieved rapid sectoral modernisation. In contrast, farmers located in areas 
characterized by small plots often had more difficulty obtaining capital and were more 
likely to commercialise only a portion of output. Boyaca and Cundinamarca had 
much lower land concentrations than the regions of the Cauca Valley and Uraba, and 
were characterized by comparatively less commercial activity. Nonetheless, 
Colombian potato growers did have limited access to modern technology and credit 
and potatoes were commercialised since the beginning of the period. Progressively, 
increased technical levels and capital per hectare were observed in the region. This 
phenomena suggests, not a causation but a closer correlation between access to land 
and access to other agricultural resources in general. Thus it follows that the 
concentration of land intrinsically restricted the opportunities for efficient market 
signals and improvements in income distribution.
Following this result, unequal land distribution and rigid land titles (in some
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areas) were argued to have adverse effects on wide-scale sectoral production 
expansion. In the cases of sugar and bananas it was proven that because growers 
mainly had easy access to land, inefficient production decisions were made. For 
sugar in Colombia early mechanisation occurred despite relative capital scarcity and 
labour abundance. A better use of scare capital would be to direct it towards 
fundamental output expanding components such as improved seed and input 
purchases. In banana production large-scale land ownership either pushed out 
foodstuff production and/or monopolised irrigation water. These were all detrimental 
to an economically and socially efficient modernisation. Capital- and land quality- 
bias towards large producers in all crops was another aspect of this argument—small 
scale producers were clearly disadvantaged. In some regions this meant ecologically 
unsound cultivation practices. In others it impeded the sufficient use of important 
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticide. In yet others it resulted in small producer 
proletarianization. However it was evident that farmers, whatever their resource 
constraints, tended to employ efficient production methods within their means. This 
implies that easier access to capital throughout the agricultural sector would most 
likely have resulted in improved production techniques and output.
Closely connected to land tenure arrangements were contractual agreements. 
For banana exporters and sugar mill owners contractual arrangements arose to secure 
a specified amount of the commodity for a particular period of time. It allowed 
banana exporters and sugar mill owners to shift the risk of cultivation to farmers and 
also expand capital investment in other areas such as milling, packaging and/or 
transport. The benefits of contractual arrangements were that they diffused profits
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from the traditional banana TNCs or sugar mill owners. Although terms of exchange 
favoured TNCs and mill owners, the introduction of new techniques also made 
production less risky for small contracted producers (assuming security of tenure). 
Obviously, a preferred, more equitable system would allow the direct participation 
of growers in processing and commercialisation activities, however contractual 
arrangements appeared to be an imperfect solution to imperfect market structures.
Another institutional issue is property rights. In the literature titled land was 
found to have higher levels of capital applied per hectare. However in Uraba it was 
seen that increased title per se did not necessarily boost output, a result which refutes 
theoretical debate. Rather it was other elements which stimulated the demand for 
titles such as credit facilities or the transformation to capitalist relations of production, 
and/or increased use of capital-intensive production techniques. In earlier years when 
capital using techniques were not as important (such as in Santa Marta) title to land 
could be bypassed as it was not needed for collateral, and export crops were 
cultivated. This trend was seen with the existence of squatters in Santa Marta. The 
entrance of agents who established capital-intensive production impulsed the demand 
for land titles. It was not the institutionalisation of land titling which motivated this 
change.
The organisation of fair titling of land was a formidable obstacle for LDC 
governments. The difficulty with titling implementation affected production scale and 
regional development. In both areas of banana growing rapid colonisation, vague 
demarcation and titling confusion in general led to rural unrest as peasant farmers 
were denied land and were displaced by capitalist production. Colonisation can be
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beneficial because it opens up previously non-exploited land. However due to the 
size of many LDCs, poor cadastral surveys and strong independent landowners, land 
titling is difficult to enforce.
Another trend was the increasing urban nature of large landowners. This was 
observed with absentee estate owners in the Cauca Valley and large scale banana 
plantation holders in Santa Marta as early as the 1960s, and later in Uraba after the 
mid-1960s. Large landowners increasingly tended to live in urban areas and manage 
their estate from a distance. This often resulted in the discouragement of 
infrastructure improvements and in some areas, unsafe rural conditions. Although 
causation is difficult to ascertain, areas of colonisation in Colombia in later years 
were also characterised by high levels of violence and guerilla activity.
In Colombia the effect agrarian policies had on farm-level decision were 
profound. Though State policy fluctuated between protecting either small or large 
producers the long-term outcome was that the expansion of capitalist agriculture 
largely harmed small farmers. For instance land reform laws which aimed to protect 
peasants, colonos and other traditional producers resulted in negligible land 
expropriation and peasants farming untitled land were usually expelled by large 
landowners. Although the Caja Agraria was originally founded to foster small scale 
production with credits and technical assistance, the patterns of lending rapidly came 
to favour large scale agriculture and cattle ranching. An apparent bias towards large 
scale production evidently exists as large landowners had political influence and 
consequently obtained lower transaction costs in capital and land markets which 
conferred them higher levels of profitability. Given the large numbers of rural
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population in many LDCs, the efficiency of small scale production and their positive 
market creation effects, this bias should be readjusted to favour a larger base of 
farmers in the agricultural sector.
An outcome of the workings of markets and institutions was patterns of 
technical adoption. Technical change followed a discontinuous pattern with all three 
crops. It was evident that major adoptions such as new varieties and mechanisation 
resounded in enormous structural changes to production. What were the sources of 
new techniques? The origins and diffusion of technical change were distinct for all 
three crops. For Colombian sugar, foreign technology was vital during the 
establishment of modern milling, however new techniques were increasingly 
innovated internally. This was attributed to the stability of production (primarily due 
to secure internal market demand), the quick establishment of institutional support 
within the region, and centralised production centres which resulted in high learning 
externalities. For Colombian export banana throughout the period, technology was 
diffused from abroad and continual reliance on imported innovations and sophisticated 
inputs was the trend. Moreover unstable market conditions pre-1950 were not 
conducive to sectoral consolidation. Technical change for potato producers originated 
mainly from internal sources with the first experimental farms dating back to the 
1920s. Inconsistent State policy sporadically influenced production decisions and 
homogeneous production patterns were only vaguely identified in the 1970s and by 
the 1980s comparable technical levels throughout farms were beginning to be 
observed. The disproportionate pace of technical adaption was related to capital-bias, 
as small producers did not have the cash to obtain inputs. Moreover it was seen that
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in periods of capital shortages, small producers would switch back to more labour 
intensive techniques and use cash only for input purchases and continue to employ a 
system of labour exchange. It was proven for all three crops in Colombia that 
modern methods of production clearly occurred before the 1950s, the decade denoted 
by most economic historians as the commencement of the era of commercial 
cropping.
The patterns of technical diffusion in the three different crops suggest a close 
relationship between technical diffusion and orientation of commercialisation. More 
contact to international markets quickly led to the internationalisation of factor 
markets, production techniques and the use of externally-induced technologies. This 
heavy reliance on externally induced technology was also related to the organisation 
of research and development which for the bulk of the period was dominated by 
external sources. In the case of commodities marketed domestically and abroad, 
farmers appeared to have more space to adopt new techniques either from local 
discoveries or imports of innovations from abroad. This was due to internal 
investments in research centres, the diffuse nature of research world-wide and the 
early maturity of mill technology. Lastly, a commodity that producers cultivated only 
for domestic markets employed techniques innovated externally and internally and 
techniques among producers were diverse.
It was evidenced that organisational bases were crucial for the establishment 
of research and development. The nature of the crop and processing were found to 
be elements which guided technical change and in some cases diffusion. Growers of 
large-scale capital-intensive crops could more easily organise due to their size and
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capital endowments. Crops which were diffuse in terms of number of producers and 
location experienced more obstacles in establishing research centres. Although in 
Colombian potato research farms established by the State existed as early as the 
1920s, technical adoption appeared to be an individual choice as heterogeneous 
production patterns were prevalent until the 1970s, the time at which the potato 
producer’s association was formed. In the other two crops, strong organisational 
support from producer’s associations usually resulted in improved techniques. With 
potatoes this also seems plausible as producer’s associations were able to influence 
production decisions and notify cultivators of recent technological breakthroughs as 
well as marketing channels through their monthly bulletin.
In general, low-cost techniques were crucial to modernisation. Given resource 
constraints, they were vital to accommodate other innovations in the production 
process. For example, changes in plot design in the 1960s which allowed for faster 
cane harvests, manual pest removal for small Windward Island banana producers or 
manual weeding for potato growers were all important for successful cultivation. 
These findings demonstrated that labour can and has been substituted for capital with 
no compromise to efficiency. Moreover low-cost techniques were not biased towards 
any size producer thereby stimulating a broader base of development.
Related to the use of low-cost techniques was the existence of capital-bias 
towards large units with all three crops. This bias, often affected technological 
adaption and scale of production. Capital-bias clearly pushed small producers out of 
processing and cultivation. During the twentieth century the increasing use of capital- 
intensive techniques in agriculture accelerated the pace of small producer
380
Conclusion
displacement.
Finally, this leads to the influence the above factors had on labour. Labour 
in the capitalist crops (bananas and sugarcane) in the long term was proletarianized. 
With the transformation to proletarians, labour was often migrant in regions of 
seasonal harvests. In Colombia where cane harvests were aseasonal, labour initially 
was proletarianized and lived in rural areas. However later it was observed that 
labourers relocated to urban centres and commuted to the fields. Therefore it is seen 
that with agricultural modernisation, in conditions of stable employment, workers will 
migrate to urban areas. Another general trend was that temporary labour migrated 
primarily to supplement their earnings and not as a source of permanent income. 
This shows that modernisation in the long term tended to push peasants and 
proletarians to become involved in a number of activities (not only agricultural) to 
survive.
Proletarianization did not occur with potato production and polyvalency was 
the rule. The reasons for polyvalency can be attributed to two factors: l)the small 
scale nature of production which relied on family labour, labour exchange and 
sometimes wage-labour; and 2)the inability of wage-labourers to earn enough money 
on potato farms for subsistence. If potato farms become large-scale, 
proletarianization is likely, however with labour abundant and capital in short supply 
in the departments of Boyaca and Cundinamarca, small producers seem to be using 
resources efficiently.
Did agricultural modernisation improve conditions for labour? Without a 
macroeconomic study, a complete explanation cannot be given. However within the
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particular crop general tendencies can be underlined. Because of the stability of cane 
growers in the Cauca Valley (mainly due to strong internal demand and rigid land 
titles) mill owners were initially able to give secure employment to workers. But 
following technical changes later in the period, an increased use of short term 
methods of recruitment (contracted work) was observed. The increased use of 
contracted work was also apparent in banana production as TNCs progressively hired 
labour temporarily for specific tasks, during particular periods in the banana life­
cycle. Therefore instead of witnessing improved conditions for labour during the 
modernisation process, it was observed that temporary hiring increased. The 
introduction of technical change also resulted in an increasingly stratified work force.
Quantitative changes in labour were diverse for all three crops. Moreover 
living conditions for agricultural workers world-wide were distinct with some areas 
characterized by a marked decline, yet in others satisfactory conditions remained. 
However, after analysing the Colombian data, it was seen that the proportion of social 
security benefits for sugar workers decreased. Wages for banana workers were not 
compiled however inadequate living conditions point to diminished welfare throughout 
the period. These trends show that labour received few of the benefits of technical 
change.
These trends in general point to disarticulated agricultural development with 
the strong growth only in sectors with easy access to capital. Paradoxically, the only 
crop which exhibited long term links with the regional economy was that with limited 
capital availability, potatoes. Both capitalist crops became increasingly large scale 
and obtained more access to productive resources. This was a result of market
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preferences towards large units and weak institutions, that despite policy were mainly 
unable to reverse or create conditions for more participation in modernisation which 
would create more room in domestic markets for demand in general. When small 
producers can fully participate in the modern agricultural sector, they will be able to 
share, not only the costs but also its benefits and contribute to and stimulate economic 
growth in general.
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Appendix S .l
BIASES OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN SUGARCANE PRODUCTION, 
WITH REFERENCE TO MANUELITA S.A., 1926-1990.
Year Category Innovation Land
Saving,
Capital
Using
^abour
Saving,
Capital
Jsing
jtnd
Saving,
-abour
Jsing
ntemally
nduced
ixtemally
nduced
1921 1 Soil preparation, Fowler machinery assisted in plowing X X X
1929 2 Introduction of seed variety, POJ 2878. X X
late 1940s 2 18 new seed varieties introduced in Colombia. X X
1936-1950 1,2,3,4, Most innovations during this period were capital and labour using. A period of 
agricultural frontier extension and a general systematisation of cultivation techniques. X
X X
1950s 2 Length of time between cuts has become more scientific due to higher mill capacity and 
diffusion of knowledge.
X X
1956 3 First well dug in Manuelita. X X X
late 1950s 4 Disease control introduction o f pesticides 2-4-D and TCA. X X
1960 2 Canal Point seed variety introduced. X X
1.960-63 4 Fertilization with nitrogen. X X
1960s 1 Soil preparation changes: size and shape of plots redesigned to systematize distance 
between plants and make cutting more efficient.
X X
1970s 1 Cane planted at a deeper level of subsoil, micro and macro levelling. X X X
1970s 4 Appropriate fertilizer dosage established. X X
1970s 3 Microlevelling & redesign of plots to improve efficiency of water application. X X
1970s 4 Mechanized disease control introduced. X X X
1974 4 Mechanized fertilization introduced. X
mid 1970s 2 Anti-virus & anti-fungal seed treatment. X X
1976/78 5 Mechanized cane lifting introduced. X
1978/82 5 Innovation of Caltcrpillar-Manuclila Transport Vehicle for Sugarcane. X X
1980s 2 Technological Advance in seed varieties: Mayaguez variety bred in Colombia. X X
Categories: l)soil preparation, 2)sccd varieties, 3)irrigalion, 4)inputs, and 5)harvcsl.
Source: Constructed from information based on: Pifleiro. Martin (1982). Cambio Tecnologico v Articulaci6n Social en la Aeroindustria Azucarera 
en Colombia. San Jose: Instituto Interamericano para la Cooperaci6n Agricola; Manuelita Archives: "InnovacionesTecnologicasenManuelita S. A." 
Document written by Field Department. Signed by Alberto Anzola Jimenez, Vice President. Undated, must have been written post 1988; "Recuento 
llistorico dc los Ultimos 25 Aflos de Fabrica." Mimeo. Undated, unsigned. Must have been written up in 1989. Interviews with Carlos Navia 
Director of Manuelita S. A. Field Department, Palmira, Colombia.
Appendix S.2
FIELD PRODUCTIVITY DATA FOR MANUELITA S.A., 1971-1990.
LAND
PREPARATION
PLANTING DISEASE
CONTROL
FERTILIZATION RRIGATION YIELDS
Manual Techniques Mechanised
Techniques
Manual Techniques Mechanised
Techniques
Mixed Techniques Manual Techniques Mechanised
Techniques
Area Irrifated 4rea Irrlf aled Manuelita-Owneo Land Cane Suppliers
Year Tractor Hours/ 
Hectare
Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) (ha) %) Tonnes of Cane 
(lOOOsj
Tonnes/Ha/Month Tonnes of Cane 
1000s)
"omves/Ha/Month
1971 467.8 8.4
1972 19.46 1057 2928 1957 11764 n.a.
1973 11.87 11074 3172 16349 6684 9258 2871 48 552.7 8.4
1974 4.86 10246 2671 12482 7356 8289 32995 63 529.0 9.2
1973 12.37 13840 3372 11679 8304 8408 527 25361 49 730.1 8.3
1976 11.38 14188 7429 10945 8924 10190 1312 37385 63 636.3 7.7 318.8 8.1
1977 33.12 10368 6342 13692 9517 6435 1305 34277 58 518.5 8.4 296.3 8.3
1978 27.39 7013 6111 7452 6923 4518 2166 27793 36 566.5 8.3 412.0 8.7
1979 23.18 1481 6738 7881 5771 3102 2377 16894 31 646.0 9 535.9 8.9
1980 24.39 7878 10148 3125 7824 3370 1820 3656 24872 49 669.6 8.6 546.9 9
1981 17.2 5933 12186 2311 8407 4641 1345 4627 27536 48 612.3 9.7 651.3 9.4
1982 13.03 7274 13374 3786 8530 4922 557 5550 26160 45 697.5 10.1 642.9 9.8
1983 11.94 8940 12788 3828 8788 4537 329 6047 47863 76 748.8 9 685.8 9.4
1984 13.19 10151 16716 4769 9465 5068 734 6306 47130 67 780.5 10.2 892.7 9.8
1983 13.61 10023 17457 4698 9763 4228 443 6478 61685 89 969.2 9.9 961.6 9.9
1986 17.22 8947 16252 2845 9893 4382 710 5473 54550 83 8/5.1 10.3 914.8 10.2
1987 13.73 9985 17280 2373 12611 5507 2338 6364 62825 91 937.7 10.1 960.3 9.6
1988 11.34 8936 13480 2492 10340 5599 3585 5571 41528 61 896.4 10 955.5 10.6
1989 9.71 9530 17274 4211 12014 6065 3898 6305 52416 75 950.9 10.5 1144.9 9.9
1990 9.71 8035 16193 3682 11880 5531 2928 3852 56448 80 858.5 9.9 1135.7 9.8
Source: Manuelita Archives. Supcrintendencia de Campo Monthly Reports: Irrigation Department 1970-1990, Cultivation Department 1970-1990, Harvest Department 1970-1990. Manuelita S.A., Palmira,
Colombia. Mixed techniques started being employed in 1980, thus the reason for no data prior to 1980. Mechanised fertilizer technique did not commence until post-1975.
Appendix S.3
FACTORY PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS IN MANUELITA S.A ., 1936-1990.
/
% Sacrose Number of Milling Tons of Cane % sucrose Average
harvest
Year in Cane days Hours Milled extracted as % Tons Cane
(in 1000s) as % of Milled/Hr.
sucrose content
1936 14 248 91615 22.68
1937 13 313 115285 23.57
1938 327 144394 28.09
1939 14 330 135342 25.46
1940 14 277 110765 25.58
1941 14 309 4183 145554 93 34.8
1942 304 4829 155847 91 32.27
1943 14 336 5058 171022 91 33.81
1944 14 293 4398 144834 92 32.93
1945 15 338 5195 185505 90 35.71
1946 16 287 4568 148539 92 32.52
1947 15 296 4975 165107 91 33.19
1948 15 293 4763 171866 91 36.08
1949 15 313 5470 196473 89 35.92
1950 14 318 5556 208040 90 37.44
1951 14 319 5780 221773 90 38.37
1952 13 322 5953 230675 91 38.75
1953 13 313 5097 281900 94 55.31
1954 15 314 5324 223576 95 41.99
1955 14 313 5314 333285 96 62.72
1956 14 319 5398 350154 95 64.87
1957 15 285 4825 341100 95 70.69
1958 14 348 5995 372147 95 62.08
1959 14 320 4889 359857 94 73.61
1960 13 314 5213 480232 92 92.12
1961 13 318 5361 533583 90 99.53
1962 14 317 5329 546977 91 102.64
1963 14 298 5007 490121 93 97.89
1964 14 322 5325 554509 93 104.13
1965 13 324 5355 589370 92 110.06
1966 13 360 5876 640022 91 108.92
1967 14 284 4455 551199 95 123.73
1968 13 304 4890 655025 94 133.95
1969 14 312 5197 701899 94 135.06
1970 13 336 5541 671808 95 121.24
1971 13 330 5377 718829 95 133.69
1972 13 331 5825 795584 94 136.58
1973 12 353 6276 813408 94 129.61
1974 12 353 6208 877924 93 141.42
1975 12 349 6158 1036291 91 168.28
1976 13 343 6192 1087303 91 175.60
1977 12 353 6136 925016 92 150.75
1978 12 365 5816 1091085 91 187.60
1979 12 365 6361 1263143 89 198.58
1980 13 366 6537 1301250 89 199.06
1981 14 365 6513 1280359 90 196.59
1982 13 365 6620 1355080 90 204.69
1983 14 365 6579 1434664 92 218.07
1984 13 366 5951 1684422 93 283.05
1985 13 365 6318 1924920 93 304.67
1986 13 365 6409 1801329 94 281.06
1987 13 365 6318 1924920 93 304.67
1988 12 366 6707 1975594 92 294.56
1989 13 365 6728 2089978 92 310.64
1990 13 365 6707 1962813 94 292.65
Source: Manuelita S.A. archives: Factory Productive Statistics in three volumes: 1925-1953, 1953-1970, 
1970-present. Statistical incongruities were reconciled by factory head engineer, Gerardo Ortiz.
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Appendix S.4
CHRONOLOGY OF PURCHASED CANE IN MANUELITA S. A, 1945-1971.
Amount Coal Amount Coal Amount Coat Amount Coal Amount Coat Amount Coal
714497 34111 904633 34333 1327873 38393 1719667 31867 4151397 36702 5769191 33299 4737510
512210 92467 886761 84163 1313794 59538 1686123 71079 1932380 63715 5253452 95826 8407858 49604 5793354
802565 30699 1283201 55126 1829371 52358 1632542 59603 4475118 62686 7888027 55510 6025514
840286 58381 1319419 65397 1861856 72169 1965090 84345 4935375 85774 7704223 89762 8000708
Caacijal 791350 91433 1234469 61319 1745306 101199 2335971 72958 5193744 109068 8834822 99105 7569918
31374 819824 58999 1474977 76686 1717168 73637 4140941 63829 6268068 77488 5608979
Realpca 53515 1673057 59218 3073653 49953 4596753 45519 3082888
24723 741705 55976 1847227 71464 3737862 36506 2747178 89077 9993556
Casangal 10167 422913 12353 837671 14161
778719 282017 4035459 350161 6895342 359855 10667411 531542 15246015 529160 35799213 554505 53603040 539364 50812427
Coat/Ton 
of Cane
Source: Manuelita S. A. Archives. Annual Hacienda Accounting Reports found in Main Archive Room. Reports drawn up for submission to the Banking Superindentency. For example La Cabana annual accounting 
report 1945, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1964, 1971.
Appendix S.5
DIRECT AND INDIRECT WORK FORCE IN MANUELITA S.A., 1948-1990
Direct Work 
Force
Total Indirect Work 
Force
Total Total of £)irect 
ind Indirect Work 
:orce
Year Field Factory Admlninistration Field Factory Administration % of Direct Work 
:orce
1948 1136 95 1231 92.28
1951 1296 112 1408 92.05
1952 1435 124 1559 92.05
IMS 1464 122 148 4 91.80
1954 1484 121 1605 92.46
1955 1366 129 1495 91.37
1956 1239 121 1360 91.10
1957 1446 129 1515 91.49
1958 1373 133 1506 91.17
1959 1551 142 1693 91.61
1960 1754 148 1902 92.22
1961 l4 l7 i41 1^69 92.28
1964 2017 163 2180 92.52
1965 26&6 165 2251 92.67
1966 2040 187 2227 91.60
1$67 1977 206 21&3 '96.56
1968 2061 203 2264 91.03
1969 2176 241 2417 90.03
1970 1465 550 97 2112 62 68 120 250 2362 89.42
1972 1753 536 98 2387 65 68 121 254 2641 90.38
1976 1815 549 96 2460 68 70 122 260 2720 90.44
1$7S 1700 614 101 2415 71 70 155 297 2712 49.05
1981 1743 655 109 2507 75 73 157 305 2812 89.15
1987 1718 652 96 2466 77 74 157 308 2774 88.90
1983 1665 643 98 2406 74 71 156 301 2707 88.88
1944 1741 $$9 96 1426 75 72 158 305 174 i 55.44
1985 1718 756 93 2567 69 76 157 302 2869 89.47
1986 1702 548 99 2349 73 77 175 325 2674 87.85
1987 1737 533 104 2374 72 76 177 325 2699 87.96
1944 839 520 118 1477 Is 74 184 444 14l6 81.60
1989 1917 516 129 2562 74 79 204 357 2919 87.77
1990 1952 514 136 2602 77 86 214 377 2979 87.34
Source: Manuelita S. A. Archives: Manuelita Annua) Accounting Books 1972-1990; Annual Reports to the Banking Superintendency submitted by Manuelita, 1936-1987, Palmira, Colombia.
Appendix S.6
COLOMBIAN SUGAR PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND EXPORT, 1960-1990
(Metric Tons)
Year Production Consumption Export
1960 328327 287436 167
1961 362643 321216 45667
1962 401872 369407 65666
1963 368139 340700 40334
1964 427601 367500 25350
1965 485191 389473 101344
1966 537365 409720 113917
1967 596575 393390 200367
1968 663327 446772 238311
1969 708673 521960 173495
1970 676174 545692 129705
1971 743974 602081 161061
1972 823681 625574 202856
1973 809890 690223 142470
1974 894S20 749716 128661
1975 969701 771461 197837
1976 934632 844247 100220
1977 853607 911465 0
1978 1014075 856081 132000
1979 1107268 837722 278214
1980 127488 992378 28045
1981 1212371 1041052 177213
1982 1318047 1011364 293319
1983 1340190 1006958 302607
1984 1177169 963237 182980
1985 1366893 963736 294934
1986 1272154 1006653 211815
1987 1293484 1066016 97621
1988 1363976 1033452 243269
1989 1523323 1110562 323319
1990 1592816 1177484 416339
Source: Constructed from Asocafia (1992). Aspectos Generales del Sector Azucarero. 1990-1991. Cali: Asocana, Table I, 
p.37.
Appendix S.7
ESTIMATED DEMAND OF WORKERS ACCORDING TO CROP, 
1950, 1960, 1971
Type of Crop 1950 % 1960 % 1971 %
Commercial 61.2 4.8 174.1 10.9 215.4 11.7
Traditional 295.0 23.0 332.6 20.9 410.3 22.3
Plantation 38.1 3.0 42.0 2.6 51.4 2.8
Mixed 320.1 25.0 344.4 21.6 281.1 15.2
Coffee 248.0 19.4 334.1 20.9 385.0 20.9
Minor Crops 49.5 3.8 58.8 3.7 100 5.4
Subtotal 1,011.9 79.0 1286 80.6 1443.2 78.3
Cattle Ranching 270 21 310 19.4 400 21.7
Total 1281.9 100 1596.0 100 1843.2 100
Source: Kalmanovitz. Salomon (1974b). "La Agricultura en Colombia. 1950-1972." Boletm Mensual de 
Estadfstica. No.277, Table 4.A ., p.111.
Appendix S.8
MANUELITA AGRICULTURAL WORK FORCE DATA, 1944-1990.
Year Number of Cutters Number of
Contracted Cutters
1944 141
1949 158
1950 199
1955 302
1958 192
1961 414
1964 437
1968 466
1971 503
1974 703 258
1978 929 307
1980 903 342
1981 723 421
1982 770 523
1983 817 515
1984 839 609
1985 655 625
1986 846 603
1987 871 632
1988 888 660
1989 910 760
1990 947 712
Source: Manuelita S. A. archive data. Number of Contracted Cutters derived from field productive data, 
1980-1990. Number of cutters for 1944-1974 was obtained from the weekly payrolls. Since there is year 
round harvest in the Cauca Valley there is not very much fluctuation from month to month of sugarcane 
workers. Howver, there is a larger harvest in the months of February to April, and October to November. 
Cane cutters were counted from the payrolls of these months. A systematic month could not be chosen 
for all the years because of the nature of the organisation of these payrolls.
Appendix B.l
BIASES OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN BANANA PRODUCTION, 1936-1990.
Year Category Innovation .and 1 
Saving, L 
Capital 
Using
.a hour 
Saving, 
Capital 
Jsing
.and
Saving,
^abour
Using
Colombia:
nlemally
nduced
Colomhia:
ixtcmally
nduced
pre-1936 2.3,4,7 Banana cultivation based on traditional methods, small amounts of inputs applied, land 
clearing conducted by animal power, and little if any irrigation or drainage networks on 
banana plantations, transportation irregular and banana packing is based on bunches.
X X
1930s 3 Application of insecticides using the pump method, and other disease control methods 
conducted manually.
X
1940s 3 Flooding of fallow land in order to cleanse land infected with Panama disease; a technical 
change introduced instead of switching varieties.
X X
1940s 2 Substitution of mules for tractors for banana transportation from plantation to point of 
export.
X X
1940s 4 Introduction of washing fruit at point of harvest on the banana plantation proper. X X
late
1940s/and
1930s
1 First time full-scale variety shift from Gros Michel to Cavendish, primarily impulsed by 
destruction being caused by Panama Disease.
X X
late 1940s/ 
and 1950s
3 Irrigation ditches constructed suitable for the new Cavendish variety. X X X
1956/64 4 Banana boxing instead of shipping fruit in bunches, precipitated by the variety switch of 
Gros Michel to Cavendish.
X X
1960s 5, 6 Improved managerial and administrative structures of plantations, systematic planning of 
banana harvests.
X X
1960s 4 Packing plants become integrated parts o f banana plantations. X X
1960s 1 Cavendish becoming the popu'ar variety throughout the world. X X
1965/70 7 Tractors replaced by suspended cable systems, signifies enormous decrease in labour use. X X
1960s/70s 3 Low volume aerial spraying for Sikatoka Control X X
1970s 3 Polyethylene sleeves used for protection of banana bunches during (he growing period. X X
1970s 3 Fertilization with other chemicals besides urea. X X
1980s 1 Reproduction o f suckers scientifically conducted in regional greenhouses using in-vitro 
fertilization for methodical reproduction of banana suckers.
X X
'N ot necessarily land saving, this technique is perhaps both biased towards capital and labour: i.e., capital and labour using.
Categories: l)variety, 2)cullivation, 3)irrigation/inputs, 4)packing, and 5)harvcsl, 6)administration, 7)transportation.
Si mrce: CmiKtniclcd from information based on: lUlis, Prank (1983). la s  Trasitaciunalcs del I tana no en Cent run mcrica. San Jose: lUlitorial 
Univcrsitaria Ccntroamcricana; "l’roduccion, y comcrcializacion del banano." (1986) Rcvista Aut?ura. 12(2), pp. 117-138, 1986; Bolero, l-'emando 
(1990). Urabi: Colonizaci6n. Violencia v Crisis del Estado. Medellin: Universidad de Antioquia; The World Banana Economy 1970-1984: 
.Structure Performance and Prospects. (1986), Rome: FAO. Interviews with Arturo Hernandez. (March 1991) Vice-President for Planning and 
Development in UNIUAN, Medellin; Humberto (Jribc (Nov. 1991) Head of Operations for UNIUAN, IJraha; Camilo Peilalosa (March 1992) Head 
of International Marketing for UNIBAN, Bogoti.
Appendix B.2
WORLD AND COLOMBIAN BANANA TRADE FIGURES. 1936-1990.
Year World Imports Colombian Exports Uraba Exports Participation of 
Colombian Exports in 
World
Participation of Uraba 
Exports in World
Colombian exports in 
1000s of bunches
1936 247.59
1937 275.6 164.6 6585
1938 256.89 187.3 7493
1939 238.89 189.4 79.3% 7575
1940 198.2 12.5 6.3% 5003
1941 162.26 66.8 41.2% 2672
1942 90.42 6.4 7.1% 255
1943 79.78 0.0 0.0% 1
1944 97.35 11.5 11.8% 460
1945 117.737 34.6 29.4% 1383
1946 1700 52.8 3.1% 2110
1947 2020 83.5 4.1% 3339
1948 2080 117.9 5.7% 4716
1949 2030 157.0 7.7% 6280
1950 2319.2 143.8 6.2% 6438
1951 2381.6 154.472 6.5% 6348
1952 2664.2 152.585 5.7% 6454
1953 2662.1 196.2 7.4% 7659
1954 2882.5 195.7 6.8% 7925
1955 2886.2 209.6 7.3% 9155
1956 .3038.1 215.9 7.1% 9547
1957 3234.1 184.1 5.7% 8349
1958 3431 174.1 5.1% 8220
1959 3585.9 203.3 5.7% 9526
1960 3968.9 190.7 4.8% 9255
1961 5131.4 205.6 4.0%
1962 3905.5 108.2 2.8%
1963 4191.7 202.6 4.8%
1964 4386.9 171.5 23.2 3.9% 0.5*
1965 4951 253.5 90.6 5.1% 1.8*
1966 5308 31 230 0.6% 4.3*
1967 5400.7 339.1 262.5 6.3% 4.9 *
1968 5557.6 304.1 239.3 5.5% 4.3*
1969 5707.7 334.9 259 5.9% 4.5*
1970 5737.7 290.9 276.5 5.1% 4.8*
1971 6248.9 256 241.9 4.1% 3.9*
1972 6477.1 245.2 224.4 3.8% 3.5*
1973 6449.1 250.8 226.4 3.9% 3.5*
1974 6388.2 287.3 244.2 4.5% 3.8*
1975 6390.4 387.8 332.2 6.1% 5.2*
1976 6325.6 433.5 382.2 6.9% 6.0*
1977 6549 441.6 399.3 6.7% 6.1*
1978 6967.1 577.6 530.8 8.3% 7.6*
1979 7040.4 612 562.9 8.7% 8.0*
1980 6852.7 715.9 668.3 10.4% 9.8*
1981 6970 785.9 740.2 11.3% 10.6*
1982 6786.8 704.7 668.7 10.4% 9.9*
• 933 6199.9 766.6 710.1 12.4% 11.5*
1984 6714 921.5 847 13.7% 12.6*
1985 6903.2 774 694.2 11.2% 10.1*
1986 7301 987.1 757.7 13.5% 10.4*
1937 7561 962 883.6 12.7% 11.7*
1988 7844 977.7 743.6 12.5% 9.5*
1989 8278 985.4 651.3 11.9% 7.9*
1990 9061 1148.2 717.1 12.7% 7.9*
(1986), RevisU Aueura. Year 12(2), pp. 132 Sl 127; Banana weight pre-1950 was measured according to bunches, not be metric tons. Comers ion from 
number of bunches was nude so that 10C9 bunches=25tons. Figures from Revista del Banco de la Republics. 34(411), p. 134, the conversion is not precise 
but at least a rejght idea of Colombian banana exports can be obtained from this; Dat on total Colombian Exports 1974-1983 Botero Herrera. Fernando 
(1990). Uraba: colonizacidn. violencia v crisis del estado. Universidad de Antioquia: Medellin, Table 11, p.96; Data on Uraba exports 1986-19990: 
Computer print out from UNIBAN, ’Exportaciones de banano zona de Uraba 1980-1991, Source: Turbo Customs and Commercial Houses, Data on World 
Exports from FAQ Trade Yearbook 1987 (1988), Rome: FAO 41(84), Table 56. p.159 and FAQ Trade Yearbook 1990 (1991). Rome: FAO 44(102). 
Table 57, p. 160; International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1940-41. (1941), Rome: Interactional Institute of Agriculture, Table 77, p.286; 
In'emational Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1941-42 to 1943-46. Vol. l!: International Trade. (1947), Rome: International Institute of Agriculture, 
Bureau of the FAO, Table 19,, p. 160; Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics 1950. Vol. IV. Part 2. (1951), Washington, D.C.: FAO, Table 12, 
p. 36.
Appendix B.3 
AREA PLANTED WITH EXPORT-BANANA 
AND BANANA EXPORTS IN URABA, 1964-1990.
Year Banana Exports from 
Uraba(lOOOsMT)
Index Area Planted with 
Export-
Banana in Uraba(IIa)
Index Banana Exports Per 
Hectare (MT)
1964 23.2 10.09 6000 41.52 3.87
1965 90.6 39.39 11400 78.89 7.95
1966 230 100.00 14450 100.00 15.92
1967 262.5 114.13 15550 107.61 16.88
1968 239.3 104.04 16730 115.78 14.30
1969 259 112.61 18950 131.14 13.67
1970 276.5 120.22 15860 109.76 17.43
1971 241.9 105.17 15358 106.28 15.75
1972 224.4 97.57 11498 79.57 19.52
1973 226.4 98.43 13120 90.80 17.26
1974 244.2 106.17 13725 94.98 17.79
1975 332.2 144.43 14830 102.63 22.40
1976 382.2 166.17 15300 105.88 24.98
1977 399.3 173.61
1978 530.8 230.78
1979 399.3 173.61 17479 120.96 22.84
1980 668.3 290.57 17365 120.17 38.49
1981 740.2 321.83 18300 126.64 40.45
1982 668.7 290.74 19400 134.26 34.47
1983 710.1 308.74 19800 137.02 35.86
1984 847 368.26 20100 139.10 42.14
1985 694.2 301.83 20300 140.48 34.20
1986 757.7 329.43 19700 136.33 38.46
1587 883.6 384.17 20400 141.18 43.31
1988 743.6 323.30 20000 138.41 37.18
1989 651.3 283.17 20400 141.18 31.93
,990 717.1 311.78 20456 141.56 35.06
Anuario: Estadfsticas del Sector Agropeciiario 1990. (1991) Bogota: Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 13, data based 
on export-banana from Antioquia. Since most export-bauanas in Antioquia must be in the geographic region 
of UraM data must mainly be from this region; "Exportaciones de Banano Zone de Uraba Anos 1980-1991." 
Computer Print Out from UNIBAN. Citing Turbd Customs and Conmiercial Houses.
Appendix B.4
MOST PROMINENT COLOMBIAN EXPORTS, 1905-1935. 
(Value in 1000s o f pesos)
Year Coffee % Banana % Petroleum % Tobacco % Leather % Gold % Platinu
m
% Total
1905 4822 39.16 485 3.94 404 3.28 759 6.16 1692 13.74 83 0.67 12315
1910 5517 31.02 1668 9.38 377 2.12 1850 10.40 3370 18.95 261 1.47 17786
1915 15248 48.29 1997 6.32 335 1.06 3680 11.65 5453 17.27 550 1.74 31579
1919 54292 68.71 2215 2.80 1703 2.16 8595 10.88 277 0.35 3506 4.44 79011
1925 66524 78.33 55563 65.43 308 0.36 3222 3.79 1610 1.90 4006 4.72 84924
1930 61654 54.42 8741 7.72 26292 23.21 198 0.17 3493 3.08 9063 8.00 1888 1.67 113288
1935 7922 5.55 8939 6.26 29099 20.38 403 0.28 2681 1.88 19186 13.44 2088 1.46 142788
Source: Constructed from Revista del Banco de la Republica 12(146), Table 6, p.47 S.
Appendix B.5
URABA BANANA EXPORTS ACCORDING TO COMMERCIAL HOUSE (%)
Year UFCO UNIBAN TECBACO BANACOL
1964 100 - - -
1965 100 - - -
1966 100 - - -
1967 100 - - -
1968 100 - - -
1969 88.3 11.7 - -
1970 48.5 51.5 - -
1971 15.4 84.6 - -
1972 - - — -
1973 - — - -
1974 55.9 44.1 - -
1975 56.3 43.7 - -
1976 57.5 42.5 - -
1977 44.1 46.5 9.4 -
1978 37.4 44.0 18.6 -
1979 32.2 48.7 19.0 -
1980 37.3 46.4 16.3 -
1981 37.9 46.1 13.7 2.3
1982 33.2 44.9 8.5 13.4
1983 22.4 55.5 1.1 21.0
Source: Ramirez. Margarita (1983). "Consolidacibn de la Actividad Banauera de Urab&" In Revista Aueura. 
9(2), p.91.
Appendix P .l
COLOMBIAN POTATO PRODUCTION, LAND AREA, AND YIELDS, 1934-1990.
Year Production (1000s of Tons) Area (1000s of Hectares) Yield
(Tons/Ha)
1934# 225 27 8.3
1937-38« 285 67 4.2
1946*** 460 96 9.0
1948**** 487 102 4.8
1949**** 538 115 4.7
1950 360 39 9.2
1951 550 56 9.8
1952 600 61 9.8
1953 610 58 10.5
1954 650 62 10.5
1955 580 56.2 10.3
1956 624 55.2 11.3
1957 682 60.7 11.2
1958 566 74.5 7.6
1959 785 94.5 8.3
1960 653 79.6 8.2
1961 551 76.5 7.2
1962 872 103.8 8.4
1963 572 72.4 7.9
1964 867 102.0 8.5
1965 762 90.7 8.4
1966 760 95.0 8.0
1967 800 95.2 8.4
1968 950 115.8 8.2
1969 850 101.2 8.4
1970 913 106.1 8.6
1971 869 88.3 9.8
1972 823 89.5 9.2
1973 1030 98.6 10.5
1974 1012 92.0 11.0
1975 1320 110.0 12.0
1976 1516 125.0 12.0
1977 1608 130.0 12.4
1978 1995 141.6 14.1
1979 2065 151.0 13.7
1980 1727 142.0 12.2
1981 2105 160.0 13.2
1982 2149 165.2 13.0
1983 2234 161.3 13.9
1984 2319 165.2 14.0
1985 1880 153.1 12.3
1986 2091 156.0 13.4
1987 2355 161.6 14.6
1988 2659 165.7 16.1
1989 2698 172.5 15.6
1990 2464 161.4 15.3
of Agriculture (March 1992), Bogoti: Computer print out #2.
♦PRO, Foreign Office. "Economic Section of the Annual Report on Colombia for 1935." (18 May 1937) Commercial 
Secretariat in Bogota citing 1934 crop census largely estimated and compiled by municipal authorities, F0371.20624, Registry 
Number A4084/2851/11.
♦♦Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1937 (1938). Bogoti: Contraloria General de la Republica, p. 134.
♦♦♦Anuario General de Estadistica Colombia 1946 (1949). Bogoti: Contraloria General de la Republica, p.viii.
♦♦♦♦Estudio Sobre las Condiciones Del Desarrollo de Colombia (1958) Bogoti: Presidencia de la Republica, Comiti Nacional 
de Planeacion, p. 148.
Note: The data from 1950 to 1957 originated from data compiled by Jay Atkinson and are considerably higher than the rest 
which were derived from official sources such as the Ministry of Agriculture and FEDEPAPA.
Appendix I\2
AREA CULTIVATED AND YIELDS BY DEPARTMENT , 1979-1990 
AREA CULTIVATED (in 1000S), YIELDS (tons/ha)
Depart 
ment: ..
Antioqu
ia Boyaca
(.'aid
as
('auc
a
Cun
dina
marc
a
Nari
no
N.
de
Sant
ande
r
Sant
ande
r
Toli
ma
Year: Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield
1979 13.8 12.7 41.2 16.1 7 12.3 2.1 12 36 15.1 27 7.7 5.5 11.1 2.5 13 8.3 14
1980 14.2 12.7 39.5 11.3 6.2 11.3 2.9 13.2 32 13.2 30 11.2 4.6 12 2.3 14.1 6.9 13.1
1981 14.6 12.7 43.6 14.2 7 11 4 12 37.6 14 30.5 13 6 12 3.8 11.2 9.5 11.7
!982 13.6 11 52 14.5 4.5 9.11 3.5 10.6 48.1 14.5 22 11.5 4.8 9.5 4.4 9.5 7.7 10.5
1983 17.1 10.8 48.5 15.2 3 10.3 3 10.3 50.7 15.3 19 12.7 4.9 9.3 4 9.9 7.9 9.5
1984 17.5 16.4 50.2 15 3.1 12.4 1.7 13.8 51 17.2 19.8 13.3 4.5 14 3.9 12.4 5.3 13.8
1985 15.7 16.4 38 13.4 1.9 12.7 1.1 12 46.4 14.7 23.5 11.6 5.8 14.7 3 12.5 2.2 13.3
1986 13 15.3 43.5 13 2.2 11.5 2.2 9.2 53 13.8 27 13.6 7 12 4 11.9 2 11.8
1987 16.4 16.1 40.8 13.2 2.7 12 2 12 53.5 14.4 29 15 8.4 14.7 5 12.7 1.8 13
1988 16.9 16.4 41.7 13.6 3.3 12.1 3.3 12 59.9 15.6 31.5 14.8 12 14.6 5.1 12.7 2.7 13.4
1989 18.6 10.9 37.5 >4.3 1.9 11.4 6.3 15.8 60.4 16.1 34.5 15.9 3.1 16.2 5.1 14.3 2.8 13
1990 18.6 16.7 37.8 13 1.8 10 5.1 18 54.4 15.7 26.4 16.9 4.4 17.4 4.6 17.5 6 11.7
Departamento Nacional de Dlancacion, Unidad dc Esiudios Agrarios; Cifras del Sector Acropccnario 1980. (1981). Bogota: Minstcrio dc Agricultura, pp.133-134.
Appendix P.3
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL AREA BY 
TYPE OF LAND OWNERSHIP: BOYACA (ha)., 1988
Size of APU (ha) Total Owned Land Rented Land Share-cropping Colonists More than one 
Form
Total Hectares 1883658 1620644 28040 39403 3053 77419
0 > 1 .8 .8 1.5 .9 .1 .4
1 > 3 5.5 5.5 10.5 7.7 0 5.6
3 > 5 6.5 6.5 12.7 7.1 0 8.4
5 > 10 12.1 12.1 16.6 14.4 0 17.3
10 >  20 15.5 15.7 10.6 15.2 0 22.8
20 >  50 22.5 23 33.2 28.1 0 25.2
50 >  100 15.5 16.2 14.9 0 99.9 16.8
100 >  200 9.9 9.6 0 26.6 0 3.5
200 >  500 8.3 6.6 0 0 0 0
500 and up 3.4 3.9 0 0 0 0
Source: Primera Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Bovaca. (1990). Bogota: Ministerio de
Agricultura, table 4, p.37.
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL AREA BY 
TYPE OF LAND OWNERSHIP: CUNDINAMARCA (ha), 1988.
Size of APU Total Owned Land Rented Land Share-cropping Colonists More than one 
Form
Total Hectares 2278316 1927085 94943 6721 5898 120402
0 > 1 .9 .8 1.2 1.9 .4 .6
1 > 3 4.6 4.5 5.1 16.7 2.6 3.1
3 > 5 5.0 4.8 5.0 13 5.6 5.6
5 > 10 10 9.4 11.4 10.6 7.4 14.9
10 >  20 13.3 12.5 14.2 40.6 56.3 21.4
20 > 50 18.5 17.8 22.2 17.2 19.4 15.5
50 >  100 12.3 12.6 6.4 0 0 14.1
100 >  200 13.5 14.2 13.5 0 8.3 2.5
200 > 500 12.4 12.4 21. 0 0 19.2
500 and up 9.5 11 0 0 0 3.1
ource: Primera Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria: Cundinamarca ( 1990), Bogota: Ministerio
Agricultura, table 4, p.37.
Appendix P.4
FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION IN COLOMBIA, 1960-1987.
Year Total
Consu
mption
of
Fertiliz
ers
(Thom
as
data)
Year Total 
Consum 
ption of 
Fertilizer 
s (tons)*
Internal
Production
of
Fertilizers
*
Internal
prod.fert as a
% of total
consumption
*
1960/6
1
53,500 -- -
1964/6
5
161,243 - -
1971 479,00
0
1969/7
0
140,606 57,800 41%
1975 565,80
0
1973/7
4
270,600 154,900 57%
1981 661,00
0
1982/8
3
312,300 90,300 29%
1984/8
5
362,900 80,700 22%
1986/8
7
421,000 113,000 27%
ucted from CE1PAL. Anuario Estadistico de Am6rica Latina: 1"homas (1986), 0 ]
p. 165, based on data citing OPSA, DNP, and the World Bank. 
*CEPAL figures.
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